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DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY 
NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL 
1 UNIVERSITY CIR 
MONTEREY CA 93943-5000 IN REPLY REFER TO: 
The Naval Postgraduate School and Office of Naval Research were 
pleased to host the Professional Military Education for the 21st Century Warrior 
Conference in January 1998. An impressive group of top-ranking legislators, 
academicians, historians, and military education community leaders came 
together at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey to present and discuss 
the history, current status, and future of professional military education (PME). 
The conference presentations and panel discussions, transcripts of which 
are included in this proceedings book, raised and proposed solutions to some of 
thr: ,~hallenges that face those in the military education community. The overall 
tontJ of conference participants indicated that, while PME has improved 
significantly as a result of Goldwater-Nichols legislation and the Skelton Panel 
recommendations, there is still work to be done. 
Those of us in the PME community have a profound responsibility to 
begin efforts required to refine and focus our current PME system, thus enabling 
it to produce the educated military professionals that will lead America's fighting 
forces into the 21st century. For as Congressman Skelton, in the words of Sir 
William Francis Butler, reminded us: 
"The nation that will insist on drawing a broad line of demarcation between 
the fighting man and the thinking man is liable to have its fighting done by 
fools and its thinking done by cowards." 






DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY 
OFFICE OF NAVAL RESEARCH 
800 NORTH QUINCY STREET 
ARLINGTON. VA 22217-5660 IN REPLY REFER TO 
I was pleased to co-sponsor and participate in the Professional Military 
Education for the 21st Century Warrior Conference held in January at the Naval 
Postgraduate School. At the Office of Naval Research, we view investment in the 
education of our military decision-makers as important an endeavor as the direct 
investment we make in the science and technology that supports the warrior. 
The conference pursued an ambitious agenda with perceptive attendees who 
represent the driving force in PME. The conference was fast-paced; discussion was 
lively and represented serious insight and vision on PME issues, challenging those 
who will shape the educational process of our future military. 
The enclosed proceedings reflect the progress in the development and 
implementation of PME, and the current view of the direction it should take in the 
future. I was particularly interested in the discussion over keeping our warfighters 
technically current enough to make sound decisions throughout their careers. The 
conference and these proceedings provide pause for reflection and further analysis in 
this most important area. We must continue to challenge ourselves to set new 
horizons for our future forces. 
PAULG.GAFFNEY, II 
Rear Admiral, USN 
Chief of Naval Research 
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Background and Objectives 
Military Education for the 
21st Century Warrior 
A Conference Sponsored by the 
Naval Postgraduate School 
and the 
Office of Naval Research 
15 - 16 January 1998 
Monterey, California 
How did the military educational system evolve 
to its present state? 
How has implementing the recommendations from the Skelton 
Panel on military education affected the Services? 
Within what sort of national security environment will military 
education perform its function in the future? 
What are the overarching issues for military education in the 21st Century? 
What kind of officer will we need to dominate the 
future operating environment? 
What are the infrastructure requirements for creating and sustaining 
a learning organization to support the future force? 
What are Congressman Skelton' s observations on professional 
military education a decade after the Skelton Panel Report? 
How, when, and where is technology integrated into the continuum 
of military education? 
What are the salient legislative issues associated with military 
education for the 21st Century warrior? 
Where do we go from here? 
xi 
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Historical Review of the Goldwater-Nichols Legislation and the Skelton 
Panel Recommendations 
Question. How did the military educational system evolve to the present state? 
Objective. This session reviews the development of the military education 
system: its areas of emphasis, its infrastructure, and the underlying 
philosophical and pedagogical basis of the evolution. 
Implementing the Skelton Panel's Recommendations and Identifying 
Dimensions of Importance for the Future of Military Education: Service 
Insights 
Question. How has implementing the recommendations from the Skelton Panel 
on military education affected the Services? 
Objective. This session provides an opportunity for each Service to present 
issues that 
a. arose as they implemented the Goldwater-Nichols legislation and 
the Skelton Panel recommendations, and 
b. the Service deems sufficiently important to warrant inclusion in 
framing the debate associated with educating the officer of the 
21st Century. 
Human Capital: Joint Operations of the Future 
The Future Operating Environment 
Question. Within what sort of national security environment will military 
education perform its function in the future? 
Objective. This session attempts to estabHsh a framework to bridge the near 
and far-term national security environment perspectives. The 
far-term perspective may be driven by prevailing large-scale political, 
economic, social, technological, and demographic trends, but the 
near-term perspective will driven by the findings of five recent 
planning documents. Those documents are: 
a. the National Defense Panel Report, 
b. the Defense Reform Initiative, 
c. the Quadrennial Defense Review, 
d. the General Accounting Office Report entitled Future Years 
Defense Program: DoD's 1998 Plan Has Substantial Risk in 
Execution (GAO/NSIAD-98-26 of October 1997), and 
e. the Congressional Budget Office's Report on the Future Years 





Overarching Issues for Military Education in the Post-Cold War Era. 
Question. What has this conference accomplished thus far? 
Objective. This introduction will identify the overarching issues that surfaced 
during the Conference's first day. No particular position will be 
advocated, but the dimensions of future discourse are articulated. 
These dimensions may be the 
a. relationships among undergraquate education, graduate 
education, PME, and JPME, 
b. relationships between the art of war and the science of war, 
c. relationships among Service perspectives regarding military 
education, and 
d. the relative weight given to the study of history, policy, doctrine, 
strategy, and technology along the continuum of a military 
education. 
Human Capital: What kind of officers do we need for the 21st Century, how 
do we get them, and what kind of organization will best 
support them? 
Question. What kind of officer will we need? 
Objective. This session focuses on the desired qualities of mind and character 
- the "cultivated intelligence" - this nation's military officers will 
need to dominate the operational environment of the 21st Century. 
The session begins to identify the nature of an educational process 
that will produce the intelligence and the propensity to innovate, 
integrate, and inculcate technological advances in matters of policy, 
strategy, and doctrine. 
JPME for the 21st Century 
Friday, 16January1998 
Session 6:· Supporting the Growth of Military Human Capital: Infrastructure 
Requirements for Creating and Sustaining a Leaming Organization. 
Session 7: 
Question. What are the infrastructure requirements for creating and sustaining 
a learning organization to support the future force? 
Objective. Focus on and identify the characteristics of future educational 
systems needed to deliver professional military education, the role 
technology will play in those systems, and the resource commitment 
necessary to create and sustain them. 
Observations on Professional Military Education a Decade after the Skelton 
Panel Report 
xiii 
Session 8: Integrating Policy, Strategy, Technology, and Doctrine 
Question. How, when, and where is technology integrated into the continuum of 
military education? 
Objective. Identify instances that highlight the need for the military educational 
system to more adequately prepare officers to integrate emerging 
technology into evolving strategy, policy, and doctrine. 
Lunch: Human Capital: Technology in Systems 
Session 9: Congressional Panel 
Question: What Professional Military Education issues are important from a 
legislative perspective? 
Objective: Legislators seek to articulate and discuss the salient issues about 
military education for the 21st Century warrior. 
Session 10: The Conference: A Recapitulation 
Concluding Remarks: Where do we go from here? 
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SESSION ONE 
Historical Review of Goldwater-Nichols Legislation 
and the Skelton Panel Recommendations 
Question: How did the military educational system evolve up to the Goldwater -
Nichols Act and the Skelton Panel recommendations? 
Objective: 1. Review the development of the military education system up to the 
Goldwater- Nichols Act and the Skelton Panel's recommendations. 
2. Cover the areas of emphasis, the system's infrastructure, and the 
underlying philosophical and pedagogical basis of the evolution. 
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Thank you very much, Admiral Gaffney, and good morning. Happy New Year 
and welcome to the sunny, beautiful Monterey Peninsula. I welcome you here 
because this is a very special place in the United States and in the history our 
country. 
The California Constitution was drafted here in Monterey, setting the stage 
for California to become the 30th state of the Union. In the 148 years since that 
constitution was adopted, California has grown to become the sixth largest 
economy in the world. With 32 million people, I think it's the first place on earth 
where we're really experiencing a multicultural democracy. The challenges that the 
State of California face are driving forces of the country and of the world. So it's 
really appropriate that you come not only to California, but to the place where 
California government began. 
I also welcome you because of what you're discussing -- Military Education 
for the 21st Century Warrior. I can't think of a better place to discuss that topic. Not 
only because the Naval Postgraduate School is here - and it's one of the finest 
educational facilities in the country - but it is surrounded by many other great 
educational institutions. 
NPS alone offers over 40 different study programs, as you heard from the 
Superintendent, for over 1600 students. NPS provides advanced instruction in 
subjects ranging from engineering and oceanography, to logistics and national 
security studies. The students and faculty conduct leading-edge research in such 
fields as laser-optics, mine detection, and computer sim·u1ation. This school is a 
key part of our military, doing unique work in advanced research and instruction, 
much of which is not done anywhere else in the military. 
One stand-out example of Naval Postgraduate School work is in its Center 
for Civil-Military Relations. Many local people don't even know that this program 
brings officers and civilians to the United States from around the world, teaching 
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them how a military should operate in a democratic society. For newly democratic 
nations, this instruction is absolutely critical. I have to tell you, as a former Peace 
Corps volunteer who lived in Latin America, I really enjoy the exchange with these 
officers who are seeing not only how provincial government works in Sacramento, 
but how our federal government works in Washington. 
During the Gulf War, the Naval Postgraduate School provided critical 
support to our military, giving briefings on military strategy to officers in the field. It 
analyzed the effects of sand and wind on military equipment, and provided 
advanced computer technology to foster more efficient logistics. 
This school works with other military facilities around the Bay. Not only has 
the State of California invested in this region, but the federal government has as 
well, including the military. We located the Defense Language Institute here in 
Monterey, in 1946. One of the foremost language schools in the country, its faculty 
teaches 21 languages to over 3,000 students each year. Its over 800 instructors 
teach language an average of 20 hours a week. 
We have the Navy's Fleet Numerical Weather Center here - DoD's weather 
prediction, research, and tracking organization. Some of the most advanced 
weather science in the world is done there, not to mention its significant 
participation in the international discussion of the effects of El Nino and global 
warming. The greatest concentration of weather science and application anywhere 
in the United States outside of the city of Washington D. C. is right here in 
Monterey. 
The Defense Finance and Accounting Service offices located at former Fort 
Ord are part of the largest finance and accounting system in the world. Its 
"Operation Mongoose" is a unique program which has successfully tracked and 
prevented abuse of our military pension system. 
But when you're here in Monterey, you're not just at the Naval Postgraduate 
School. You're here in a region, and this region is leveraging itself by investing in 
all three segments of higher education: the Community College system, the 
California state system, and the University of California system. All of those have 
campuses here. There are about four community colleges in this region. 
The Naval Postgraduate School works with all of these institutions, and 
particularly with the Monterey Institute of International Studies (MllS) - a private, 
for-profit institute located here in Monterey that spun off from Defense Language 
Institute. It is one of the foremost educational institutions in the world, teaching 
civilians how to do business in foreign countries, in their own languages. I'm very 
excited to see that the president of that school, General Bob Gard, is here today. I 
hope that you'll have a chance to interact with Bob, because MllS received a lot of 
federal money to get it where it is today. His Center for Nonproliferation Studies is 
doing great things here in Monterey. 
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The federal and state government is well invested in this region. Most of 
those investments are in education-related concerns. During the next couple of 
days, I hope we'll discuss how you develop the soldier of the 21st century using a// 
the educational resources that are available to the military, including civilian 
schools. 
Not that I agree with the idea that you ought to get the graduate education at 
some other institution and close the military postgraduate process. I think that 
would be inappropriate. I think what's appropriate is getting the kind of education 
that one gets here at the Naval Postgraduate School, and utilizing all the other 
resources to collaborate in interchange and access. 
If you add up all the faculty in Monterey's educational institutions - all the 
marine scientists, and we have more marine scientists than any other place in the 
United States, including Scripps - we have a faculty equivalency of New York, or 
Boston, or Los Angeles, or San Francisco, or London, or any of the great 
educational centers of the world. 
In short, the Naval Postgraduate School is a critical part of this area, a 
critical part of our military education system. I hope that today's conference fosters 
discussion among some of the great experts in military education, including 
officers, scholars, analysts and, indeed, members of Congress. 
I've served in Congress now for five years. I spent part of my first year on 
the Armed Services Committee, where I got to be a good friend with Ike Skelton. I 
was serving on a subcommittee when he chaired it. I'm delighted to see this 
conference is bringing the greatest concentration of members of Congress that 
have come here as a group since I've been in Congress. As always, when we need 
help, we're assisted by Leon Panetta, who's retired and lives here, teaching at 
California State University of California Monterey Bay. 
I look forward to the discussion on the nature of our future soldier, and I 
hope that we not only learn what kind of education is necessary to win future wars, 
but that we'd better understand the importance of education for our nation's future 
security. That requires congressional investment in education, and I think that is 
your biggest challenge. To lobby for the conclusions you've come to, to deliver 
them to the Hill and get them funded is going to take teamwork. I stand as a 
champion of that team. In the end, we must remember that it's not just muscle that 
wins wars -- it's also brains. 
Thank you very much and welcome to Monterey. 
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THE HONORABLE SAM FARR 
17th Congressional District, California 
Sam Farr, a Democrat, represents the 17th Congressional District of California, which 
includes all of Monterey County, San Benito County and a large portion of Santa Cruz 
County. Agriculture, tourism, education, and commercial fishing form the economic 
underpinnings of the District. 
Congressman Farr serves on two key House committees: Agriculture and Resources. 
Since taking office, he has made economic revival and the creation of new jobs in the 
17th District his top priority. So far, Sam Farr has provided an economic stimulus by 
obtaining $44 million in defense conversion funds to start a new California State 
University at Fort Ord and a federal commitment to hire hundreds of employees for a 
new Defense Department finance center to be located at the base's closed hospital. 
Congressman Farr also saved 300 jobs by stopping the closure of the Social Security 
Administration's Salinas Data Operations Center. Sam Farr has been recognized as an 
"Environmental Hero" by the League of Conservation Voters, garnering a perfect voting 
record in its 1996 ratings, and has been given perfect voting scores by the Center for 
Marine Conservation and Children's Defense Fund. He was named 1996 Legislator of the 
Year by the American Planning Association. 
Before coming to the House of Representatives, Sam Farr served 12 and one-half years in 
the California State Assembly, being re-elected six times with overwhelming majorities. 
As a member of the Assembly, Sam Farr chaired the Assembly Local Government 
Committee as well as the Committee on Economic Development and New Technologies 
and was a member of the standing committees on Education, Natural Resources and 
Finance and Insurance. He is recognized as a leader in legislative efforts for educational 
excellence, environmental protection, economic development, and new technologies. His 
accomplishments include passage of laws to expand and develop the State Park system, 
to stop offshore oil drilling and hold polluters fully financially responsible for oil spill 
damages, to give businesses incentives to develop new technologies for environmental 
cleanup, to place computers in public school classrooms and to study the impacts of 
defense conversion on the state's economy. Sam Farr has been named Legislator of the 
Year nine times. 
Sam Farr began his career in public service in 1964 with a two-year commitment in the 
Peace Corps in Colombia, South America. Sam Farr graduated from Willamette 
University in Salem, Oregon with a Bachelor of Science degree in Biology in 1963 and 
attended the Monterey Institute of International Studies and the University of Santa 
Clara. He is fluent in Spanish. 
A fifth-generation Californian, Sam Farr was born on the 4th of July, 1941. He is a long-
time resident of Carmel, California and is married to Shary Baldwin Farr. The Farrs have 
one grown daughter, Jessica. 
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THOMAS C. HONE 
Center for Naval Analyses 
Dr. Hone is presently an analyst and project director at the Center for Naval Analyses. 
From 1994-1997 he was on the faculty of George C. Marshall Center for European 
Security Studies, Garmisch, Germany, where he designed and conducted seminars and 
courses for officials from the former Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact countries. Prior to 
that he served as Special Assistant to the Commander, Naval Air Systems Command. 
From 1988-1992 he was a faculty member, Defense Systems Management College, Ft. 
Belvoir, VA. While holding this post, he also served as a team leader for the Gulf War 
Air Power Survey, a study of the air campaign in Desert Storm commissioned and 
financed by the Secretary of the Air Force. He has also worked as a consultant to private 
business firms with Booz-Allen, Hamilton, Inc. and taught classes at the Naval War 
College,_ NeWPort, RI. 
He received his Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Wisconsin in 1973, and 
is a 1988 graduate of the Program Managers Course, Defense Systems Management 
College, Ft. Belvoir, VA. 
Among his performance awards are the Navy Meritorious Civilian Service Medal, and 
the Air Force Exceptional Civilian Service Award. Awards for writing include the E.S. 
Miller Prize (Naval War College), E.J. Eller Prize (Naval Historical Foundation), and 
Moncado Prize (American Military Institute). 
Dr. Hone has published many articles and essays in various journals. He has written a 
book, Power and Change: The Administrative History of the Office of the Chief of Naval 
Operations, 1946-1986. He is co-author of Managing Command and Control in the 
Persian Gulf Conflict, and is co-editor of Anglo-American Liberalism. 
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Professionalizing Command, Professional Military Education, 
and Military Doctrine 
by 
Dr. Thomas C. Hone 
Since the passage of the Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 
(Goldwater-Nichols), the Congress of the United States has encouraged (some 
might say "pressured") the military services to develop joint operational doctrines. At 
the same time, influential members of Congress have pushed for improvements in 
the 'professional military education' of officers. These two pressures have 
sometimes merged. That is, advocates of improved professional military education 
programs have assumed that better programs would also be more 'joint," and that 
enrolling officers in those programs would inevitably improve joint doctrine. 
This paper questions the latter assumption. It does so by considering the 
history of the United States Navy's Naval War College since 1911. I believe that a 
survey of the War College's history shows that the faculty and leaders of the War 
College have developed four primary models of professional military education since 
1911. The first three of these models were largely complementary; that is, the two 
later ones tended to build on the concepts that underlay the earlier one. The fourth 
model, created after 1972, was very different, but it has also been judged a success 
and used as the standard against which to measure progress in the improvement of 
the Army and Air Force war colleges. But is this model, based on the changes made 
after 1972, adequate as a tool to promote the development of joint warfighting 
doctrine? That is, can the Naval War College model, in its latest manifestation, do 
what some members of Congress want it to do? I believe that, in the case of the 
Naval War College, the answer to these questions is no, and I will explain why that is 
so in the paragraphs which follow. 
To make this explanation, I need to show that the first three models of 
professional military education developed at the Naval War College in this century 
were both complementary and sound. The argument is best made historically; that 
is, by laying out the progression of models used to guide the curriculum and the 
purpose of the War College. Then I need to explain why those models lost their 
utility. 
The first model is that of the professional naval commander. By this I do not 
mean the professional naval officer, or the professional sailor. I mean instead 
someone who is a professional in the practice of commanding naval forces. When 
this model was adopted at the Naval War College in 1911, it was revolutionary. 
"Command" was thought to be an art, peculiar to the temperament and intellect of 
the commander himself. There were many models of successful fleet commanders 
(such as Britain's Admiral Horatio Nelson), and their careers were the objects of 
study in institutions such as the United States Naval Academy in Annapolis, 
Maryland. But to say that the process of commanding squadrons or fleets of ships 
was, like commanding a ship itself, a profession, and that naval officers needed to 
be schooled in the command of fleets, was novel. 
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How was this model taught? First, by instructing officers in a standard means 
of analyzing combat at sea. With such a common thread of analysis, officers would 
use the same ideas and the same terms. The goal was to give them the basis for 
rapid, clear discussion and communication in wartime. Were this goal achieved, 
then coordination would be easier and achieved faster, and the potential for 
misunderstandings among officers and between superiors and subordinates would 
be reduced. The second element of this new curriculum was the use of a standard 
order form. Again, the goal was to facilitate clear communication to reduce the 
chance of error. Finally, war games were used to allow officers to practice giving 
and interpreting orders, and to test the doctrine that was the foundation of fleet 
actions. These were the three elements of a system of professional naval command 
called the "applicatory system." 
Note the term "system" - not "art" or "science," but "system." A system is 
something that you can teach, because it is an ordered process governed by rules. 
But it is not a bureaucratic routine. It is not a rulebook. Indeed, this "applicatory 
system" was deliberately designed to prevent senior commanders from giving 
detailed instructions to subordinates. As historian Ronald Spector noted in his 
history of the Naval War College, the adoption of the applicatory system "meant 
acceptance of the principle that subordinates should be granted wide discretion ... 
and make decisions at their level of responsibility with only very general guidance 
from their superiors. "1 This system meant to replace orders as the link between 
seniors and subordinates with doctrine, and the doctrine would first be tested in war 
games. 
The adoption of this model had profound implications for the United States 
Navy. It rested on the assumption that direct, immediate control of large naval 
forces was impractical. A senior commander could direct the forces under his 
command, but his control over them would be more a matter of their carrying out 
doctrine than following his instructions. Instead of the forcF commander ordering 
individual ships to steam at specific speeds on specific courses, the commander 
would say, ''Your responsibility is to reach such-and-so position by such-and-such 
time," or, ''Your responsibility is to support the flagship in the engagement without 
obstructing the fire of friendly ships." Moreover, such orders would not be sent by a 
fleet or task force commander to an individual ship during an engagement. Instead, 
prior to an engagement, the force commander would exercise his responsibility by 
explaining his objectives, his plan to achieve those objectives, and his view of the 
doctrine that would apply. His subordinates would then issue their own orders as 
part of a coordinated effort to turn his guidance into action. 
As historian John Gooch has reminded us, that is the definition of military 
doctrine: "the bridge between thought and action. 112 The goal of the Naval War 
College in 1911 was to turn the U.S. Navy's concept of command away from detailed 
instructions and toward the development of doctrine. It aimed to focus on the 
"bridge." In this it succeeded, and it did so despite the invention of radio. As my 
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colleague Peter Swartz has observed, radio held out the promise of tighter control by 
a fleet commander, and even direct control of forces at sea from a command post 
ashore. But radio was a two-edged sword; it could easily be used too often, and the 
Navy therefore needed to develop a doctrine for communications before and during 
battle. 
But what was doctrine - the bridge between thought and action - to support? 
What was the proper way of thinking for fleet commanders? Answering that 
question led to the development of the second model of professional military 
education for the Naval War College: the senior officer as campaign planner. As 
Admiral William S. Sims, War College President in the years immediately after World 
War I, put it, ''The War College should be made the principal asset of the Navy." 
This was an audacious claim - that the War College, in peacetime, was in fact the 
heart of the Navy. But Sims was adamant. In his view, the Navy, no matter what its 
strength, would fail unless it were led by a cadre of officers skilled in campaign 
planning and in implementing such plans. He went so far as to argue that "no officer 
not a War College graduate [should] be assigned to any important position, either 
ashore or afloat. .. 3 For Sims, doctrine had to be rooted in campaign plans. Such 
plans had to be anchored, in tum, in strategic thinking, or at least thinking at the 
theater level. And there was no better way to prepare officers for thinking at the 
theater or strategic level than through war games. 
Sims' emphasis on war games led to a blossoming of simulations and games 
at the Naval War College in the early 1920's. His emphasis on games provided 
support to the fledgling Office of the Chief of Naval Operations. The latter developed 
a war plans division, but this division never had more than ten or twelve officers. 
Hence it relied on the results of games played on the large, blue-tiled game floors of 
the War College. The War College games, however, were only one part of a multi-
phase process that pioneered many doctrinal and tactical innovations in the U.S. 
Navy before World War II. Ideas that seemed worthwhile to the war planners were 
tested in games. The more promising were then forwarded to the staff of the 
commander-in-chief of the United States Fleet and to subordinate staffs. These 
staffs were the source of proposals for the annual fleet exercises. In effect, ideas, 
doctrine, and command procedures that were developed first in War College games 
were then tested in major exercises. Then the results of these exercises were 
circulated to the War College faculty and students, the war planners in the Office of 
the Chief of Naval Operations, and also to the bureaus of the Navy responsible for 
weapons development and ship design. 
This continuous, rolling cycle of planning-to-games-to exercises-to acquisition 
was instrumental in allowing the U.S. Navy to develop its air arm in the 1920's. In 
1924, the Navy had one experimental aircraft carrier, the converted collier Langley. 
This "experiment" operated twelve aircraft at most. In 1925, Captain Joseph M. 
Reeves, an officer who had watched aviation concepts tested at the War College 
and also served as a member of the tactics faculty, took command of the fleet's 
aviation squadrons. Under his leadership, Langley stopped being an experiment 
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and became an operational carrier, with 36 (and eventually 42) operational aircraft. 
At the same time, the Navy's Bureau of Aeronautics was pressing ahead with the 
development and procurement of rugged, powerful aircraft for use on carri~·~s. As 
ideas from fleet exercises flowed back to the War College, they were mar:· _ J with 
projections from the Bureau of Aeronautics. The result was a systematic study of 
the strike capability of aircraft carriers. 4 It was precisely this sort of interaction that 
Sims had hoped for. 
The third model adopted at the War College before World War II was that of 
the war planner. Campaign plans focus on a the.ater. War plans deal with directing 
the resources of the whole nation toward victory over another, enemy nation. This 
was the highest level of professional military education. Officers who were selected 
for this kind of preparation were judged capable of advising the president of the 
country in wartime. If campaign games were the tool to prepare officers to serve on 
the staffs that would wage a Pacific campaign against the forces of Imperial Japan, 
then the study of strategy was the technique for preparing officers to lead forces 
fighting modern, total war. It was not clear at the time just what was the best method 
to study strategy, but the goal of this model was clear: to prepare senior officers 
Ounior officers were not eligible for this instruction) for command at the national 
(versus theater) level. 5 
Indeed, by the end of the 1930s, the U.S. Navy had developed a "ladder'' of 
education that it hoped would produce officers capable of responding to the different 
challenges that went with the different levels of naval command. The first rung on 
the ladder was the Naval Academy, first accredited as an academic institution in 
1931. The purpose of the Academy was to produce educated officers -- young men 
who understood what formal education was and who accepted the idea that formal 
education was essential to their development as officers. The second rung on the 
ladder was the junior course at the Naval War College, established in 1924. Though 
the junior course later copied the course offered to more senior officers, it was 
initialty focused on tactics and doctrine. The third rung was the senior course at the 
Naval War College, which combined lessons in· how to command naval forces with 
experience in mock campaign planning. The fourth rung, the "advanced" course at 
the Naval War College, was created in 1933. It was an attempt to prepare officers 
for command at the national level. Through the second, third, and fourth "rungs" of 
this comprehensive "ladder," there ran one common theme: the need for doctrine to 
form the basis of the command and coordination of naval forces. 
But what was this doctrine? The founders of the Naval War College in the late 
19th century would have understood it: gain control of the sea and then use it for 
some other, larger purpose in war (such as blockading an enemy nation or 
assaulting it from the sea). For decades, "gain control of the sea" meant "defeating 
the enemy's main battle force," and so the central idea of the Navy's doctrine 
spawned other, logically subsidiary doctrines, rather as a large river spreads its 
muddy tentacles through a delta where it drains into the ocean. Imperial Japan, the 
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"Great Britain" of the Far East, was particularly vulnerable to these doctrines once 
they were put into effect. 
But the act of putting these doctrines into effect changed the way in which 
doctrine was created. Before World War II, the staff of the commander-in-chief of 
the United States Fleet was too small to serve as a source of doctrine. During the 
war, however, fleet staffs grew larger and gained more and more responsibility. The 
creation of doctrine became a fleet responsibility, not that of the Naval War College. 
Moreover, once both Japan and Germany had been defeated, the War College did 
not regain its role as the primary source of strategic ideas and advances in naval 
doctrine. World War II had produced a revolution in the Navy's organization. Both 
the naval staff (the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, or OPNAV) and the 
multiple fleet staffs (including the type commanders) had grown in size and 
sophistication. Just as important for the process of creating doctrine was the shift to 
a ''forward deployed" Navy during the Cold War. 
As historian Michael Palmer has shown in his study of what might be called 
"the first maritime strategy," the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations and the 
multiple fleet staffs (that is, the staffs for the Atlantic and Pacific fleets and for the 
numbered fleets) were the source of new strategies and doctrine. 6 The War 
College's role shifted from that of innovator to that of sometime educator of flag 
officers. Instead of being central to doctrinal, tactical or strategic innovation, the War 
College slipped to the periphery, and War College programs prepared officers for 
their more important roles in organizations like OPNAV or the fleet staffs. As Peter 
Swartz put it, ''The center of gravity of the Navy had shifted from those who thought 
about and practiced what they would do to those who prepared for and did what had 
to be done ... 7 
This changed somewhat in 1972, when Rear Admiral Stansfield Turner was 
appointed President of the Naval War College by Chief of Naval Operations Admiral 
E. R. Zumwalt, Jr. Zumwalt had been influenced strongly by the way the staff of the 
Secretary of Defense had used techniques such as systems analysis to manage the 
Defense Department, including the Navy. As Chief of Naval Operations, Zumwalt 
had created his own systems analysis branch within OPNAV. However, when it 
came to the Naval War College, he and Rear Admiral Turner chose to emphasize 
the study of strategy as well as (or even more than) the study of systems analysis 
techniques. 
Why? The answer lay in the need to give naval officers the tools to be 
successful in the Pentagon; where the management of national defense was 
increasingly accomplished through techniques and processes that had been 
borrowed from civilian (especially industrial) life, or created by a small corps of 
civilian analysts and intellectuals working in "think tanks" like the Rand Corporation. 
Naval officers needed to be familiar with these techniques and with the ways they 
were used in the management of national defense. At the same time, military 
officers needed to demonstrate that they could contribute to the development of 
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national strategy in a unique and valuable way. President John Kennedy had 
complained after the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962, for example, that his senior 
military advisors had not really demonstrated creative strategic {as opposed to 
military) thinking. Turner set out to prepare naval officers for roles where they would 
either {1) work with the leading civilians in the Pentagon in the management of the 
nation's military resources, or {2) advise the president and the Secretary of Defense 
on strategy. 
Under Turner's leadership, the faculty of the Naval War College developed a 
fourth model of professional military education for naval officers. One part of this 
model stressed decision-making in the Pentagon. Another part stressed the roots of 
strategy -- not just strategic ideas, but the sources of those ideas. As a 
consequence, the teachers of strategy in the Naval War College became most'· · 
civilian academicians and historians, and the strategy curriculum became a1, 
exercise in reading and understanding key episodes in military history. 
This was ~ break with the earlier models, because this new approach did not 
emphasize docL .• e. It assumed that doctrine was something officers learned at 
other institutions, such as operational fleet staffs, and this assumption was correct. 
In the 1930's, doctrine had been the thread linking early professional education with 
preparation for flag rank. By the early 1970's, admirals Zumwalt and Turner were 
worried less about doctrine than about the loss of influence on the part of senior 
military officers at the highest organizational levels of national defense. Turner, 
especially, felt there was a need to ground senior officers in the intellectual roots of 
strategy. He wanted them to be able to think and speak as national security 
strategists, not as representatives of separate military services or of unique military 
communities {such as naval aviation). 
Of course, there were reactions to this. One reaction was to focus on the lack 
of ethics training for senior officers. A later {and still ongoing) critique was that the 
war colleges {and not just the Naval Wa.- College, in particular) did not pay enough 
attention to the doctrinal implications of joint operations and to the intellectual and 
organizational keys to the success of joint military operations. A third concern was 
for innovation and new ideas. Senior admirals feared that the most promising junior 
officers lacked the time and the place to develop ideas that they could put into 
practice when they gained the rank of admiral. The Naval War College curriculum 
and organization were altered after Rear Admiral Turner's presidency to account for 
these concerns. 
But what about doctrine? Doctrine became the concepts that the deployed 
fleets developed, tested and then implemented. The deployment process itself 
became a laboratory and a school; officers learned and developed doctrine on fleet 
staffs and at sea. Because the Navy deployed to regions (especially the Western 
Pacific and the Mediterranean) where it was likely to fight, deployments assumed the 
function that the annual pre-World War II ''fleet problems" had performed. Preparing 
for and executing deployments became a mechanism of almost continuous change, 
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especially in tactics. The fleets prepared and tested concepts such as the 
Composite Warfare Concept (CWC); that was doctrine. 
But the Naval War College did not gain great influence over what might be 
called "strategic doctrine," either. Consider the "Maritime Strategy" of the mid-
1980s. Where did it come from? From the Navy staff, infused with the ideas of 
leaders such as chiefs of naval operations Admiral Thomas Hayward and Admiral 
James Watkins, and from the energy of an ambitious, aggressive Navy Secretary by 
the name of John Lehman. Though the "Maritime Strategy" was not doctrine, it was 
an operational concept with strong doctrinal implications - similar to the "Orange 
Plan" of the 1930s, which set the Navy and Marine Corps goal in a future war with 
Imperial Japan as a trans-Pacific, island-hopping campaign. The Maritime Strategy 
came along just as all the military services took a renewed interest in doctrine, and 
the Maritime Strategy met the standard of being a "bridge between thought and 
action." 
And that takes us to the really interesting part of this story. Where should 
doctrine come from now? The history of the Naval War College in the 20th century 
suggests an answer to this question. Remember that the model of professional 
military education put in place at the Naval War College matured as the concept of 
military command matured. Step 1 was to professionalize the practice of fleet 
command. Step 2 was to focus the War College on preparing officers for theater-
level command. Step 3 was to place in the War College program a section that 
prepared senior officers for the highest level of command - at the national level. All 
these efforts to create a sound program of professional military education paid off in 
World War II. One of the Navy's most important assets in that war was a cadre of 
staff officers who could plan and conduct a theater-level campaign. Once they 
undertook a deliberate offensive against Japan, they and the forces they marshaled 
and commanded were never stopped. 
But the war and its aftermath changed everything - the technology of naval 
warfare {to include nuclear weapons), the "enemy," the nature of Navy organization, 
the organization of national defense (in 1947 and 1949), and the role of the Navy in 
national defense. Under such circumstances, it is surprising that the Naval War 
College survived at all. The· Navy didn't need the War College as a source of 
doctrine or as an aid to the Navy staff. The Navy also didn't need the War College 
as a source of innovative concepts or plans. Admiral Sims' belief that the War 
College was the intellectual center of the Navy no longer held. But what is just as 
interesting is that the need for naval doctrine as the unifying intellectual thread of 
professional military education also seemed to fade away. The evidence that such a 
fading occurred is the success of Rear Admiral Turner's 1972 changes to the Naval 
War College curriculum. 
My point is that the history of the Naval War College before World War It is· 
the history of both professional military education and the process of 
professionalizing naval command. The two grew up together because the Naval 
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War College was the place where the process of professionalizing naval command 
was institutionalized. Professional naval command required doctrine, and so the 
War College played a key role in the development and propagation of doctrine. The 
great success of U.S. naval forces in World War II was proof that the process of 
professionalizing naval command had succeeded. The officers who were the 
products of that process went on to lead the Navy, and even the Joint Chiefs after 
the war. They bequeathed to their successors a range of apparently effective 
institutions (one of which was the Naval War College), a firm concept of professional 
naval command, and a "military-industrial complex" that could and did pioneer new 
military technology. 
Yet they also bequeathed the practice of deploying fleets prepared for war 
forward, in waters distant from the United States. Doctrine is now made in these 
fleets through operations and through the work-ups for deployment. The great 
success of the pre-World War II process created the fleets that displaced the Naval 
War College as the center of professionalism and doctrine development. So the 
Naval War College became (after World War II) a place where military officers were 
introduced to doctrine that was actually madr by someone else. In the 1920s and 
1930s, the Naval War College had been a problem-solving institution that 
concentrated on developing both ideas and doctrine. Granted, there were courses 
"students" had to take just to fill in gaps in their formal education, such as 
international law. But "students" and faculty were also part of an institution that was 
engaged in important processes, such as preparing campaign level planning staffs 
for the likely war with Imperial Japan, and linking tactical- and operational-level 
doctrines of naval warfare. 
All this went away after World War II. The Naval War College was, ironically, 
a victim of its own success. Both strategy and doctrine were developed increasingly 
in the fleets, although the War College continued to house officers whose work in 
fields like logistics and defense economics was valuable to officers manning fleet 
staffs. Admiral Turner, therefore, did not and could not give the Naval War College 
back its former mission in 1972. Instead, he gave it a new mission. He did not give 
it back its pre-World War II functions. He could not. Instead, he gave it functions 
which suited the times: (1) preparing naval officers to work successfully in the 
Pentagon, and (2) preparing those same officers to think at the broadest strategic 
levels. In short, he combined a truncated graduate program in business 
administration with an abbreviated course in military (not just naval) history. His goal 
was to produce intellectually sophisticated managers of national defense. 
Outstanding officers still "slipped by" the Naval War College course, however, 
because they could pick up critical command and planning skills (and doctrine) 
through fleet experience. · 
The "bottom line" is this: professional military education can be graduate 
level study, or preparation for serious staff work at the Pentagon, or a process of 
forming doctrines that facilitate effective military command. It can't be all three at 
once, certainly not over the time span of ten months. And it's not just a matter of 
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time. An institution designed to do what the Naval War College does now is not 
suited to develop doctrine. Navy leaders have a difficult time explaining to members 
of Congress, or to officers in the other services, that using the Naval War College as 
a model for the war colleges of the other services is not the way to develop new 
military doctrine - especially joint doctrine. The Naval War College is difftrent than it 
was before World War II. Since World War II, the Navy's professional and doctrinal 
heart has been in the deployed fleets. That situation can't be changed so long as 
the fleets deploy forward. 
The Navy, the Army, and the Air Force have responded to calls to reform their 
processes of professional military education with what are essentially minor changes 
to the curricula of their war colleges. These are not useless changes; quite the 
opposite. They amount to taking, with some variation, Admiral Turner's model for 
the Naval War College and applying it to the Army and Air Force war colleges. But 
these changes are also not what some members of Congress have had in mind. 
These members want to give professional military education a function like it had at 
the Naval War College after 1911 - the function of creating a new profession of 
military command, though now it's not naval command but joint command. Yet the 
Naval War College cannot do this. And any institution of professional military 
education modeled after the Naval War College will not be able to do it, either. 
Navy officers do not know quite how to explain this to members of Congress, 
because they do not want to say that the program and curriculum of the Naval War 
College have not been successes. Yet it is critical to distinguish professional military 
education, which can take many forms, from the process of changing the military 
profession - a process which was, as the history of the Naval War College shows, 
not at all the same as formal graduate education. A better understanding of the 
history of the Naval War College - an understanding which this paper has attempted 
to provide - may clear up some of this confusion and facilitate communication 
among all of those involved in the search for both improved professional military 
education and a changed military. 
But missing in this conclusion so far is the answer to my earlier question. 
What is the proper bridge between thought and action? The answer is doctrine. 
Doctrine is still closely intertwined with the nature of military command, and so 
efforts to change the latter and make it truly joint must influence the way the former 
is developed. But this is a fundamental undertaking, not the incidental by-product of 
improvements to professional military education. Put another way, "fixing" 
professional military education will not make the services joint, because making the 
services truly joint calls for fundamental changes in doctrine and in organization, and 
those changes will not come about when officers are sent through tailored programs 
of graduate formal education, especially in the Navy. Change in doctrine will come 
through joint exercises in which the deployed fleets participate. This is, in fact, what 
is happening. I think that it is inevitable, given the history of the Naval War College 
in the 20th century. 
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The PME panel was formally chartered by Chairman Les Aspin to: 
( 1) assess the ability of the then current DoD military education system to 
develop professional military strategists, joint war fighters and 
tacticians; and 
(2) review DoD plans for implementing the JPME requirements of the 
Goldwater-Nichols Act with a view toward assuring that this 
education provided the proper linkage between service competent 
officers and competent joint officers. 
A third purpose which was not in the charter but was implicitly included, in 
our view, was to examine the quality of military education. 
With charter in hand, the obvious question was, 'Which way to go?" The 
only way to make any sense of where we were headed was a systemic approach to 
self-education on PME. After all, none of the military staff members were experts 
on PME. We were its by-products. Our approach was: 
( 1) Conduct personal interviews with academic experts and renowned 
military leaders; 
(2) Conduct hearings at each of the schools (ISS/SSS) with panels of 
expert witnesses; 
(3) Conduct our own historical research; and 
( 4) Review service personnel assignment policies. 
We limited our study to service and joint intermediate and senior schools and 
education for general/flag officers for a specific reason. We believed the first time 
an officer should receive any substantial exposure to JPME was at the intermediate 
level. Before this, the officer's focus necessarily should be on his/her own service. 
We heard time and again, the most effective joint officers ought to bring to the table 
a solid grounding in their services' capabilities. Many also believed that general/flag 
officers were not being adequately prepared for joint command and staff 
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responsibilities. Before Goldwater-Nichols, Capstone was an optional course at 
NDU established in 1983. The panels' view, shared with Goldwater-Nichols, was 
that, with few exceptions, Capstone should be mandatory for all newly selected 
general/flag officers. 
I now want to spend time focusing on the three principle areas of the panel's 
effort: development of strategists, joint specialty officer education, and quality. 
A major portion of our effort was directed at assessing how well the current 
PME system encouraged strategic thinking and the development of strategists. Bu' 
first, we had to define what we were speaking about when discussing strategy. Ir, 
other words, what did we expect a strategist to do? What education did we think a 
strategist needed, and did the current system nurture strategic thinkers? Could they 
be developed, and if so, how? 
Strategy and strategic vision are difficult concepts to grasp. In 1988, 
Chairman Les Aspin accused the administration's strategy of "be everywhere and 
do everything" as a prescription for disaster. He felt there needed to be a shift in 
the emphasis of the debate from the weapons we buy to the strategy we employ to 
secure our national objectives. 
Strategy is the link that translates power into the achievement of objectives; 
whether it be national security strategy (using all the influences available to the 
nation), or national military strategy (employing the armed forces to achieve national 
objectives). 
Developing a cadre of officers who could conceptualize and articulate 
national military strategy to our civilian leadership and/or provide military advice is 
dependent upon at least three factors: 
(1) a comprehensive understanding of operational art (joint doctrine), 
(2) appropriate professional and academic education, and 
(3) personnel policies which ensure our most able officers are allowed to 
grow in experience and intellectual capacity. 
From a long Int of attributes the panel settled on four qualities which were 
most often mentioned as necessary in an individual destined to become a strategist 
or strategic thinker. He/she must be: 
( 1) analytical - have the ability to move beyond isolated facts or 
competency in a given subject area to see and develop 
interrelationships, 
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(2) pragmatic - able to understand emerging trends and able to react to 
them, having a keen sense of the art of the possible. 
(3) innovative. Strategies should be creative and challenge the status quo. 
Out of the box thinking, today's cliche, is a requisite. 
(4) broadly educated to appreciate trends in political, technological, 
economic, scientific and social issues, both domestic and international. 
The panel recognized a distinction between the theoretical strategist, a 
seldom found individual who can conceptualize and innovate, and the more 
common applied strategist, the practical problem solver who can think strategically. 
Nevertheless, well-educated military officers who can think strategically have an 
important contribution to make in the development of strategy, and there is an 
overwhelming need for PME as a whole to reinforce its contribution to strategic 
thinking. 
Where officers possess the talent, intellectual capacity, appropriate 
experience and relevant education, the PME system must be sufficiently capable of 
nurturing these individuals. How is this to· be accomplished? By first providing an 
officer a firm grasp of his own service, sister service, and joint commands. Second, 
by providing a clear understanding of tactics and operational art; and, finally, by 
providing an understanding of the relationship between the disciplines of history, 
international relations, political science and economics. The panel believed these 
were fundamental to developing strategists. 
In terms of structure, the panel believed that the entire PME system should 
be focused to provide an appropriate educational opportunity based upon an 
officer's time in service, experience and future career potential. The focus and 
structure would not only enhance the development of strategists, but would provide 
the correct template for educating officers not only in service-specific competencies, 
but in joint capabilities as well. 
The second focus of my discussion is joint educational requirements outlined 
in the Goldwater-Nichols Act, and how the panel addressed the issue. Once again, 
however, the panel was faced with a dilemma. At that time the Joint Staff, in our 
opinion, had not given a great deal of critical thought to the Goldwater-Nichols 
mandates. They had not thought through the educational requirements or, for that 
matter, what constituted a Joint Specialty Officer, and how this officer differed from 
his/her counterpart in a sister service. Some envisioned the JSO as the precursor 
to a German-style general staff. Others were adamantly opposed to this notion. 
The crux of the issue was whether or not the JSO could ever represent a 
unique, tangible quality in the planning and/or execution of joint combat operations. 
Was this expectation realistic? The Congress asserted 'yes', given time, education, 
experience and opportunity, according to civilian and former senior military advisors 
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to Congress. The DoD opposed this view, holding that the best joint officer is the 
expert in his/her own service and that there is not sufficient time or opportunity for a 
professional soldier, sailor, marine or airman to be both a service and a joint expert. 
So the panel once again found itself dealing with a conundrum because neither 
Congress nor the Department of Defense, by design or otherwise, would articulate 
what the JSO could be - the prerequisites, assignment policies, selection criteria 
and career paths. 
The joint specialist problem, if you will, appeared to have two parts. Part one 
was institutional -- the selection, education and qualifications of JSOs. The second 
part, and more difficult, was intellectual and social, and involved: 
(1) changing an officer's mindset from service-orientation to joint, and 
(2) creating acceptance that the JSO career path was gcod for both the 
service and officer corps. 
As you may recall, unless you YJere very junior or senior, assignments to the 
joint staff YJere "career enders" for many. And this was the problem Goldwater-
Nichols was going to address by directing the services through various incentives, 
to assign their future leaders to joint duty. Goldwater-Nichols tied promotions, 
assignments and education to joint duty. 
Goldwater-Nichols directed the services to strengthen the content and focus 
of joint matters taught at the existing service schools, and directed the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff to provide specific joint education at a JPME school provided by the 
National Defense University. The panel made a clear distinction between these two 
requirements. The first constituted joint education from a service perspective; the 
latter, joint education from a joint perspective. 
The present PME system could have accommodated the joint educational 
requirements of Goldwater-Nichols, or so it seemed, until GNA accounting rules 
were applied to the joint duty assignments list (JOA). The Joint Chiefs of Staff had 
a production problem because of the inability of the National Defense University to 
educate all potential JSOs. In response, the JCS, with service cooperation, 
adopted a joint track to be taught to designated students in each service's 
intermediate and senior school. The joint track would have a prescribed curriculum, 
minimum student mix, standards applied consistently in each school, and be 
accredited by a JCS-designated procedure. But the joint track, in the panel's view 
created several problems: 
(1) Two tracks created two classes of students. Joint track, because of the 
GNA promotion and assignment rules, was the fast track. 
(2) Schools would have to make significant changes to their curricula to 
teach the prescribed joint block of instruction. 
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(3) During joint track education, other service students and faculty would be 
unavailable in the classroom. 
(4) Uncertainty existed that the Navy could provide students and faculty of 
the prescribed quality and operational experience in sufficient numbers 
to attain the joint education standards at non-Navy schools. 
In spite of the joint track concept, the panel could not alter its belief that this 
was joint education from a service perspective and did not meet the intent of 
Goldwater-Nichols. 
Our solution to the production problem, of course, was to focus upon how 
Armed Forces Staff College could be restructured to meet the intent of GNA. Here 
was an institution whose historical root, the Army-Navy Staff College during World 
War II, had addressed essentially the same issues 40 years prior -- joint education 
for service-oriented officers enroute to assignment on joint and combined staffs. 
The AFSC had all the elements. It would: 
(1) ensure the mix of faculty and students by service. 
(2) ensure equity of job opportunity - one "class" of student. 
(3) provide standard joint education at the intermediate level under the 
control of CJCS and the President of NDU. 
(4) ideally, enable students to attend enroute to their joint assignments. 
(5) not preclude more senior officers (colonels/captains) from attending. 
(6) allow service schools to continue to focus on joint matters from a service 
perspective. 
The revamped Air Forces Staff College would no longer be an intermediate 
service school counter for all services, but would be provided for JSO joint 
education focused on understanding 
(1) the combat capability and limitations of units and organizations within 
other services; 
(2) doctrine for employment of other service forces and joint doctrine, to the 
extent it exists; 
(3) service and joint command and control systems; 
1-21 
(4) campaign planning with emphasis on joint task force (JTF) 
responsibilities. 
Having discussed strategies and education for JSO, let me now turn to 
quality. The panel focused on four segments where we believed quality was 
necessary to provide the foundations for an effective PME system. These were 
faculty, commandants and presidents, student bodies, and pedagogy. 
Foremost, in the panel's opinion, was the faculty. The importance of a 
competent, credible and dedicated faculty to both the fabric and reputation of our 
PME institutions cannot be overstated. Faculty determine the quality and worth of 
the educational experience. 
PME faculties should rightly consist of both military and civilian faculty 
members. Military faculty should be from three areas: ( 1) operationally oriented 
individuals with recent command or staff experience; (2) military specialists, who 
might be foreign area specialists or intelligence officers; and (3) military educators 
who are degreed in the requisite subject matter - perhaps service academy 
instructors. 
Civilian faculty instructors enhance both the academic stature and 
scholarship of the institutions, particularly if they are renowned in a particular field. 
General Goodpaster said, "Civilians can add depth to the curriculum and help 
establish pedagogy." They also add continuity to an institution, particularly a 
service school where the turnover rate of military faculty can be disruptive. While 
the panel never stated how many civilians should be on the faculty, we believed that 
senior service schools should have more than intermediate schools, and that 
perhaps one-third was a good target. 
The panel included PME commandants and presidents in its quality 
discussion because of the tremendously important role these officers play in their 
service (or JCS) and the difficulty in identifying these officers. Former Army Chief of 
Staff, General Meyer, expressed concern that only a few officers possess the 
characteristics to hold these positions. They must have operational credibility, 
academic credentials, a superb intellect, and must be seen by the student body as 
having the highest standard of integrity. 
One other former service chief had similar criteria for PME commandants 
and presidents: 
(1) have a strong academic inclination, but not be seen as an 'egg- head'; 
(2) be a general/flag officer on the way up; not assigned to the positions for 
faithful service; 
(3) be willing to devote three years to the institution; 
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(4) be seen by his/her peers and student body as having operational 
knowledge; and 
(5) have the ability to establish sound rapport with the student body- i.e.,be 
a mentor with a high degree of integrity. 
Mentorship by the commandant is particularly important. No other single 
officer in any of the services has such capability to influence -- positively or 
negatively - so many of our nation's future military leaders. During a three-year 
tenure, the commandants of the five senior schools will have direct interaction with 
approximately 3,000 lieutenant colonels/navy commanders and colonels/navy 
captains. 
Who are these 3,000 military officers who make up the student bodies in the 
PME system? They are career officers, serious about the military profession, well-
educated and capable of serious academic study. The panel reviewed service 
policies with respect to selection, school designation, follow-on assignments, 
promotions, and whether or not these policies resulted in selection of those officers 
who were more able and had the greatest potential. Despite wide variances among 
the services, by and large, the services select very capable officers for in resident 
PME. 
The pedagogy -- or art, science and profession of teaching -- and the rigor 
associated with several of the institutions we found to be quite lacking. We heard 
from numerous educators that the most effective learning takes place in small 
seminar groups where the student is accountable to the faculty and his peers to 
make meaningful contributions. Active learning requires self-discipline and 
diligence, as well as reading and writing. Lt Gen John Pustay, a former president of 
NDU, provided the panel with three watch words that capture much·of the essence 
of the active learning process: research, relevance and rigor. 
Passive learning, on the other hand, is the least effective method and is 
characterized most commonly by listening to lectures. General David D. Jones, 
former chairman, JCS, stated, "Passive education is the least productive for the 
time spent." Occasionally, lectures and symposiums should be used to support a 
major theme, but they should not be a steady diet for an academically challenging 
institution. With the exception of the two naval colleges and the Army Command 
and General Staff College, the panel observed too much passive education. 
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Before I conclude, let me share with you what I think were the panel's 
real achievements: 
(1) We focused the debate about JPME and JSOS at the right level -
chairman, service chiefs, presidents and commandants, and CINCs; 
(2) We held our ground on the joint track issue - that it was not the 
solution to the JSO production problem; 
(3) We brought attention to the quality of education and, by doing so 
scared the hell out of many students for fear of more writing 
assignments, DG programs and comprehensive tests - particularly the 
Air Force; 
(4) Armed Forces Staff College became the Phase II JPME institution 
at the intermediate level, returning to its historical intent; 
(5) The School of Advanced Aerospace Studies (SAAS), modeled after 
SAMS, was founded at Air University; and 
(6) For 19 months, we became "they". 
What future panels accomplish will be important, too. But we should all 
remember the words Congressman Ike Skelton uttered in 1987: 
"Education in the present is the foundation of everything that happens in 
the future." · 
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The views expressed in this presentation are solely those of the presenter. 
These views do not represent the positions of the Department of Defense. 
Thank you, Admiral Smith. I'd like to begin by saying that serving the 
Skelton panel was a great learning experience. The lesson I most learned, or 
really, learned again, is that it is often a few good people who make things . 
happen. 
Amongst the many fine people I worked with on the Professional Military 
Education panel, the two who stood out the most were Congressman Ike 
Skelton, the panel Chairman, and Archie Barrett, the House Armed Services 
Professional Staff Member, who was the study director. Both are men of the 
highest integrity, and both have always put the good of the nation's military as 
a top goal. 
I'd like to take this opportunity in front of a group who have knowledge and 
responsibility for military education to recognize Congressman Ike Skelton 
and Archie Barrett. In the last dozen years, and including PME, Goldwater-
Nichols, and other actions, I believe they have done as much to improve the 
U.S. military as anyone I can think of. 
Let me now turn to the Skelton panel and joint PME, upon which I'll focus 
my comments. 
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MAJOR WARS TAUGHT 
NEED FOR JOINT SCHOOLS 
• After Civil War, Army established School 
of Application for Infantry and Cavalry in 
1881 and Navy established the Naval War 
College in 1884 
• In World War II, JCS created Army-Navy 
Staff College 
• Explicit recognition of need for joint school 
• After WWII, JCS created NWC & ICAF 
One of the most basic conclusions of the panel was that major wars taught 
the need for joint schools. Thus, the evolution of Joint Professional Military 
Education (JPME) has it roots in the experiences of the Civil War. It taught 
that branches of the Army were unlikely to ever fight alone as they had in 
conquering the western frontier and elsewhere. 
The first "joint branch" institution designed to teach officers in one branch 
of the Anny to learn about operating with other branches was the School of 
Application for Infantry and Cavalry established in 1881 at Ft. Leavenworth, 
Kansas. The Naval War College followed in 1884 at Newport, Rhode Island. 
Similarly, World War II was a major lesson that all future wars are likely to 
be joint. Even in the middle of that great conflict, our Joint Chiefs of Staff 
recognized the immediate need to teach jointness and that to fully teach 
jointness, a joint school was needed. Therefore, George Marshall, Ernest 
King, and Hap Arnold took the time in the midst of their other concerns to 
create the Anny-Navy Staff College. These war-experienced leaders 
established the precedent that joint education should be accomplished in joint 
schools. 
After the war, the leaders who had commanded realized that, especially at 
the senior level, more education in jointness and joint schools were required 
and they established the National War College and the Industrial College of 
the Armed Forces. 
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JPME EVOLUTION 
• 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act established 
Joint Specialty Officers and called for 
improving PME focus on joint matters in: 
- National Defense University Schools for JSOs 
- Service PME schools for all 
• 1989 Skelton Panel recommendations 
More recent joint PME evolution includes the following two actions. 
In 1986, Congress passed the Goldwater-Nichols DoD Reorganization Act. 
The major impact of that Act was to increase the emphasis on jointness in 
DoD. As part of that emphasis, Goldwater-Nichols established a new category 
of officers called Joint Specialty Officers, or JSOs. It also called for 
improving the PME focus on Joint Matters both in NDU schools for JSOs and 
in Seivice P.ME schools for all students. 
Then in 1989, Congressman Ike Skelton led a Panel that reviewed and 
made recommendations on how best to implement the P.ME provisions of 
Goldwater-Nichols. Let's look at these recommendations. 
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SKELTON PANEL JPME 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
Major: 
1. Two-Phase JSO Education 
2. Develop Framework relating Warfare Level to 
PMELevel 
Other: 
1. Establish Director of Military Education 
2. Increase Faculty/Student Mixes by Service 
This slide summarizes the recommendations of Congressman Skelton's 
panel. On the two major recommendations: 
The Two-phase Joint Specialty Officer, or JSO education was 
to ensure the JSO got fully joint education. and 
The framework relating Warfare Level to a PME Level was to 
ensure that each school concentrated on a specific subject, and unnecessary 
overlap was minimized. 
Let us discuss these recommendations individually. 
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TWO-PHASE JSO EDUCATION 
Either: 
-PHASE I 





-Follow-on, three-month course taught at Anned Forces Staff 
College, Norfolk, VA (900 students per year) 
- PHASES I and II 
-Taught at NWCand ICAF during ten-month course 
The Two-Phase education for JSOs recommendation recognized the lesson 
learned in WW II that full joint education required a joint school. 
The joint PME curriculum was divided into two phases, the PHASE I of 
which is taught at Intermediate and Senior Level SER VICE colleges during 
their ten-month courses. These service schools, as we'll discuss, have had 
increased numbers of faculty and students from non-host military services, but 
they still are not a full joint environment. 
PHASE II is taught as a follow-on, three-month course at the Armed Forces 
Staff College at Norfolk, VA. AFSC is under the command of CJCS, has a 
one-star commandant position whose occupant rotates by Service, the school 
concentrates solely on a joint curriculum, and it has a 1/3, 1/3, 1/3 mix by 
Military Department for both faculty and student body. AFSC is a fully joint 
environment. 
An alternative for providing the joint environment is for a student to take 
both Phases I and II during the ten-month course at one of the two joint 
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Tactical .__I __ ___, 
This slide shows the basic framework for PME. 
The three warfare levels are shown in the horizontal rows and the middle 
three PME levels in the vertical columns. 
As you can see, the_primary PME schools concentrate on the tactical level 
of warfare, the intermediate or Staff Colleges on the operational, and the 
senior, or War Colleges, on the Strategic level. 
There is some overlap at each school, which is appropriate. The major 
problem has been the overlap between the intermediate and senior levels, 
which in some past cases, has been seen as excessive. For example, in the past 
the Naval War College essentially taught the sarrie course at both the 
intermediate and senior levels. One reason for this was that it was believed 
that naval officers could only attend one of the those two levels. 
However, now that substantial numbers of students from all services attend 
each school, it is necessary to have an overall framework to minimize 
unnecessary overlap. 
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OTHER DOD JPME 
ACCOMPLISHMENTS 
• Deputy Director Joint Staff for Military 
Education, J-7 
-One Star who Advises CJCS on Joint PME 
• "Officer PME Policy" (CJcsr lsoo.01) 
-Framework, Joint Curricula & Standards 
-Faculty & Student Mixes by Service 
• Accreditation of Joint PME 
-Every Five Years 
-In Both Service Colleges & NDU 
Besides the implementation of the Skelton panels' two major 
recommendations, DoD has some other accomplishments in JPME. 
First, the CJCS has established for the first time the position of Director for 
Military Education, a one-star on the Joint Staff who advises the CJCS on joint 
PME both in the Joint and the Service schools. The current Director for 
Military Education is Brigadier General Ralph Pasini, who will address us 
tomorrow. 
One of the Director of Military Education's first tasks was to develop a 
"Officer Professional Military Education Policy," (CJCS Instruction 1800.01, 
and in its first edition called the "Military Education Policy Document."). This 
document not only codified the framework we just discussed, it also 
e~tablished joint curricula, academic standards, and goals for faculty and 
student mixes by Service, which we'll address in a minute. 
The document also established a process for accreditation every five years 
of joint PME, both in service colleges and the joint schools of NDU, the 
National Defense University. 
These are significant acc.omplishments, but the services have had some 
difficulties accomplishing the Skelton panel recommendations on student and 
faculty mixes by Service. 
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MILITARY FACULTY MIX GOALS 
(%Each Non-Host Military Department) 
Coogres.sional CJCS 
Coll~e Goal Goal 
National 
Defense 33% 3301o 
Universitv 
Senior 
Service 25% 10% 
Intermediate 
Service 15o/o 5% 
Here we see the percent of military faculty for each non-host Military 
Department, first as a goal recommended by the Skelton Congressional Panel, 
and in the last column as a goal established by CJCS in his "Officer PME 
Policy." 
As a fully joint school, NDU has long had approximately 33% military 
faculty from each Military Department. 
Starting with the Congressional goal column, for the senior service schools, 
the Congressional goal was 25%. Thus, for example at the Army War 
College, half the faculty would be of the host military department, the Army; 
and 25% would from the Air Force and 25% from the Sea Services. The Sea 
Services designation includes the Navy, the Marine Corps, and the Coast 
Guard. 
The intermediate schools were considered to have more of a requirement 
for Service unique education and less for joint education than the senior 
schools. Therefore, the Congressional goal for military faculty of intermediate 
schools was 15%. 
For the CJCS goals, besides the 10% shown for senior service military 
faculty, there is also a requirement that the combined non-host Military 
Department total should be no less than 25%. While these goals are above 
where the Service schools were in the 1980s and they are being met in all 
essential elements, they are 33-40% of the Congressional goals. 
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STUDENT MIX GOALS 
(Students/seminar from 
Each Non-Host Military De~artment) 
Congressional CJCS 
College Goal Goal 
Senior 3 
Service (20o/o in 96) 1 
Intermediate 
Service 3 1 
Now to look at the STUDENT MIX goals. Here we see the numbers of 
students per seminar from each non-host Military Department. 
The Congressional goal for both senior and intermediate levels is three 
students. 
You'll note in parentheses that in the 1996 DoD Appropriations Act (Section 
8084), Congress directed that for classes entering the war colleges after 30 
September 1996, at leaSt 20% of the military students be from other Military 
Departments. This 20% Congressional requirement is being met. 
As with the military faculty, the Chairman's goal isl/3rd of the 
Congressional goal and is being essentially met. The hardest case is the Army 
Command and General Staff College, which has almost 1,000 students. These 
1,000 students are currently arranged in 64 seminars, so you can see that it 
takes 64 Air Force and 64 Sea Services students just to meet the CJCS's goal 
of one student per seminar from each non-host Military Department. 
In the panel's view, even the Congressional goal of 3 students per seminar 
is not as good as the NDU schools having 1/3 of the seminar from each of the 
non-host Military Departments and so was not sufficient for Phase II JPME. 
Since the one student from a service in a seminar often had knowledge only of 
one part of his service, the panel believed a single student did not meet the 




• DoD has made major commitment to P ME 
-In Intermediate & Senior Schools, almost 
4,000 students every year 
• Kept Service PME and Added Joint P ME 
-What believe is required 
Let me summarize by stating that DoD has made a major commitment to 
PME with almost 4,000 students attending Intermediate and Senior schools 
every year (This figure includes international students). 
Also DoD has kept the Service-unique PME needed to develop capable 
Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps warriors, and added the joint PME 
required to fight the major wars of the future that will be joint. 
However, even with this major commitment to JPME and the significant 
DoD accomplishments, there still remain two related areas where there is a gap 
b.etween the Skelton panel recommendations and the current DoD position. 
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OPEN PANEL ISSUES 
• Ways to Increase Faculty/ Student Mixes 
• Protect Substantial AFSC Course 
- Work Interrupted Tour TDY Issue 
- (3-month Course, 900 Students, 3/Year) 
These are what I've called "open panel issues." 
First, as we already discussed, the military faculty and student mixes by 
Service are below the Congressional goals. 
The CJCS faculty/student goals are about I/3rd of the Congressional goals. 
The good news is that DoD is essentially meeting the CJCS goals, but many, 
including those outside Congress, would like to find ways to increase the 
mixes. 
The second jointness issue is the need to protect the most basic JP1\1E 
lesson of our major wars--that is, that full joint education should be taught in 
joint schools. The two-phase JP1\1E program using AFSC as the second phase 
was a good compromise, but some are still trying to undermine AFSC. 
Perhaps the major problem with AFSC is the "Interrupted TDY Issue." 
While the bulk of new assignments to a CINC occur in the spring and early 
summer, AFSC with three courses each year can only graduate part of its 
students at that time. There are some advantages to having an officer TDY 
back to AFSC after 4 or 8 months in a new assignment, because he knows 
what subjects are important for his job. The disadvantage is that the CINC 
loses an officer in the middle of his tour. This too is a problem to work-but in 
any case AFSC should be protected. 
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CIVILIAN EDUCATION 
EFFECT ON PME 
• CORM Report (95) 
- Called for "Structured Educational System" 
• Management Reform Memo #3 ( 5/97) 
- Streamline Management of OSD-Sponsored 
Higher Education 
• Defense Reform Initiative ( 11 /97) 
- Chancellor for DoD Civilian Education 
While this slide discusses a subject that was not assigned to me for this 
PME conference, I believe it is important enough to introduce it. The subject 
is the potential effect on military education of the changes that are being talked 
about in the education of civilians in DoD. Let me just mention a bit of 
background. 
First, the 1995 Commission on Roles and Missions (CORM) called for 
establishing a "structured educational system" for DoD civilians. This sounds 
much like the Skelton panel's call for making explicit the inherent framework 
forPME. 
Second, was last spring's Management Reform Memorandum #3 from the 
Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) that assigned the ASD (Force 
Management Policy) to summarize inputs from the OSD principals and 
Directors of Defense Agencies and Field Activities on ways to streamline 
management ofOSD-sponsored higher education organizations and programs. 
Finally and most importantly, in November 1997 the Secretary's Defense 
Reform Initiative, amongst other actions, called for establishing a "Chancellor 
for Education and Professional Development to develop and administer a 
coordinated program of civilian professional education and training .... " 
While the DRI direction is only beginning to be studied under the aegis of 
the USD (Personnel and Readiness), all of us concerned with military 
education should be aware of its potential for affecting PME. 
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NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL 
and 
OFFICE OF NAVAL RESEARCH 
CONFERENCE ON 
MILITARY EDUCATION FOR THE 21sr CENTURY WARRIOR 
Discussion by 
James R. Locher, Ill 
Former Assistant Secretary of Defense for 
Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict 
and 
Robert Goldich 
Former Head, Manpower and Budgets Section, 
Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division, 
Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress 
Mr. Locher: The political conflict that produced the Goldwater-Nichols Act lasted four 
years and 241 days· -- a period longer than World War 11. Those of us who 
participated in that epic struggle can talk about Goldwater-Nichols for hours without 
taking a breath. My remarks focus on the influence that Goldwater-Nichols had on 
Professional Military Education. Admiral Smith, you better keep your gavel close at 
hand, because I might just get started. 
As many of you know, Goldwater-Nichols was a watershed event for PME. In 
the larger context, as Mark Smith mentioned, Goldwater-Nichols was an effort to 
balance joint and service interests and perspectives in the Department of Defense. In 
that context, it put a tremendous amount of emphasis on the management of joint 
officers, and on the education of officers who would serve in joint assignments or in 
service assignments where they would be working with joint institutions. 
As a matter of fact, one of the eight principal purposes of the 
Goldwater-Nichols Act, as mentioned in it's preamble, was -- and I quote, "to improve 
joint officer management policies." The Congress was tremendously troubled by the 
performance of joint duty in the Department of Defense. 
A report by the Senate Armed Services Committee in 1985, as we were 
working our way up to the Goldwater-Nichols Act, summarized the situation as follows 
- and I again quote, "For the most part, military officers do not want to be assigned to 
joint duty, are pressured or monitored for loyalty by their services while serving on 
joint assignments, are not prepared by either education or experience to perform their 
joint duties, and serve for only a relatively short period once they have learned their 
jobs." This is a very different environment from the one in DoD today. But that was 
the environment that the Congress saw, and it saw it as an intolerable situation. 
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To give you some examples, in 1982, only two percent of the officers on the 
joint staff had previous joint staff experience. Only 13 percent had attended the 
Armed Forces Staff College. Tour lengths were below 30 months. As a matter of fact, 
at one time, as we were taking testimony preparing Goldwater-Nichols, one of the 
witnesses revealed that, for some time, admirals serving on the joint staff had been 
serving on average 11 months. In 1982, the serving Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff, David Jones, convened a special study group made up of retired admirals and 
generals and former Assistant Secretary of Defense, Bill Brown. 
The study group came to the following conclusions -- and I quote, "The 
combination of lack of staff experience, lack of practical knowledge of joint activities, 
and lack of formal education through the joint school system, all coupled with short 
tours, makes it very difficult for joint staff officers, no matter how capable -- and many 
are very capable -- to deal effectively with these major staff responsibilities." 
Given this situation, the Congress, in Title 4 of Goldwater-Nichols Act, 
mandated improvements in the performance of officers in joint assignments. 
Congress had three goals in mind: First, the selection of more talented or more highly 
qualified officers for joint duty assignments. Second, to increase the joint-experience 
level of officers in joint assignments. And third - the subject, in part, of this 
conference- to educate officers appropriately in joint matters. 
We discussed an important part of the Goldwater-Nichols Act in d '-1ating 
the joint specialty officer - and General Cook and Mr. Smith have covered that 
subject very well. So, let me turn and talk for a moment about the various provisions of 
Goldwater-Nichols that were designed to accomplish these three goals. 
First, with respect to the quality goal, the Secretary of Defense was expected to 
establish qualifications for joint specialty officers. Joint specialty officer promotion 
rates were not to be less than those for service headquarter staffs. Joint specialty 
officers and nominees were expected to make up half of the joint duty assignment list; 
and all general and flag officers were supposed to first serve in a joint duty 
assignment before they could be pnmoted to general or flag rank. 
Second, with respect to the experience goal established in Goldwater-Nichols, 
it was expected that, before an officer could be designated a joint speciality officer, he 
would serve a full joint tour. A thousand of the most critical billets in the joint arena 
could only be filled by joint specialty officers. 
And, lastly, the Congress designated tour length for officers on joint duty --
three years for field officers and two years for general and flag officers. The 
Congress felt it had to specify this because, every time the services needed an officer 
back, he would be pulled out of the joint assignment to go into a service position. 
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As it turns out, another important part of Goldwater-Nichols was to make the 
JCS Chairman the principal military advisor. This played an important role with 
respect to Professional Military Education. Even though, shortly after World War II, 
the JCS had moved out smartly to create joint education institutions, for the most part 
there had been inattention to this subject from the late '40s through the period just 
prior to enactment of the Goldwater-Nichols Act. Giving the Chairman the 
responsibility broke a little bit of the institutional logjam in the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and 
permitted a more objective perspective on the requirements for Joint Professional 
Military Education. 
The Goldwater-Nichols Act did not go into the education subject in more detail, 
primarily because of the enormous controversies surrounding the other subjects that 
were considered in the act. 
In the beginning, on the Senate side - and I suspect over on the House Armed 
Services Committee as well -- education was one of the subjects the Congress had in 
mind. But, eventually, we focused on the overarching joint officer personnel policies, 
and began the shift of emphasis in the education field. But we needed to leave much 
of that to the work subsequently done by the Skelton Panel. 
I think it's important to have an understanding of the context in describing the 
period leading up to the Goldwater-Nichols Act. It seems like a long, long time ago, 
but it was only ten years ago. It provides the context for what it is we are now doing 
with respect to military education. 
Mr. Goldich: When I was charged with a discussant role on the subject of 
Goldwater-Nichols and the Skelton Panel, I read those portions of Goldwater-Nichols 
that were applicable and I read the Skelton Panel Report, which I had not done for ten 
years. I had used snippets of them here and there, but I had not had the occasion to 
look at them on a comprehensive basis. 
What struck me about them was, in addition to the enormous amounts of rigor 
- a term used in the Skelton Panel Report a lot - that an often abused institution, 
members of the United States Congress, brought their efforts to bear on a subject that 
would gain little or no appreciation from their constituents, simply because it was an 
important thing relevant to the defense of the United States that needed to be done. 
But I was struck again, even though I had worked in this subject for my entire career, 
by the relentless emphasis on jointness -- how, that is to say, the· wording and the 
discussion of jointness permeated virtually the entire content of the Skelton Panel. If 
the process issue on the subject of PME that interested the Skelton Panel was rigor, 
the substance issue that mattered, to the exclusion of just about everything else was 
jointness. 
Now this, of course, comes as no surprise. In fact, it was an explicit charge to 
the panel; and it was, by all accounts not only understandable but very much 
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warranted. But I confess that after reading the report, I was struck by the extent to 
which such formidable intellectual guns were brought to bear, on any one target. I felt 
like somebody saying, "Be careful what you shoot at because you may hit it, and a lot 
of collateral damage by omission, if not commission, could result." 
We have structured, over the past ten years, a great deal of our PME 
curriculum around jointness, based on a very well-founded concern in the early and 
mid 1980s about the ability of the services to conduct and win joint military operations 
in the field. 
Now we find that other issues need dealing with as well, and the guns are 
being brought to bear on them. These include such things as information warfare; 
operations other than war; the increasing technological sophistication of military 
hardware, the issue of unmanned vehicles and robotics, and military operations in 
urban terrain, with all its political and social ramifications -- comparatively new things 
which have interested people in the last year or so, and for which interest which is 
growing greatly. 
When reading through the report, I was thinking of the predilection that we 
Americans - not just those in the Congress or in the government, but Americans in 
general - seem to have toward intellectual fads. We are fascinated by new topics; we 
think "something needs to be done," and we turn to it with unbounded enthusiasm. In 
some cases, perhaps a little skepticism might be warranted at the same time the 
enthusiasm is showing. Here I think, in particular, the Congress can help a great 
deal. The Congress has a tendency, since it comes with a broad and properly 
political perspective on things, to question fads - to show some scepticism and to not 
jump on board with them. 
So, based on this initial thrust by Goldwater-Nichols and the Skelton Panel ten 
years ago on jointness, what did I come away with after the second reading of the 
subject? One thing is that, perhaps more than anything else, further changes and 
further evolution in PME should strive for balance. We want to be careful about how 
the very splendid enthusiasm of the services drives for totality in every way. Perhaps 
what we need to do is not just develop a PME system proper for the 21st Century, but 
think more about developing PME criteria that the soldiers of the Republic -- using 
soldiers in its broad sense -- can use in any century. 
Thank you very much. 
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JAMES R. LOCHER, Ill 
Former Assistant Secretary of Defense 
for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict 
Born in Lancaster, Pennsylvania, in 1946, Mr. Locher has more than twenty-five years of 
professional experience in both the executive and legislative branches of the Federal 
Government. He graduated from the U.S. Military Academy in 1968 and received an 
MBA from the Harvard Graduate School of Business Administration in 1974. 
Mr. Locher began his career in Washington as an executive trainee in the Office of 
Defense. Subsequently, he served in the Executive Office of the President as executive 
secretary of the White House Working Group on Maritime Policy, which formulated the 
legislative proposal that resulted in the Merchant Marine Act of 1970. 
Returning to the Department of Defense in 1969, Mr. Locher worked in the Office of the 
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Program Analysis and Evaluation. As an operations 
research analyst in the Mobility Forces Division, he was responsible for seali:ft programs. 
He also served in the Naval Forces Division, with responsibility for amphibious shipping, 
mine countermeasures, naval gunfire, and maritime and power projection net assessments. 
In 1978, Mr. Locher joined the Senate Committee on Armed Services as a professional 
staff member. Initially, he served as the senior committee advisor on international 
security affairs, with additional responsibility for force projection programs, including 
airlift, sealift, amphibious warfare, and rapidly deployable forces. Beginning in 1985, Mr. 
Locher was assigned responsibility for military strategy, defense organization and 
management, special operations and low-intensity conflict reforms, and Persian Gulf 
issues. During this period, he directed the bipartisan staff effort that resulted in the 
Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986. 
President Bush appointed Mr. Locher to the post of assistant secretary of defense for 
special operations and low-intensity conflict on October 19, 1989. As assistant secretary, 
Mr. Locher was responsible for the overall supervision of the special operations and low-
intensity conflict activities of the Department of Defense. He also performed as the 
principal civilian adviser to the secretary of defense on these matters. He served as 
assistant secretary throughout the Bush administration and the first five months of the 
Clinton administration. During the latter period, Mr. Locher also served as the acting 
under secretary of defense for policy. 
Since leaving government service in June 1993, Mr. Locher has been writing, lecturing, 
and consulting. He is authoring a book on the history of the Goldwater-Nichols Act, 
entitled Victory on the Potomac -The Five-Year War to Unify the Pentagon. In 
December 1996, Mr. Locher was appointed as a distinguished visiting fellow at the 
Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University. Most recently, he 
served on the secretary of defense's Task Force on Defense Reform. 
Mr. Locher and his wife, Norma, have one son and reside in Springfield, Virginia. 
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Robert L. Goldich is a Specialist in National Defense, and former Head of the Manpower 
and Budgets Section, of the Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division, 
Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress. His principal areas of expertise are 
defense manpower and personnel issues, defense organization and management, U.S. 
Army force structure and doctrine, and military history. Mr. Goldich has written and 
coordinated · CRS analyses of overall current defense policy issues, and is currently 
working on a major study tentatively entitled The U.S. Marine Corps: Current Issues for 
Congress. He has also written or co-authored analyses of the DOD service academies, 
Army reserve component issues, concurrent receipt of military retired pay and veterans' 
disability compensation, military retirement generally, defense reconstitution, the Army's 
roundout concept after the Persian Gulf War, the reserve mobilization for Operations 
Desert Shield/Storm, reserve officer personnel management, U.S. Army combat-to-
support ratios, U.S. POWs and MIAs held by Communist countries since World War II, 
the Goldwater-Nichols DOD Reorganization Act of 1986, and the Military Retirement 
Reform Act of 1986. He has published articles in various professional journals of military 
history and defense analysis; is a member and officeholder in the Inter-University 
Seminar on Armed Forces and Society; and participates in several other organizations 
concerned with defense policy. 
Mr. Goldich received a B.A. in history and political science from Claremont McKenna 
College in 1971 and an M.A. in international affairs from George Washington University 
in 1977. He is a graduate of the National War College, Class of 1982. He is married and 
has one son. 
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PME for the 21st Century Warrior ~ 
SESSION TWO 
Implementing the Skelton Panel's Recommendations and Identifying 
Dimensions of Importance for the Future of Military Education: Insights 
Question: How has implementing the recommendations of the Skelton Panel 
affected professional military education in the post-Cold War 
environment? 
Objectives: 1. Present issues that arose as Services implemented the Goldwater -
Nichols legislation and the Skelton Panel recommendations, and 
2. Present issues that the Services deem sufficiently important to 
warrant inclusion in framing the debate associated with educating 
the officer of the 21st Century. 
NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL· 
and 
OFFICE OF NAVAL RESEARCH 
CONFERENCE ON 
MILITARY EDUCATION FOR THE 21st CENTURY WARRIOR 
Remarks by the Honorable Deborah Roche Lee 
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs 
Less than a decade ago, the driver of a company commander's jeep needed to 
know how to drive the vehicle and operate a simple radio which had a power switch and a 
dial for changing frequencies. Today, that same driver is in charge of a HUMVEE, a high-
tech vehicle equipped with a sophisticated radio and electronic countermeasures, a global 
positioning system, a secure mobile phone, night vision goggles, and a chemical agent 
alarm. Astounding advances like these are fueling a revolution in military affairs. 
We in the United States have chosen to harness this technology revolution, so that 
we remain the world's only superpower, and dominate the battlefields of the future from 
air, land, sea and space. And yet at the same time, we know that technology alone is not 
enough to keep us strong in the 21st century. 
In today's rapidly changing security environment, we must also continue to focus on 
people, and to adapt the education and training of our future military leaders. We must 
anticipate new challenges and change to meet them. Today's conference is an important 
step forward in reaching that goal. 
How do we equip our future leaders to face the security environment of the 21st 
Century? Let me answer this question from my perspective as Secretary Cohen's 
principal advisor on Reserve Affairs. 
The Reserve components have clearly and repeatedly demonstrated their 
capability to operate effectively in today's strategic environment. Reserve component 
personnel are being called upon in more cases, and in more places, than ever before. In 
the Operation Joint Guard theater - Bosnia, Croatia, Hungary, and backfill in Germany 
and the United States - nearly one out of every four American soldiers is a member of the 
National Guard or Reserves. 
On other fronts, Guardsmen and Reservists have fought· fires in Indonesia and 
dropped winter feed to snow-bound cattle in New Mexico. Thousands were recently 
called up in the Northeast to help relieve the impact of severe winter storms. They are 
constructing roads and hospitals and infrastructure in South America and the Caribbean. 
And they are forging bonds of alliance with our new partners in Eastern Europe, helping to 
build a united Europe that is peaceful, prosperous and free. 
In short, they are helping on a daily basis to get the total work of the Total Force 
accomplished. In fiscal 1996 alone, RC personnel contributed 13.6 million man-days in 
support of missions and exercises around the world. Just for comparison, that number of 
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man-days during a year of peace equals about one-third of the Gulf War contributions, 
when more than 250,000 Reserve component personnel were mobilized. 
These are important numbers. They show that the Reserve Components are 
making the kind of contribution these times demand. They are not just a backup force of 
last resort, but are needed on a day to day basis in peace. And they show that the 
Reserve Components are increasingly effective in the post-Cold War world. This is good 
news. 
The other good news is that a decade of increased use has not had a negative 
impact, at least not yet, on readiness or our ability to meet end strength targets. Attrition 
figures are stable, and recruiting and employer support remains strong. 
These facts and figures aren't just interesting from a theoretical point of view. To 
the contrary, they directly relate to important policy decisions emanating from the 
Quadrennial Defense Review - policy decisions that say we will continue to use the Guard 
and Reserve when possible to help reduce Active component OPTEMPO. And we will 
continue to use the National Guard and Reserve in the future, not only in war but also in 
peace. 
Let me offer you a few recent examples of how we intend to pursue this philosophy 
of increased use of the Guard and Reserve. 
Efforts are currently underway to provide the National Guard with an enhanced 
capability to support civilian authorities in responding to terrorist use of a weapon of mass 
destruction. I anticipate that DoD will soon announce a new plan in this area, which is a 
national follow on to the Guard's long standing role in disaster response here at home. 
We've also received some recent marching orders from Secretary Cohen on the 
subject of Active/Reserve integration, for it is his belief that maximum integration is key if 
we are to make our overall strategy work. Congress agrees. 
Secretary Cohen has challenged each of the services and the Department of 
Defense as a whole to identify and tear down any remaining barriers, both cultural and 
structural, to effective integration between the Active and Reserve components. Toward 
that end, a number of recent initiatives have been taken. 
Last week, Secretary Cohen announced the establishment of two new two-star 
positions, recently authorized by Congress to be filled by National Guard and Reserve 
general or flag officers, who will advise the Chairman of the JCS. In November, Secretary 
Cohen, as part of his Defense Reform Initiative, announced that a National Guard general 
officer would permanently fill the position of Deputy Director of Military Support (DOMS); 
and that up to one half of the action officers within DOMS would be drawn from the 
Reserve components. DOMS is the lead DoD agency in supporting civilian authorities m 
domestic emergencies, including those involving weapons of mass destruction. 
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Integration continues on other fronts as well. By October 1999, six Army National 
Guard enhanced readiness brigades will form the core of two new integrated divisions 
under Active Army commanders. And Reserve component personnel will soon receive 
green-color identification cards like their Active component counterparts. 
In case you're wondering what increased use and integration of the Reserve 
components has to do with the subject of this conference -- Professional Military 
Education, or to use the acronym, PME - the answer is: a lot. As Congressman Skelton 
noted nearly a decade ago, high quality PME is vital to our national security and an 
essential investment in future military leadership. 
In today's joint environment, when technology is changing the way we work and 
think, the need for diverse individual and collective skills among soldiers and leaders 
remains paramount. Given the inherent complexities of jointness, and with ad hoc 
alliances and coalitions becoming the norm, Joint PME is now, more than ever, a critical 
component of military strength. Simply put, the highest educational standards and 
opportunities must be maintained for officers assigned to joint elements. 
Today, Reserve Component officers occupy an increasing number of billets in joint 
organizations, and they are being called upon more frequently to support joint operations. 
Yet there is no systematic method for Reserve Component officers to obtain JPME 
beyond the initial level found at intermediate or senior service schools. 
One of my goals in the next year is to move toward putting them on a more equal 
footing with their Active duty counterparts. Here's how: 
First, we're working with the Joint Staff, National Defense University and the 
Armed Forces Staff College to assess the possibility of having Reserve component 
officers join the facilities of these institutions. Second, we are working to begin and/or 
increase attendance of Reserve component officers in establishing JPME courses, like 
CAPSTONE, in which sixteen spaces were allocated to the Reserve component for FY97. 
We'll try to do more in the future. 
Another example is the Marine Corps University, which has recently begun offering 
RC officers from all Services an opportunity to attend the two-week Marine Air Ground 
Task Force. Eight RC officers attended this past summer. 
But the availability of billets at JPME courses does not define the issue in its 
entirety. Even if large numbers of seats were available, civilian commitments of RC 
personnel prevent attendance at the lengthier residential JPME courses. And in other 
cases, geographic constraints and money hamper attendance. 
So, by July 1999, we hope to implement a new model of JPME for RC officers. 
Admiral Blair and I have formed a working group to review how best to accomplish this 
goal, and, although we don't have it completely figured out yet, we believe that the "book 
end" model holds particularly great promise. 
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This approach calls for two weeks in residence, followed by a period of distance 
learning, capped off by another two weeks in residence. Distance learning, as you know, 
leverages existing technology to bring more learning to more people in more different 
locations at less cost. It may provide a ready-made solution to the time constraint 
dilemma faced by RC officers who seek advanced JPME. It may also hold the key to 
keeping costs down for this program. 
With each passing year, we are gaining additional experience and confidence in 
Distance Learning as an alternative way to train in some -- though not all -- areas. It is 
increasingly being merged with other technologies, like simulations and embedded 
training, to facilitate warfighting training. 
We are also using Distance Learning to assist in classroom training and education. 
For example, through distance learning, degree programs are being offered over the 
Internet and on CD ROM, and virtual seminars are being held on a global basis. 
Within the Reserve world, the Army National Guard is at the forefront of distance 
learning endeavors, helping to create the National Guard Bureau's Distance Learning 
Network. Using fiber-optic communications, this Network integrates state area commands 
and links them to state armories and public institutions, such as community colleges and 
fire and police offices. The goal is to build interactive learning centers across the country, 
within an hour's drive of Guardsmen's homes. And in Maryland, the Army Guard has 
teamed up with the General Accounting Office to support telecommuting initiatives. 
These examples illustrate how we are effectively moving away from classroom-
based training and education in some areas. They also give you an idea of how we hope 
to harness this technology to help create a versatile, affordable and workable approach to 
Reserve JPME. 
Let me sum up. Where does all of this leave us? I would offer you a number of 
propositions. 
First, technology may be fueling a revolution in military affairs, but war ultimately 
remains a human endeavor. 
Second, all of our people - Active, Guard and Reserve - will need a thorough 
understanding of the challenges ahead and how to face them: Active component officers 
need an appreciation of what 50 percent of their team -- the Reserve components - offer; 
what their capabilities are; how they contribute to the CINCs and Joint Task Force 
commanders; and how they are activated and deployed. 
For their part, Reserve component officers must embrace joint concepts. They 
must be prepared to augment their Active duty counterparts at the planning and 
implementation phases of joint operations. They must be flexible and fully prepared to 
meet the needs of a changing world. 
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To meet the challenges of the 21st Century, we will need continuous improvements 
in Professional Military Education, especially as it pertains to the joint environment. We 
will need to leverage technology and the power of information to edueate and train our 
people. We will need to use all of our manpower assets -- Active, Guard, Reserve and 
Civilian - to their maximum potential. And the name of the game will need to be 
integration, integration, integration. 
Thank you very much. 
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THE HONORABLE DEBORAH ROCHE LEE 
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs 
Deborah R. Lee was nominated by President Clinton to be Assistant Secretary of Defense 
for Reserve Affairs on April 5, 1993, and was confirmed by the United States Senate on 
May 28, 1993. Ms. Lee serves as the principal staff assistant and advisor to the Secretary 
of Defense on all matters involving the Reserve components of the United States Armed 
Forces, including the Army National Guard, Air National Guard, Army Reserve, Air 
Force Reserve, Naval Reserve, Marine Corps Reserve, and Coast Guard Reserve. 
Prior to serving in the Department of Defense, Ms. Lee was a professional staff member 
on the House Armed Services Committee. She is a specialist in military personnel and 
compensation and National Guard and Reserve issues. 
Her most recent assignment was as a senior professional staff member and advisor to 
former Chairman Les Aspin. In this capacity, Ms. Lee worked directly with Members of 
Congress -- both on and off the Armed Services Committee -- to help build the coalitions 
necessary to pass the annual defense authorization bill and other defense-oriented 
legislation. 
Ms. Lee's other responsibilities included: serving as a liaison between the Chairman and 
other House Members on defense programs and policies related to the defense 
authorization bill; troubleshooting/problem solving in an "ombudsman" capacity; and 
serving as one of several staff advisors to the Chairman on political matters related to the 
House of Representatives. 
Ms. Lee holds a Bachelor of Arts degree from Duke University (1979) and a Master of 
International Affairs degree from Columbia University (1981). Upon graduation from 
Columbia University, Ms. Lee was chosen to participate in the Presidential Management 
Intern program -- a prestigious and competitive program that attracts graduate degree 
candidates nationwide who are interested in public service. 
As a Presidential Intern, Ms. Lee accepted a position in the· Department of the Army 
Materiel and Development Command and served as resource and program analyst in the 
task group of the Deputy Commanding General for Resources and Management. Her 
work there focused on the planning, development, and preparation of short- and long-
range program requirements and studies related to the management of people, dollars, 
and equipment. 
As part·of the Presidential Management Internship, she was later detailed to the staff of 
the National Security Council, Executive Office of the President, where she worked in 
the Office of Legislative Affairs and Security Assistance. 
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VICE ADMIRAL PATRICIA ANN TRACEY, USN 
Chief of Naval Education & Training 
Director of Naval Training 
Vice Admiral Patricia Ann Tracey, a native of The Bronx, New York, completed Women 
Officers School and was commissioned as an Ensign in 1970, following graduation from 
the College of New Rochelle with a Bachelor of Arts degree in Mathematics. She also 
holds a Masters degree, with distinction, in Operations Research from the Naval 
Postgraduate School. 
Her initial assignment was to the Naval Space Surveillance Systems in Dahlgren, 
Virginia, where she qualified as a Command Center Officer and orbital analyst. 
Following a tour on the staff of the Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet, she served 
at the Bureau of Naval Personnel as the Placement Officer for graduate education and 
service college students. 
From 1980 to 1982, Vice Admiral Tracey served as an extended planning analyst in the 
Systems Analysis division on the Chief of Naval Operations staff. She served as 
Executive Officer of the Naval Recruiting District in Buffalo, New York, until 1984, 
when she was assigned as a manpower and personnel analyst in the Program ApT'lraisal 
division of the Chief of Naval Operations staff. 
Vice Admiral Tracey commanded the Naval Technical Training Center at Treasure Island 
from 1986 to 1988. She then headed the Enlisted Plans and Community Management 
Branch on the Chief of Naval Personnel's staff for two years. She assumed command of 
Naval Station Long Beach, California, in 1990. 
Upon completion of her command tour, Vice Admiral Tracey reported as a Fellow with 
the Chief of Naval Operations Strategic Studies Group at the Naval War College. Vice 
Admiral Tracey was assigned as the Director for Manpower and Personnel, J-1, on the 
Joint Staff from July 1993 to June 1995. From June 1995 to July 1996 she served as 
Commander, Naval Training Center, Great Lakes. She assumed the duties of Chief of 
Naval Education and Training and Director of Naval Training for the Chief of Naval 
Operations, 10 July 1996. 
The Admiral's personal decorations include the Defense Distinguished Service Medal, 
three Legion of Merit awards, and three Meritorious Service Medals. 




for 21st Century Warrior 
0 Provide update on implementing Skelton 
Panel Recommendations for PME 
0 Identify Dimensions of Importance for Future 
of US Navy Military Education 
VADM P. A. TRACEY 
CHIEF OF NAVAL EDUCATION AND TRAINING 
SDd• 1 
Thank you and good morning. I am just going to spin through a couple of slides 
to talk about these two major bullets. It is a particularly good time -in our 
evolution to have this conference, since most people believe that it will be a 
prolonged period before we engage in a peer-to-peer sort of conflict. During this 
strategic pause, if you will, it is important to capture the knowledge and 
experience of our old warriors and apply them to the training of our young 
warriors, so that they can develop the tactics and procedures required to face that 
peer competitor. 
It happens at the same time that we are operating everyday in an environment 
that demands the very precise, surgical, and adaptive application of military 
power, and at the same time as technology is dramatically changing the way that 
power can be applied. These things demand that our young warriors have a 
precise and full knowledge of their particular skills and have knowledge of how 
those skills contribute to the joint environment. 
Education plays a critical role in making those two kinds of evolutions happen in 
a way that keeps us the winning force that we have been since Desert Storm. I 
would like to talk about where the Navy is going in that regard. 
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for 21st Century Warrior 
IMPLEMENTING CONGRESSMAN SKELTON 
PANEL RECOMMENDATIONS 
• Curricula remains rigorous 
- Strong historical basis 
- Reshaping for the future 
- Service PME continues to be foundation for JPME 
• High quality faculty 
- Effective use of Title 10 hiring for civilian professors 
• Opportunity for joint education is increasing 
- NPS Joint Program certified in 1995 
- NWC non-resident programs meeting needs of Fleet 
• 17 seminar sites in Fleet concentration areas 
• All Navy programs will undergo accreditation in 1998. 
This slide talks to what we have done to implement the Skelton Panel recommendations. 
We have evolved our curricula at the Naval War College, maintaining the strong 
historical basis that has always been the foundation of that course. We shape 
continuously for the future by updating and incorporating changes to doctrine, and · 
incorporating case studies of recent engagements. 
We continue to maintain that service-specific PME must be the foundation of joint PME, 
so that our naval warrior measurably contributes to the joint enviromnent. 
We capitalize on the Title 10 hiring opportunities that were provided as a result of 
Goldwater-Nichols, and have maintained a very high quality faculty, one-third of which 
were hired under the Title 10 authority. 
We have addressed the requirement to educate more than the people who are on track or 
JSO in PME and JPME matters by expanding the opportunity for joint education away 
from the Naval War College. 
In 1995, we received certification for the Naval Postgraduate School's joint PME 
program, and we will go through an accreditation process for that curriculum in about two 
months. 
We've also upgraded and enhanced the ability to complete the Naval War College 
nonresident program, having established about 17 seminar .sites in fleet concentration 
areas so that officers who are still engaged in their afloat assignments have the 
opportunity to pursue JPME in those kinds of duties. The Naval War College senior 
course and Naval Postgraduate School courses will undergo joint staff accreditation this 




for 21st Century Warrior 
The Implementation Continues 
in 1998! 
• Permanent Military Professor Program 
- Increases Military faculty stability and expertise 
- Enhances link between warfare and academic disciplines 
- Includes recruitment and mentoring of military faculty 
• Naval Warfare Development Center 
- Link education, doctrine, and concept development 
commllllities. 
Slldo3 
Additionally, We have just implemented a Permanent Military Professor 
Program. The first selections for that program will take place this March of this 
year. This program attempts to establish a more permanent military faculty at 
the Naval Academy and the Naval Postgraduate School, enhancing the link 
between academic and warfare skills. 
That small cadre of military professors will not be the only military instructors at 
those institutions. We will continue to draw officers from the operational 
environment and will cycle them back out to their warfare specialties once their 
educational tours are completed. One of the goals will be to recruit and mentor 
those officers who spend only a few tours as instructors while they continue to 
perform their permanent assignments as military professors . 
. The second is a larger and more exciting innovation. It is the establishment 
of a Naval Warfare Center - an effort to link together and support the 
educational doctrine and concept development of the Navy. 
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*** (Retired) /. ·W-1---------1~ 
Contept Generation ~ 
Team; ············ s::S_ents 
(SSG, CNA, Studentll) 
. . 
...................................................................................... 
This is a conceptual picture of what that organization will look like. The Naval War 
College will be organized into three divisions. 
The Strategic Studies Group is a small group of captains selected specifically to 
spend a year studying concepts and developing far-reaching notions as to how to 
evolve naval strategy. It has been in place for more than 15 years at the Naval War 
College, and has drawn heavily on the military and civilian faculty at the Naval War 
College to enhance its output. 
Through the seminar structure I recently mentioned, we have strengthened the 
relationship between Strategic Studies Group fellows and students here at the Naval 
Postgraduate School, giving the SSG a much more robust view of the technical and 
analytical aspects important to the development of some far-reaching concepts 
approved by the CNO. 
Within the next year, we expect to add a Commander, Naval Warfare Development 
Center -- a two-star flag billet that will draw together the notions of concept 
development and testing using the Marine Battle Center and fleet exercises. 
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Naval Warfare Development Center 
Doctrine Development and Fleet Battle Experiments 
INmlt--1 
.._ ______ Doctrine Use and Evaluation 
SUdoS 
The lessons we learn through that process will determine the sorts of doctrinal 
changes that ought to be incorporated into our educational and training systems 
to continue an evolutionary process of concept development in the 21st century. 
It's an exciting development that will capitalize on a couple of things that are 
important for us during this inter-war period. 
Melding our historical perspective with current operational experience and 
conceptual thinking about how to apply new technologies and new ways to fight 
the fight, will enable us to evolve new doctrines, technologies, and procedures 
that will be incorporated into our training process. 
It's an exciting synergy that will include our War College and Postgraduate 
School students, as well as bringing into the mix people with current warfighting 
experience, in an effort to further develop our conceptual and innovative ability 
in this inter-war period. 
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Looking to the Future 
• Naval Studies Board - Sep 97 
- Technology for the United StaJes Navy and Marine 
Corps 2000-2035 
• CNO Executive Panel Task Force - Mar 98 
- Navy Line Officer Advanced Education Requirements 
for the 21st Century 
• CNO Officer Education Policy Document - Fall 98 
Where are we going next? There are two key things that have been undertaken 
in the last six months alone. One is the output of the Naval Studies Board, which 
reported out in September 1997. 
Second is a study by a CNO Executive Panel -- some of the members from that 
group are here today -- which is looking at the role of advanced application and 
development of navy line officers, in particular for the 21st century. Their 
efforts are aimed at the development of an updated CNO policy on officer 
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Technology for the United States Navy 
and Marine Corps 2000-2035 
People: The Critical Resource 
• All system designs: fewer people with more technical 
acumen and capability at their disposal 
- USS YORKTOWN "Smart Ship" experiment 
• Naval forces must be ready to exploit or defend against 
new technologies application in the battlefield 
- Exploit with information superiority and integrated 
systems: ie., Network Centric Warfare 
- Defend against adversaries who exploit the global 
technology base 
SUdo7 
A couple of things came out of the Technology for the Navy and Marine Corps document. 
It reaffirmed that people are our critical resource. The trend in the procurement of modem 
systems is to design fewer and fewer people into those systems. The Smart Ship is a 
successful experiment. One of the fall-outs of that kind of trend is that individual people 
require broader activity, broader exposure to the technology, broader understanding of the 
tasks at hand, in order to be able to carry out their functions with a smaller crew. 
Secondly, Navy forces must be able to exploit or to defend against new technological 
applications in the field. RADMNutwell will be talking about our concept ofnetwork-
centric vice platform-centric warfare as the way in which warfighting will be organized in 
the future. It places demands on the career development of officers able to engage in that 
kind of evolution in technological warfare. Individual warfighters will still demand 
platform skills, but we must lay on top of that the knowledge of the battlespace that comes 
from current methods, at much more senior levels than we currently demand. 
Thirdly is the requirement to be able to defend against technologies that are 
proliferating and are much more widely available than they were in the Cold War era. Our 
previous assumption that only those who could afford large standing militaries could afford 
those very sophisticated technologies was wrong. 
These dimensions demand a level of conceptual thinking, technological comfort, and 
analytical process, combined with a very deliberate notion of conceptualizing involving 
tactics, techniques and procedures --things that are normally acquired from an education 
system, not just products of a training experience process. 
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CNO Study: Navy Line Officer Advanced 
Educati.on Requirements for the 21st Century 
JI". Intellectually lead in strategic and 
operational planning 
• Shape technology in innovative ways for 
naval purposes 
• Develop doctrine, tactics and techniques 
for employment of advance weapons 
systems 
..... 
As I mentioned earlier, about two months ago the CNO tasked the CNO 
Executive Panel to begin a look at Navy line officer advanced education 
requirements for the 21st century. He requested that the panel report their 
findings to him by late February to early March. These are the pretty big 
families of ideas that we are looking for as the general descriptors of what 
we believe officers need to be able to do for the 21st century -- all of which 
we think demand a pretty heavy-duty investment in education - not just at 
the prescribed times in the life of an officer, but probably a continuing 
commitment to learning and progressing. 
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Characteristics would include: 
- Well versed in Military History 
- Understand Joint/Integrated Force Application 
- Comfortable with technology and it's 
impact on the battlefield 
- Able to adapt quickly 
- Conceptual thinker, developed analytical skill 
- Strong moral and ethical foundation 
CNOEXECUTIVEPANELSTUDY 
"Navy Line Officer Advanced Education Requirement 
for the 21st Century" 
This a notional descriptor ofwhat we think the basic characteristics of the 
warrior for the 21st century ought to be - each of them laying a pretty heavy 
demand on the education system, and for Navy officers, a particular challenge. 
The education syste~ must imbue in our officers a knowledge of military 
history, an understanding of joint and integrated force applications, a level of 
comfort with technology, not so much to enable warfighters to design those 
systems, but to enable them to recognize the applicability of emergent 
technologies to the warfighting arena and to understand what the introduction of 
those technologies will mean to the way we fight, and the way we command and 
control the fight. Clearly, the demand for adaptability and for conceptual 
thinking and analytical skills apply in settings like the Naval Warfare 
Development Center, where there's time for contemplative effort applying one's 
operational experience to new ways of thinking and new ways of applying 
technologies; but equally important, the ability to adapt and conceive and 
innovate on the run in the heat of battle, a skill that takes comfort in the 
analytical processes developed probably only in an educational environment, and 
practiced in the field. And that without question requires strong leadership 
founded in ethics and values. All of those kinds of skills, added on top of a 
continued requirement for physical strength, stamina, endurance and agility are 
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Navy Line Officer Advanced Education 
Requirements for the 21st Century 
CNO Executive Panel Study Terms of Reference: 
• Expected role of education in 21st century? 
• Best balance between Plvffi, Grad Ed, and continuing education? 
• Desirable balance between civilian and military education institutions? 
• How to fit into already crowded Navy career patterns? 
• How much should education be linked to promotion? 
• How to promote a stronger culture within the Navy for advanced education? 
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Career paths for naval officers have not gotten any easier as we've gotten smaller 
-- as we've moved from the Cold War into the late 20th and early 21st centuries. 
So the CEP is confronted with some challenges that are very familiar to people 
who have worked on officer career path and education issues over the lifetime of 
most of us in the Navy. Their primary challenge is to determine the balance of 
requirements for PME and JPME and continuing education. What balance 
should be struck between the opportunity to study the art and science of war 
together with one's brothers and sisters in arms, and the exposure of military 
intellectuals to the thinking of civilians who engage in the other dimensions of 
the application of U.S. power? What mix do we seek in our exposure inside 
institutions like the Naval War College and the Naval Postgraduate School, and 
in our education at civilian institutions? How we fit all the kinds of growth 
experiences that we suspect young officers need today inside already crowded 
Navy career paths continues to be a problem for us. 
And what kind of link should exist between formal educational experiences and 
promotion opportunities inside our services? And, lastly, as all of you in dark 
blue Navy uniforms will admit, we must address the culture of our Navy with 
regard to formal education and its tie to the development of the warrior ethic. 
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CNO Education Policy will .. 
• Demonstrate Navy Leadership commitment. 
• Incorporate insights of this conference and recommendations of ongoing 
CNO Executive Panel study on Advanced Education. 
• Describe the Navy Education Continuum incorporating: 
- Undergraduate, graduate, P:ME, JPME, Leadership Continuum 
- Address the linkage between education and career advancement. 
• Address appropriate evolution from traditional PME toward a more 
technically and analytically-focused dimension oflearning. 
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We expect, as a result of the CEP, that sometime in the next year the CNO 
will issue an updated education policy he hopes will accomplish these kinds of 
things, and will demonstrate his personal commitment to the educational 
dimension of warrior development. This personal commitment is evidenced by 
his support of events such as this conference, with regard to the role of 
technology and analytical skills in the development of PME and JPME, 
describing our Navy educational continuum including the link between 
education and career advancement. We think addressing the ·evolution of a Navy 
definition of PME must take in the contributions of technology and analysis in 
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MAJOR GENERAL TIMOTHY A. KINNAN, USAF 
Commandant, Air War College, Air University 
Air Education and Training Command, Maxwell Air Force Base, AL 
The general was born in Tacoma, Washington. He entered the Air Force in June 1970 as 
a graduate of the U.S. Air Force Academy. He is a command pilot with more than 3,000 
flying hours, primarily in the F-4, F-15 and F-16 aircraft. He has been assigned to 
numerous operational, command and staff positions, including four tours in NATO. He 
has commanded a fighter squadron and two wings. While commanding the 347th Wing at 
Moody Air Force Base, Georgia, he was responsible for the first deployment of 
America's Air Expeditionary Force.· 
The general received a Bachelor of Science degree in astronautical and aeronautical 
engineering from the U.S. Air Force Academy, Colorado Springs, Colorado, and a 
Master of Science degree in astronautical and aeronautical engineering from Purdue 
University, West Lafayette, Indiana. He is a Distinguished graduate of Squadron Officer 
School and National War College. 
His most recent duties have included serving as executive officer to the chief of staff, 
Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe, Mons, Belgium; commander, 401st Fighter 
Wing, A viano Air Base, Italy; military assistant to the secretary of the Air Force, 
Washington, D.C.; commander, 347th Wing, Moody Air Force Base, Georgia. He is 
currently deputy commander, North Atlantic Treaty Organization's 5th Allied Tactical 
Air Force, headquartered in Vicenza, Italy. 
The general's major awards and decorations include the Defense Superior Service Medal, 
Legion of Merit with oak leaf cluster, Meritorious Service Medal with four oak leaf 
clusters, Air Medal, and Air Force Commendation Medal. He was also the first recipient 
of the Air Force's Robinson Risner Trophy. 
General Kinnan and his wife, Sue, of Boothbay Harbor, Maine, have two daughters, 
Jennifer and Emily. 
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• THE USAF AND P ME: FOR THE 2J8TCENTURY 
Major General Tim Kinnan 
Air War College 
I'm pleased to be here with some very distinguished co- panelists. It's a great 
honor for me, as a relative newcomer to the world of PME, at least on the 
delivery side. It is a sure bet that I'm gaining far more from this experience than I 
could ever hope to contribute. With that, I'm going to do the same things that the 
previous two speakers have just done, and that is to talk about the results of 
Goldwater- Nichols and the Skelton Panel efforts, particularly as they impact the 
United States Air Force and the schools at Air University. 
That isn't what I was going to talk about. As a matter of fact, Bob Scales and 
I got together and cooked up a scheme where we were going to break up the 
program and do something a little different. We decided, in a spirit of jointness 
and intellectual curiosity, that we would talk about each other's service. 
Specifically, he would go through an effort to determine who, in his mind, the 
most ·important Air Force officer who has ever lived was and to justify that choice. 
I, on the other hand, would determine who the most important U.S. Army officer 
who ever lived was and justify that choice. 
We had worked on that about a week, when Bob called me. He was really 
excited, and said, "I've decided on Curtis LeMay, because he's about 
development of the strategic deterrent, and because of the role that played in 




• Where We've Been 
• What Was Wrong 
• What We've Done Since 
• A Modest Proposal 
That sounded good to me. And he said, "How are you doing?" I 
said, "Well, Bob, as a matter of fact, I've got a little bit of a problem. I've 
narrowed it down to two Army officers, and I can't decide whether I want 
to talk about Hap Arnold or Billy Mitchell." (laughter). It was at that point 
that Bob decided, maybe we'd better talk about what we were told to 
talk about. I said, 'Well, okay, we can do that." 
The Skelton Panel, of course, made a number of recommendations. 
VVhat I'd like to address briefly, from the Air Force perspective, is, 
"Were they good?" and "What have we done with them?" 
In addition to that, I have a faculty proposal I'd like to lay on the table 





• 1987--Panel on Military Education 
• 1989--First Report 
- Recommendations for Pl\1E institutions 
• 1991Air Force Response to Committee 
Recommendations 
- 29 of 30 at ACSC Implemented 
-29 of32 atAWC 
I'll start with where we've been. I'm not going to go through a 
pictorial on that, because most of you know far more about that than I 
do. 
Let me just say that the report from the Skelton Panel, when it was 
published in 1989, was distributed to the leaders of the Communist 
nations around the world. They read it, and they realized that, after all 
these centuries of not thinking in a joint way, suddenly we were going to 
start thinking in a joint way. It terrified them so much that they closed 
their shops and left. And you know how the rest came out. 
Looking at the recommendations from that Panel, ACS, our 
intermediate school, has implemented 29 of the 30 recommendations. 
Our Air War College has implemented 29 of 32 recommendations. 
I'd be happy to discuss the three we didn't implement if anybody 
wants to during the discussion period. Let me just say, they weren't the 
more substantial recommendations. They were sort of in the margins. 
So that there's no suspense regarding what I'm coming to as my 
"bottom line," let me say that, from the perspective of the Air Force, 
these initiatives have greatly improved, in my view, the education of 
military officers. · 
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WHAT WAS WRONG? 
• Insufficient Focus on Joint Education 
• Faculty Weaknesses 
- Quality and Experience 
• AWC had Most Passive Learning (62%) 
• Least Rigorous Academic Standards 
- Limited Testing and Grading 
• No Clear School Objective or Mission Statement 
What was wrong in the Air Force part of this? First of all, we didn't 
have a focus on joint education in our service schools to the extent that 
we probably should have, outside of NDU. When we looked at our 
faculty, we didn't see a lot of jointness there. There was a shortage of 
quality and experience in those faculty members from our own service. 
We had ad hoc faculty development, if any; and in many cases, we had 
none. 
The problem, particularly for the Air Force, was passive learning. 
Sixty- two percent of our curriculum was lectures and videos - passive 
experiences. No activity was required of the students. The Air War 
College was probably the least rigorous at the time - academic 
standards, minimal grading, no testing, and not a lot of requirement for 
cbncrete evaluated output by the students. 
Finally, we really had no clear mission. We couldn't look to a 
mission statement or description of what we did for a living at the Air 
War College or Air University, in general at our schools, and say, ''This 
is what we're here for. This is what we do." We didn't have a plan that 
enabled us to focus on the words in our statement of goals and 
objectives and understand what was supposed to be going on. 
2-26 
• Learning Methods Now 80% Active, vice38% · ... 
• 100% graded ... Focus on Active Evaluation 
- Essay tests 
- 25 Page Research Papers 
• Electives Increased from 80 to 192 Hours 
• Air University Initiatives for Educational 
Continuum and Accredited Degrees 
What have we done since then? As a result implementing the Panel's 
recommendations, we have increased active learning from 38 percent to 80 
percent - in other words, an increase in graded papers, take- home exams, 
case studies, student presentations, war games, exercises and the like. This 
is a vast improvement in the way we do business, with a great increase in 
rigor. A hundred percent of our courses are graded now - both core courses 
and elective courses. We have instituted a flexible system of electives that 
supports the core. We call them core electives. We've increased that part of 
the program from 80 to a 192 hours. These are rigorous electives; there are 
no courses in basket weaving. The courses are directly related to what our 
mission objectives are. 
There are some other initiatives underway through Air University that I'll 
touch on just briefly. For example, one of the things the Skelton Panel report 
showed us was that we needed to think through the continuum in education. 
What should be studied, when should we worry about national military 
strategy, when should we worry about operational art, and when should we 
worry about making better warriors in specific areas of expertise? 
We are thinking those things through and developed a scheme by which 
we're examining the educational continuum across an entire career. What we 
found is that there are some gaps in there, because of the times in people's 
careers when they go to the in- residence schools or take correspondence or 
seminar courses. We're looking at ways to fill those gaps, such as through 
distance- learning techniques and some other initiatives. 
Another thing we're doing - - thanks to those of you who paved the way 
on this - - is pursuing accredited degrees both for graduates at the Air War 
College and Air Command Staff College. This is something that, we think, 
ultimately will make a better institution and a better graduate. 
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• The mission of the Air War College is to 
educate senior officers to lead at the 
strategic level in the employment of air and 
space forces, including joint operations, in 
support of national security. 
We have a mission statement. If you look at it, there are words like 
strategic, lead, joint, air and space. It's a mission statement that tells us 
what we're supposed to be doing, and everything that we do in support 





• A WC was First Senior School Phase! ' 
Accredited (1992) 
• We Meet 0Pl\.1EP Standards for 
Student/Faculty Mix 
• Study National Military Strategy, while 
maintaining focus on Air and Space Power 
How are we doing as far as jointness is concerned? A lot better than 
we used to. We were the first senior school accredited for Phase One 
Joint PME in 1992. As all you know, that's a five- year process. We 
have just been reaffirmed by a PAJE Team accreditation, and we were 
very pleased with the outcome. For those of you who have that coming 
up, I'll tell you that it was a positive experience. It's a great opportunity 
for mid- course corrections, and a great opportunity for the educational 
institutions to think, through the eyes of the PAJE Team, about what 
they're doing and where they can do things differently to improve. 
We've met the OPMEP standards. If you walk into one of our 
seminars, you'll find Army, Navy and/or Marine Corps, civilians, at least 
two international officers, International Guard, Air Force Reserve, and 
Army Reserve representation there. You can walk in on any given day 
and hear an Army student trying to each others how to say, "Hu-ah," or 
you could see an-Air Force officer trying to teach the other services the 
fine points of grip, stance and swing. There's a lot of jointness going on. 
What's even more impressive than the mix, though, is the quality of 
the students. I'd like to tip my hat to our sister services. The quality of 
the students you send to the Air War College is extraordinary. As proof 
of that, the Army colonel list just came out and our students were a 
hundred percent, including one below the zone. They are of a very high 
quality, and that makes the program so much more valuable to 
everybody who's in it. 
Yes, we focus on national military strategy. But, of course, it bears 
saying that we are still the Air War College, and our focus is on air and 
space power from the service perspective. And I think we have come to 





• Increase from 6 Civilian F acuity to 30 
-90%PhDs 
• Military F acuity Experience 
- 75% Command Experience 
- 97% Advanced Degrees 
- 90% Senior Service School Grads 
• 25% Military are from Other Military Depts 
What have we done as far as the faculty is concerned? We've 
greatly increased the civilian faculty, and the quality is very impressive. 
They add another dimension to what we do in school. Those of you 
who have been associated with the quality of civilian faculty at the 
National War College and at Navy schools in the past, know what that 
dimension adds. The level at which we are doing this now is fairly new 
to us. 
We continually look at our military faculty to make improvements, 
and try to make it even better. As far as PAJE requirements for MEP, 
as I mentioned before-those are laid out in the OPMEP - - I'm very 
pleased with the quality of the instructors, not only of our services, but 
those the other services provide as well. 
Another thing we've done is to improve the overall ratio of students 
to faculty. We were in the middle of the pack at the time of the report --
somewhere between 4:1and5:1. Today, we're 3.22:1. It doesn't 
require me to say anything about how that improves the institution. 
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SMART THINGS TO DO? 
• Surveys of Grads' Supervisors 
• What Percentage Rated A WC as "excellent" 




What's the result of all this? We say, "Gee, these things sound 
great. These are improvements. This is better. We like it." But is there 
any way to measure that objective? One thing we do - - and I know 
the other schools do it too - - is to survey the senior people our 
graduates are working for one to two years after they have graduated. 
The grades these supervisors, bosses, leaders, and commanders have 
given our War College graduates have improved our "excellent to 
outstanding" rating from 49 percent in 1989 to 71 percent in 1996. 
I would submit that that is beyond the realm of sampling error. Of 
course, any time you survey like this, there are so many inputs that it's 
hard to pin down results. I think, as a result of the PAJE reports and 
the implementation of the recommendations, that we have a better 
school program. 
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• Skelton Panel's recommendation sought to 
improve PME, increase jointness 
• We've all done well in moving in this 
direction with their guidance and assistance 
• But there are still things we can do to 
improve both even further 
• We have a joint student body, but not 
necessarily a joint faculty 
Are there other things we can do? Yes, there are. We are at a time now 
where we've made changes in each of our schools. We've got some things 
that are working very well. One of the things that happens when you dictate 
specific rules in an area like this, is unintended consequences. Jim alluded to 
some of them. We need to go back now and make sure we consolidate the 
many gains that we have made. We need to examine what the real impact of 
some of the details of both the Goldwater- Nichols legislation and the other 
things are. He gave some very good examples. 
I'd like to go just a little bit further with just one of his examples - - and this 
goes back to something Mark Smith alluded to -Joint PME Phase 2. The 
way that we now do that is by TOY or TAD attendance. Mr. Smith mentioned 
that the CINCs are frustrated because they get an outstanding young staff 
officer up to speed after three to six months, and then suddenly lose the 
services of this officer for three to four months. Regardless of the value of the 
school that the officer attends, and the additional capability that officer brings 
back to that staff, it's still a significant gap on that staff for an extended period 
of time. The CINC understands that pretty well, because that CINC is a 
product of the system, knows what went into the legislation and what went into 
the requirements. 
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I see (Brig Gen) Ralph Pasini sitting out there. He and I have just completed 
joint tours laboring in the vineyards of NATO, where he worked for a German 
three-star general and I worked for an Italian three-star general. I can't tell you 
how difficult it is to go in to that German or Italian three-star boss - and he and I 
both had opportunities to do this -- and explain why the most productive, dynamic 
young officer on his staff is going to be gone for four months. It's a very difficult 
thing to do, and it's one of the unintended consequences that we need to do 
something about. 
As we look forward, again I'd like to reemphasize the point that we are much 
better off now than we were. I would also add that, left to our own devices, we 
wouldn't have done these things ourselves that have improved us. So I applaud 
the effort that went into this. Although it was painful at the time, I think we all have 
to agree that the benefits far outweigh the negatives. 
But we have to look ahead, too; and I know that's what a majority of this 
conference is going to do. General Chilcoat last night talked about the revolution 
in military education that has to take place to support the revolution in military 
affairs. When we think about technology, we have to think about jointness and how 
do we do those things in the future. 
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• 
CIVILIANS IN PME: 
• Civilians consititute one third to one half of 
the faculty at ISS, SSS and academies 
• Some may be prior service, most are not. 
• Provide continuity for the faculty 
• They are not joint trained and educated but 
are responsible for helping to insure that 
this happens for their students 
I'd like to toss out one proposal, which I recommend become an item 
of interest to the MEP, and that has to do with civilian faculty - an area 
that has been left out a little bit, not so much in numbers, but in who 
these people are and how they are developed. They have been left out 
of the PME process, although they are a large and probably growing 
percentage of our capabilities to teach in our schools. They're super 
individuals. They add a lot of rigor to the program, but they don't have a 
lot of first-hand knowledge about the other services because they tend 
to come from academia. They tend to be associated with one of the 





A MODEST PROPQ$J-k 
• We Exchange Students and MilitfifS' "; . 
Faculty between Services ... 
• Why Not Exchange Civilian Faculty 
between the PME schools of the 
. . 
vanous services 
• Service Academies could take part 
Here's our proposal. Why not exchange civilian faculty between 
schools in a way similar to how we exchange faculty and students on 
the military side between the services? What would that do for us? We 
could start out with bilateral trades, and we really don't need to change 
any of the rules, laws or regulations to do that in a small way. Bob and I 
could trade a couple of civilian faculty members. If there's a case 
coming up where he's got a shortfall and he's got an exercise, and he's 
got something coming up and needs some particular expertise, I could 
loan him somebody for six months. We could work things like that -
treat it like a sabbatical. It would add benefit when that person returns 
to our school, because of what they would gain from the other school 
and from that other service. 
· What an enabler that would be! Many of you are familiar with the 
IPA (Intergovernmental Personnel Act) legislation. It allows us to bring 
in civilian faculty- - from six months to a four- year period - - without 
a lot of expenditure other than paying salary through the institution that 
we are borrowing them from and paying some per diem and relocation 
cost. This is a very valuable piece of legislation, because it allows us to 
tailor our faculties on a shorter term basis than we would be able to do 
strictly working within the civil service and Title 10 employees that we 




SP EC/Ff CALLY . .. 
Amend existing IP A legislation to 
permit intra-governmental as well as 
inter-governmental exchanges. 
What would it require us to do? I would like to see an amendment to 
the IPA legislation to allow us to exchange civilian faculty between 
service schools at both intermediate and senior levels, and between the 
academies. We would use the same rules laid out in the IPA 
legislation. For example, if any of the other schools send us a professor 
for a two- year period, we pay that individual's salary through their 
school. We would also be authorized to pay for relocation cost and the 
standard per diem as part of the IPA legislation, as it currently exists. 
This is something that I think would be of tremendous benefit to the 
faculty. It would be a benefit to exchanged faculty members; it would 
be a benefit to the gaining school, during the period of that sabbatical 
period, and the owning school when that individual returns. I think we'd 
see enhanced academic freedom and frank exchange on different 
service perspectives. 
Most of our civilian faculties, unlike a lot of our military faculties, are 
very focused and very specialized in areas of particular interest to them. 
If we could share that between the Services, I think it would be a great 




• Home institution continues to pay salary' · 
and benefits--reimbursed by gaining 
institution 
• Maximum of $25 per diem for up to one 
year also paid ($9,025) 
• Period of service for 6 months to four years 
(as in original legislation) 
• No other expenditures involved 
But it's not without cost. The civilian faculty is our continuity, just like 
our civil service friends provide continuity in a lot of our units. We 
wouldn't want to introduce additional turnover and turmoil. Initially, at 
least, this would be a small-scale thing. There is also the funding issue 
- about $9, 000 a year for faculty members - about what the per diem 
works out to in the $25 days authorized by the IPA legislation. Then, of 
course, there's always the fear that the faculty would be captured by the 
other institution -- find a home and stay. Then they'd lose that person's 
services for the long term. We can live with that. I think it's worth a 






: <Y:rimt .·"' 
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• Share individual expertise for curriculmri ··.·· . 
development, faculty development 
• More fully utilize those already familiar 
with PME environment 
• Permit "new blood" without permanent hire 
• Joint training and education of PME 
civilians 
• Enhance quality of jointness and PME 
• 
DISADVANTAGES 
... _.-.·;·::. '. 
• Additional turnover in faculty at academies 
and PME institutions 
• Additional funding for IP As to be used for 
per-diem or relocation (only applies for a 
maximum of one year) 
• May disrupt faculty with some wishing to 
stay at a different institution 
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CONCLUSION 
• Thanks to the Goldwater-Nichols Actali(f .. 
the Skelton Panel ... 
• We are closer to producing "Masters of the 
Profession of Arms." 
attributed to Harry Summers! 
• But there is still ground to be plowed! 
In conclusion, I'd like to say thank you to those who were involved in 
the Goldwater- Nichols and Skelton Panel processes, because I think 
they have improved our capability to do the things that we do. Because 
of them, I think we are closer to producing "Masters of the Profession of 
Arms." That's the business we should be in. That's What we are doing, 
and I think, through these enablers, we are doing that better. 
But I would also say, let's not slow or stop. Let's consolidate our 
gains. Let's fix those areas where unattended consequences are 
detracting from our ability to do what we do, and let's look to the future 
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and 
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BGen Robert R. Blackman, Jr., USMC 
President, Marine Corps University 
First I'd like to thank the Naval Postgraduate School and the Office of Naval 
Research for extending an invitation to the Marine Corps University to participate in 
this conference. This is not going to take very long and, regrettably, there are no 
new revelations in what I'm going to say. But sometimes there's value in collating 
and summarizing what we all think we understand. 
The Goldwater-Nichols Act and subsequent review of professional military 
education by the Skelton Panel provided a wake-up call for military educators and 
leaders. While the services have done well implementing changes to the way we 
educate officers and by providing enhanced joint education, the real impact of 
Goldwater-Nichols and the Skelton Panel may very well lie in the future. 
Goldwater-Nichols and the Skelton Panel are Cold-War-era legislation and 
studies. But that doesn't make them a legacy of a time long past. In fact, just the 
opposite is true. 
The greatest value of Goldwater-Nichols and the Skelton Panel is that they 
helped evolve professional military education and our PME institutions so that we 
are now poised to enter the next century with the proper and necessary foundation 
to educate 21st century leaders. 
Marine Corps University is a good case in point. During the later part of the 
1980s, the Marine Corps determined that our construct for providing PME needed~ . 
an overhaul. Goldwater-Nichols and the Skelton Panel recommendations provided 
impetus, direction, and the incentive to help us focus our efforts. The resulting 
improvements are evident in our facilities, our military and civilian faculty, and our 
improved curricula. The fact that we have been successful so far in our efforts to 
accredit our Marine Corps Command and Staff College masters degree program 
with the Southern Association of Colleges and Schools is another indication of 
improvement and success brought on by Goldwater-Nichols and the Skelton Panel. 
So the reality is that, while Goldwater-Nichols and the Skelton Panel 
recommendations helped PME institutions correct some noted deficiencies, the real -
and perhaps more important impact is that our institutions are now prepared for the 
very real business of dealing with the challenges of providing education for the 21st 
century warrior. 
2-41 
Never before has the need been greater for educating our officers. Sound 
leadership, warfighting, and decision-making skills will be a requirement hour by 
hour and day to day, in peace and in war. The challenges that face us today are the 
challenges of uncertain and ambiguous threats. The military leader of the 21st 
century must be as comfortable working in an uncertain environment as our 
generation of soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines was when we thought we knew 
exactly who our enemies were and where we would fight them. It will take a 
different kind of thinker and leader to be successful in the next century. 
Trying to describe what the 21st century warrior-leader should look like is a 
difficult task. But some things don't change. Leaders must be physically and 
morally fit to endure the rigors of combat and the stresses of leadership. At the 
same time, our future leaders at all levels - from lieutenant to general officer -- must 
be more aware, more attuned to change, and more capable of succeeding in 
ambiguous and uncertain situations. They must be agile thinkers able to identify 
threats that aren't clearly defin~d, and to exploit opportunities that are fleeting. 21st 
century military leaders will have to know how to use information-age technology 
and systems to best advantage while retaining the ability to lead from th· front in 
combat. Leaders at the very lowest level will have to be confident and savvy 
enough to take needed actions not necessarily spelled out in their orders; and 
generals will have to be skilled in articulating guidance and intent, and confident 
enough in the training and education we've provided young leaders to trust them. 
Combat will continue to be what it has always been -- chaotic, vicious, deadly 
and frightening. Indications are that future asymmetric enemies may use our very 
culture as weapons against us by perpetrating unthinkable atrocities against 
combatants and noncombatants alike, hoping to so affect our culturally based 
sensitivities that we are shocked into inaction. Preparing leaders to operate in an 
environment like that will be difficult. 21st century leaders will not just have to be 
technically and tactically proficient. They will need more than ever to understand 
the moral dimensions of our profession and be well-grounded themselves in the 
values and virtues necessary to make the right decisions for the right reasons. 
As important as what we teach, is who we teach. Every officer must be 
educated if we are to be as successful in the future as we have been in the past. In 
the Marine Corps we can only provide resident education to a portion of our officers. 
Therefore our PME outreach to the majority of officers who will not have the 
opportunity to attend courses in residence is as important to our future as the 
product of our resident schoolhouses. Along that same line, we must view PME as 
a life-long pursuit, not just the two or three years an officer may spend at resident 
schools. This will require relevant and imaginative programs that will gain and 
maintain the officer's interest and through which he or she will see the tangible 
results of their efforts. 
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Likewise, reserve officers deserve the opportunity to have a high-quality 
professional military education so that they can successfully prepare their units and 
themselves for active service alongside their regular counterparts. 
Technology favors our efforts to provide this outreach, and we are leveraging 
advances in interactive courseware, computer simulations, use of the Internet and 
video-teleteaching. Successful learning organizations, like those that we all 
represent, are made up of highly educated individuals who understand and 
embrace change. PME outreach programs will ensure that we have the educated 
force we need to seize the opportunities that lie before us. 
In summary: 
• PME is more important than ever because our officers will be called on at every 
level to make decisions of a magnitude we have never seen before. They will be 
making those decisions in an environment of unimaginable pressures and 
demands. 
• PME will have to be continuous, not just spikes in an officer's career at career, 
intermediate, and senior service college levels. 
• We will have to provide a quality PME experience for every officer, whether he 
or she is active or reserve, or enrolled in a resident or non-resident program. 
• We will have to employ technology not only to export non-resident education and 
enhance the resident experience, but we need to push modeling and simulation 
to the limits to create vicarious opportunities for officers to make complex 
decisions in the chaos, uncertainty, and terrifying environment of combat. 
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BRIGADIER GENERAL ROBERT R. BLACKMAN, JR., USMC 
President, Marine Corps University 
Brigadier General Robert R. Blackman, Jr., currently serves as the President of the 
Marine Corps University, Marine Corps Combat Development Command, Quantico, VA. 
General Blackman began his current assignment as the President of the Marine Corps 
University in August 1996. He was promoted to brigadier general on October 1, 1996. 
General Blackman was commissioned upon graduation from Cornell University in June 
1970. After completing The Basic School, he served as a platoon commander and 
company executive officer in 1st Battalion, 4th Marines. In March 1972, he reported to 
Marine Corps Recruit Depot, San Diego, where he served as a series commander and 
Director of the Sea School until July 1975. 
Following Amphibious Warfare School, General Blackman served as S-3A and a rifle 
company commander in 3d Battalion, 1st Marines. Assigned to the 3d Marine Division in 
January 1980, he served as the S-3 for 2d Battalion, 4th Marines. Upon return to the U.S., 
he served as the Plans Officer in the Officer Assignment Branch at Headquarters Marine 
Corps. After graduation from the Marine Corps Command and Staff College in June 
1985, he was assigned to the Air-Ground Exchange Program with MAG-26 where he 
served as the S-3A and S-3. 
General Blackman reported to the 2d Marine Division in June 1987, and was assigned as 
the Executive Officer of the 8th Marines. In May 1988, he assumed command of 3d 
Battalion, 8th Marines. Following the return of BLT 3/8 from a Mediterranean 
deployment with the 22nd MEU, he was assigned to Top Level School as a Fellow in 
National Security Affairs at the Kennedy School of Government. In August 1990, 
General Blackman was assigned to the Operations Division at Headquarters Marine 
Corps. From there he was assigned as the G-3 Operations Officer for COMMARCENT 
(Forward) in Southwest Asia. Upon return to CONUS in March 1991, he was reassigned 
as Head, Current Operations Branch, Headquarters Marine Corps. In July 1991, General 
Blackman reported to U.S. Central Command for duty as the Commander in Chiefs 
Executive Officer. In August 1993, he assumed command of the 15th MEU. Upon 
completion of his tour with the MEU, he assumed his last assignment in March 1995 as 
the Military Assistant to the Secretary of the Navy. 
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COLONEL JAMES W. BEAUCHAMP, USA 
Director, OPMS XXI Implementation Team 
Colonel James W. Beauchamp was selected as the Director of the Officer Personnel 
Management System (OPMS) XXI Implementation Team on July 1, 1997. Colonel 
Beauchamp's organization will implement those changes developed by the OPMS XXI 
Task Force, educate the officer corps on those changes, and coordinate proponency for 
the new system Prior to this assignment, he served as the Chief, Leader Development 
and Training Division on the OPMS XXI Task Force. 
Colonel Beauchamp was born December 7, 1947, in Lawton, Oklahoma. Graduating with 
a Bachelor of Science degree from the Cameron University in 1970, he began his career 
as an Infantry Officer. He holds a Master of Science degree in Public Administration 
from Western Kentucky University. He graduated from the Air Command and Staff 
College in 1981; the National War College in 1990. 
His military experience spans more than 27 years of service in various levels of command 
and staff positions. His commands include Company A, 4th Battalion, 23d Infantry, Fort 
Richardson, Alaska; Company B, lOlst Aviation Battalion, Fort Campbell, Kentucky; 9th 
Armored Cavalry Squadron at Fort Wainwright, Alaska; and the Aviation Brigade, 7th 
Infantry Division (Light) at Fort Ord, California. He then served as deputy for readiness 
and deputy for operations for the Pacific Command, Camp Smith, Hawaii. He served a 
combat tour in Vietnam and has served in Joint and Department of the Army staff 
assignments. 
Colonel Beauchamp' s awards for peacetime and combat service include the Defense 
Superior Service Medal; the Legion of Merit; the Bronze Star; the Purple Heart; the 
Defense Meritorious Service Medal; the Meritorious Service Medal (with three oak 
leaves); the Air Medal; the Joint Service Commendation Medal; and the Combat 
Infantryman's Badge. He is also authorized to wear the Senior Parachutist Badge, the 
Senior Aviator Badge, and the Ranger Tab. 
Colonel Beauchamp resides in Burke, Virginia, with his wife, the former Jonnie 
Strickland, and their daughter, Lauren. 
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OPMS Task Force 
Implementing the 
Skelton Panel's Recommendations 
and Identifying Dimensions of 
Importance for the Future of 
Military Education: 
Insights 
..• Leaders for the 21st Century Army 1 
An earlier speaker talked about the great weather service that we have here and all 
the technology that supports it. That being the case, I wonder why we scheduled the 
conference this week (it rained .95 inches during the first 36 hours of the conference). 
Maybe technology is part of the solution; but I think every time we tum to it as the 
solution, as opposed to the process, we're making a mistake. 
Every time I look at a topic like the one I've been given here - the title would take 
longer to read than the time I am given talk - I feel a little intimidated. So what I'm 
going to do is confine my remarks to my experiences and thoughts on the joint, and 
where I think the Army is headed. It's not an Army position - it's my position. I'm also 
going to apply what I call the 95 percent rule. I think the Army is doing very well in the 
joint arena. I think we're doing very well across the board, overall. But it's like when my 
daughter comes home from school and says, "Dad, I got a 95!" I never ask her the 95 
things she got right. I also want to take a look at some of the things we may be looking 
at now that we need to look at a little closer. 
You see a lot of emphasis on technology. I will tell you: I think in many cases it is 
misplaced. There are already dollars available in technology; technology is going to 
take care of itself in many ways. The greatest thing that we can do for the 21st Century, 
in my view, is to invest in human capital. The human dimension is the one we need to 
develop the most. There are programs out there that ought to integrate technology and 
the person better than we're doing today. 
I think the pace of change in the future is going to continue to increase. There is 
no such thing as "steady state." We looked for it in the Services over the last 25 years 
as we embarked on our OPMS study and we couldn't find any steady state. It just 
doesn't exist. 
The discussion we had earlier about the relation between tactical, operational and 
strategic is exactly right, and will continue to be so. And I think the discussion of the 
military as a system of systems is right - - or, even more a~rately, I think it is an 
ecosystem, where one part of any decision affects the whole. 
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Goldwater- Nichols raised a couple of questions a few years ago. Was it 
the right thing to do? I think the Army at that time, and the services as a whole, 
needed a force from the outside to get it to look more seriously at jointness. I 
thought then it was right and am still convinced it was right 
I think, though, that creating a vision of where we want to go is the easy 
part. It is executing the vision that is very difficult. A vision without a detailed 
plan of execution is a hallucination. We need to make sure we have some way 
of looking at the programs we want; to make sure that we can do them. And 
we shouldn't just look at the program level. We need to look at program goals 
and objectives. It's the matters of performance and measure of effectiveness. 
How do we know we're getting there? It does no good to make a decision that 
solves a problem today if we don't know where we are going. We need to look 
at the future and what we want to develop and reverse-engineer a way to get 
there. 
I want to give you some clear examples of the difference between intent 
and reality. I'll start with some of the things we have in Goldwater- Nichols, 
and some in Title 4. We looked at tour lengths. We've tried to develop 
experience by making a joint tour 36 months. I've done a 36-month joint tour 
and think it was wonderful. At the same time, I know many officers who steer 
clear of joint for that very reason. The time compression for that 0-4 or 0-5 is 
very great So they think, "Well, if I need to do this, I'll try to do It later," and 
they will try to steer clear of joint. This is not what we really want for some of 
our best and brightest. 
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PME, I think, has come a long way. It is tremendous in many ways. JPME-1 is 
very good right now -- at each of the institutions. I had a chance to look at some them in 
the last year and they were very good. JPME-2, I think, needs some work. A lot of the 
people who come back from JPME-2 tell me that the JPME-1 was so good, they felt like 
they just got another dish of the same thing at JPME-2. If we're doing that, then we 
probably ought to add more rigor. 
Many of the students also tell me it's a great six-week course crammed into twelve. 
What I believe is, we ought to look at what we're doing. I think the greatest thing we have 
at AFSC is the integration of the officers. It works very, very well, but there is room for 
improvement. 
Another problem I see with JPME-2, which we talked about earlier, is assignment 
pattern. I have seen officers go to a CINC command who did not get JPME before going 
to their billet. They didn't get it during their three year billet, so they would go to the JPME 
School at the very end of their joint assignment, just before going back to their service, 
because it was easier for the CINC to do. I have seen officers, as they got the orders for 
that, cancel the JPME-2 part of it because, if they got that, they would be a JSO and might 
have to do another joint tour again. So they decided they weren't going to do that, and we 
let certain officers get away with that. 
I have seen the same thing with joint critical billets. You have a joint critical billet 
that you want to fill. You get exactly the right officer for the billet, and you find out that the 
prospective fill is not a JSO, even though they have some of the skills that you really like. 
What do we do? We move the joint critical designation to another billet. We still have the 
50 percent, but we haven't filled it like we thought we would. At CINCPAC, for instance, 
where I worked several years ago, the chief of JTF training and the chief of the crisis 
action planning team was not in a JSO billet, but the protocol officer was, because he was 
a JSO. We simply moved the designation over there. Was that the CINC trying to subvert 
the system? Absolutely not! That was the CINC trying to perform the mission the best he 
could, with the people he had available. So don't mandate that we can't do that any more. 
You've got to remember that vision is one thing, but management tends to be 
determined more by rules. So we have to make sure that we check the rules occasionally, 
and go back and assess them to see that we're really getting what we want out of them. 
For the most part, these are exceptions. Most people do go to the course, they do learn a 
lot, and they are very good officers for attending. 
I've seen the same thing in the promotion. Some of the categories we have for 
joint make great sense for promotion. "Joint other'' is one that really bothers me because, 
if I cannot count you as a "joint other", then maybe I don't want to send you back at all. 
The same thing goes for JPME at the National War College. 
When we first designated officers for joint jobs years ago, before we started the 
joint business, we just went out and looked at personnel files and said, ''These would be 
great joint officers." A few years later, when many of them were then ready to go to the 
war college, never having served in joint duty but wanting to go joint, we said, "We would • 
like to send these soldiers to the National War College." The personnel folks said, ''You 
can't do that because he doesn't count against my 50 percent, because he's already been 
given a 3-Lima, even though he's never worked a day in his life in the joint field." 
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So maybe sometimes rules don't give us exactly what we want. The same thing 
happens when we designate someone as a "three ring" when he's been promoted. What, 
then, is the incentive to send him back, other than to fill the joint critical billet? I was told, 
leaving a joint assignment this summer, "You don't need to go back to a joint critical billet. 
You're already a 3-Lima, and we've already counted you in our statistics once." I have 
about six years in joint billets and I think that's probably where I can help the Army the 
best. 
Well, I eventually got that changed, but sometimes the personnel policies that we 
intend, and the rules we write to implement them, don't give us the results we want. I 
guess I still view many things I've looked this last year like we in the Army view joint, as a 
wicket to be passed through - as a way of life. Now, the scale is sliding to the right, and 
rightfully so. But it's still not where we think it ought to be right now. The Army right now 
is - still rightfully so - a doctrine-driven, values-based, performance-oriented organization; 
and the first thing we ought to bring to the table, as everybody has said, is experience in 
our service. 
If that's the case, then the joint community should say, "Service training is, in fact, 
joint training." I believe that it is. It's like the core of an egg. It's not all of joint, but it's 
certainly the core of what we want to bring to the table, and it ought to be viewed, then, by 
the joint community as a part of the joint training program. 
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I want to talk a couple of minutes about studies. I've seen and read 
a lot of joint studies over the last several years, and most of them have 
recommended some kind of increase in joint training or duties. I look at 
them and ask myself, "If I was on that study, what would I recommend?" 
I don't have to identify a bill-payer. I don't have to identify the trade-offs. 
Am I going to recommend an increase in joint? As my 14- year- old is 
fond of saying, "Duh." I probably am. 
I will tell you, we have to not just look at what to increase, but we 
have to make sure that we drive it in the right direction. Often I'm asked, 
what is the right balance? How much is enough joint, and how much is 
enough Army? I will tell you, that's not the right question. We ought to 
dismiss it every time we hear it. We need to develop an officer corps for 
the future. We start first by identifying the skills, knowledge, and 
attributes we expect that officer to possess. Then we reverse engineer 
to get an answer to what the appropriate amount of joint training and 
Army training needed is to meet those goals to produce that type of 
officer. If it means more or less, so be it. 
We want to produce a certain set of outcomes, and it's not enough to 
go from where we are. We have to have a direction we're driving 
towards. We have to get away from the idea of solving problems for 
today. How do we know if we've got the right solution if we don't know 
where we're going? Let's determine what we want the outcome to be, 
and reverse engineer from there. 
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The same holds true for organizations. We tend to organize the Army from 
platoon to corps. All of our training documents are written that way; and yet we 
tend to fight as combined-arm teams and joint task forces. Now, we teach that to a 
degree, and I think we've got it about right in many cases. We need to do both. 
We also organize our units around our missions. So what we're finding in 
certain times, like now, is that MPs, signal, civil affairs, and PSYOP folks are being 
deployed at an inordinate rate. Now, should we increase the size of those in our 
structure? I'm not sure. But it's something we need to look at. 
As we're downsizing, we've also asked the joint staff, on a couple of 
occasions, and the Army to look at reducing the joint billet numbers. We're asking 
for about 300 billets. There's going to be another review coming up pretty soon. I 
would ask the joint staff to take a good hard look at that. I know we've only reduced 
about one percent the total billets, as we've drawn down the officer corps by about 
35 percent. What we ask is that you give it a good harc;t look and come back and 
tell us that the answer, 300, is right or wrong, or that it's going to be something 
different. But do it through analysis, not through arrogance. 
Joint is no better than the services. Each has its different place. It's not a 
hierarchical thing. It is a complementary arrangement, and we all need to think of it 
in those terms. We need to determine what we want the total force to do, and who 
does what part of that. 
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I've been working this last year on the OPMS XX.I Task Force. How do 
we design and develop a system for officers for the 21st Century? Many of 
the things I've told you about are some of the things we're doing. Let me 
give you a few examples of what the Chief of Staff of the Army has 
recently approved. In fact, that hasn't even been tasked out to everyone 
yet. But they're going to be coming. 
We think we need a more holistic approach as to determining where 
we're going. Many times, in the different areas, we find that we're too 
concerned with solving problems. Deliberate decision- making serves us 
very well, but it also tends to work on a finite set of problems at the time. 
We think that's too problem oriented. We think we need to orient decision 
making on a goal - on a vision of where we're going. 
We think we need to develop the whole person more than we have in 
the past - and not just technically. We need to do it emotionally, 
physically, and morally, and to make sure that it's an integrated program. 
These are not separate entities of the whole. The technical, tactical, 
moral, physical, emotional, and spiritual should be combined to produce 
the result we want most efficiently. 
The same thing is true in training and education. Nothing in warfare 
tends to fail as much as success. The thing that works today, won't work 
in the future. So, as much as we teach task condition standards, we have 
to have minds that adapt to situations that are changing faster than they 
have in the past. 
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We think we need to place more emphasis on education, and on how to think. 
Would we get away from the idea of task condition standards? Absolutely not. But we 
think it ought to go a little bit more towards applying those in a practical sense, as opposed 
to teaming them and regurgitating them back on exams. 
Obviously, the higher up the chain you go, the more you're going to try to develop 
those particular skills. I also think that we have too many people who are very, very 
analytical, when what we really need, in many cases, is people who can synthesize - who 
can recognize a relationship between this and some totally unrelated view in most 
people's minds. I think what we need is people who can draw together the different parts 
of an ecosystem, and realize that this action will have an affect somewhere that you might 
not tl1ink it would, somewhere along the line. 
We also have to go more into the idea of modular education. Education is not just 
the institution. Every time we hear about JPME as only an institution, we're wrong. It's 
everywhere. It's self-development. It's out in our units, and we need to get that together. 
Whoever designed this thing - three pillars - I think has got it wrong. It's a lattice 
work. It's working all three together, consecutively and concurrently. Education is 110 
longer going to be progressive and sequential. It's got to be progressive, sequential and 
continuous. But we're not doing that. We can no longer afford to rely on the PME that 
sends you back to school every eight or 10 years. It won't work. 
We think we need to define and develop exact skills, knowledge and attributes and 
write them down - make them extant, make them real and visible to everyone - -:md say, 
''These are the things we want you to have." We need to make sure they know up front 
what these are, so you can combine your self-development with what you're being taught 
to achieve those goals. And they ought to be reviewed on an annual basis to make sure 
they haven't changed. 
We've also looked at some of the other things the Chief has just approved, that are 
directly related to joint: going to the service school, for general officers. That's going to be 
reduced to no more than five percent. We're going to examine the idea of either serving 
in a joint billet or being joint qualified before battalion or brigade command. Those 
percentages should be about 25 percent before battalion command, and 50 percent 
before brigade command. Now, we obviously don't want to do that if we don't provide the 
opportunity for the officers to do that. And we want to look at the pros and cons of doing 
that in great detail before we actually implement it. But we think there's great value there. 
We also think we need to put former battalion and brigade commanders in more 
high-level joint jobs. We said, "Chief, the place you need to start is your own desk. What 
good does it do to say joint is really important when every single four star, the first time we 
looked at it, had an exec who was not joint qualified." Well, the very next exec he hired 
was joint qualified. Ifs starting where it needs to be, I think. 
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Overall, I will tell you, I think the Army is doing a very good job. 
think all the services are. We are getting away from the idea that joint is 
a wicket, and going to joint as a way of life. The things that we've done 
in JPME are absolutely the things we should have done to push us in 
that direction. We're not there yet, but we're getting there. 
Sometimes, the speed of change is as important as the change itself. 
We've got to continue to push in that direction, but we have to be careful 
that we don't alienate a lot of folks and force them to dig in their heels 
and retrench. We've got a good thing going. Let's keep it going in that 
direction. 
Lastly, I will tell you, we have to continue to focus on the future. I 
look at what I want this service, this DoD community, to look like, and I 
reverse plan to the greatest level of detail to make it work. The job for 
folks below the flag or general level, most the time, is to operationalize 
decisions. How do we take your decisions - your visions - and make 
them real? It's not a program. It isn't complete until it's inculcated into 
the officer corps. I think that's what we can try in the future. I think 
that's where we're headed. I'm very encouraged about what we're 
doing. As to where we ought to be on joint, we're not exactly there; but, 
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Fred Pang: Let me first join my collegues in commending Congressman Skelton 
for giving impetus to this conference. I also commend the Naval Postgraduate 
School and Dick Elster for putting it on. I believe this is a very timely conference, 
especially as DoD and the Administration consider and Congress debates the 
implications of the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), the National Defense 
Panel, and the Defense Reform Initiative for PME. I also want to commend the 
speakers on this panel for their excellent presentations. 
I think it probably would be most useful for me to summarize what I think are 
the key issues that have emerged in this conference thus far, and then raise some 
questions that come to mind as I consider these issues. 
First of all, there's no question that our national security environment is more 
complex, and more uncertain than it has ever been, and that it will become more so 
as we move into the 21st century. I also think there's no question that our military 
will get even smaller -- you can just look at the base-force size, the Bottom Up 
Review, and the QDR. The numbers aren't getting larger. They're getting smaller, 
and because of the resource pressure, I believe they will get even smaller. The 
downsizing isn't over, in my mind, and there are going to be a lot of pressures on 
leaders to squeeze more efficiencies out of the system. 
I think there's no question that the technology revolution will continue at a 
rapid pace; and that our leaders need to deal with that and use this revolution to 
their advantage. -
There's also no question that wartime operations and operations other than 
war will be more joint. Look at the Persian Gulf War, our operations in Bosnia, or 
read the CSIS report - the Cheney Report. It's clear we're doing three times more 
operations other than war than we did before the collapse of the Soviet Union. 
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There's no question that our military and civilian leaders will be challenged 
by this very dynamic environment to make wise decisions about the allocation of 
scarce and competing resources. And there's no question that their decisions in 
peace and in war will come under greater public scrutiny. Unfortunately, their 
comportment in their private lives will as well. 
There is no question that our PME institutions will be challenged in the vital 
task of educating our current and future leaders - equipping them to deal 
effectively with 21st century challenges to our national security. Frankly, we've 
known and debated this for a long time. Indeed, the way we have gone about 
managing and equipping our leaders has evolved over time. 
I remember when I was on the staff of the Senate Armed Services 
Committee, indeed even before that, when I worked on the OSD staff. We were 
working on DOPMA - the Defense Office Personnel Management Act. It provided 
a uniform system for the accession of our officers, and for their professional and 
career development. It set the tenure points in law so that our services would 
operate and manage their officer forces in a more uniform way. I believe that was 
an effective foundation. 
The Goldwater-Nichols Act followed, and then the Skelton Panel, which were 
all part of this evolution as we moved to more and more jointness. 
So, how are we doing? We've heard from our panelists that the answer is, 
"We're doing quite well." We've heard that there are some difficulties with 
implementation; but, overall, when you look at the evidence - and the evidence is 
in the performance of our forces - I think the answer has to be that it's looking 
quite good. 
What of the current status and future with regard to PME? And of our 
response to the guidance and recommendations of the Skelton Panel? 
Before I came to this conference, I read CJCS Instruction 1800.01 (the 
OPMEP), which was published in March of 1996. That document clearly spells out 
the framework and policies for conducting JPME through the entire personnel life 
cycle. It is quite explicit. It embodies, I believe, the bulk of the Skelton Panel 
recommendations, and also institutionalizes and evaluates the process that never 
existed before. So, the framework and guidance are there; but what are the 
implications of this evolution that we ought to consider? 
There are many questions, and we're not going to find the answers to all of 
them today. But I think it's worth considering, first, whether we need longer careers 
for some of our officers? Do we need to change DOPMA because of all the very, 
very difficult matters senior leaders must deal with? Should we get away from this 
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notion that officers really have two careers: a military career and another one later? 
Should there be some who have only one career? 
Do we need to do a better job of integrating the Reserves? Debbie Lee hit 
on that, and I agree with her. We cannot mount any kind of significant operation 
without calling on the Reserves. 
Do we need to do a better job integrating our civilians? An earlier speaker 
pointed that out that ORI has called for a Chancellor of Education and Professional 
Development to look at the way we develop civilians. That has implications for 
military PME. 
What elements of PME need to be strengthened? For example, should 
there be a greater emphasis on and continuity in presenting value systems and 
expectations of personal conduct -- of morality and ethics? 
Are we satisfied with NCO JPME, or does it also need attention? 
Today, in operations other than war, the forces we have are scattered about 
in very small groups. A question I think worth asking, is, "Are we satisfied in our 
programs and the visions that are articulated in Joint Vision 2010, the QDR, and 
other policy documents regarding our leadership requirements?" Given the critical 
role of PME, is it adequately programmed and resourced? That's a big question, 
because, in order to implement the bigger role implied in these documents, .it's 
going to take money and resources. 
These are some of the questions that have emerged thus far, and I hope I'll 
hear responses to these questions. I believe they should guide our debate as to 
where we've been and where we're headed. 
So, thank you again for inviting me, Dick. This has really been an enjoyable 
experience. 
COL Summers: Let me open, as well, with a comment about Congressman 
Skelton. Many view with alarm the fact that fewer and fewer of our congressmen 
have served in the military, as if that was a terribly bad thing. But we couldn't have 
a better friend in the military than Ike Skelton, who's never served a day on active 
duty. So, maybe we need to look beyond military service as a criterion for our 
. congressional leaders. 
Secondly, if you take .nothing away from this conference except this - it is 
that there is a bottom line to this whole business. And that bottom line is the 
battlefield, and we're getting farther and farther away from that reality. Fewer and 
fewer of our people have any firsthand battlefield experience. 
2-59 
Among other things, I am the founding editor and publisher of Vietnam 
Magazine, now in its tenth year. This last year, we had a piece by Major General 
Guy Meloy who, as some of you may know, as a lieutenant colonel in Vietnam, 
commanded the 1st and 27th Infantry "Wolfhounds." In November 1966, he got in 
a very severe fight with a Vietcong regiment. He normally commanded three rifle 
companies but, in the course of this battle, ended up commanding 11 rifle 
companies. He was reinforced piecemeal, by eight rifle companies from other 
battalions, and even beyond his brigade. In the conclusion to his article, he said 
that his other commanders didn't know him from Adam. They had never met him. 
They didn't even l<now his name. All they knew was a call sign over the radio. And 
all he knew at : them was a call sign over the radio. But he ordered them, 
literally, to their ... ~aths, and he got no argument. All he got was a "Roger" over the 
radio, as they closed with the enemy. He said, "If you want a testimonial to tne 
military's educational system, you can't get a stronger one than that." They shared 
the same concepts, the same values, the same notions, the same tactics as he did, 
and they didn't need to know each other. They didn't need to know any more than 
a call sign over the radio that said, "Move out and close in on the enemy." 
I think that is a lesson that we need to carry away. All of this military 
education has to focus on this point: when the time comes, does it work on the 
battlefield? 
There was an earlier comment about the orofessionalism of study at the 
Army War College. I spent six years on the faculty there. I was in the Army Chief 
of Staffs office, and I was sent up to the Army War College with a mission directed 
by the Chief of Staff to inquire about what went wrong in Vietnam and to write a 
teaching text for the Army War College about it. I got that task because the Army, 
in particular, was avoiding Vietnam; they didn't want to talk about it, sweeping it 
under the rug as we had done with the Korean War. As I began my research, I 
came across a document that was being used at the Naval War College up in 
Newport. It was an article written in 1915 by Commander Dudley Knox on the role 
of doctrine and naval warfare. I would commend it to you today, as a matter of fact. 
In his conclusion, he said - and this is in 1915 - "What we need 
desperately is a conception of war. Without a conception of war, we are like a ship 
in the fog - uncertain of its bearings." As we think about it, that really has great 
applicability today. 
As you think about the post-World War II era, we've had two faulty 
conceptions of war. First were the atomic purists, who said, "Conventional war is 
obsolete. Atomic war is the wave of the future and it will govern everything." It 
almost destroyed the Army and the Marine Corps, and didn't do any favors for the 
conventional forces of the Navy and Air Force, either. 
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As Colonel Jack Broughton in the Air Force first said, "When the tactical 
component of the Air Force first went into Vietnam, it had to relearn, at great cost, 
all the lessons it had forgotten from the Korean War, because it had been 
'SAC-emcised.' It had forgotten about close-air support, it had forgotten about 
air-to-air combat, and it had to relearn them at a terrible cost." 
The other great misconception was the idea of counterinsurgency. As that 
thinking went, "Conventional, forward war is maintenance; all wars of the future will 
be guerilla wars, wars of national liberation, and the like." As a recent Marine 
Corps University pamphlet by Joe Strange pointed out, "The major factor behind 
our loss in Vietnam was that we seized the wrong center of gravity." This is a basic 
military concept which, of course, was out of favor. 
We owe a great deal to the Navy because these fallacies were destroying us 
until Stansfield Turner, at the Naval War College said, "Enough of this nonsense. 
Enough of these civilians, these wizards of Armageddon, if you will, and the social 
scientists of the counterinsurgency crowd telling us about our profession. We're 
going to go back to basics. We're going to go back to fundamentals. We're going 
to go back to Mahan, to Sir Julian Corber, to von Clausewitz." And conventional 
warfare became again the basis of military education after a hiatus of many years. 
We are again in danger of forgetting that lesson, as the National Defense 
Panel goes on with a new version of counterinsurgency. Conventional wars on the 
battlefield are 'out.' They say there's going to be terrorism, and this and that and 
the other - again moving the focus away from our basic mission in the Armed 
Forces, which is to win on the battlefield. 
Most recently, General Reimer, the Army Chief of Staff, has come down on 
that thinking and, as General Powell did before him, reminded us that our basic 
function is to fight and win our nation's wars. "Yes," he said, ''we can do other 
things. We can do peacekeeping and all these other tasks, but never at the 
expense of our primary mission." In a recent speech, General Reimer reinforced 
that again. 
So, as we talk about military education, we need to talk about military 
education for whar? I would submit that the real revolution of military affairs took 
place in 1972, at the Naval War College. As we sloughed off the false doctrines of 
atomic war and counterinsurgency, we came back to the basic trade that we're in -
conventional war -- and becoming masters of that profession. 
Sir Michael Howard, a great strategist, in remarks on the revolution in 
military affairs given at a recent conference at the Army War College said, "Yes, 
the information age will bring with it great changes on the battlefield, as the 
industrial age before it brought great changes on the battlefield." We already see 
some of these revolutions. In Army field artillery, for example, what used to take 
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hours to serve a battery, now can be done almost instantaneously with global 
positioning satellites. There are enormous changes taking place, and they will 
continue to take place on the battlefield, as digitalization goes apace. But Howard 
pointed out that while all this was well and good, and while we had to take 
advantage of it, we needed to remember that we also had to fight not only in the 
Industrial and Information ages, but also in the Agrarian age. Someone with a 
sharp stick can still put out your eye. 
The task for the military today is to keep one foot in the war of the 21st 
. Century without forgetting the ancient tenets that Julius Caesar knew -- that the 
spirit of the bayonet is still with us. You forget that at your peril. 
The major challenge ahead -- the basic challenge ahead - which is beyond 
the purview of the military, is to come up with what Dudley Knox called a 
conception of war. We haven't come up with that yet. · 
I spent 38 years on active duty - 10 years as an enlisted man and 20 years 
as an officer. During that entire time, I knew who the bad guy was. It was the Cold 
War. But for the first time in 60 years, we don't know who the enemy is. And that 
has enormous ramifications, because you can train for a known enemy, as we did 
during that period, but you can only educate for an unknown enemy. 
This reflects what some of the speakers have said before. Adaptability and 
flexibility are absolutes, because we don't know who the bad guys are, and we'.ve 
got to have an officer corps educated to be able to rapidly adapt to a changing 
situation. That's the great challenge - to prepare people for the 21st Century while 
retaining the virtues of past centuries. 
As General Solomon, 8 former Army Chief of Staff, said, "Unless we have 
young men and women who will sail forward, fly forward, march forward into the 
face of the enemy, all the rest of the stuff is just junk." That's the lesson we need to 
remember as we go forth. Thank you very much. 
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2-64 
PME for the 21st Century Warrior 
A Conference Sponsored By 
NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL 
and 
OFFICE OF NAVAL RESEARCH 
CONFERENCE ON 
MILITARY EDUCATION FOR THE 21sT CENTURY WARRIOR 
Presentation by 
Gen. John J. Sheehan, USMC (Ret.) 
2A-1 
GENERAL JOHN J. SHEEHAN, USMC (Ret.) 
General John J. Sheehan was born August 23, 1940 in Somerville, Mass. He graduated 
with a degree in English from Boston College in June 1962. After graduation, he was 
commissioned a second lieutenant in the U.S. Marine Corps. He holds a master's degree 
in government from Georgetown University. He has served in various command 
positions, ranging from company commander to Brigade Commander, in both the 
Atlantic and Pacific theaters of operations. General Sheehan's U.S. combat tours include 
duty in Vietnam and the Persian Gulf. He also served in Malaya with the Far East Land 
Forces of the United Kingdom 
His staff positions include duties as regimental, division, and service headquarters staff 
officer as well as joint duty with the U.S. Army Special Forces, the office of the 
Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff and the U.S. Atlantic Command. 
His last assignment was as Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic and Commander in 
Chief, U.S. Atlantic Command. Prior to that General Sheehan served as Director for 
Operations (J-3), Joint Staff, Washington, D.C. 
General Sheehan's professional education includes the Amphibious Warfare School, 
Naval Command and Staff College, and National War College. 
His decorations include the Defense Distinguished Service Medal with two oak leaf 
clusters, Distinguished Service Medal, Silver Star Medal, Defense Superior Service 
Medal, Bronze Star Medal with Combat "V" and gold star in lieu of a second award, 
Purple Heart with gold star, the Defense Meritorious Service Medal, Meritorious Service 
Medal, Army Commendation Medal, Navy Achievement Medal, Combat Action Ribbon, 
Presidential Unit Citation, Navy Unit Commendation, National Defense Service Medal 
with one bronze star, Vietnam Service Medal, Southwest Asia Service Medal with two 
bronze stars, Republic of Vietnam Cross of Gallantry with silver star, Republic of 
Vietnam Armed Forces Honor (First Class), Kuwait Liberation Medal (Saudi Arabia), 
and Kuwait Liberation Medal (Kuwait). Other awards: The Ribbon of the Commander of 
the National Order of Merit of France, the Medal of Merit in Gold (Netherlands), Great 
Cross of the Royal Norwegian Order of Merit, Great Cross of the Military Merit of 
Portugal, Defense Intelligence Agency Director's Award, and State of Indiana 
Distinguished Service Medal. 
General Sheehan is married to the former Margaret M. Sullivan of Boston, Mass. They 




The Role of the U.S. Military 
"We the People of the United States, 
in Order to form a more perfect Union, 
establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, 
provide for the conzmon defence, 
promote the general Welfare, 
and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves 
and Posterity, do ordain and establish this 
Constitution for the United States of America.'' 
The subject that I will talk at.. :.;ut today is why America developed a Professional Military 
Education system. To answer that, I would argue, you first have to address the more 
fundamental question of why you have a military. Discussing Goldwater-Nichols is a 
temporary fix. 
If you look back at the early military history of the United States, the most fundamental 
question concerning the military was what kind of Navy we wanted? That debate had 
everything to do with the mercantile activities of the United States as a nation - with protecting 
our coastline and commercial activities from pirates and other navies. Our economic lifeblood 
was our commercial trade in Europe. Our experience with British occupation was the basis for 
our land forces. The Congress of the United States made a decision to raise an army, but it 
did not want a permanent force, because of the legacy Europe had brought to the United 
States during the early colonial days. 
These arguments framed the debate among the elite citizenry of the United States, and 
were the basis for the formation of, and the nature of, the military we developed. We were, for 
a long time, an isolationist nation - known for our ability to fight only when we were either 
attacked by pirates in the Caribbean, or were invaded by another nation, mostly the U.K. 
As we started to grow as a nation, our PME focus was on teaching naval officers, first 
and foremost, how to be officers and gentlemen. Etiquette and the fundamentals of sailing 
were covered in depth. As we came to grips with our expansionist internal policies, our 
ground-side education took on a civil engineering focus. We built forts; we opened the West; 
we protected wagon trains from Indians. The European ground combat influence was very 
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much in the colonial mindset -- how we saw the battlefields and how we trained our people. It 
was a mathematically oriented military education system. 
That was our early history. And up to World War I we, as a nation, accepted the 
European premise that our officers weren't good enough to command -- we weren't 
sophisticated enough; we weren't smart enough; we didn't have the experience of the 
legendary European heroes whose armies slaughtered generations of their own people. And 
so, I argue that our PME institutions are a product of a process in which there wasn't a whole 
lot of substantive thinking about why we have a military. 
An exception to this general process was the war period of 1939 to the end of World 
War II, when there were some bright people in the system who looked at the United States and 
determined that we couldn't survive as an isolationist nation. We had to do things differently. 
This group of people hatched most of the military ideas that were executed in World War II. 
But most of the people in that system were categorized as rebels by the peacetime War 
Department hierarchy. It was only after the early slaughter of World War II that they came to 
the fore. But most of the ideas executed during World War II were thought through before the 
war. 
Fortunately or unfortunately, at the end of World War II, our military and defense 
institutions looked at the conflict spectrum they had experienced during the war and focused 
on a land Army as the basis for their strategic learning. The whole procurement cycle and 
thought process had everything to do with organizing and training, especially how to deal with 
the correlation of forces in a force-on-force engagement. We never thought through much 
more than the principles of mass material, and firepower and their effect on casualties. 
Now, all of a sudden, the Soviet Union has collapsed. We now have this large 
organization called DoD and its many PME institutions. As they search around for a new 
direction, they must ask themselves the very fundamental question: Why do we have a 
military? What do you want the defense institution to do, and who will decide on a new 
direction? 
Many people, especially those who wear military uniforms, know that the answer is, 
"Our job is to fight and win wars." That is fair answer because behind it is a platform-incentive 
thought process. 
This slide has an excerpt from the Constitution of the United States. It says that ~ur 
job-is'tt> "provide for the common defence." In the late 1700s, that had everything to do with 
-our :capability to protect our shores, to trade across the oceans, to expand our natiion 
vvestward and build our civil infrastructure. So we created places like West Point. Now that we 
no longer have a clear competitor, the question becomes, "What frames the debate about 
what the U .. S. military does?" Clearly there is an element of strategic deterrence that doesn't 
require a whole lot of thought. . The consequence of not dealing with it had some 
consequences. But, increasingly, there is evidence that a sophisticated conventional 
deterrence has an equal to or in some cases of greater value as a deterrent. The world you 
currently live in is framed by these kinds of arguments. 
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The geo-strategic environment of today looks something like this. 
On the left, you have the world that most of us grew up in -- the industrial world. We 
view the world through an industrial lens. Our structures, our thought processes, our 
school systems live in this world. Our institutions -- whether DoD, the United Nations, 
or whatever live there too. We deal with world outside ours by trying to make it fit our 
current thought processes. 
In the middle is the corporate economic world, where there are no borders. That is 
where the United States is today, whether you recognize it or not. 30 percent of our 
GNP is derived from exports. In 1970, that number was 13 percent. The United States 
today has more export trade with Singapore than it does with Italy and France. There 
are 11.5 million jobs in the United States that require or rely on export trade in order to 
survive. And most of those are not "Chicken Lickin" jobs. Most are substantive, well-
paying jobs -- the economic engine of the United States. 
On the right, you've got this developing world. The countries in that world are 
undergoing transitional political or economic processes. That developing world is 
trying to figure out how to deal with the already developed world. The United Nations 
and other large world institutions monitor this process. The World Conference on 
Population Control was viewed by many of these developing nations as an attempt to 
impose Western values on their cultures. We are creating friction points with this 
developing world because, in their cultural assessment, a McDonald's is not always a 
good deal. 
And so, we're asking the military to participate in three different kinds of worlds. And to 
make matters worse, we've not engaged in any substantive process to understand why 
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World Population Explosion 
Let me give you an example of what I'm talking about. I argue that we have not seen the kind 
of change that the world is currently experiencing since about 1848 or 1850 - the beginning of 
the industrial revolution. It took the human race from our beginnings to the year 1800 before 
the first billion people showed up on Earth. It took slightly less than another 100 years to add 
the next two billion. You are now looking at adding roughly the equivalent of the population of 
China (1.2 billion) every 12 years. The population of the United States has doubled in the fast 
50 years. And there is an interesting phenomenon in these numbers. If you subtract first year 
mortality rates from population growth numbers, the mortality rates of most nations averages 
out at about the same age, but that average age has been increasing in almost all nations. 
That global aging process has tremendous implications, not only for the recruiting force, but 
from the social welfare perspective. This has tremendous implications for countries, especially 
countries in Europe like Germany that has a high industrial base requirement but does not 
have the work force necessary to compete in the global mark.et. Increasingly, those types of 
countries have to import younger workers in order to survive. 
To make the case, when the IMF forced the Mexican government to deaf with the peso 
devaluation, Mexico was forced to shut down 26,000 companies and put almost two million 
workers out on the street. What happened? They came to the United States, for the most 
part. It was a natural escape valve, so it didn't create internal problems. Suharto is now 
talking about restructuring the Indonesian economy. His first solution is to export almost two 
million workers from Indonesia back to where they came from: Korea, Vietnam, Myanmar, 
Thailand. Too many workers who become migrants on a global basis cause discontinuities. 
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Our World 
--Reduced to a JOO Person Village--
• There woul,d be 57 Asians, 21Europeans, 14 from the 
West~rn Hemi~phere (~ort_. and ,S9uth AtrlericQ,), 
and 8 Africans. ' · 
• Seventy would ;be non-white 
• Seventy would be non-Cb..ristian .•• 3o· Christians· 
• Fifty percent of the entire:<world·wealth would be in the 
hands of only 6 people,'~d::all 6 would be fromihe 
United States 
•Seventy would be unablt to,tead 
• Fifty would suffer from .mal~utrition 
• Eighty would live in sub~standard housing 
• Only one would have a college education 
The world you live in is not the world that you represent. Look around the room. You 
are a statistical minority, as a group. If you took the world and shrunk it to a village of 
100 people, this slide shows what your world looks like: there are 57. Asians, 21 
Europeans, 14 from the Western hemisphere - North and South America, 8 Africans. 
Seventy are non-whites, 70 are non-Christians. Fifty percent of the entire world's 
wealth is in the hands of six people, and they're in the United States. Seventy are 
unable to read. Fifty suffer from malnutrition. Eighty live in substandard housing. Only 
one has a college education. 
At the end of World War I, about seven million people in the world lived homeless, slum 
type areas. Today there are seven hundred million such people. That type of 
discontinuity is also occurring here in the United States. So the question that you, as a 







I would also make the case that the definition of security is being redefined for you. One of the •ll'gir 
great tragedies that's occurred over the last couple of years is that we have been unable to 
define where the United States fits in the world and what instruments it should use to execute 
its foreign policy. For 50 years, we have defined security purely in military terms. There was a 
correlation of forces. The German border was the central front. We understood kinetics. We 
worked at great lengths here at the Naval Postgraduate School figuring F-pulls for air-to-air 
missiles. 
Increasingly, that is not true. Increasingly, it's about economics. And if you don't think 
that's true, just replay the last six months in the Asian economy. If you don't think it's about 
culture, go to Bosnia. You could move the entire NA TO structure into Bosnia, and you're not 
going to solve the problem. Bosnia is about culture. Bosnia is about economics. Bosnia is 
about leadership. 
Go to Kyoto, Japan and participate in the environmental conference. What that is 
really about is a tax transference from the industrial world to the third world -- to somehow or 
another level the playing field. 
Why is it that private security firms in Australia, South Africa, and in the United States 
spend more money on security than every nation in NATO, save the U.S.? The budget' for 
private security firms is 50 billion dollars a year. France is the closest, with a 4$. billion dollar 
defense budget. Why? Why is it that 23 percent of Americans live in gated communities? 
Why do assault rifles cost 17 dollars a copy? 
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You're dealing with a different world, and what happens by default is you end up with 
somebody saying, "Let's go to Somalia because there are people dying. It's on CNN, so let's 
go there and stop the dying." It's a legitimate mission. Let's go to Rwanda to stop the dying. 
Let's go to Haiti to restore democracy. Let's go to Bosnia so we can create a unified state. 
Those are what I would call fundamentally different missions. 
Who do you go with to these battle spaces? People you never thought of. Ninety days 
ago now, I parachuted into Central Asia. In the aircraft there were 500 guys - myself and the 
82nd Airborne, a Russian company, a Turkish company, and one company from Khazakstan, 
Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan. The C-17s, as we approached Kahzak air space, were escorted 
by MiG-29s. Close air support was flown by Russian helicopters called HINDS and HIPS. 
Now, if that's not a different world, I'm missing something. 
The resource base has declined. Those of you who somehow or another think that, 
because you read in The Washington Post that we have a balanced budget, you're crazy. You 
do have a balanced budget today and maybe through the rest of the calendar year. But when 
you took at the out-years of this global aging process that's taking place, especially here in the 
United States, you had better realize that entitlement programs are going to be a major debate 
in which DoD is going to pay part of the bill. 
That's not just true in the United States, it's also true in Europe. As Europe moves 
down the road of the EMU process and moves to meet materiel requirements, there's not a 
nation in Europe that will spend more than two percent on defense. And so the discontinuity 
you have between the very highly sophisticated force in the United States and what I call a 
constabulary force in Europe is becoming more and more pronounced. 
That has tremendous political implications in terms of how you view the use of force, -
and what it means if you fight a sophisticated force and the front end of that spear is U.S. 
forces . The political side of that is, you have events like what occurred in Mogadishu, where 
you get 18 Rangers killed, and the next day you change the policy. 
So the asymmetrical nature of what's going on in the world essentially says that, if you 
want to defeat the United States, don't fight in a force-on-force engagement. Rather, kill as 
many Americans as quickly as possible early in the conflict, and fight it out on the international 
media stage. 
The center of gravity for the use of military force in the United States today is not the 
intellectual capital of National Defense University. It ties on the floor of the Congress of the 
United States. So you'll not get somebody to take you on a force-on-force engagement except 
to kill people for TV purposes. The great lesson that came out of the Gulf War is, never give 
the United States six months to get ready. 
Today's forces have to fight on arrival. To do that, you've got to win, and win quickly. 
What you see today is a whole bunch of activity that looks like this. 
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• Combat ·operations 
It's interesting in the bottom part of this is where Most of the service chiefs will say, 
"Our job is to do combat operations." If you read the most recent study that the Army 
produced the soldiers serving in Bosnia, what is going on is the internal deterioration of 
both morale and leadership because it's a static operation. It's not even a fight. You 
create activity in lieu of substantive analytical thought that says, "Let me tell you why 
and where we're going to use force." 
There is nothing wrong with stopping the dying in Mogadishu. But taking the next step, 
to say we're going to rebuild the failed state, is a stupid idea because Mogadishu or 
Somalia never existed as a state. Before you went to Rwanda, the international 
community put almost three billion dollars worth of aid into Rwanda, all of which went 
down the tubes during the massacres. 
There are some parts of the world that are just not in our national interest. 
Understanding what those nations are and what their relevance is, is not something 
we're capable of doing right now because we don't have an intellectual framework for 
determining how and why we use force. 




Tasks in Rebuilding a Failed State 
--Balancing Priorities--
Operational 
(Stop the Dying) 
•Immediate Tasks 
• "Enablers" 
• Treat the Symptoms 
- Create Cease Fire 
- Provide Emergency 
Services 
Structural 
(Cure the Disease) 
• Long-Term Activities 
• "Foundations" 
• Redress Root Causes 
~Rule of Law 
- Transitional Institutions 
- Repatriation of Refugees 
- Resettlement of Internally 
Displaced 
- Integration of Warring 
Factions into Military or 
Militia 
- Rebuild Economy 
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Everyone thinks it's a great idea to stop the dying. I support that concept a hundred 
percent. And when you get there to do that, all of a sudden someone says, "Let's also 
repatriate the refugees. Let's also figure out the displacement processes. Let's also 
figure out the warring factions." 
I built this slide after Haiti. A few days after we arrived in Haiti, the guys from the 1 Oth 
Mountain Division discovered the Haitian national prison -- a room that's probably 
one-third of the size of the room that you're in now (100'X300'). In one cell there were 
seven hundred people. It was clearly an inhumane situation. We took the people out, 
washed them off, gave them medical treatment, and fed them. Eight months later, our 
MPs were still running the Haitian prison, because there was no mechanism for the 
Federal Bureau of Prisons -- the people trained to do that type of thing - to do it. So 
we've created this whole subculture in the system, that we have these conferences on 
operations other than war. 
Go to the National Training Center at Fort Polk, Louisiana, and you'll find civilians on 
the battlefield. The lessons we're teaching the lieutenants and captains is how to deal 
with them. It's probably necessary because, in today's conflicts, about 60 to 65 percent 
of the people who get killed are civilians and kids. So you have to figure out how to 
teach people how to deal with the problem. 
What is the real message in our educational institutions for the young lieutenants? 
Because what's going on -- not only in the United States, but on a global basis -- is that 
you have restructuring because of the technological revolution. 
On the ground side, you can see what's going on. And on the air side, There's an 
interesting phenomenon going on that somehow or another says that these parts really 
don't fit. The average cost of a tactical jet today is about $70 million a copy. The roll-
out cost of an F-22 is a 150 million dollars for the first couple. At the same time, there's 
a proliferation of shoulder-fired weapons systems at about 10 thousand dollars a copy. 
What's the economic exchange rate? Why is it that, when you get an F-16 shot down 
over in Bosnia, the pilot gets to go to the White House for lunch? What's the 
unintended signal? 
What you see in this world, the military at large, is a leveling process. You have a 
veneer of technology that's being bought outside of the United States and goes to 
different parts of the world. It doesn't have the depth and width that exists here in the 
United States, but there's enough to give the enemy an ability to deal with us on the 
battlefield. There's enough of a technological edge to give the opposition force the 
ability to kill "enough" Americans during the first couple days of conflict, to force you to 
fight on two fronts: one on Second Street and Pennsylvania Avenue and the other on 
the battlefield itself. 
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Now let's talk about where we think we're going. This slide doesn't have any JCS Pub 1 
sanctions. This is something we might use to figure out where we are really going. lt'f 
interesting that after Goldwater-Nichols was written into a law, we started this joint businesf 
But even in the passage of the law, there's what I would call a cooperate and gradu 
syndrome. There is nothing wrong with the law from an execution perspective. The' 
everything wrong with the law in terms of people not being willing to take on service-par 
interests. 
And so what you saw here, in joint specialized operations, was the Gulf War - ma 
multidimensional, multifunctional. It was driven by two common objectives. Ont 
Iraqi's out of Kuwait, and two, the fear of General Schwartzkopf. As we moved l 
chain to the synergistic joint operations, we're talking operations like in Haiti. For th' 
we will have cross-decked different parts, different core competencies, to bu 
battleforce. 
,;er 
The decision to put the 10th Mountain Division and some of the soldiers on an ame 
caused absolute havoc in the United States Navy and United States Marine Car.form 
a roles and missions fight, instead of an answer to the question, "What sea-threat 




Where do you need to go? Clearly, it has to do with joint operations. Each service, in its 
institutional process of education, teaches a culture. Whether you accept it or not, it happens. 
It's derived from the educational institution which you represent. It comes from the hardware 
that you give the people to operate. And it's driven by budget that says protect certain kinds of 
things. 
Let me give you an example: carrier deck cycles. The centerpiece of the U.S. Navy is the 
aircraft carrier. It runs in a cycle of 17 to 19 hours, depending on which carrier you're talking 
about. But if you're in the Air Force business and you're true to doctrine, you're in a 76-hour 
thought process. Clearly, you can change it but, by and large, it's 76 hours. And if you're in the 
heavy Army business, you advertise you can fight for 24 hours on a sustained basis, but that's 
not true. It's basically a 20 to 22 hour cycle. If you're a light guy, like the Marine Corps, 
depending on night vision and tactical capability, it's between 9 and 11 hours. 
You come to the battlefield either as a commander or as a staff officer with a predisposed 
understanding how battlespace is put together. The problem is, the joint force commander has 
to synchronize the different battle rhythms of different forces. That's the challenge today -
different battles, different battle intelligence cycles, and different thought processes. 
Our national intelligence apparatus is not operationally focused. It's focused on the decision 
cycle within Washington D.C. And you find that the vast majority of the intelligence information 
goes to Washington staffs -- to people who have no business being in the policy business 
because they don't understand the difference between management and policy. 
If you're a staff officer on a joint staff somewhere, you're also an advocate. You're an 
advocate for a platform or an advocate for a service. And the question then becomes, where 
does the advocacy role start and stop, and where does "truth in lending" start and stop? In 
most cases, we've not been able to figure out what truth in lending really is. 
It's the same thing in TRANSCOM. TRANSCOM advertises 98 percent delivery. It's probably 
true statistically, but between the time the first aircraft lands and the time you close the force, 
almost 30 percent of the airlift does not arrive where and when you need it. 
My point is that, as we build joint operations, there has to be some other way for our 
educational institution to teach this business about battle rhythms, not from a Service 
perspective, but to truly understanding what you get when you have a Service platform 
perform in a joint battle space. 
In today's ground combat, you cannot ask an F-16 or F-15 driver to stick his nose into any fight 
because our systems are not interoperable. If you divert an aircraft into a battlespace, he has 
a 39 percent chance of getting to the right target with the right bomb at the right time - he has 
a 60 percent chance of getting it wrong. What will the system do to him if he is wrong? It'll kill 
him. He'll be court-martialed. It is because we can't get an agreement between the Army and 
the Air Force on Link 16 and variable message formats. All the while, we argue 
bureaucratically back in Washington, D.C. about whether my system is better than your 
system. 
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And so what are the impediments of the process? First and foremost is our Cold 
War structure. Much of what you currently see in overhead is a direct growth out of or 
a direct transfer from the Cold War. Our whole unified command plan does not make 
sense. Our whole structure inside of Washington D.C., in terms of the 
Goldwater-Nichols intent, does not make sense. It does not reinforce civilian control of 
military. 
If you're really going to exercise oversight, how does the Secretary of Defense 
do it? He does it three ways: through policy, through budget, and through operations. 
But the Secretary of Defense has zero control over operations. He does not know why 
it costs $268,000 dollars a year to keep one soldier in Bosnia. That's what it costs. It's 
now a $2.3 billion bill and John Hamre tears his hair out every day trying to get control 
of an operation that has been going on for almost three years. 
Who do you think controls combat strength -- the front end of the process, the 
operating forces? No! You are hollowing out your military because of the 
disproportionate weight you're putting in the staff service. 
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A revolution is going on in the commercial world as the decision process is greatly 
facilitated by technology. At the same time, we're dealing with a hierarchical system 
that is not responsive. 
When we were doing air strikes in Bosnia a couple years ago, the secretary general of 
NATO was told that an air strike was going to take place. It took some eight hours 
before he got his first operational report because it went from the field, where the event 
was taking place, through 34 echelons of command. 
In today's world of instant telecommunications and press access, you have the press 
on the beach meeting the Marines, or you have 250 reporters standing on the top of 
Haiti's Montana Hotel who know exactly where the target sets are. You are unable to 
maintain strategic surprise because of the telecommunications capabilities of the press 
or even of your own soldier. The average soldier on today's battlefield is carrying a 
cellular phone and calls his mother with status reports. You can buy a commercial, 
one-meter resolution satellite imaging system through the Internet for 15 hundred 
dollars. So strategic surprise simply does not exist anymore. 
We are asking our commanders to go into a battlespace, in most cases not prepared 
for the multidimensional world we're placing him in. The great thing about each of the 
events that have occurred over the last five years -- whether Rwanda, Haiti, Somalia, or 
whatever -- is that they've been politically unpopular. 
And so, when General Shelton lands at Port-au-Prince Airport, he doesn't meet 
Jean-Bertrand Aristide or General Cedras. He meets 135 press people who ask him 
what he thinks. Has something changed between the time he lifted off USS MOUNT 
WHITNEY and the time he got to Port-au-Prince? When you ask General Shelton what 
would he do different, he'll tell you he wished he had a CNN television set in the cockpit 
of his Huey. 
Why, during the fall of Srebrenica, when they handcuffed the Dutch soldiers to 
telephone poles on the bridge, did the Dutch Minister of Defense get called before 
Parliament and almost fired? Why is it that when the Khobar Towers were blown up, 
was there a hearing in Congress two days later during which the Secretary of Defense 
took responsibility? It's because the world that your commanders are living in today is 
a very different world. You don't have time to make excuses, and if you don't have 
proper guidance in terms of what the mission is and what the outcomes are, the 
commander is caught behind the information loop end of political management back in 
Washington D.C. 
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Joint Force Integration Process 
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Now, how did we get here? It's easy to complain. Part of the criticism, I would suggest, 
is in the third step of this slide -- specifying materiel. We have become a nation that's 
equipment oriented. We buy things without understanding how they fit into an 
operational concept. Instead of dealing with the whole business of concept 
development, organizational theory, buying the equipment, and ultimately establishing 
training and leader development with an integrated C31 system, we are leaving the 
system to chance in terms of how we train people. 
This is the mechanical process. But there's a bigger issue, I would suggest, in this 
whole business of training. 
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Seven Principles of Trust 
• Trust is not blind 
• Trust needs boundaries 
• Trust demands learning 
• Trust is tough . 
• Trust needs bonding 
• Trust needs touch 
• Trust requires leaders 
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It has to do with trust. You have to ask yourself today some very hard questions: Why mmr 
are large numbers of very bright, young officers leaving all the services? Why is the 
resignation rate of tactical jet pilots so high? I know it's got something to do with the 
airlines hiring, but the kids who fly the same mission over, and over, and over ~gain 
say, "It is non-threatening, non-substantive, and I don't want to do it." Why is it that 22 
Marine Corps captains hand-picked to go to the Amphibious Warfare School resigned 
just before they got there? Why is it that JOs and deck officers in the Surface Navy are 
leaving? 
Part of th@ answer is that we in senior leadership positions have failed. If a young 
officer out there does something because he's genuinely trying and experimenting, but 
fails, he will not be promoted; he will not be augmented. It has everything to do with 
our personnel system that says that it is of more value to be a staff officer than it is to 
be a commander. All of our personnel laws are written to ensure that you go through 
all the wickets to be Goldwater-Nichols qualified. There is not one law on the books 
that talks to being a proficient commander. You are, across the board, building a 
generation of people who don't know their trade. 
It has everything to do with the personnel system that forces people in and out very 
quickly. The numbers that I looked at have everything to do with the amount of time 
you spend in the foxholes, and cockpits, or aboard ship. If you're an infantry guy on the 
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groundside, it's about 20 months as a major. Lieutenant colonel command tours are 18 
to 24 months. We have colonels today in the groundside, both in the Army and Marine 
Corps, who have less than 60 months operational experience. They don't know their 
trade. 
You have one opportunity to command either a flying squadron or surface combatant 
vessel. During that one opportunity, do you think you take that organization or that ship 
and fight it to the edge of its performance envelope? Or are you careful that you don't 
do something, because you know down deep the senior leadership will not protect you 
if you make a mistake? 
What you do is build a generation of people who are conservative in their thought 
process, and if you think or operate outside that norm, the system will kill you. The 
bright young kids in the system who want to experiment, who want to try new ideas, are 
not rewarded. If they make a bad decision, you have service secretaries who review 
the process and guarantee that that officer leaves the service. 
There is, in fact, what I will call a crisis of confidence developing in the U.S. military. 
It's because people like me have failed to stand up and say, "That is not what we are 
about as an institution." There are certain fundamental things that you ask the 
American youth to do, not the least of which is to go into harm's way. If he does that, if 
she does that, you as an institution have an obligation to train them for this new world 
that you're asking them to operate in. But more important than that, you have an 
obligation -- senior leadership -- to insure that the guidance you give them is 
executable. If they do make a mistake, a good and honest mistake, you have an 
obligation to protect that person, regardless of sex. Or, if you see a debate taking 
place that says the real purpose of the U.S. military is to become a social 
experimentation substation, you have to ask yourself, for what? 
We did it during the Vietnam War, during the Project One-Hundred Thousand. We 
brought into the U.S. military 100,000 people who were Category lvs -- who could not 
read or write. We almost destroyed the military. The U.S. military has a social 
responsibility to the nation it's paid to protect. It ought to be reflective of the society at 
large. But at the end of a day, the responsibility of the U.S. military is to execute those 
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Ladies and gentlemen, you're about to be struck with an intellectual 
blunt instrument. If you'll bear with me, I have 25 minutes to talk about 
something that's sort of controlled my life for the last two and a half 
years, and any time you are intimately immersed in any sort of endeavor, 
you do two things: You generate too many view graphs, and you talk too 
long. 
So, what I'll try and do for the next few moments is spin you through 
the high points of the Army After Next project, to try and give you some 
idea of how the Army looks at the future. Then I'll make a couple of 
specific comments about the future and how it relates to my current job 
as Commandant at the Army War College, and how it relates to the 
issue of PME. 
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~ The Path to AAN Begins With AWE and 
~ Passes Through Army XXI 
Capability 
1--__,1----+---+----+--+--...&---l-4>-'-~ • New systems 
• Information dominance 
• Global maneuver 
awareness 
• Strategic mobility 
• Operational-strategic 
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~Wear-out 
Regional competitors to Major competitors 
The Army After Next project was started by the Chief of Staff of the Army two 
and a half years ago to look at the future of the Army beyond the year 2010. 
Why? Because JV 2010, ;my 21 -- whatever you want to call them -- are nothing 
more than programs to improve systems in today's operational environment -- to 
do the best we can with what we have now. There isn't a whole lot we can do 
between now and 2010, quite frankly, and in the opinion of our group, there is not 
a whole lot that you really need to do. 
The problem comes beyond that period, when we will face what we believe 
to be a couple of historic events which will change the international security 
environment. We operated a great deal differently than the Air Force and the 
Navy did in conceiving their future groups. We took a very holistic view of the 
future. We looked at four general categories: geostrategy, the art of war, 
technology and its symbiotic relationship with the art of war; and probably most 
interesting of all, human behavior - organizational and human behavior. 
One of the great frustrations that General Sheehan mentioned just a few 
moments ago is this creature called the human animal. We find that when we 
have wonderful ideas, we run into three roadblocks: Kepler, Newton and the 
human being. Each one of them keeps drawing us back into the realm of reality. 
Let me walk through each of those four areas and talk a little bit about them, 
and then speak to the human and organizational impacts, as we see them, 
beyond the year 2020 or 2025. I'll then talk about technology very briefly. 
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I * GEOPOLITICS of 2025 
Conflicts arise along: 
•Rich-poor cleavages 
• Ethnic intersections 
• Intersection of economic interests 
• Points of hegemonic conflict 
• Natural resource zones 
Eurasia and Pacific Rim . . . where fault lines 
and interests will most likely intersect 
Our view of the future nature of conflict is very similar to what 
General Sheehan described just a few minutes ago, with a few 
modifications and subtleties that we think are important. 
First of all, wars and conflicts will be caused by those factors that 
cause wars and conflicts today. And, as in the immediate past, they will 
be exacerbated by many of the factors that General Sheehan spoke 
about at lunchtime. 
However, wars for national survival -- or, better yet, conflicts fought 
for America's vital interest in the years ahead -- will occur where wars 
have occurred for the last five millennium, along those sort of tectonic 
fault lines that define conflict. It's where those fault lines intersect with 
America's national interest that, we believe, America will fight for its vital 
interests. 
That's not to say that South America and Africa and Central Asia 
aren't important. They certainly are. Will they involve national security 
assets? They certainly will. But the issue, as far as we're concerned, is 
just as Harry Summers said this morning: "We're interested in where 
major conflicts fought for our or vital interest will occur. That is, as best 
we can tell, in the Pacific Rim and Eurasia." 
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I 
~AAN Anticipates the Rise of One or More Major liJ Competitors by 2025 
A Major Competitor: 
Will Not 
•Try to recreate a Cold War bipolar world 
•Attempt to match US system-for-system 
Will 
• Focus on landpower 
•Apply limited resources asymetrically 
•Frustrate US with just enough precision to kill and buy time 
• Capitalize on intrinsic potential of mass, Popular Will, and 
inherent strength of the defensive 
A moment, if you will, about the nature of a future enemy. We reject out of 
hand the term "peer competitor." It is inconceivable to our minds, after 
studying this for the last two and a half years, that any major power will be able 
to develop the expendable income and gamer the technologies necessary to 
match us ship- for- ship, plane- for- plane, tank- for- tank. It won't happen, 
even though it would almost be best for America's national interest if it did. 
Instead -- again back to General Sheehan -- we see, after the year 2010, the 
rise of what we have called, euphemistically, a "major competitor." 
We presume that we will be the intervening power. We presume that a 
major power that we face in the future will use - to use a hackneyed and 
overused phrase that we coined a few years ago -- an asymmetric approach to 
warfare. As Harry said, "An future enemy does not have to defeat us in the 
field in order to win. He merely will need to avoid defeat." - like George 
Washington after Long Island. 
I have taken eleven or so jaunts around the world to visit many of the 
armies and militaries of emerging or transitional states. In doing that, I 
discovered a few things. 
First of all, as a rule, the 21st Century warfare has already started in many 
ways. These countries have just about got us figured out. They understand 
that they don't have to defeat us in the field to win. They understand that they 
need to buy just enough technology, either precision or counter-precision, to 
provide just enough of a deterrence and just enough killing power to buy time, 
because time is the our future enemy's friend, and it's our enemy. 
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You see evidence of it today as you look around here. We are eight years into the 
21st Century. You look around at what foreign militaries are doing and what they're 
buying. They're shedding their Cold War impedimenta. Their heavy equipment is going 
into the junk heap. They're buying cheap weapons of mass destruction, cruise missiles, 
and cheap ballistic missiles, distributed air defense, dismounted infantry weapons, sea 
and land mines, et cetera, et cetera, et cetera. 
What I saw in the eyes of these potential enemies, as I went around the world, is 
the sense that they've got it. As a defending power facing down the world's only global 
superpower with the means to intervene, they have the impulse to gamer their own 
inherent strengths, which are, to borrow from Harry Summers, "a will to win"; second, to 
leverage their advantage in mass; and, third, to leverage the inherent value of the 
defensive. They don't have to win openly in the field; they merely have to avoid defeat. 
To exacerbate the problem after the year 2010, we face this interesting symbiotic 
effect of military technology and military art. All too often we look at technology in the 
future and we treat it as a "Toys R Us" exercise. You break into a toy store, pick those 
technologies off the shelf that you think are neat, and buy and apply them to platforms 
and weapon systems. It's a bad approach. Why? Because we have to take a look, and 
we have taken a look, at how technology affects the art of war. 
Recall what happened with the first precision revolution -- with the introduction of 
the muzzle-loading rifle, the small bull rifle, the quick-firing artillery piece, railroad, 
telegraph, and so forth. A hundred years ago, with the appearance of the machine age, 
technology took the killing zone or battlespace and moved it from a distance of about 150 
meters to a thousand meters or more at Antietam. It had moved out to about 14,000 
meters by Verdun. 
Not only had the battlespace become more expansive, but, with the perfection of 
muzzle-loading and repeating arms, it became tremendously more lethal. But the pace of 
movement of military forces through and across the killing zone was the same in 1917 as 
it was at the battle of Marathon -- two and a half miles an hour. It was that exposure to the 
lethality of the first precision revolution that removed the ability of military forces to strike to 
operational distances; capture, seize, and hold the enemy's operational center of gravity; 
and break his will to resist -- the essence of victory in any war in the future, or present, or 
for the past five thousand years. 
Fast forward to the second precision revolution. The same lethality rules apply. In 
1944, it took an average of 14 rounds at an average range of 800 meters in the European 
Theater of operation to kill a German tank. In Desert Storm, it took 1.2 rounds at an 
average range of 2,400 meters. A P-47 glide attack against a German tank had a .005 
probability of kill. In Desert Storm, it was .4 or .5 against an Iraqi tank -- an enormously 
more lethal battlefield and tremendously more expansive. The thousand-meter killing 
zone of the Civil War grew to about 36,000 meters for a corps in World War II. In Desert 
Storm, the 7th Corps had a front that was 140 miles wide and 240 miles deep - an 
enormously more lethal and an enormously larger killing zone, or battlespace. And what's 
the pace of movement today? It is exactly the same as it was in 1939. It's 11 miles a day 
or 20 kilometers per hour. It hasn't changed. 
3-7 
I V Future Military Environment Imperatives 
Speed ... to Exploit Knowledge: 
•Forces must move to survive and succeed 
•High-tempo operations 
• Pulsed operations 
• Focused logistics 
• Agile, high operational transition capability 
~:::::::::==~::::::::;,~ 
• Adaptive, full-spectrum force 
Some would say, "Not a problem. Make the battlefield more 
transparent. Continue to make it larger and more lethal, and eventually 
you'll win." We argue that's simply not so. A firepower attrition war - -
a view of future war - is no more relevant in 2025 than it was in the 
spring offensive against the Northern provinces of 1971. It won't work. 
In the battle of 2025, just as Harry (Summers) said, you need a 
balanced military force that has the inherent capability to attack an 
enemy -- to reduce his advantage in time, and to collapse his will to 
resist - just as the Panzer forces did in 1940. The question is how. 
The answer is speed - speed enough to cross the killing zone 
intact, speed enough to gamer the advantage of time and apply it to our 
side. We must have forces that are able, in the next millennium, to 
exploit speed to survive. And not only speed in terms of velocity, but 
speed in terms of agility. We have to build forces that have the ability to 
operate at a very high momentum. 
I disagree with, I think it was General Sheehan, who said the 
operational tempo for ground forces is 24 hours. It's really 72 hours per 
unit. But that's still not long enough, because units in the field follow that 
traditional pulse- and- pause scheme that again gives the advantage of 
time and initiative to the enemy. 
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The critical element in what I am going to talk to you about in restoring 
speed to the battlefield is logistics. The secret of blitzkreig wasn't tanks, airplanes, 
or Army personnel carriers at all. It was the ability of the German army to break 
free from the tyranny of the railhead, to break their operational maneuver force free 
form the railhead, and accelerate it by an order of magnitude to destroy the 
enemy's will to resist. 
It's no different in 2025. The only difference is, instead of the tyranny of the 
railhead, we face this enormous logistical umbilical cord that restricts our 
operational pace of movement, and our strategic pace of movement. So, how do 
you do it? 
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111* I KNOWLEDGE AND SPEED I 
•Avoid attrition warfare 
-Cross the deadly zone intact 
- Protection derived from a shield of knowledge 
• Operational- Tactical Speed 
- Dominant maneuver and precision engagement - restore the balance 
-Psychological collapse of enemy's will to resist 
•Protect and sustain in bare-based environment 
-Sever (or shrink) the logistical umbilical cord 
• Expansible 
-Quantity has a quality all its own - size counts 
---- -----
First, cross the killing zone intact. Secondly, restore op9rational and 
tactical speed. Third, use the inherent advantage of tr. ~· information 
revolution to lighten your force, to reduce your need for self- protection --
to reduce this terrible proclivity that the American military has to 
oversize, safesize, and to overstaff an operation because of fear of 
failure or a lack of information about the nature of the enemy force. And, 
finally, to borrow from Lenin, understand that quantity has a quality all of 
its own. 
Battlespace in the Napoleonic era was 30 soldiers per square 
kilometer; today, it's about 16. And in the battle I'm about to describe to 
you, it may be five or six. But the bottom line is that technology no 
longer drives the size and density of soldiers on the battlefield. 
Psychology does -- the fear of violent death, the ability to bond with 
leaders, confidence in your leadership -- trust, to borrow a phrase from 
General Sheehan. All of that has to be built into small units before they 
can be broken out and dispersed to the degree that I'm about to show 
you here in a moment. 
So, let me walk you through speed as it applies to the three different 
levels of warfare. 
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IT Strategic Speed 
/ • Power projection from all I 
I 
points on the globe converge 
and paralyze enemy 
I 
•Simultaneous convergence of 
overwhelming land, air, 
space, and sea forces 
I •Overseas presence quickens I global maneuver 
I · Being "First with the Mosf' I 
reduces risk and begins 
I 
process of psychological I 
domination 
Seize initiative, 
build momentum ... an image of uncontestable 
competence and unsto able 
The Goal: A globally self-deployable force capable of striking directly at 
strategic and operational centers of gravity 
The information age is on us. The information age to the 
commercial sector will give us a knowledge- based army and information 
dominance. But to know is not enough. If you have a 
knowledge- based army without the ability to act on that knowledge 
when warfare comes, you simply die smarter. 
Strategic speed. The act of strategic projection is a means by which 
the process of psychological intimidation and domination begins. When I 
did my study on Desert Storm, we interviewed senior Iraqi officers. And 
much to my chagrin, I realized that Peter Arnett was, in fact, our friend. 
The Iraqis, particularly those who had been stationed at a corps level 
and above around Basrah, who had a down link for CNN, told me that 
when they saw this enormous projection of forces from Beaumont and 
from Bayonne and other ports in the United States, they quickly 
appreciated the concept of a global power converging from all points of 
the compass by air, land, sea, and space. It planted in their minds the 
conviction that they would be defeated. The only question was when, 
and what cost? 









Forward Presence Forces 
The way we do it now, and the way we've done it since the end of 
the Second World War, is through forward presence forces, pre-
positioned to provide early warning -- the global scout function. 
Unfortunately, our forces face an enemy who is already set in-theater, 
closer to his operational objectives. The military challenge for strategic 
projection forces is to restore the balance -- to counterattack, using Air 
Force terms. This means that you have to send early- arriving forces 
that can place a line in the sand. But those projection forces don't have 
the ability to conduct offensive maneuver and, sometime in the future, 





~. , Power Projection Today: Slow Arrival Allows 
ljll Enemy to "Set": Reaction vice Preemption 




I Army XXI .. Sustains, I 
consolidates, and 
guarantees success 
What we want to do in the future is to be able to build an early 
arriving force able to achieve an act of strategic preemption - a strategic 
coup de main, if you will. They will arrive in a theater of operation so 
quickly that the enemy is unable to capture and hold his operational 
objectives. 
What happens if we could have put three brigades into Kuwait 
before Saddam crossed the border? What happens if we'd have put 
three brigades across the three Rhine River bridges to prevent the 
German army from marching into the Rhineland in 1935? Those would 
have been acts of strategic preemption. 
I get in trouble with the press at this line here (pointing to the line 
irnmediately above the Army XXI block). If you're not careful, and if we 
don't reform the Army XXI, and form it to fit with our early- arriving 
strategic preemption forces, then we have a situation where we may be 
a continent too far away. So, the active reform of ground forces is one 
that melds and alters the composition of our strategic projection 
capability, parallel with existing forces and new forces that might come 
along. How do you do that? 
3-13 
AAN - FROM LINEAR TO VERTICAL 
arth orbit C31 
L arth orbit C31 








The only way to do it is to accelerate the pace of operational movement on 
the battlefield by an order of magnitude. We can no more achieve what I've just 
shown you at the theater level of war with a 20 kilometer per hour Army than we 
could with a two- and- a- half mile per hour Army in August 1914. We must be 
able to accelerate the pace of movement. And the only way to do that for 
operational forces is to transform ourselves from a two- dimensional into a 
three- dimensional force. 
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IT OPERATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS of AAN (20XX) ... A BALANCED APPROACH to WARFARE 
I 
• Combined air and ground capabilities at 
lowest levels 
I • Independent operations for weeks 
I 
• All operating systems resident within I 
battle force 
1
• "Reach out" for combat Junctions j 
(Fires, c2, Logistics) 
• Self-protection through movement, 
organic weapons, low-observables, and 
I 
situational awareness I 
• Engage enemy with information, 
organic, and inorganic weapons 
[ • Pull-Down Data - from the "Warehouse" [ 
How do you do that? Something like this: first, remove from the immediate 
confines of the closed combat area everything that isn't needed to perform four 
essential functions: movement, sensing, fusion and killing. That means that --
thanks again to the information revolution -- we should be able to remove 
whole categories of combat functions away from the close-confines combat 
area, to include, helo- communications, logistics, intelligence, and most fire 
support. Just pick them up and move them somewhere else. 
Where else? Somewhere out of the close confines to an area with some 
form of sanctuary outside the range of crude weapons of mass destruction. 
What you see at the right is a force that's able to move at a single bound about 
600 kilometers, consisting of somewhere around 7,000 soldiers, that has 
inherent in its battlespace sphere, or battlespace cylinder, all of the seven 
inherent combat functions. That cylinder represents what my war-gamers call 
the "surface- to- space continuum" -- that is, the ability to form a continuous 
connection between surface forces and low- altitude, medium- altitude and 
high- altitude devices connected up into space, so that many of those functions 
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Last fall we conducted a series of tactical war games. We built a 
series of "Army After Next" battleforces and experimented with them in a 
sophisticated tactical war game that exploited, or was able to measure, 
information dominance versus just the single force- on- force 
measurement from traditional war games. And we came up with some 
very interesting insights. 
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* Time-lapse view from NTC "Star Wars Room" 
We built a series of information tiers and metered information to the 
red and the blue sides. By the way, if you don't conduct war games that 
are free-play, force- on- force, you're just telling each other bedtime 
stories. We did that out at Fort Leavenworth, with two forces; red and 
blue. We metered information to create an information flow ratio of 
about 3- to-1. We continued to meter the information flow, and when we 
reached a dominance on one side of about 9-to-1, the cycle, pattern of 
movement, maneuver, and fire on the battlefield changed fundamentally. 
There are some caveats here. First of all, if you don't control space 
in the exosphere, none of this works. Secondly, if the enemy possesses 
even primitive weapons of mass destruction, even at the tactical level, 
you must approach the battlefield in a dispersed fashion. Third, because 
of our dominance of information and our ability to control many disparate 
parts of the battlefield, we were able to take, first, the application of 
precision, followed by the application of a force, and were able to gain 
positional advantage over the enemy. We turned a three- week 
campaign into a two- hour campaign. 
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_____________________________________ ! 
I • AAN TACTICAL IMPRESSIONS 
• Dominance of exosphere and space 
•Approach by infiltration 
•Strike multiple points simultaneously 
• Large-scale tactical air-ground operations 
•Ambush dynamic 
• Takedown times: minutes to hours 
• Precision Maneuver complements Precision Strike 
• Complex landscapes controlled from surrounding areas 
•Adds infinite complexity to opponent's situation while collapsing 
his ability to act 
Why? In the limited time I have available, let me just give you a 
gross analogy. Picture seeing an open field, a meadow maybe the size 
of this auditorium, with thousands of fires burning in the meadow. 
Picture the ability to drop two large wet blankets on top of those fires and 
snuff them out. If you're looking for an historical analogy, forget about 
Desert Storm for a moment and think more about the operational 
takedown in Panama in 1989. We did seven iterations. Of the seven, 
we won five; the enemy won two. How? They went straight for the 
cities. And by going to the cities, the takedown time went from hours to 
days, and, in one case, several weeks. 
This is a difficult problem. I'll be more than happy to talk about 
some ideas about urban warfare, separate and distinct from (General) 
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Then we did a series of winter war games -- the largest strategic 
future war game the Army has conducted in its history. 
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THEATER OPERATIONS circa 2020 
By \'\Tj,,tcr \\".al" C.amc 0-6. th~ jojn.t .1ppli.-c.liio1) o! AAN-~r'.l fon:c::> qul<k!y di~i2\t~S:1""-'le<I. th~ oppo.:'itivI, 
and dt>J:vvTP<l a ~tratt'~k~lly Lh!'d~iv~ victory. 
For those of you who are geographically challenged, we fought the 
battle in the Ukraine, over a 12-hour period. It essentially was a 
strategic takedown that took three "Army After Next" battle forces, 
juxtaposed them with Air Force AEFs and Marine MEFs, and managed 
to collapse an entire Red Force in a period of 12 hours. 
We used strategic preemption - approaching from four or five 
different directions by air, land, sea, and space. The enemy was kept 
out of his operational objectives, and destroyed in the open. We dodged 
a bullet in not having to fight in the streets of Kiev. 
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I. AANSTRATEGIC IMPRESSIONS 
• Military tempo may outstrip diplomatic and political condition setting 
• Conflict thresholds more complex and varied 
• Overseas presence still coun.ts 
•Warfare medium extends continuously from surface to space ... 
"Jointness" becomes "Interdependence" ~ 
.... ~ 
Here are some of the insights we had, and this caught us by 
surprise. Suddenly it was August 1914. If you tell the President of the 
United States that it used to take us 30 days to deploy to a theater, and 
it now it takes you three days, what does the President say? "You've 
given me 27 days, thank you very much." 
And that's what happened here, particularly as the Red Force began 
slowly to erode our dominance in space. Space became a Pearl Harbor 
in slow motion. And it very greatly complicated the process of strategic 
projection. Because, for instance, our ability to project forces to Europe 
was measured at thirty-two hours. The process of cobbling together a 
coalition and doing the diplomatic and political condition setting was 
more, not less complicated, and it made the strategic problem the most 
difficult problem. 
Also, if you can project a force like this in 32 hours, conventional 
warfare, to an enemy at least, begins to take on the image of warfare 




I W SPACE and INFORMATION IMPRESSIONS 
I • Immediate impact from space attack 
I 
• Space-to-ground continuum essential to 
information dominance 
I • Information operations contribute immediately , I to operational and strategic campaigns 
I 
• Dependence on GPS demands either a rapid satellite 
reconstitution capability, a surrogate (UAV) system, 
or greater redundancies 
I • Army must broaden its traditional focus on delivery 
ace roduc warfighters. 
Space was the Achilles heel. The immediate impact of sp:1ce, as I 
said, was such that the President wasn't sure if America · d been 
attacked, because no American boys were dying and no American 
territory had been seized. The enemy's surprise was that, by 2025, the 
constellation of orbiting bodies was so thick and so robust, and so 
interconnected with those of other countries, that, until he attacked 
military- specific satellites, he had little or no effect 
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IT AAN OPERATIONAL IMPRESSIONS 
• Operational success more dependent · 
II 
upon speed and mobility. Decisions 
assured within days, if not hours. 
I 
• Great synergy in reachout fires and 





• Think of SOF as global scouts 
~=~~~=====9 •"Precision" essential to maneuver, firepower, 
1 and logistics 
Operationally, there is an enormous synergy between the ability to 
apply massive precision on the one hand, and the ability to apply precise 
maneuver in a near- simultaneous fashion on the other. 
My key point is that the biggest impediment to exercise success was 
joint operations. Jointness was the best friend the enemy had in this 
particular exercise. The American joint operational system, which 
demands a sequential, linear, pedantic, carefully coordinated, planned 
application of combat power gave the enemy time to react. 
What we need in the future is something beyond jointness, which in 
our book we call interdependence - the ability to push aside the 
bureaucracy associated with the application of fire and maneuver, and 
get beyond it -- much like General Sheehan talked about this morning. 
The use of SOF as global scouts is important. Because we did not 
have the ability to set the diplomatic and political conditions for victory, 
SOF became our most effective means of gaining time and using 
economy of force. By SOF, I don't mean just special operating forces. I 
mean soldiers embedded in theaters of war for a decade, who establish 
that special trust and confidence with potential coalition partners. An 
alliance is a marriage; a coalition is sleeping together. And if you don't 
have confidence in your partner, it's very difficult to come together for 
just a one- night stand. 
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I W' HUMAN AND ORGANIZATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS 
SUPPORT: Focus on Efficiency 
Organizational imperatives and processes 
drawn from civilian/industrial sector 
• Flat organizations 
• Decentralized management 
• Low leader-to-led ratio 
• Direct producer-to-user distribution 
• Relatively protected 
• Individual specialization 
• Heavily civilianized/contracted force 
• Increased lateral entry COMBAT: Focus on Effectiveness 
-------
, · Unique military organizations focused 
......... -=:......,_~· ·-...: ·--·~· ' on extreme effectiveness and lethality 
· · • High leader-to-led ratio 
-----
• Highly trained, multi-skilled soldiers 
·Psychological hardening 
•Accent on maturity and cohesion 
·Long service, low turnover of personnel 
• High tooth-to-tail ratio in deployed forces 
Requires revolutionary change to traditional 
personnel and management approaches 
• Systems designed to limits of human 
cognition 
• Mastery of information 
To build an organization like this requires a fundamental change in 
the way armies recruit, train, and retain people. The force on the left 
would warm the cockles of Frank Fukuyama's heart It's industrially 
efficient, has a high density of reserve components, contracted 
personnel, host- nation support, and like any good industry, a leader-to-
led ratio of 1: 12 or 1 : 13. 
On the right is an entirely different force -- with a very high 
leader- to- led ratio, perhaps 1- to-2, and bonded to a degree 
unprecedented in our military history. Think of platoons that are together 
for decades, rather than months, with a leader- to- led ratio, as I said, of 
1- to- 2; with an apprenticeship and a selection process that takes 
years, if not decades, to be fully qualified to be part of that organization; 
with the ability to operate under the enemy's precision in an environment 
threatened with weapons of mass destruction, isolated, hundreds of 
kilometers away from friendly forces for periods stretching into weeks, if 
not months. 
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IT TECHNOLOGY and SYSTEMS 
• Hybird Power Sources 
• Fuel Efficiency (reduce consumption by 75%) I AAN Systems Short List 
• Human Engineering/Cognitive Engineering 
• Signature Control (including counters) 
11
. Future Grou~d Craft 
• Protection Schemes for L.and Systems • ~dvanced ~irframe 
(including active protection) Hea':'Y Lift. . . 
• Advanced Materials - Tactical Utility Lift 
• Alternative Propellants ~ • Unmanned Systems (Air, Ground, Sensors) 
• Biological and Chemical Protection, • Advanced Fire Support System 
• "Living Internet" 
I 
Antidotes and Vaccines jl 
. • Logistic Efficiencies ~·-A_ct_ive_P_ro_te_c_tio_n _______ ~ 
It's too expensive? No, it's not too expensive. Heinz Guderian 
didn't invent machine-warfare. Society invented machine warfare. The 
internal combustion engine, the vacuum tube and metal roads dictated a 
change in the nature of warfare, whether Guderian would have shown up 
in 1933, or not. 
The same applies for the information age. It will fundamentally 
change the way we build and project forces. Exploitation of the private 
sector market and the thickening of our telecommunications pipes in the 
years ahead will give us the means to do most of what we seek to do, if 
in our own silly way, we don't allow our acquisition process to get in the 
w~.y of progress. 
Think of a craft that's able to lift hundreds of tons with a single lift. 
Now think of an AT&T "craft", where small numbers of people are hired 
out to provide the level of strategic telecommunications we need to do 
just what I've just said. Our future R&D efforts can then be focused on 
the things that the civilian industry can't give us -- distributed precision,. 





~ INTELLECTUAL CONVERGENCE GNES US 




Defense Science Board: 
Sea Dragon, TF Griffin 
National Reconnaissance Office 
OSD Acquisition and Technology 
Advanced Concept Technology 
Demonstration 
LTG Redden 
Strategic Force '96 
One of the things I've learned in this two and a half years of study of 
how militaries change is simply this: if you don't get the ideas and the 
visions right, just as General Sheehan said -- if your view of the future 
isn't clear and if you don't have the ability to follow the intellectual glide 
path from the line of departure today out a generation ahead - then you 
will throw money and resources at bad ideas. That only makes bad ideas 
worse. 
The greatest technological innovation in the 20s and 30s was the 
Maginot line. It was terrific. The eleven mechanized, motorized 
divisions the Germans put into France in May 1940 were essentially 
derivative technologies taken off their ships. 
Which side won? The side that got the ideas and the vision right, 
and then managed to leverage commercial technologies to build an 
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GENE H. MCCALL 
Los Alamos National Laboratory of the University of California 
Dr. McCall is a Laboratory Fellow of the Los Alamos National Laboratory of the 
University of California and is Past Chairman of the United States Air Force Scientific 
Advisory Board. At Los Alamos he was one of the founders of the Inertial Fusion 
Program, and participated in laser and plasma physics research. He and a small group of 
collaborators designed and built the first high power Nd:Glass laser to be used for fusion 
research at Los Alamos. From 1972 to 1976, he was leader of the group responsible for 
the development, design and performance of diagnostic instrumentation for laser-driven 
fusion experiments, for the fabrication of targets for fusion experiments, and for the 
development of new technologies in these areas. He holds patents in both the diagnostic 
and target fabrication areas. He was responsible for the discovery of and the explanation 
of the high-energy electrons and large electrical currents produced by the interaction of 
high intensity laser light with matter. He was Leader of the Laser Division from 1980 
until he became a Laboratory Fellow in 1982. 
In addition to his activities as a senior advisor to Laboratory, Department of Energy, and 
Air Force managers and workers, he continues to be active in hands-on scientific and 
applied science work. His research as a Lab Fellow has been in the areas of lasers, 
hypervelocity particle production, plasma physics, and nuclear weapon related science. 
He invented techniques for the shockless acceleration of matter to high velocities, 
developed a large program to explore those techniques, and served as the Chief Scientist 
of that program from 1986 until 1992. He has contributed to the development of large 
computer codes for modeling nuclear and conventional weapons and has developed 
algorithms for describing detonations. He also developed new experimental techniques 
for investigating shock waves in matter using microwaves. 
He worked abroad in the United Kingdom as a Visiting Professor and a Visiting Fellow 
in the Physics Department of Imperial College (London) and a Visiting Staff Member at 
the Atomic Weapon Establishment, Aldermaston. He has collaborated with workers at 
the Rutherford-Appleton Laboratory and at the University of Essex in the UK on laser-
produced plasma and laser-driven shockwave experiments. At the United Kingdom 
Atomic Weapon Establishment he participated in nuclear weapon technology and design 
projects of joint interest to the United States and the United Kingdom. He was a Visiting 
Researcher at the Institute of Laser Engineering at Osaka University, Japan. 
Dr. McCall was awarded the prestigious E.O. Lawrence Award by the U.S. Department 
of Energy in 1988 for contributions to National Security. He has also received 
Distinguished Performance Awards from the Department of Energy and from the Los 
Alamos National Laboratory. In 1995 Dr. McCall directed the New World Vistas study 
and received the 1996 Theodore von Karman Award in recognition. In 1997, the 
Secretary of Defense awarded Dr. McCall the Department of Defense Medal for 
Distinguished Public Service. 
Dr. McCall is married to the former Leslie Summerford of Albany, GA, and they have 
one son, Stuart, who is an officer in the United States Army. 
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The 21st Century Military Environment 
NPS/ONR CONFERENCE ON 
MILITARY EDUCATION FOR THE 21ST CENTURY WARRIOR 
15-16JANUARY1998 
Gene H. McCall 
Los Alamos National Laboratory 
It's appropriate that General Sheehan set that strategic context for 
our discussion of the operational environment of the 21st Century. And I 
think what General Scales said concerning the imperatives of the 
battlespace and the structure of forces for the future Army applies 
equally well to the other services. 
What I would like to talk about is certainly more 
technology- oriented. Let me caution you not to interpret my discussion 
of technologies as technologies which enable platforms or things; I'll 
discuss technologies which enable capabilities. So, I will discuss the 
future of military technology in terms of the capabilities which are 
enabled by them. 
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+ Science board studies and Service estimates 
+ USAF Scientific Advisory Board 
• New World Vistas 
+AF 2025 
• Defense Science Board 
+ Army Science Board 
• AF long range planning 
• Advisory board participation 
• Defense Airborne Reconnaissance Office 
• other 
• Conversations 
+ Science and technology studies 
+ Experience 
53340ozgd - 2, 2123198 
When I see hear someone talk about the future, I always wonder 
where they get this stuff? So I decided to make a slide that would give 
you an idea of where some of my stuff comes from. Some of it is Air 
Force oriented because of my background, some is from the New World 
Vista Study of the Scientific Advisory Board, some of it is from the 
Summers report, some from Air Force 2025, which I think Jay Kelley will 
talk about, some is from Defense Science Board Studies, and so on. I 
noticed I've left out the Naval Studies Board, but it did have an effect 
here, as did Joint Vision 2010. In the end, what we're really talking 
about is experience and conversations with others, and forming an idea 
based on your own experience and those of others in the future. 
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[ ___ A_Wc_o_'Ili_d_o_f_In_cri_e_'il_s_in_ig_U_n_ce_ir,_ta_1_n_ty _ )
+ The Cold War presented a single adversary with well-known tactics, systems, 
and capabilities 
+ Cold War military training and technology responded to the threat with 
scenario-driven weapon systems and doctrine 
• Generic capabilities were mainly derived from the response to the Soviet 
threat 
• Cost was a parameter rather than a requirement 
• Military technology was self-contained 
+ No single, well-defined enemy now exists 
+ Current scenarios are of questionable reality 
• Military technology and doctrine will be driven to provide generic solutions 
which will respond to diverse situations 
• Commercial technologies will have significant military applications 
• Cost will be a major factor in system development, training, and deployment 
53340oz.gd- 3, 2/23/98 
I call this chart "Questionable Insights Into the 21st Century" 
because, any time one talks about the future, you should certainly 
question that person. Questioning is going to be a significant 
characteristic of the military officer of the future. I think that, in any 
case, we are going to have to question our own opinions; we are going 
to have question our own scenarios; and we are to going to have to 
question our doctrine. We're just going to have to keep questioning 
until we think we have it right, and then we are going to have to 
proceed. 
The world is one of increasing uncertainty. During the period of the 
Cold War, we tended to proceed on the basis of scenarios. We 
constructed scenarios which we really believed had basis in fact. Those 
scenarios led us to think of ways of countering the Soviet Union. We 
generally would come up with an idea for a new system to counter 
something that, we believed, was happening in the Soviet Union, and I 
think we did pretty well at that. The Cold War military training and 
technology paradigm responded to this threat with what I call a 
scenario- driven, weapon- system approach. 
We generated a number of generic capabilities as a result of that. In 
fact, we fought with those generic capabilities generated during the Cold 
War and Desert Storm, and did very welL But that was not the purpose 
of generating them in the first place. 
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Cost was certainly a parameter in everything we did, because, we usually 
found that our first idea of the system was unaffordable. But cost was not a major 
parameter going into studies of ways to proceed against our enemy. 
What is the situation now? As we've heard many times, there is no single, 
well-defined enemy. The scenarios we've built, the study aids, have questionable 
basis in reality. Military technology and doctrine must now respond to generic 
problems. We don't know what those specific problems are, and so we have to 
address the generic if we want to be able to fight a specific war in the future. 
Commercial technologies are certainly becoming far more applicable to 
military problems than they ever were in the past, partly because of the proliferation 
of information technologies around the world. But, as we all know, anyone who has 
tried to start, or pursue, a program in the past few years understands that cost is a 
major issue. It will be a major factor in the development of everything we do, 
certainly for the next decade. 
3-32 
Options will be Limited ] 
+ Budgets will decrease 
+ Cost will be equal in importance to capability 
+ Number of people in the armed forces will decrease 
+ Performance of people and systems must be optimized 
53340ozgd- 4, 2/23/98 
What about our options, given all this may be true? Budgets are 
going to go down. I don't think we've seen the bottom of that yet. 
We're going to find that cost is equal in importance to capability. Now, 
that's.a rather frightening prospect, but I'm afraid it's the world we live 
in. The number of people in the Armed Forces will decrease, and we 
must optimize the performance of those who remain in the services. 
We'll try to do that through technology. 
Sometimes it's said that we must do more with less. That's not what 
I mean. Don't say that, because it's really rather insulting to the people 
who are trying to do the best they can and who are overtaxed in 
performing their jobs right now. I say we must generate systems. We 
must generate technologies that optimize the performance of the people 
we have in the Armed Forces. 
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Maintaining Technical and Operational Superiority 
Difficult and Important in the 21st Century 
• Commercial capabilities are developing in militarily important fields 
• Space communications and surveillance 
• Information processing 
• New technologies will be available to all purchasers 
• Military systems will be pressed to respond to commercial developments 
• Foreign arms sales will become more competitive 
• New vendors may enter 
• Low observable cruise missiles 
• Highly effective SAM's, anti-ship missiles, anti-armor munitions 
• Reduced procurement budgets will demand that many new capabilities 
must result from technology insertion 
53340ozgd - 7, 1J23/98 
We all know about what is happening in the communications field 
today. We've heard of Iridium, Teledesic and Bill Gates putting up 
hundreds of satellites. But we don't hear as much about surveillance. 
We've heard it mentioned once today, but you hear it only in a few 
limited arenas. Commercial organizations, a lot of them multinational, 
are launching satellites that will certainly have one meter ground 
resolution. Some are hyperspectral, which means you can't hide from 
them with camouflage. They will be available to the highest bidder, and 
the cost of pictures, now available for a thousand dollars, is probably 
going to come down to a hundred dollars, or ten dollars, depending 
upon the turnaround time you want. 
The day will come when our men and women of the Armed Forces 
are going to be targeted and die because of commercial multinational 
space observation capabilities. Frankly, I think we have to do 
something about that situation. These new technologies are available 
to all purchasers. 
Military communication systems will be so intertwined with those of 
our own commercial world, and those of our allies, that we will simply 
not be able to tum them all off. In fact, we may not be even able to find 
our enemy's communications in this tremendous battle which will occur 
around the world once there are hundreds or thousands of satellites in 
orbit, all carrying gigabits of data per second, most of it encrypted, 
whether military or commercial. 
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Foreign sales are becoming more competitive. New vendors are entering 
the market and bringing in new technology, such as high-power microwave and 
laser technology, new information technologies, and low-observable cruise missiles 
that we won't be able to find very easily with the systems we have today. And if we 
find them, it's hard to destroy them before they reach their target. 
More highly effective surface-to-air missiles, anti-ship missiles, and armor 
munitions are going to appear over the next few years because, with the 
information and control systems that are developing and processors now available, 
they're easy to make; and they're cheap. 
Look at the dichotomy. In working recently on anti-personnel land mine 
replacement issues, I've heard people say, "Well, land mines are really cheap." Ah 
ha! Land mines are cheap because a Third World country can go out and pay 
three bucks a piece for them. We pay $250 apiece for about the cheapest mines 
we employ, and building a mine field will typically cost you a quarter of a million 
dollars, right from the outset. That's not cheap for us -- it's cheap for the enemy. 
And the same thing is happening with information systems in the commercial world. 
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The Future Force 
• Mix of inhabited and uninhabited aircraft and, perhaps, ships 
• Weapons projected by many diverse platforms 
+ Long range and directed energy attack 
• Greatly enlarged airlift and sea lift capability 
• Fully integrated offensive and defensive information capability 
• Extensive integrated military and commercial Space operations 
• Widely distributed sensors and information sources 
• Netted processing and control centers 
• Wideband, redundant links to theater 
• Improved weapon accuracy at lower delivery cost 
• Appropriate, individually tailored information on demand to all 
pa rtici pants 
53340ozgd - 8, 2123198 
l 
What is this future force going look like? If we take advantage of all 
the capabilities and commercial technologies we can generate, what are 
we going to have on both sides? We're going to have a mix of aircraft, 
some which have people in them and some which don't - aircraft I like 
to call "uninhabited aircraft," to get away from the issue of what "pilot" 
really means, The idea of uninhabited ships, I think, is one that the 
Navy will eventually consider, just as the Air Force of the day is 
considering the idea of uninhabited combat aircraft, for jobs where it 
makes sense. 
We are going to have weapons projected by many diverse platforms 
-- some delivered by air, some by sea, and some from the ground; and 
you really can't distinguish weapons based on their range, or based on 
their accuracy, in terms of the platform which delivers them. 
Information is a rather special subject that we hear a lot about. We 
hear a lot about the information world. So where does defense 
information stand, in general? 
Fifteen or twenty years ago, the Department of Defense purchased 
60 percent of the information products produced in the United States. 
Today, the Department of Defense purchases less than 2 percent of the 
information products produced in the United States. That means that 
there is no one who, in the long term, is going to address our problems 
with the same intensity, or the same interest, with which they address 
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the problems of commercial information technologies. So, we are going to use 
those commercial technologies. But that means we're going to use them smarter 
than our enemy, because they can buy them, too, and they are becoming cheaper 
all the time. 
We're going to have netted-processing. We're going to be able to network 
information and, eventually be able -- and so will our adversaries - to distribute 
individually-tailored information to all the participants in the battle space. This 
means, in principle, that the private can know as much as the general about what's 
going on. Distribution of information should never be a question of equipment; it 
should only be a question of doctrine and security. And that is certain to lead to a 
number of cuitural changes in the services. 
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[ New Capabilities and Obligations) 
• Integrated, distributed system of sensors, satellites, processors, databases, 
communication systems, terminals 
• Information on demand at proper granularity to all nodes 
• A stressing environment for the planner and warfighter 
• Planning and execution times reduced from days to hours or minutes 
• Point-of-use delivery in theater will revolutionize warfare 
• UCAV optimizes integration of information and weapons 
• Hypersonic 500 km, 5 km/s weapon for short dwell ground targets 
• Directed energy for TBMs, CMs, SAMs, Aircraft 
• Information munitions for C41 platforms, databases, infrastructure 
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What about these new capabilities and new obligations that will be incurred by 
the military officer of the future? I mentioned integrated and distributed systems_ 
We're going to have satellites that work together_ Nowadays, we tend to put up a 
satellite, and the satellite does its thing - it sends messages or pictures down, or 
whatever. In the future, satellites that communicate with the each other are going 
to perform integrated tasks, which means we, and our adversaries, will be able to 
view a part of the world 24 hours a day, at whatever revisit rate we like, It's not 
going to be cheap_ It's just going to be possible. 
This is a very stressing environment for the planner in particular, because 
planning must occur on a much more rapid basis and at a much more rapid rate 
than we've been accustomed to in the past. Planning will require great flexibility, 
great innovation, and a capability for pursuing new approaches when the old 
ones no longer make sense - in periods that may be only days or, perhaps, 
weeks. 
When I think of flexibility in pursuing new approaches, I'm reminded of a 
woman who was called for jury duty in a civil case. She told the judge that she 
couldn't serve because she was opposed to capital punishment. She had seen 
the O.J. trial and the Oklahoma bombing trials. The judge said, "Well, that really 
doesn't apply in this case, because this is a civil case in which the husband took 
all of the money out of their joint bank account and spent it on liquor and women 
and gambling." And the woman said, "Oh well, in that case, I guess I can serve; 
After all, I may be wrong about capital punishment." We must be flexible. 
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Uninhabited combat air vehicles certainly optimize the integration of 
information and weapons. They are information machines which carry weapons. 
They're not just airplanes that fly to a target and drop a bomb. 
Directed energy for theater missile defense, and cruise missile defense for 
defending against surface-to-air missiles, will also become more important. 
I use the term information munitions because we hear the term information 
warfare so much, but it's not well-defined. I think it has its possibilities, but we must 
define information and information use in the way we define the use of a 
2,000-pound bomb, a precision-guided munition, or an artillery round. Until we do 
that, it's not going to be accepted in the force, because it's not going to be 
understood -- in the same way that space, and space capabilities, have not been 
understood in the past, and have not been used to their maximum capability. 
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Airplanes may lo'"''' more like this than the airplanes we're familiar 
with now. This is no airplane without a pilot - there's no place for a 
pilot in this airplane. ·1 nis particular design, you notice, is very smooth 
on one side, and has the engine/weapon delivery pods on the other. It 
takes off, flips upside down, flies to its target in a low- observable 
configuration, then flips itself up to deliver its weapons. It's a little 
uncomfortable for pilots to do that, although some of us believe you can 
teach a pilot to do anything. 
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Satellites, as I mentioned, will, be cooperative. They will know 
where each other are to an accuracy, certainly, on the order of 
millimeters; and, perhaps, on the order of a few wavelengths of light. 
We must take a rational, but creative, approach to all this. 
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A Rational but Innovative Approach to new ] 
Ca vabilities js Essential J: 
• The relationship between revolutionary and evolutionary concepts is 
complex and complementary 
• Revolutionary ideas sometimes point the way to later applications 
• Identification and development of revolutionary concepts require intuition, 
innovation, acceptance of substantial risk 
• At least half of good ideas fail to produce useful results 
• Most revolutionary ideas will be opposed by a majority of decision makers 
• We must remember that Science and Science Fiction are related only 
superficially 
• The educated warrior is an essential part of decision making 
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We hear about "revolutionary ideas" in technology. But the relationship between revolutionary and 
evolutionary is very complex and certainly complementary. It's not that one's good and one's bad, 
because revolutionary ideas point the way to later applications. 
In some ways stealth was a revolutionary idea. The F- 22 is an evolutionary advance, as was the 
Stealth Fighter, which is far more competent than anything ever envisioned by early stealth designers. 
To identify and develop these revolutionary ideas requires great insight and the acceptance of a 
substantial amount of risk. We're going to have to be willing to fail - maybe half the time. And we're 
going to have to believe that failure will teach us something. We're going to have to believe that the 
half we get out of all our experiments is worth having. 
We talk so much about risk reduction, and we heard General Sheehan talking about risk reduction 
in careers today. My only other story here is about the risk reduction expert who's walking down a 
country road, and hears a voice which says, "Help! Help!" He walks over and realizes that this voice 
is coming from a frog, which is sitting next to a pond on this country road. He picks up the frog and 
looks at it, and the frog says, "Oh, kind Sir. I'm a fairy princess who has been bewitched and turned 
into a frog. But if you will kiss me, I will tum back into a fairy princess. I will grant your very wish. 
You will be rich. You will be famous. You will live forever." And the risk reduction expert looks at the 
frog, puts it in his pocket, and says, "No, thanks. I think I'd rather have a talking frog." 
Most revolutionary ideas will be opposed by a majority of decision makers. I caution people not to 
use that definition as a way of identifying revolutionary ideas, but you better be prepared for it. 
The educated warrior is an essential part of decision-making. After all is said about technologies, 
people will be the enduring factor in our 21st Century forces. We simply must have more efficient and 
broader training to respond to a much broader set of threats and capabilities in the enemy, and a 
broader set of capabilities in our own forces. 
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People are the enduring Factor in the 21st 
Centurv Forces 
+ More efficient and broader training and education are essential to 
support a smaller, more effective Force 
+ Detailed physical and psychological models of people included in 
weapon system design 
+ Real-time distributed simulation of human against human 
+ Commercial involvement 
+ High bandwidth, Human-Machine interaction 
+ Artificial intelligence, expert systems & software agents 
+ Brain controlled computers 
+ Safe, effective chemical intervention 
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We are going to have to develop more rapid ways of producing 
results from simulations, especially people oriented simulations --
simulations that are as unpredictable as people are but have many of 
the same characteristics. This kind of effort should have the 
involvement of the commercial sector. 
Finally, we are going to have to interact with computers much more 
efficiently and effectively than we have in the past. It's becoming a 
machine- oriented world, in many cases. 
People will remain the limiting and enduring factor, but they're also 
the factor which enables all of this. Technology is done by people. 
There is no such thing as buying technology off the shelf. You buy it 
from people's brains. 
When the "mouse" came out, we all thought it was wonderful 
because we could now move this thing around the screen and - click --
we didn't have to type. For those of us who didn't know how to type, that 
was really great. But it's too slow; it's too confined, and it's going to be 
replaced by something - I don't know what, but we need to work this 
problem. Does that mean brain- controlled computers? I don't know -
perhaps. One other item I think is worth mentioning is related to the 
way drugs interact with the brain. That's another subject, but we're 
learning more about that at the same time. 
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[ The Future will be Exciting and Stressing J 
One should not doubt that the 21st century forces which 
will be enabled and, indeed, demanded by new 
capabilities and responsibilities will hardly be similar to 
those of today. The changes will be as profound as 
those experienced by the Army in moving from horse to 
tank or by the Navy in converting from sail to steam. 
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In closing, I'd just like to say that the future is always uncertain, but 
it's always exciting_ In the past, there have been a couple of turning 
points in military history_ I think for the Army, in particular, it was when 
the Army finally transitioned from the horse to the tank. For the Navy, it 
was the sail to steam transition_ I think we're facing issues, problems 
and questions that are at least as significant as those, and there are 
going to be some very lively discussions about all of this in the future_ 
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My comments today will be from a JV 201 O perspective, and also from 
my perspective as one who has the pleasure of working on the Joint 
Staff, helping to motivate, assess, and prime the intellectual pump up 
there to make things like this happen. I'm not coming to you as an 
advocate, but as an observer. I'm going to share with you some of the 
things I've seen, and some of the conclusions I'm beginning to draw, 
particularly as they relate to our PME challenge. 
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JOINT VISION 2010 
-- PEACETIME 
ENGAGEMENT 
I SIX CRITICAL ELEMENTS I 
PEOPLE 
LEADERSHIP 
PREPARE -- FIGHT &WIN --
FULLSPECTRUMDOMI!'1ANCE ===~~~~ 
This is a graphical depiction of JV 201 O out of the JV 201 O booklet --
I'm sure all of you have seen it. It shows the four major operational 
concepts - dominant maneuver, precision engagement, full dimension 
prc+~ction, and focused logistics. There are the six critical elements 
ana these are the enabling dimensions. Nothing happens in these 
operational concepts unless you do something in these six critical 
elements. Of those six critical elements, I believe the bottom three --
materiel, organizational structure and doctrine - are the drivers. They 
are the ones that are the independent variables. 
JV 2010 is aimed at fighting and winning the next big one. In a 
comment during the concluding days of his tour as CJCS, General 
Shalikashvili said, "You know, it is a challenge to discuss these 
operational concepts during peacetime engagement. The term 
peacetime engagement ·is probably not a good one, because I'm not so 
sure it's peacetime anymore." 
What do things like dominant maneuver, and so many of the other 
activities the military does outside combat, mean -- things like force 
protection and precision engagement? We don't know. And from what 
I can see, we are not expending a lot of intellectual effort right now to 
figure it out. Yet, we spend most of our time concerned with JV 2010. 









Those bottom three critical elements - doctrine, organization, and 
materiel -- are the things which, in the aggregate, provide us with 
capability. They are the heart and soul of the operational concepts of 
JV 2010. I'll tell you, we have kind of skipped over the operational 
concepts in JV 2010, in an effort to try to understand them. 
We have the four bumper stickers, but I do not see us spending 
much time sitting around the table or discussing, among ourselves, 
what we think those really mean -- what the vision of warfare looks like 
when we think about these functional concepts. We leap past them 
quickly into desired operational capabilities - "DOCs" we're calling them 
- which, for the most part, are descriptions of the technology systems 




TRADITIONAL JV2010 CHALLENGE 
1ECHNOLOGY 
1ECHNOLOGY 
IN JV2010, OUR BIGGEST ROAD BLOCKS ARE: 
-DON'T UNDERSTAND THE TECHNOLOGY. 
1ECHNOLOGY 
-CANNOT ENVISION TECHNOLOGIES' POTENTIAL BEYOND THE 
CURRENT ORGANIZATIONAL AND PROCESS PARADIGMS. 
Traditionally, this is what we're running up against, and I see it over 
and over again. Within the Joint Staff, we're using the Joint War 
Fighting Capability Assessment Teams - JWFCATs - as the work 
groups to come up with these desired operational capabilities. What I 
repeatedly see in their work is the concept that organization and 
process are fairly fixed - the potential of C41SR technology out there in 
the future, the command that it offers, the weapons' technology, that 
sort of thing. So often They are looking at these things through a 
lenses of how we're organized today and the processes that we practice 
today. When they think about what we're going to be doing in the 
future, it's just an extrapolation in one dimension. 
What will future technology accomplish I keep the organization and 
the procedures fixed in relationship to each other? The technology, by 
the way, fits into JV 2010 in the materiel dimension of the critical 
elements. 
So what needs to happen? What isn't happening very well is an 
appreciation of technology in the military context and what it means, not 
just in weapons, but in what we fundamentally do. How we organize to 
do that? 
Let me give you some vignettes. They have the anecdotal property 
of being just points. Drawing a line through them may not be valid, but 
I'll give them to you anyway. 
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Two weeks ago Wednesday, we had a 6:30 a.m. morning meeting on JV 2010. 
How are we doing? The fellows from the dominant maneuver, OPS concept bunch, 
JWIC, got up to pitch their desired operational capabilities. Poor fellows, they got up 
there, and what we got was, 'We're going to have to hold them; we're going to have to 
move quickly to the theater, and we're going to have to build a force and then 
counterattack." It was a tragic display of "yester-think. 
The general idea, though, was we're going to do it better in the future. It was the 
same old trick with a bigger dog - no real thinking about what dominant maneuver is. 
From an Army perspective, you have a sense of units moving. But what does it mean if 
you are the bad guy? What does dominant maneuver do to you? You know. It 
conveys that you're going to get hit, and you don't know when or where, and you can't 
make a move without getting smacked. You're frustrated by the fact that you can't hit 
back, because you don't know where to hit. 
There is virtually no thought going on about how you start doing that 
immediately? And what's the role, eventually, of the Army, the Air Force, and the Navy, 
and the capabilities they contribute to doing that? We're just reinventing the old 
processes there. There's no thought about process and organization, and what the 
technology offers to accomplish those same ends. 
I'll give you another example -- integrated air defense. We ran an informal 
roundtable discussion to try to stir the imaginative juices in the Integrated Air Defense 
bunch, which works common air picture understanding. They're wrestling with concepts 
like air-radars on aerostats, and the idea that one service could potentially provide a 
missile that would be guided by another service's acquisition or tracking systems, and 
all that. 
As we began to talk about the potential of a completely interoperable military, 
where anybody's weapon could be guided against anybody else's by a third service; 
where the end game could be accomplished by someone other than the launcher; and 
where you could get maximum efficiency out of what you had to shoot, I observed their 
eyeballs roll into the back of their heads. They were unprepared to leave the concept 
that each service's weapon system enables you to kill from acquisition to end game; or 
to entertain that there might be a benefit in one service providing resources to another 
to do a job more efficiently. 
And beyond that, there was no thought at all concerning how you would manage 
technical interoperability on the battlefield? We worked around to the idea of a defense 
coordinator, someone who could look at the integrated air picture and determine that a 
certain threat needed to be engaged. It had been detected, say, by an AWACS. There 
were potentially F-22s in the area without munitions that could take a missile off a ship 
in mid-course and guide it to the end game. Who would make those calls to a defense 
coordinator? They couldn't touch that because the implication was, if you had a 
defense coordinator, then you might have an offense coordinator. 
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Rather than air, land, and sea component commanders actually fighting a war, 
they became more like football team managers. You had some coaches for offense, 
defense, and special teams. The whole structure of JTF and war fighting began to 
change in their minds, and they backed away from those concepts very quickly. The 
possibility of technology ran up against fixed constraints of how we organize, and what 
we do. 
also ran into another problem, which it still has me thinking. I'm not sure what 
to de about this one, or how one wrestles with it. Just last week, I went down to the 
Joint Battle Center in El Paso with JTF-6. Their mission is to introduce technology to the 
JTF commanders, not as science fair kind of stuff, but to really help them get their 
mission done. They work with technology that's available now, and get stuff out to them 
quickly to solve command and control issues. 
They offered the JTF-6 commander a thing called Compass. Now, Compass is 
just a current version of a distributed collaborative planning system for operations, so 
you can get different organizations together and come up with an operations plan in one 
system, bringing everybody together. It put the one system, the JTF-6, in the distributed 
collaborative process. Like the sound of one hand clapping, it doesn't do much good 
unless you get a second system out there so you can bang the two together and see 
what you've got. 
So they asked the JTF commander, 'Where would you like the second system?" 
And he said, 'Well, let's put it in the El Paso Intelligence Center, because that's where 
we do most of our planning. Those are the people we provide a great deal of support 
to." So the action officer from the battle center did that. Then, after noon, he took our 
work station over and put it there, loaded the software, showed them how to use it, and 
left it in the hands of the JTF-6 folks to assess. 
The young officer got on an airplane, and by the time he had flown back to the 
Joint Battle Center, he had a pack of legal-beagles on him. They were all sniffing at his 
drawers something fierce - posse commitatus. So, how much can the military give to 
the law enforcement folks? And do we even want to do that? 
Once again we have run into a constraint of old think, rather than thinking about 
what needs to be done and how can we go about doing it? Were people more afraid of 
making mistakes there? 
Luckily, we've got some forward-thinking people in the legal staff and the joint 
staff, and they've decided to turn that into something of a precedent-setting activity. 
Rather than ordering that this stuff be taken out of the El Paso Intelligence Center, 
they're now working the legal decisions to allow it to stay there, so that we can work 
interagency. 
I'm left wondering when and where we really think about the impact that 
technology has, not only on our organizations and on our doctrine, but on the whole 
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structure of what our military allows itself to do -- including the legal dimensions as well? 
Out of that thinking, we need to decide how far we can go in terms of structuring 
campaigns to push those boundaries out a little bit to give us the maneuver room we 
need. Because we're still -- as we've talked earlier with regard to Goldwater-Nichols --
very much constrained by the letter of the law in what we're·able to do. We have to 
think out farther and beyond that. 
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What's the role of PME in all of this? In my opinion, it is consensus -
- fold the technology in with the history and political science and 
economics and everything else. It's within this context that the military 
challenge lies. As we go about doing that, these new technologies 
have to be appreciated, because out of the PME system comes the 
leadership that's going to manage this expansion of our capability, in 
terms of organization, process and technology - and ultimately, legally, 
too. 
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JOINT VISION 2010 
-- PEACETIME 
ENGAGEMENT 
I SIX CRITICAL ELEMENTS I 
PEOPLE 
PREPARE -- FIGHT &WIN --
FULL SPECTRUM DOMINANCE 
PME'S 
Very simply, the challenge for PME lies primarily in those bottom 
three critical elements .. The match between technology, organization, 
and culture, or doctrine, or process -- what the military does -- it has to 
be appreciated in unity. From what I've seen in our efforts in JV 2010 to 
implement it and to move joint warfare forward, I don't see that we've 
been doing very well so far. 
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Thanks, Dean. I reckon my job is to bat cleanup for the best after-lunch 
speakers you're ever going to forget. I don't have any slides, so I am going to sit 
tight. I had the honor, in my last few years active duty to run a couple of future 
studies for the Air Force: One was SPACECAST 2020; the other was Air Force 
2025. Those studies identified some significant capabilities the Air Force needed 
to engage -- serious capabilities in technologies that it needed to embrace and 
grasp. Most important throughout all that, the thing that struck me was that our 
capabilities are far out in front of our thinking. So, in my opinion, it's not the future 
of PME that's important; it's the PME in the future. One would imply plotting 
evolutionary change, and the other says to "get with it, and get on with it." 
I would assert that the PME we have today comes from the time when mass 
production was booming in America, when mass production drove American life 
styles and drove that thing called mass education. I would submit to you that PME 
today is mass education. Everybody gets pretty much the same stuff in their 
service's PME school - a little difference service-to-service, and there's some 
· exceptions to this - But by and large, that's how I see it. 
I also see things are changing in terms of the folks who are engaging PME, 
and the environment in which that Professional Military Education is occurring. 
We're well into the time when folks aren't content to have the same thing the other 
guy has - be that their buddy or their neighbor. We don't all want black Fords, and 
we don't all want black telephones. We might prefer a red convertible, thank you 
very much. We'd like to have telephones with no wires because it's all about 
mobility. It's all about, "I want it when I want it, the way I can use it, and that's the 
way I see it, okay? It's the way I've got to have it." 
Technology is doing great things -- providing me choices I never dreamed 
of. You, too. But we're not doing such a good job at preparing people to deal with 
these choices. You can see it very clearly in your kids today. You know, they've 
got more choices and opportunities than you and I ever dreamed of. You can also 
see some of the challenges that confront these kids - and you, too - trying to pick 
among those choices and opportunities. You and I have choice and opportunity 
more than we ever expected,as welJ. My other bosses - with my other hat on -
are Al and Heidi Toffler. Al and Heidi would describe all this as overchoice. 
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The importance of these critical decisions is mounting by the day, and our 
preparation for making them is going up even more rapidly. We want to think for 
ourselves. We want to find out answers. We want to question and challenge, as 
was made clear to us this morning. 
We know there's more than one way to do almost anything. What we want 
to do is explore the ways, and see the ones that fit us best. We want to keep on 
learning. We want to learn continuously - not episodically, like we do in PME 
today. We know things are rarely going to be clear, so we're becoming comfortable 
with ambiguity. But we want to understand the shapes in the fog. 
Some of you probably read the most recent issue -- the special edition - of 
Newsweek (on U.S. military readiness) on your way to this meeting. If you got to 
the section in the back that says, "How We Fight," you found that the old quote is 
still in there, but there's a twist at the end. The old quote is, "Generals are always 
preparing to fight the last war - the one they know how to fight." The twist is, "The 
best minds in the business are trying to prepare for a war no one has ever fought." 
Now, I would submit that nearly everybody in this room comes from a time, 
when you talked about hardware, you were talking about a hammer and saw. 
Software wasn't even a word. You all remember slide rules? Try to explain how a 
slide rule works to your kid, and why it was important, and then convince him you 
know where to put the decimal point. Now, there's a challenge for you! 
Some of us remember when we were asked, "What does an Air Force do?" 
and "Why does America need an Air Force?" that the answer was "to fly and fight." 
But today, if you look at all of the services -- not just the Air Force - and look at 
what they're actually doing, you'll find more food, blankets and medicine than 
bombs, rockets and bullets - just like General Sheehan said. 
I don't know about you, but when I retired just a little over a year ago, the 
day I retired I'd never been in an Air Force so small. America had never had an Air 
Force that small. And as you all know, today it's even smaller still. And when I was 
promoted to general in the mid-eighties, I was issued a handgun. When generals 
- at least in the Air Force - get promoted today, they get issued a laptop computer. 
The handgun's "optional." I don't know if that's still the policy, but it was at about 
the time I checked out. 
Some of us remember dumb simulators and training devices, too --
cardboard replicas of the real thing. But go down to Tyndall Air Force base today. 
You can fly a 2 Ship of F-15s, look over there and wingman's right where he's 
supposed to be. You can go 2-V-2 with F-16s from Luke (AFB) and never leave 
the ground. These are exquisite, extraordinary training systems. Same thing for 
the Army, with M1A2. systems, firing systems. Same thing for the Navy submarine -
- full-motion simulators. It's great. 
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Then there's PME. Only a very few get to go -- the top 10 or 20 percent, I 
suppose. Those who aren't selected get a stack of books that's shrink-wrapped 
with an errata sheet. There are very few Guard, Reserve slots., and fewer still 
civilian slots. It's hard to build a team that doesn't get the same preparation. 
Those selected to go get to stop whatever they're doing for their service; 
pack up family, too, probably; and travel cross country, to Quantico, Newport, 
Carlisle, Leavenworth, Maxwell, McNair. They join up with ten or twelve other folks, 
sit around a table with a talking head at the other end, a black or a white board, 
and an overhead projector. Some now have TVs and VCRs. They're going to read 
a lesson the night before, they're going to go to a lecture on it the next morning, 
and then they're going to go back to the room and sit around that table and talk 
about it. And they are going to do that for ten months, with little or no exception. 
Along the way, they're going to hear a couple of good comments: "You're 
lucky. You get a chance to get reacquainted with your family and play a little golf." 
The other comment that comes out -- and you heard it here today, by the way -- is: 
"You're going to learn more from your classmates than you will the course work." 
My friend, John Warden, once said, "Socrates would be comfortable in our 
classrooms." I think he's right, but give us a break. America's never had forces so 
small. Technology is providing us with exquisite weapon systems. Capabilities are 
improving at a fantastic rate -- Gene ( )talked about some of that. And we've still 
got the top troops sitting around a table in an old building, studying history and 
management. 
In a time of smaller forces, smarter weapon systems, and uncertain futures, 
we need to prepare brilliant warriors. And by brilliant, I don't mean with IQs of 140. 
I mean smart, savvy, agile through ambiguous situations, with a desire to survive 
and succeed in whatever future presents itself -- to be confident in finding a way 
knowing there's more than one way. I'm talking about life-long, career-long 
learners, thinkers and risk-takers. 
My good friend Brigadier General John Brooks, when he was a commandant 
of SOS, started each class with this: "Space systems, airplanes, ships, and forces 
that can strike beyond the horizon are of little value without minds that can think 
beyond the horizon" -- the killing zone. 
In the midst of World War I, some of our best were trying to solve a very, 
very knotty problem: how to design gas masks for horses. Now, I'm sure they 
thought it was important at the time, but it seems a little bit short of the horizon. 
What about PME in the future? You've got to understand the environment 
you're dealing with, and, in the case of the military, the only natural predator of 
PME is training. It seems that there is this inner desire, a belief by some, that 
education "ain't really important," but that training is. So they're more than willing 
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to waive PME in lieu of improved training. Moreover, you and I know that we can 
directly measure the value of training. We also know how very, very hard it is to 
directly measure the value of education. I think Jimmy Doolittle had it right back in 
the '40s, when he said, "If we should have to fight, we should prepare from the 
neck up." We just didn't see it come to pass. Instead, the natural predator won 
out. So you see services with a function that says, "organize, train, and equip." 
I know it's important to learn how to learn, and to learn how to fly an 
airplane or drive a tank or drive a ship. But I would submit -- and I'll bet you'd 
agree -- that it's more important to learn what to do with the airplane, tank and ship. 
Bob talked about that. In other words, it's not the doodad or the gadget; it's what 
you do with it that PME ought to be concerned about. 
So now the challenge of PME is from it's only natural predator, and it ranks 
right up there with some of the great challenges of life. I got out my book and tried 
to look up what some of those challenges were, and I said, "Well, okay. Everybody 
knows what the speed of light is. What's the speed of dark?" I've got another one -
- we've all said, ''That's the best thing since sliced bread." But what was the best 
thing before sliced bread? But the real big one is, "How in the hell do you know 
when your bagpipes need tuning?" 
So, how are we going to do PME in the future? I would submit to you that 
this Asian had it right when he said, "If you show me, I'll see. If you tell me, I'll 
hear. If I experience it, I'll learn." Now, we've all said that, you and I, but we've 
said it a little differently. We've said, "Experience is the best teacher." We've got 
T-shirts that say, "Been there, done that." We wear them proudly. 
We treasure experience in this profession. It's most respected -- combat 
experience - deeply respected. Few really have it. It means a lot, because some 
things are learned that thus far can't be learned any other way than through 
experience. 
But why not try to provide experience-based learning to many, instead of just 
a few? Education is supposed to be about making connections. So, let's make 
them smarter. Let's smartly identify those courses, or portions of courses, that can 
be done by distance learning. That would prevent the enlisted folks, the officers, 
the civilians, the Guard, the Active Reserve from having to stop what they're doing, 
pack up their bags and go get it done somewhere else. 
Let's identify what can only be learned, or best learned, through experience, 
and ask technology and industry to provide the capability and ability to do that 
across a range of alternative futures. Because nobody knows what the future is 
going to be. 
Let's also go back and let get some of the historical things we believe are 
important - let's do that, too. Let's make technology give us that historical 
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experience. I've got a benchmark. Is that virtual reality, or is it Holodeck 3 (the 
simulation room on The Next Generation Star Trek's USS Enterprise (NCC-1701-
E) )? I don't know. But we haven't asked for it, either. As educators, let's put some 
requirements on industry and technology to serve us. I'm not sure we've done that. 
PME ought to be used to leverage the most important and most powerful 
factor in any war-fighting equation -- the human mind. It's all about learning 
whatever we do not know, but envisioning what we must know in order to survive 
and succeed. The ultimate test of PME will be success in environments and 
futures that were not anticipated. Businesses that don't get that right lose market 
share. Militaries that don't get that right lose nations. 
PME should study the future more than the past. It will be technology-rich, 
not poor like today. It should be the crucible for learning experiences. It should be 
career-long, continuous, Ofl demand of the individual, and structured to provide and 
enable the "right stuff'' at the right phase of the career -- a custom-tailored learning 
experience. And because you won't do it like she did, there's more than one way. 
Distance learning will set the stage and bridge the gap between resident 
experiences -- which, by the way, will be greater in number and shorter in duration. 
That should also help the Guard and Reserves, because we know one of the 
problems that they have is finding the ability and the time to get away from their 
other jobs so they can go in residence. 
This Guard, the Reserve, the civilian matter is important. We've got to 
solve it, because going into this future environment knowing how your part works, 
or how to make your part work, won't be good enough. You've got to be able to 
know how all the other parts work, too. The faculty of such educational operations 
will consist of mostly visiting scholars, visiting warriors and visiting mentors. Few, if 
any, will be permanent. 
In summary, 1·11· say that PME should have a more experientially-based 
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First, I would like very much to express our thanks to the Naval 
Postgraduate School and to the Office of Naval Research for hosting this 
conference. Obviously, great thanks is also due Congressmen Skelton and the 
other distinguished members of Congress who helped us arrive at this point. I also 
have to thank the conference organizers, particularly, who got General Don Holder 
and I up here just when the oxygen deficiency is about to reach the maximum point 
inside this auditorium. We'll do our best not to suck the rest of it out of here. 
I would also make an editorial comment, having been the gentleman who 
followed Jay Kelley at the Air University. If Jay had felt so strongly about those 
issues and fixed them all, my golf game would be a heck of a lot better today than 
it's going to be during my tenure there. 
This conference has been rich in the views that have been expressed. The 
problem that any of us have when we come to this podium is not what we will say, 
but what we eliminate from what is there to say. Certain things have been said 
about where we might go to the future, and there are three of these areas I'd like to 
focus on with you today. 
The first of those is the agility the system will require to handle the 
challenges of the future. I would certainly agree with previous panel members and 
distinguished individuals who have been on this stage that we are not prepared, 
and are not doing a good enough job in preparing, our officers to meet the 
challenges of the future. 
The second is the challenge we face in our coalition operations, and the 
importance of our allies and friends around the world within our Professional 
Military Education and training system. 
The third -- and one that's equally important to us - is our PME system for 
noncommissioned officers, which has been mentioned by some of the speakers 
already. 
I kid my old friend and classmate, Jay Kelley, about fixing some of those 
PME problems, but we have a tremendous challenge. General Sheehan eloquently 
addressed it, not only during his time as the ACOM commander, but in many of his 
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speeches I've had the opportunity to hear. Intellectually, we are not looking 
enough to the future. I was very frustrated, during the training time I spent at the 
Joint Warfighting Center, in attempts to stress the envelope a little bit. We'd look 
at some of the key strategic mobility areas, and at questions we might have about 
the environment and about trying to fight while disadvantaged. Because, as has 
already been expressed very clearly by many people far more experienced than I, 
we are not going to repeat our Gulf War experience. We will not be allowed to 
repeat that experience. If we are not preparing our military leaders to deal with 
future conflicts, then we are failing in our responsibilities as educators and as 
trainers. 
We have to find a more agile system that is willing to accept some degree of 
failure in the effort; some degree of failure in the exercise; and some degree of 
failure, if you will, in the seminar. From that failure, they will learn. 
We find ourselves in a training environment that repeats the lessons and the 
scenarios that came from the Gulf War. Despite my frustration with that, I've 
become reconciled with it, because I really understood: 1) that we had limited 
joint-training dollars, and 2) that commanders like General Sheehan were faced 
with a tremendous training problem. They had a large group of people - deep 
echelons of people, in which to train on the basics of Joint Force operation. You 
have to have a structure to do that; and, in limited time, with limited money, you 
have to focus on that problem. 
Now I'm in an environment where I see that we do have the opportunity to 
address these issues, and that is in our educational system. It is exactly that part 
of the problem we should be addressing in our educational system. One of the 
things we clearly have to fix is to make the schools agile enough to respond to all 
the changes that are going on. 
As we look at the evolution of the Sea Dragon experiments in the Marine 
Corps, at the formation of a Naval Warfare Development Center, at the Battle Labs 
and Force XX.I in the Army, and at the evolving Battle Lab Structure in the Air 
Force, we are grappling with establishing the appropriate links to make sure we're 
tied to those battle labs and the concepts emerging from them. When we do that, 
our educational system can, in fact, contribute to the development of the 
operational concepts that will help further refine those p·roducts coming out of the 
labs and the experiments. It can also help define and refine the operational 
concepts that will support the technologies that come from those labs. 
I don't know what the other services' experiences are, but I will tell you mine, 
both as a recipient of input and as one who has provided input at various staff 
levels. When we did PME system research, we would canvass a major command, 
commanders, and those serving on CINC staffs for inputs. Inevitably, our tasker 
would fall - as it did when I was that junior staff officer - to some harried junior 
staff officer who didn't have much time, who put it at the bottom of the pile, and who 
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work it at the last minute. He'd end up coming up with a bunch of vanilla 
recommendations for research projects that were then forwarded to the schools, 
most of which just simply provided a vehicle to allow someone to complete their 
graduation requirements. We very clearly need to re-energize that. 
At Air University, we have restructured our research effort. We have named 
a director of research, and have relieved him of educational responsibilities. We're 
trying to forge a link with our sister services, with our own battle labs and, more 
importantly, with the field and the CINCs, to determine the emerging concepts and 
those questions they are most concerned about. We're taking the intellectual 
capital resident in our student body and our faculty and turning that toward 
addressing the very kinds of problems that Vince Roske raised during our last 
session. 
We have failed to do that adequately, in my mind from where I sit, in our 
institution, and we need to fix that problem. We need to clearly make the year 
more challenging, certainly as an intellectual exercise, as to how we employ force 
across the spectrum of challenges we will be faced with in the future. 
I couldn't agree more with Colonel Summers - we need to stick to one level 
in making sure people understand basic blocking and tackling. But the challenge 
of the future will be much more sophisticated than that. We will need to have 
people who have thought in advance about the range of challenges they'll have to 
face, because they'll be put into difficult environments with inadequate force and 
asked to respond. Often the airlift won't get there on time, or maybe it won't show 
up at the right place. They might have to fight for a period of time at a 
disadvantage. They might have to use those things we inherently have within our 
armed services to the best advantage, and be able to hold it to a stalemate until 
they get the appropriate force, so that, with conditions appropriately in their favor, 
they can win. 
Yet, every time we sit down and talk about an exercise, even within the 
schools, we assume we have a balance of force. We start with a fully-flowed 
TPFDD, and assume there are no challenges. We don't think them through. 
We had a minor breakthrough in the global engagement game we ran for the 
Chief of Staff this last fall, because we ended up having three game teams playing 
a future scenario where they started at a disadvantage. All three teams were very 
capable people -- CINC staffs, led by retired senior officers. They fell into attrition 
warfare and, at the end of the game, the enemy Red Force won its limited 
objective. 
We all failed to catch what that limited objective was: to bog down U.S. 
forces; to create a stalemate; to drain U.S. power; to create a unfavorable attitude 
and environment at home so that we would give way to rather limited goals and 
then leave the scene very quietly. 
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We were aided by the fact that we were supported by our leadership, which 
allowed us to have a very aggressive enemy Red Force which had a lot freer play 
than we normally allow in games. They were very aggressive, did some very, very 
interesting things, and they ended up being a real challenge. Most of the people 
on the Blue Force felt like they had their hands full. Blue Force members 
repeatedly asked the controllers, "Why are you letting these guys do this to us?" 
The controllers would respond, "Who's going to stop them in real life?" These are 
the real kinds of challenges we're going to be faced with in the future. 
We need to get more integrative in our approach. One of the things we're 
doing this spring is trying to integrate our games between command and staff and 
the War College. We have great resources at both the operational level and 
strategic level of education, yet run separate war games for them in the spring. We 
are trying to combine the games this year; play staff against staff. I know this is a 
goal of General Chilcoat at NDU, and I know General Scales has the same desire -
- to learn from some of these efforts and get to the point where we're playing 
together at the schools. This will foster play at the appropriate level of warfare, and 
engage the war colleges. We hoped to be able to move forward on that front also, 
and do some things that are more innovative. 
One of the things we have to tum around in our service, as a culture, is the 
very point raised from this stage about rewarding the risk-taker and honoring the 
question-asker. I'm afraid a very, very bad mindset sometimes creeps into the 
service mentality, that says: "If you're not playing my game, you're not on my 
team." Where, in fact, I think all professional officers ought to be asking questions. 
They ought to be trying to look for alternative answers and alternative solutions. If, 
of course, when the time comes to saddle up and move forward with the decision 
your commander has made, you continue to carp or grouse when the posse has 
ridden off to the south and you're heading north - that's disloyalty. But, up to that 
time, I hope we would honor the intellectual freedom that would encourage a lot of 
people to think about all sides of a problem, and talk about some of the innovative 
solutions that might help us better find our way to the future. 
Somehow, we have to instill within our schools the kinds of challenges and 
thinking we hope people will have. Part of that comes from the challenges we have 
put on our faculty - one of the things that has been addressed here, in part. I think 
we need to leave this conference very cognizant of the fact that we're going to have 
to make some accommodations in the future. We are limited in manpower and 
we're not going to get all the people we need with the right skills to do the things we 
need to do within the schools. 
I'll give you an example of this in our War Gaming Institute today. We've 
reached the point in our operational expertise, due to a shortage of pilots -- that we 
can't man our War Gaming Institute to the level we need to. So we are making a 
military-to-civilian conversion this year that will save us about three and a half 
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million dollars. We're converting those positions to contract positions, contracting 
those functions out for an estimated cost of about two million dollars. I think we're 
going to end up with a net savings of a million dollars or so -- not small change to 
the educational system. More importantly, this will provide us with the level of 
expertise and continuity we need in that very, very important aspect of our work 
force. And finding outside help is just one of the challenges we're facing, trying to 
look at all the other things we're having to move to. Because we do not have the 
manpower to do it internally. 
Another real challenge all the schools have as we move to the future is, what 
we will do about and how we will address the question of distance learning? I'm a 
fan of distance learning, but it is neither a panacea nor a cure for all ills. I think we 
need to be very, very careful about distance learning and how we employ it. It 
does offer us the great opportunity to get what we might, in the past, have seen as 
traditional learning out of the way -- to bring everyone to a school at a much higher 
level than they might start now. But we'll still need that experiential effort and, I 
think, we'll still need the interface of the human element. 
I would harken back to my own time at the Army War College. I was very 
fortunate to be in a very distinguished company with my Army classmates -- people 
like General John Tilelli, General Jay Garner, General Gene Blackwell, former OPS 
DEP, General Dick Larson, and General Dan Christman, now the superintendent at 
West Point. I kept running into those gentlemen on the Joint Staff and at other 
assignments, and it was a great, great experience to get to know them better in the 
environment of the Army War College. It paid great benefits in terms of 
understanding and being able to deal with them on a variety of issues throughout 
the years. I hope we don't lose that in the schools. 
Very clearly, we need to be able to reduce the time, save money, and be 
more efficient. And very clearly, as we move to the future, distance learning is 
very, very important to our Reserve Forces. We are blessed because we're been 
able to integrate our Reserve Forces and our faculties. In fact, we probably 
couldn't do our Officer Training School and all the courses and electives we have in 
the Command and Staff College and the War College without help from Reserve 
Force faculty members. We're getting a great help from them, but we have 
problems in the educational processes we're using to reach them. Part of our 
problem, amazingly enough, as we have gone to CD-ROM technology - and 
General Drennan and his people did a great job of making that happen - is that 
some people don't have that CD-ROM technology available to them. 
Interestingly enough, the feedback from the field was: "We don't like reading 
from the computer screen. Can you change the course and still give us required 
readings in hand-out form, so we can use them and make notes? And make the 
print-outs small enough to stick in a fatigue pocket, or flight suit pocket, or 
someplace to store when we go on deployment." So, we made that modification. 
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But distance learning raises another big issue for us. Our distance learning 
is basically CD-ROM based, though we're also doing a lot with television and 
outreach. But in the near future, CD-ROM technology will be obsolescent, if not 
obsolete, and we do not have the money to move forward and chase new 
technologies. I can invest 15 million dollars tomorrow and still have to go back to 
the Air Force in two years and ask for 15 million dollars more -- or more than that --
just to keep abreast of the technologies. 
So, it's really important that we seek the right industry partners who can help 
us move forward in tho~.:- key areas to all the services. The challenge is that this 
requires a degree of cc ·,onalty within our own service that we have not achieved 
to date. We can't even ;;:t our information systems common enough within the Air 
Force to all talk to each other with any great ease, much less achieve the degree of 
commonalty we would like to have with our sister services to make sure we have a 
truly joint educational environment. That's the real challenge for all of us as we 
move forward in this area. 
I think the way ahead is bright. We are blessed by some very, very bright, 
articulate people. I think the challenge we have ahead of us is to challenge them 
as much as we can and, hopefully, we will be able to do that. 
We're moving forward on another front. (General) Tim Kinnan briefly 
mentioned a continuum of education, which was among the proposals and broad 
scope of issues Mr. Skelton addressed. We have gone back and really done a 
ground-up review of where we are going with Professional Military Education, and it 
has revealed gaps. This review has led us to develop a new in-residence course 
for our brand new officers that we will test this summer. It's patterned after the 
concept of the Marine Corps basic course, the Air and Space basic course. 
If it is successful, we will implement it in the following year. We have also 
developed three new distance learning courses that involve a great deal of 
mentoring - one for company grade officers, ... ,e for field grade officers, and one 
for senior field grade officers. It will require involvement from our leadership at 
various levels to make those courses work. They are intended, very clearly, to 
prepare officers for the education that they will need to handle the specific 
responsibilities they will have at transition points in their careers. So, there's a lot 
of work being done in that area. 
Internally, we will review a lot of things - commonality in our faculty, for 
example. I don't think we're yet at the point of going to one common faculty at Air 
University; although we've had the advantage of having all of our schools there on 
one campus. We certainly have to do more sharing between the faculty. 
We found a shortfall in the pace of accreditation in the joint presence at Air 
Command and Staff College. We simply could not, because of the rank structure of 
the offa;ers we had instructing that course, get a lot of joint experience. They 
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weren't at that point yet in their careers to have it, or to have command experience; 
and, when we looked to the next higher rank, we couldn't bump it up another rank, 
because we simply couldn't find the people to fill the billets. Qur solution is going 
to be to use those officers who are at other schools and who have that experience. 
We can use them to help teach in the joint arena - to augment General Drennan's 
staff in Joint PME, in specific cases and instances, at the Command and Staff 
College. 
As we look toward the importance of coalitions, we see an increasing 
pressure and request for presence in our classes, particularly with the dissolution 
of the former Soviet empire. We have an awful lot of queries and a lot of 
international presence in our courses. I think that's very, very important for us. 
(General) Rusty Blackman, in his earlier comments, indicated, "It's not going to be 
the Gulf again. It will be fast and it will be violent." Someone will try and grab the 
advantage. We are going to have to get organized on the run. And it's going to 
help if we go there and meet with coalition partners, friends, and allies whom we've 
been to school with, whom we've trained with, and whom we've exercised with. 
That will be ever more important for us. 
I would hope - particularly from those members of Congress who might 
attend, and certainly for those former members of Congress who are here -- that we 
evolve away from the carrot-and-stick mentality we've used toward our military 
training programs in the past. I would specifically reference my experience in Asia, 
when I was serving on the PACAF staff over there. In the smoke of history, many 
people may have lost the fact that, when Indonesia had difficulty in East Timor and 
members of their armed forces fired on the Portuguese minority in East Timor, the 
officer who went in and fixed that situation was put in charge of the district. In fact, 
he went in and rectified many of the ills that had occurred and was responsible for 
several senior officers retiring as a result of their actions - something unheard of in 
that Armed Force to that point in time. The officer who did that had been educated 
in U.S. schools. Yet repeatedly, during my time in the Pacific, because we were 
concerned about our relationship with Indonesia, we would cut the 1.2 million 
dollars in military education training funds used by their officers to attend Marine 
Corps University, the Naval War College, Air War College, and the National 
Defense University. That was the first thing we would cut. Yet there were many, 
many millions of dollars in aid programs that the State Department controlled that 
never got cut. 
I would always ask the ambassador's staff there, "Why don't you guys cut 
some of that agricultural fund stuff, or something else?" You can cut several million 
dollars and make them really feel the pain. But we always went for the military 
training program. 1 would argue that, for the small dollars we spend, it results in 
some of the greatest benefits we reap. We should never forget that as a point of 
emphasis, a point of focus. 
A military member of one of our allies made an interesting comment to me at 
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an International Doctrine Conference that Bob Scales and I attended at Fort 
Leavenworth while I was at Fort Monroe. He said, "As you move forward 
technologically, you run the risk of leaving us behind. If you do, you will fight your 
future battles alone because of the technology that only you use - if you're not very 
careful about that." Somehow we have to work our way through that. We is only 
through our educational process, through cooperative agreements, and through 
close-training efforts that we will be able to stay away from that, and form the kinds 
of coalitions we will need for the future. 
When we think about where we're going in the future in terms of our 
noncommissioned officers, I think all the services see us very clearly relying more 
on a well-educated force of NCOs. One of the great benefits we've seen in the all-
volunteer force, with the GI Bill and the other things that have structured us better, 
is that we have recruited far better young men and women into the service of their 
nation. Across all the services, that has resulted in a high-quality, highly educated 
force. 
From our perspective, we think the structure is in place to do extremely well. 
Right now, our Senior NCO Academy is a joint and international venture. We have 
members of the Navy and the Army serving permanently on the staff there as 
instructors. We have a member of the German Air Force serving as an instructor 
on an exchange tour. Representatives from other services regularly attend that 
school, and from the international community. 
We're fortunate to have Colonel Hank Yancey, the commandant of our 
College of Enlisted Professional Military Education, with us here today. He is 
responsible for curriculum development at all of our schools - Airman Leadership 
School, NCO academies, and Senior NCO Academy. So, given central structure 
and central control, we have the vehicle we need to ensure we insert the right 
things, at the right time, into the system. The system exists. We have to be careful 
about what we are going to teach. 
When we talk about Joint Vision 201 O and the agility we expect to have in 
future battlefields, much of that is based on information dominance and information 
superiority. The people who are responsible for those systems, in large part, for 
the Air Force are our noncommissioned officers, both junior and senior. Many of 
you in this room are old enough to remember the days when we struggled with 
ASAS - the All Source Analysis System - back in the '80s, trying to acquire that 
system and keep it alive. It was going to filter and direct inputs from all the many 
sensors we had in the battlefield - even the limited battlefield of the '80s. This 
required a degree of artificial intelligence we had not yet acquired, as my good 
friend Bob Scales will readily tell you. As an aside, he told me one time during a 
conversation on our front porch, that all the services acquired a degree of artificial 
intelligence they developed military aviators. 
For. the foreseeable future, though, we are still going to have people in the 
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loop; and a large number of those people are going to be our young 
noncommissioned officers. Their understanding of the environment in which they 
will operate; their ability to understand the broad scheme of what a Joint Force 
commander's intent might be; and what their service's role or their component's role 
within that scheme is going to be, is important to them in making the kinds of 
decisions that will give us the informational agility we will need to succeed on a 
future battlefield. Fred Pang referenced this in his comments, and I think it's very 
insightful. We need to think about that. We find, in all the services, that we have 
put great pride and a lot of effort into the Professional Military Education of our 
noncommissioned officers. The structure exists. We don't want to miss out on 
what we need to do to ensure that they continue to make the great contribution that 
they are making today. 
In closing, it's only appropriate, being a guest here at the Naval 
Postgraduate School, to quote the CNO. We were very fortunate, those of us who 
came from Air University. The day we left, Admiral Jay Johnson came to speak to a 
combined ACSC and War College audience. In his closing remarks, he assured 
everyone that ''The Navy was being guided on its way to the future - not by its 
following wake, but by the stars ahead of it." 
That was wise counsel, I think, because he was speaking very clearly to the 
service having its eyes on the future - trying to look forward over far horizons to 
the challenges they might face, and the requirements they have to prepare their 
people for those challenges. That's wise counsel for all of us involved in 
Professional Military Education, because our real challenge is to ensure that we 
are looking far enough ahead to provide the institutional and organizational agility 
needed to respond to a changing future and to support the outstanding individuals 
we have going through our schools. Thank you very much. 
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East High School, Denver, Colo., in 1960. Commissioned on graduation from the U.S. 
Air Force Academy in 1964, the general is a command pilot with more than 4,900 flying 
hours in several types of aircraft, including 607 combat missions for 1,323 combat hours. 
Throughout his career, he has served in a variety of flying, operations and command 
positions at the squadron, wing, major command and air staff levels. Prior to assuming 
command of Air University, General Redden commanded the Department of Defense's 
Joint Warfighting Center at Fort Monroe, VA. 
General Redden holds a Bachelor of Science degree from the U.S. Air Force Academy, 
and a Master's degree in political science from Auburn University, Montgomery, AL. He 
is a graduate of Squadron Officer School, Air Command and Staff College, and Army 
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His major awards and decorations include the Defense Distinguished Service Medal, 
Distinguished Service Medal, Legion of Merit with bronze oak leaf cluster, Distinguished 
Flying Cross with bronze oak leaf cluster, Meritorious Service Medal with bronze oak 
leaf cluster, Air Medal with five silver oak leaf clusters and three bronze oak leaf 
clusters, Air Force Commendation Medal, Presidential Unit Citation with two bronze oak 
leaf clusters, Air Force Outstanding Unit Award with "V" device and bronze oak leaf 
cluster, Combat Readiness Medal, National Defense Service Medal with bronze service 
star, Armed Forces Expeditionary Medal with bronze service star, Vietnam Service 
Medal with silver service star and two bronze service stars, Republic of Vietnam 
Gallantry Cross with Palm, and Republic of Vietnam Campaign Medal. 
General Redden is married to the former Shirley Ann Woodroof of Nashville, Tenn. They 
have two children, Ashlee and Brett. 
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The Inter-war Opportunity 
General Binford Peay, former CINCCENT, classified the present time an "inter-war" 
period. I like that because it draws the right parallel between today and the other periods 
that have preceded large national defense efforts. In the past, the military establishment's 
use of the time between wars has had decisive effects and many of these have involved 
substantial contributions by the military school systems. 
The Prussian preparations between 1852 and 1864, and the varying quality of inter-
war education in the western armies before the Second World War are often cited as 
examples of how professional education affects performance in war. More and more 
frequently, commentators mention the U.S. military's recovery from the nadir of Vietnam as 
a similar case. 
Couple that with the changes described by the "futures" panel, and the coming years 
promise to be similarly important. Retrospectively, this decade may well be seen as an 
opportunity and a formative period, a decisive preparatory interval for whatever follows. 
The quality of the preparation we make now is therefore vitally important. And, while 
we must develop every part of the national defense establishment intelligently, nothing 
exceeds the importance of getting the professional education of the soldiers. airmen. 
sailors and marines right. Today we are educating the leaders who will devise and carry 
out the campaigns of the future. 
Military people today serve in an environment different - very different - from that of 
the last period of substantial change. In the post-Vietnam period, the armed forces faced 
substantial challenges and made great progress in education, doctrine, training, material 
development and organization. The services are called on to do the same things today, 
but, while the post-Vietnam generation toiled in obscurity as semi-pariahs, this generation's 
military stays very busy. 
. 
You all know the chief features of this environment. Forces are smaller. 
Deployments are almost continuous. People rotate through assignments rapidly. 
Technology is presenting great new opportunities, and liabilities. The machinery procured 
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in the 1980's is wearing out at a time when the service budgets cannot support much in the 
way of procurement. And fighting doctrine is changing as national strategy and the 
international situation evolve. With all that going on, more time in resident schools doesn't 
seem likely for today's officer corps. 
The "Overarching Issues for Professional Military Education" these days seem to me 
very simple. I believe that there are really only two fundamental issues. First is that of 
transfor;1ing PME into a more flexible and comprehensive system. That means changing 
its present emphasis on progressive, periodic and modestly individualized resident courses 
to a system of comprehensive, life-long learning that will address the specific needs of the 
force. The object of this change would be to impart the professional basics of doctrine and 
practice to the leadership as a whole, while providing more rigorous, accountable education 
and training to a smaller group of key leaders and staff officers. 
The second and tougher task will be to raise the quality of the PME system from 
today's mediocre levels to real excellence. In view of the complexity of today's world, the 
operational environment we anticipate, and the complex transition that lies between the 
two, we can accept nothing less than that. But cultivating genuine seriousness about PME 
will amount to a cultural change that the services will generally resist. 
I'll spend the rest of my time elaborating on those two points. 
First the business of completing the transformation of PME and converting present 
systems to continuous learning programs. We have a good base to build on. 
• We possess a system that is the envy of business and industry; 
• We have an experienced and competent officer corps (a by-product of high 
OPTEMPO); 
• We've made great progress in joint education; and 
• Our school commandants are exceptional people. 
So reform of the PME system wouldn't start from zero. 
The Schools are dealing with a changed environment, though. The forces they 
support are operating at a very high operating tempo while simultaneously re-organizing 
and re-orienting themselves. We should not expect this to change and, therefore, with the 
forces as small and busy as they are, we should assume that there will be no more time 
available for resident education in an officer's career profile than there is now. 
To contribute effective.ly, then, the schools will have to adapt to existing conditions. 
Instead of being chiefly residential programs, they will have to provide continuous, 
individualized, accountable education to leaders throughout their service. Instead of 
spending their time in basic instruction about quantities and qualities, they will have to 
devote more effort than ever before to teaching their students not what to think, but how to 
think. Everyone has a favorite scheme of changing the concept of PME. Here's mine: 
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All career officers would be expected to learn continuously throughout their 
service and would be responsible for demonstrating progress on professional 
examinations. The mode of learning would be less important than the fact that 
the learning took place. Therefore, officers would meet professional education 
requirements established by their services and the joint staff through a mixture 
of resident and non-resident training. All officers would attend basic courses 
designed to teach doctrinal and procedural standards. All would be eligible for 
spedal courses designed to prepare them for particular assignments. A 
smaller number would attend staff and war colleges. 
In this effort: 
• All officers would receive basic specialty and service education through the ranks of 
0-3, in courses long enough to thoroughly teach them service and branch doctrine 
and staff techniques and procedures. For most officers this would be the only 
extended resident course they would attend. 
• As senior 0-3s, all officers would enter a program of mandatory and elective studies 
that would continue throughout their careers. While in staff and line assignments, 
their commanders follow their progress and assist them, while the services maintain 
central records of their course work. This in-service training obviously cannot 
distract officers from their principal duties, but it would fit easily in a tiered readiness 
arrangement in which the unit emphasizes refitting and basic training. 
• In addition to teaching resident courses, the staff and war colleges would write and 
administer these continuing education courses in doctrinal and technical 
fundamentals for non-resident students. 
• The services and joint schools would also provide special preparatory courses for 
unique or sensitive assignment - things like treaty verification duty, attache duty, 
military support to civilian authorities, humanitarian relief and the like. These would 
either be short resident courses or courses taught through any of the existent non-
resident means. (Some courses of this kind exist now.) 
• Resident attendance at the major schools -- by which I mean the staff and war 
colleges - would be limited to a smaller number of promising core specialty officers. 
A few professional specialty officers attend these courses, but most doctors, 
dentists, lawyers, administrators and chaplains go to joint senior specialist courses 
in lieu of the combat-centered courses. 
Testing would complement the system, allowing course work to be focused on the 
learning needs of the student and permitting full or partial course credit for individual 
learning. At critical developmental points, officers should take certification examinations 
just as other professionals do. If I were organizing that program, I'd require senior 0-3s to 
demonstrate their basic understanding of their specialties before promotion to 0-4, and all 
0-Ss to re-certify at a higher level before being promoted to 0-6. Freer use of testing would 
4-13 
----- ----------------------------------
allow officers who have learned in active field service to "test our of all or parts of resident 
courses, or to receive credit for short courses in the joint or service catalogue. 
This approach would preserve a strong level of general education in the force, make 
leaders principally responsible for their own development, and, by reducing the size of 
classes, support better instruction in the staff and war colleges. Such a program should 
allow officers to follow their own interests to some degree, but would also assure that they 
all read and studied their professions even when they were not enrolled in schools. 
There's a clear part for every participant in this arrangement. 
Role of the officer. In such a system, the individual leader bears most of the 
responsibility for his learning. With the assistance of self testing, branch guidance and 
counseling from his bosses, officers should be expected to improve their strength&, remedy 
their weaknesses and prepare themselves for the next level of employment. Professional 
reading lists and correspondence courses all have a part to play. As a former division and 
regimental commander, I understand the "busy-ness" of officers in the line, but I know from 
my own unstructured "in-service" study that reading the profession while doing it is 
possible. Units, in fact, derive advantages from having their leaders study while they are 
involved in troop leading. 
Role of the line. To pitch formal schooling at the proper level, the services and joint 
educators would need to administer developmental programs for their leaders between 
their school assignments. Those programs would roughly resemble the old "school of the 
soldier" that used to teach young leaders in the units in the 19th Century, but would be 
supported with the best available non-resident materials. Taught in coordination with a 
unit's training cycle, professional development would become a full- time activity, and most 
educational needs would be met in the field or the fleet. 
Role of the Schools. The role of schools in this arrangement would be to assure 
consistent basic doctrinal instruction to the leadership at large through resident and non-
resident courses. Technical and basic courses wouldn't change much. Schools would 
write and evaluate all course work. The resident courses would remain the most important 
means of educating future leaders. But they would begin their instruction on a higher plane 
than at present because students would arrive better prepared. Curricula and faculties 
would then be 
able to use the time in school to stretch their students' horizons by forcing them to solve 
problems several echelons above their actual ranks, and to think hard about the full 
spectrum of operations. 
Even if operational tempo remains high, there is every reason to support such an 
approach. As peacekeeping operations settle into long-term, routine activities or operating 
elements are positioned for deterrence, leaders will have the opportunity to work toward 
their required development objectives through distance learning and electronic 
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correspondence courses. Doing so in field conditions offers the advantages of immediate 
application of some of the learning and constant comparison of theory with reality. 
Improved teaching tool - interactive self-development programs, low-overhead 
simulations, digitized references, computer-assisted instruction, collaborative distributed 
work stations and the like - now add great efficiency to every aspect of learning. They can 
also improve faculty understanding of student progress, strengths and weaknesses, and 
pace student learning to the individual's progress. 
Service leadership and the Joint Staff would design the system and prescribe its 
requirements. 
The second problem is that of improving the quality of American PME - of 
assuring that the services get full value for the investment that PME represents. This is 
important whether or not you accept my first advice about re-forming the education system. 
And it comes down to improving the quality of students, faculties, and facilities, but most 
importantly it depends on the unqualified support of the senior leadership of the services. 
As I said in the introduction, this is a counter-cultural idea. 
The services presently use selection boards to choose officers for resident PME. 
Graduation from a course is less meaningful to the officer than being chosen to attend. 
Service schools are distressingly disinclined to insist on high academic standards. The 
"gentleman's 'B"' predominates and comes almost automatically to those who participate. 
The schools also suffer from outmoded instructional tools and fall short of accomplishing 
what they should as a result. 
A number of things might be done to improve quality: 
Changing the method of student selection from simple review of files to a mixed 
system of applications and boards would prove instantly beneficial. To be considered for 
the next resident course, prospective students should have to show progress since their 
previous academic experience. Requiring them to qualify for attendance at the staff and 
war colleges would first shock the officer corps and then stimulate a lot of healthy activity. 
Prospective students should take the initiative in their middle and high-level 
schooling. First, officers meeting course prerequisites (experiential and completion of non-
residential requirements) would take the initiative in applying for admission. Second, 
applicants would qualify for admission by passing an entrance examination. Selection 
boards' tasks would be simpler, since they would only consider for admission those officers 
who had performed to an agreed-on standard on a test. This simple change would induce 
a substantial change in officer behavior and in the quality of professional education. 
Instead of relying solely on assignment patterns, reputation and fitness reports for 
selection, the system would compel officers to study their professions to assure their ability 
to qualify for schooling. 
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A second important change would be to record academic performances in greater 
detail, and base assignments in part on school performance. This has greater applicability 
at the war college level than in the staff colleges. We would do very well, however, to 
emulate the policy of the British Higher Command and Staff Course in using course 
performance as a basis for assignments. In our application, we might make the most 
sought-after assignments contingent upon strong performances in relevant courses. 
Involving commanders and staff supervisors in monitoring the non-resident progress 
of officers in the line would be part of the system. This would settle in on top of scheduled 
performance counseling as a natural accompaniment and would add a new dimension to 
the overall evaluation of a subordinate's performance. 
Faculty. Staffing the schools with expert faculty is no less important than selecting 
the strongest possible students. The best civilian schools exert enormous effort and devote 
considerable amounts of money to build strong faculties. Teaching is only one reason that 
they do this, but it's generally agreed that an all-star faculty is essential for academic 
excellence. 
At present, only the special advanced studies programs (SAMS, SAAS, SAW) and, 
to an extent, the Marine Corps take this approach. Requirements for highly qualified 
officers in operational billets, at training centers, on joint and service staffs, and in directed 
assignments (reserve components, recruiting, ROTC) all take precedence over faculty 
positions. As a result of the priority placed on other assignments and the tendency of 
promotion and command selection boards to ignore or even penalize teaching experience, 
few officers seek assignment to service school faculties. To a promotion board member, a 
classroom teaching assignment is at best a skip-over line on an officer's record. 
For instance, the Army requires its staff college faculty to be graduates of the staff 
college course but cannot detail enough experienced people to fill the billets. It therefore 
assigns a number of each year's Leavenworth class directly to the faculty. The service also 
initiated its Combined Arms and Services Staff School (CAS3) with the intention of using 
former battalion commanders as teachers for captains. In practice, the number of 
command-experienced lieutenant colonels has dwindled and, because of other priorities, 
the former commanders the School does get are predominately those who fail in selection 
for war college. 
This institutional indifference toward teaching doesn't deter some very good people 
from working on the faculties, but it doesn't reward them either. Teaching at a service 
school therefore gets little priority from assignments officers and tends to attract ot ~ers 
who either prefer teaching to field work or have missed selection for a more prestigious 
post. 
Goldwater-Nichols strictures force a specified number of joint staff officers (JSO) and 
joint-experienced officers into the schools to teach joint subjects. The services would 
benefit from some similar forcing factor that would put outstanding instructors on the 
platform. At the very least, the status of their faculties should be reported in 
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readiness reports that inform public officials and senior leaders of the condition of 
the teaching base. 
Other possibilities include policies that link faculty duty with first line operations jobs. 
That would earmark a fraction of the 0-4s in primary staff positions with line units for 
subsequent assignment to the college faculties. First assignments for a defined number of 
line officers at the 0-5 level might be to teaching or training positions. 
More ambitiously, faculty for the staff colleges and war colleges could be selected by 
boards or "by name" based on their professional reputations. Some of the best foreign 
schools do this. The Fuehrungsakadamie and the Higher Command and Staff Course 
choose their faculties with great care. In the case of the German staff college, assignment 
as a syndicate leader is a high prestige position that usually presages promotion to flag 
rank. 
Two other European practices bear examination. Both would selectively counteract 
the loss of talent that comes with the American twenty-year retirement system and thirty-
year service cap. The German Army permits longer service in the first place, but it also 
encourages its most talented colonels who are will not advance to flag rank with special 
status. These "colonels deluxe" get additional pay and the status that goes with being 
singled out as the best on service. While the Bundeswehr does not put these officers into 
its schools as a rule, we might very well employ a few distinguished colonels and captains 
in that way to add stability and experience to the college staffs. 
Similarly, a few older general officers might be retained on duty for extended 
assignments to the leadership of service schools or as distinguished faculty. This works 
well for the Russians and complements their younger faculty very effectively. 
Where joint education is concerned, there is room to build on the strong base 
established by the provisions of the Goldwater-Nichols Act. Specifically, the Joint Staff and 
unified commands should take a more active part in joint education. 
Instituting CINC chairs or teaching positions at the major colleges would pay off in 
the quality of instruction and in preparation of students for duty with the joint commands. 
The CINCs could also assist in teaching by participating in the staff and war college course-
end exercises, which in every case involve joint operations. The potential here ranges from 
simple staff participation - AOR briefings, advisory assistance to student planners, product 
review and comment - to exercise design and administration. In the most ambitious 
application, a simple rotation would pair the unified commands with a different institution 
every year, giving the CINCs responsibility for exercise design. This would solidify the 
connection between the schools and the field, and add realism to coursework. 
Facilities. Today, the service colleges are falling behind in a period of high-tech 
teaching aids and increasingly automated operations. They neither possess the best in 
instructional aids nor the command and control tools that fighting organizations use. As a 
result, they are not as effective in teaching as they might be, and they are increasingly less 
4-17 
able to show students the full operational picture as it is experienced in field command 
centers. 
The Total Army School System (TASS), a non-resident instructional system being 
erected for the Reserve Components, has great potential for extending education to the 
field at large. Using the TASS network and courseware, the Army and the other services 
could conduct a large percentage of routine instruction using distance learning techniques. 
At the end, however, we must return to the critical assumption. The only guarantor 
of success in either re-forming the education system or improving its rigor is the determined 
and committed participation by senior leaders. If the military is wise and active, it will 
produce this leadership itself. If it fails to do so, it exposes itself to the same kind of forceful 
external compulsion that was finally necessary to install high quality joint PME. 
4-18 
NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL 
and 
OFFICE OF NAVAL RESEARCH 
CONFERENCE ON 
MILITARY EDUCATION FOR THE 21st CENTURY WARRIOR 
Remarks by 
Dr. Williamson Murray 
Lindbergh Professor, National Air and Space Museum 
It is an honor to have the opportunity to participate in this conference with its 
celebration of the Skelton Committee's examination of PME in the late 1980s.1 I am 
particularly delighted to have this opportunity to comment on the overarching issues 
involved in PME, because I believe that we are at the beginning of a substantial strategic 
pause, when the United States will confront no great threat to its security. During that 
period, the most important thing the American military can do, after accomplishing the 
day-to-day tasks set by the leaders of the Republic, is to provide its officers with the 
intellectual understanding required to handle the terrifying challenges that will confront 
them in the next century. 
Professional military education must be a crucial player in that preparation. As has 
been the case in the past, how well American officers prepare themselves intellectually by 
the serious study of war will determine to a great extent how effective they will be on the 
battlefields of the future. My remarks will then address where we were ten years ago, DOW 
far we have come, the importance of PME, and finally what we need to do to possess a 
serious intellectual basis to adapt and innovate in an era of scarce resources and great 
challenges. 
PME, Ten Years Ago 
The landscape of professional military education when the Skelton Committee 
addressed the topic in the late 1980s was an intellectual desert. 2 At virtually every PME 
institution, with the exception of the Naval War College, there was a general confusion of 
appearance with substance and training with education. The aim was generally to make 
the students feel good about themselves. PME represented the triumph of the 1960s 
educational philosophy at its worst. 
The staff and war colleges taught a wide variety of subjects with no discernable 
focus. It was education as Lyndon Johnson described the Pecos River, a mile wide and 
an inch deep. At most of these institutions there were no grades, little reading, no 
examinations, and few writing assignments. A senior marine officer suggested to me 
about his time at the Army War College in the mid 1980s, "Since you studied law at law 
schools, medicine at medical schools, and business at business at business schools, I 
thought that you would study war at the war college. Boy· was I wrong."3 Finally, the 
faculty at these institutions were for the most part undistinguished - dragooned into their 
teaching positions because the personnel systems had no other place to put them. 
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There was one exception in this landscape of mediocrity - the Naval War College. 
There, in the early 1970s, as Harry Summers suggested earlier today, Admiral Stansfield 
Turner executed an intellectual revolution that scrapped the old approach and focused the 
curriculum on a graduate-level examination of three distinct subjects - what has today 
evolved into the courses on strategy and policy, national strategic decision-making, and 
operations. Yet even here there was reason for despair, since the Navy then, as today, 
refused to send its best officers to Newport. Of the sea services, only the Marine Corps 
was willing to send its best officers to the Naval War College. 
The Present 
We have seen some significant improvements over the past decade, but there is 
still too much of an unfocused atmosphere at PME institutions, while the services for the 
most part still regard PME as a not particularly important part of their responsibilities. Too 
many senior generals regard PME as a time for their officers to rest in their busy careers, 
get to know their families, and play some golf. In other words, we still have a long way to 
go. 
Let me tum first to the positive areas where Congressman Skelton can take 
justifiable pride in the improvements the services have made in some PME areas. The air 
Force has significantly improved the Air Command and Staff College. Similarly, the 
Marines have made major improvements at their Command and Staff College. Both 
institutions now possess civilian academics on their faculties. Under John Warden, one of 
the foremost thinkers in the Air Force, the Air Command and Staff College transitioned to 
an all-book curriculum. For their part, the Marines have not only hired a number of 
impressive civilian academics, but they have taken steps to upgrade the military faculty by 
establishing a small war college at Quantico and assigning graduating lieutenant colonels 
and to serve two years on the faculty of the staff college. This has ensured that their 
military faculty have come from the war college list - the best available. 
Where the Army, the Marine Corps, and the Air Force have made the most 
significant strides in improving PME has been in the creation of second-year courses for 
the top graduates of the staff colleges. The Army's Training and Doctrine Command 
established the first of these courses at Fort Leavenworth, with the impressive title of 
School for Advanced Military Studies (SAMS). The school has lived up to that title. The 
focus of SAMS was almost exclusively on the operational level of war. An intensive one-
year curriculum, with academic rigor similar to that of the Naval War College, used military 
history, particularly the study of campaigns, staff rides, exercises, and intensive reading 
and writing assignments to provide a real education in the profession of arms. 
By the early 1990s, the Air Force and the Marine Corps had been impressed 
enough with what SAMS was providing the Army to establish similar schools at their staff 
colleges. By 1998 the Air Force's School of Advanced Airpower Studies (SAAS) and the 
Marine's School of Advanced Warfighting (SAW) had achieved similar reputations for the 
quality of their education and graduates. Unfortunately, the Navy, since it found it 
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impossible to send its best officers to the staff course at Newport, also found it difficult, if 
not impossible, to provide first-rate students as exchange officers to the second-year 
courses of the other services, much less establish a second-year school of its own for the 
intensive education of its officers in the conduct of naval campaigns. 
The record with regard to the area of PME is not nearly so satisfactory. The Naval 
War College still provides a first-rate graduate education in the study of war, strategy, and 
the complexities of American defense policies. But the Navy has remained, for the most 
part, oblivious to the importance of providing its senior officers with an education at the 
war college level. According to figures provided last year, out of the current crop of 
approximately 300 admirals, only 187 have been to the Naval War College (some 
undoubtedly to the junior course), twenty to the National War College, and none to the 
Army, Air Force, or Marines six war colleges - a monument to the Navy's contempt not 
only for education, but also for its cooperation with the other services. 
The situation with regard to the Air War College is particularly distressing. In the 
early 1990s, two of the finest military officers with whom this author has worked, (then) 
Lieutenant General Chuck Boyd (Commander of Air University) and Major General Chuck 
Link (Commandant of the Air War College) carried out a series of major educational 
reforms that brought in an impressive civilian faculty, focused the curriculum on the study 
of serious military subjects, and introduced real rigor into the course. 
Unfortunately, over the four years after they left, their successors dismantled their 
reforms, reduced the core study of war, strategy, and operations by nearly 50 percent, 
introduced a set of electives that further watered down the curriculum, and provided the 
students with junkets around the world that supposedly provided them with understanding 
through osmosis rather than serious study. Once again the educational philosophy of 
1960s "feel goodism" had reemerged along with a substantial amount of techno-babble to 
provide an "experience" that had little to do with the serious professional education of 
officers. Admittedly, there is a new team in Maxwell and there are hints of an interest in 
moving back in the direction of the Link-Boyd curriculum. Nevertheless, as with all things, 
it is easier to destroy than to build. 
The situation with regard to the Army War College is not any better. Carlisle has 
introduced grades, but not much in the curriculum's focus has shifted back to the study of 
war. The curriculum remains firmly in the hands of those who believe that war is only one 
of a myriad of subjects the students should study. The 1996-1997 curriculum devoted as 
much time to the students' trip to New York as to the study of war. In fact, in the national 
strategy block of the curriculum over the first three months, the students received a one-
day tour of the Civil War, one day on World War I, one day on the interwar period, one day 
on World War II, one day on the· Cold War, and one day on Vietnam. Altogether they 
could not have read much more than 600 pages. One might contrast that seven-day 
period with the Naval War College's intensive three-month course with thirteen case 
studies and nearly 8,000 pages of reading on the parameters of strategy making. 
4-21 
The Army, of course, may believe that its war college curriculum should focus 
largely on internal U.S. matters. In that case, it might consider changing its forces to a 
cadre structure to support the National Guard and the Reserves. The Army Chief of Staff 
has recently appointed a sophisticated and intelligent general officer and student of war to 
become the commandant of the Army War College. What he will be able to accomplish in 
refocusing the Army War College on the study of war, strategy, and operations will 
indicate a great deal about how serious the Army is in preparing its officers for the next 
century. 
The Historical Importance of Professional Military Education 
What makes PME so important is the role that it has played in military innovation 
and effectiveness in war throughout the twentieth century. To a great extent, it has been a 
major factor in determining how military institutions will adapt to the actual conditions of 
war. As the great British military historian Michael Howard has suggested on a number of 
occasions, officership is the most demanding profession not only in a physical sense, but 
in a mental sense as well. 
The history of the 1920s and the 1930s underlines this in spades. Those military 
institutions that took professional military education seriously did well on the battlefield, 
while those that did not, did poorly. Admittedly, there were other factors in play as well, 
but PME was clearly a major factor in the processes of innovation and adaptation. 4 
Of all the world's military organizations during the interwar period, the German 
Army took PME the most seriously. One gained entrance to the Kriegsakademie only by 
passing a rigorous examination that lasted sixteen hours, and only a small percentage of 
the officer corps was able to pass that hurdle. Even then, not all those admitted to the 
Kriegsakademie completed the two-year course. In the process of educating its officers, 
the general staff stressed careful, thorough study not only of the recent past, but military 
history in general. The intellectual excellence in the top levels of the German Army is 
suggested by the fact that Generals Werner von Fritsch and Ludwig Beck were two of the 
three authors of the 1932 edition of Die Truppenfthrunq, arguably the finest doctrinal 
manual of land warfare ever written; and both were about to take over the German Army 
in 1933 as its commander-in-chief and chief of staff, as well. 
Yet we need not look only at the Germans as placing PME at the center of 
preparing their officer corps for war during this period. The U.S. military throughout this 
period possessed a similar belief in the importance and relevance of military education. 
What happened at Newport with war gaming, participation in and designing of fleet 
exercises, and thinking about the potential of carrier aviation even before the U.S. Navy 
possessed a single carrier, all contributed to a Navy that possessed the fighting 
conceptions and intellectual foundation to plan and win the greatest war in naval history. 
One sees a similar emphasis on PME in the other services. The Schools at Quantico, the 
Air Corps Tactical School, the Army Command and General Staff College, and the Army 
War College, all focused of the study of war in the education of their student officers. 
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Perhaps nothing makes this emphasis clearer than the fact that a number of the 
future leaders of the U.S. military in World War II were not only students at PME 
institutions, but also served on their faculties. Admiral Raymond Spruance served not just 
one, but two tours on the faculty of the Naval War College. The aviation pioneer Admiral 
Joseph Reeves and Richmond Kelley Turner also did tours on the Naval War College's 
faculty. 
Out of seven members on the faculty of the Army War College for the academic 
year 1939-1940, one was Colonel W. H. Simpson, Ninth Army commander in 1944-1945. 
Another was J. Lawton Colins, a future Army chief of staff. The next year, another future 
Army commander in the European Theater of Operations, Alexander Patch, joined the 
faculty. Similarly, one finds such future luminaries of the Army Air Forces in World War II 
as Harold George, Kenneth Walker, Clair Chennault, and Haywood Hansell as instructors 
on the faculty of the Air Corps Tactical School in the 1930s. I hardly need to point out to 
this audience that one would be hard pressed to find a single admiral or general over the 
past thirty years who has served on the faculties of the war colleges. 
The Future of Professional Military Education 
There remains much to be done to live up to the hopes of the Skelton report. The 
real issue in terms of PME reform is nbt whether the services have lived up to Congress' 
specific recommendations. The harsh fact is that, in all too many areas, particularly with 
regard to the war colleges, the services have not lived up to the spirit of what the Skelton 
Committee was asking them to do on the educational side of professional military 
educatron. Above all, the Skelton Committee was asking PME institutions to place the 
study of war, strategic history, operational history, and the business of making U.S. 
strategy at the heart of what they were doing at the staff and war colleges. As the above 
suggests, there remain considerable improvements to be made in this area. 
The most important issue remaining has to do with rigor. There are three sides to 
this issue. The first has to do with the processes of selection. Between the wars, the 
Germans followed a rigorous process of selection that involved an eight-hour examination 
that eliminated the great majority of those taking the test (upwards of 95 percent); and 
then the Krieqsakademie eliminated a substantial number of those who had made the first 
hurdle in the process of the two-year school. Entrance to the German Staff Colleges is 
still determined by rigorous exams. On the other hand, the British Army does not require 
an examination; rather academic standing in the junior staff college determines who will 
eventually go on to the staff college. 
One might not want to be as selective as the inter-war Germans were in 
determining who goes to the staff college. But the Army and the Air Force could certainly 
cut down on their 50 percent selection rate that, in effect, makes little distinction amongst 
the officers on active duty. Educating a smaller percentage of the officer corps (and 
eliminating the nurses, lawyers, dentists, and finance officers from the student body) 
would allow more attention to individual students, improve faculty quality, and raise 
educational standards. In addition, performance at PME institutions should determine 
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assignments as well as remain a permanent and important part of each officers promotion 
file. 
But as the Skelton report underlined, rigor has especially to do with the content of 
what is taught at the staff and war colleges. Theses PME institutions are supposed to 
study a narrow band of subjects that have to do with war, grand strategy, national 
strategy, historical case studies that have to do with war, and the study of joint and 
combined operations. These schools are not supposed to be international relations 
courses and social science fads, or involve the pet rock collections advocated by narrow 
interests within the Beltway. JV 2010 is not a proper subject for study at the war colleges 
except to illuminate how "bumper stickers and advertising slogans" can replace substance 
in the Pentagon. 5 
Moreover, the Skelton Committee underlined that PME education at the 
intermediate and senior levels should be based on the same principles that guide the 
study of education at the graduate level at our best universities. Again, as Harry 
Summers suggested, the Naval War College provides the real model for academic rigor 
with a minimum number of lectures, graduate-level reading assignments (600 to 700 
pages per week), and its rigorous papers and examinations. Those who graduate from 
that institution with high distinction or with distinction have reached an academic level 
equal to that of the best students in the best graduate schools in the United States. 
The services were provided substantial authority by the Skelton Committee to hire 
the most outstanding civilian academics available in the areas of strategy, strategic 
history, national defense economics, war studies, and national security studies. Given the 
contempt that American academic institutions of higher learning c:ontinue to display 
towards such subjects, 6 one might have thought that they would r jone better than 
they have. Only the Naval War College, the Marine Corps Staff ~ege, and the Air 
Command and Staff College have assembled truly first-rate civilian iaculties. There can 
clearly be substantial improvement in this area. 
On the other hand, one of the anomalies of the present system is that both the Air 
Force and the Army have been willing to lavish graduate education (two years towards a 
masters degree at a major university) on captains in preparation for their teaching on the 
faculties of the academies. These captains are for the most part drawn out of the ver" •op 
of their year groups.7 Yet half of the cadets that these officers teach will leave them, .ry 
service in a minimum of time, while only a few of the remaining 50 percent will reach the 
rank of general, and only then after the passage of at least a quarter of a century. On the 
other hand, only the Marines have made war college attendance a prerequisite for duty on 
the faculty of their staff college. As of yet, none of the services have been willing to 
provide graduate-level education for those who are going to teach at either the 
intermediate or senior level. Considering that a far higher percentage of students have 
the potential to reach 0-7 level within a decade (at least in the case of the war colleges), 
this seems to be an unacceptable situation. 
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The most distressing aspect of this conference has been the sustained assault of 
techno-educational "experts" on serious military education. Clearly, the majority of 
speakers have been advocating the turning of PME into either an engineering, system 
analysis exercise, or even worse into a Toffleresque combination of recent educational 
trends by suggestions of interfacing, conductivity, web surfing, and the like. Let us be 
perfectly clear about the latter case. It leads straight to the death of PME -- in fact, of any 
education at all. It is a return to the principles of 1960s education, with its emphasis on 
unstructured "learning and performance," a replacement of substance with style and 
fuzzy, meaningless concepts. 
The former course, with its emphasis purely on subjects is an equally dangerous 
one. With its emphasis on straight engineering and technology, it represents the rebirth of 
Robert McNamara's system analytic, linear, engineering approach to military subjects. 
The only difference is that, this time, the enemy is not coming from within the Office of the 
Secretary of Defense -- it is coming from within the military itself.8 If such a view prevails, 
the results will be as disastrous for the U.S. military as was Robert McNamara's dismissal 
of history, strategic thought, and the serious study of military history. Let us be perfectly 
frank about this: If we are to turn our war and staff colleges into schools of technology, as 
so many of our speakers have suggested, then we would do better to close them down 
entirely and send the students to study at real engineering schools like MIT and Cal Tech. 
It is this author's contention that the study of the profession of arms demands a 
knowledge of strategic history, the conduct of campaigns not only in the twentieth century 
but earlier as well, and the historical issues that have determined performance on the 
battlefield. We have heard a senior admiral challenge Representative Skelton's defense 
of the use of history to elucidate the problems of today. Such attitudes, all too well 
entrenched at present among senior officers, represent an unwillingness to recognize the 
importance of history in broadening officers' understanding of their profession, the 
profession of arms. No less a student of strategy than George C. Marshall once 
suggested that no one who wished to understand history could do so unless they had read 
Thucydides' History of the Peloponesian War. We would do well to remember Marshall's 
wisdom as we think about professional military education in the next century. We did not 
in the 1960s, and the result was not only a lost war, but the collapse of the United States. 
Endnotes 
1 The Skelton Committee's examination of PME remains the most thorough and 
intellectually valid examination of what needs to be taught to our officers, and how 
to prepare them to defend this nation. It stands in stark contrast to the shallow and 
careless report done by CSIS this past year. For a critique of the CSIS report, see 
Williamson Murray, "How Not to Advance Professional Military Education," 
Strategic Review, Summer 1997. 
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Endnotes (continued) 
2 S :iortly before the Skelton Sub-Committee of the House Armed Services 
C Jmmittee convened to examine the subject of professional military education, this 
a\ ·''lor wrote a harsh critique of the state of PME in the war colleges. See 
V' ·amson Murray, "Grading the War Colleges," National Interest, Winter 
1986/1987. 
3 Comment made by Lt. Gen. P. K. Van Riper, USMC Ret., to the author. 
4 For a discussion of innovation during this period, see Williamson Murray and Allan 
R. Millett, Military Innovation in the lnterwar Period (Cambridge, 1996). 
5 I am indebted to Lt. Gen. P.K. Van riper, USMC Ret., for this characterization of 
JV2010. 
6 See John Lynn, "The Embattled Future of Academic Military History," The Journal 
of Military History, October 1997. 
7 What the service gains is suggested by the case of Major H. R. McMasters, who 
was the company commander for the 2nd Armored Cavalry regiment at 73 Easting 
during the Gulf War and wh~ since then has earned his masters at the University 
of North Carolina, taught at . ;st Point, and produced the definitive book 
on America's entrance into the Vietnam war in 1964 and 1965. See H. R. 
McMasters, Dereliction of Duty: Lvndon Johnson. Robert McNamara. the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff. and the Lies that Led to Vietnam (New York, 1997). 
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PME for the 21st Century Warrior t®9 
SESSION FIVE 
Human Capital: What kind of officers do we need for the 
21st Century and what kind of education and training 
infrastructure do we envision to support them? 
Question: What kind of officer will we need and do we have the best 
educational paradigm? 
Objectives: 1. Specify the desired qualities of mind and character - the 
"cultivated intelligence" - this nation's military officers will 
need to dominate the operational environment of the 21st 
Century. 
2. Identify the nature of an educational process and its attendant 
infrastructure that will produce the intelligence and the 
propensity to innovate, integrate, and inculcate technological 
advances in matters of policy, strategy, and doctrine. 
NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL 
and 
OFFICE OF NAVAL RESEARCH 
CONFERENCE ON 
MILITARY EDUCATION FOR THE 21ST CENTURY WARRIOR 
Remarks by 
Congressman Steve Buyer 
Today's topic is professional military education - PME. But first let me just 
share something with you. I heard one of the last speakers talk about the golf 
component of PME. I'm willing to stand here and admit the truth about it, which 
some of you will not laugh about, because we all recognize it. I first learned about 
PME when I went to the Officer Basic Course. I perfected my three handicap there. 
I know that's a rather sad statement, but it's true. 
From 1976 to 1980, I went from age 17 to 21. I was trained at the Citadel by 
Vietnam veterans. These Vietnam veterans taught their courses intensely because 
they had seen death. They had experienced levels of fear and levels of courage 
that most people had never experienced. So when they taught us at the ROTC, 
they were very serious. 
My first introduction to PME came after I left the Citadel and went to the 
Officer Basic Course. I was stunned. It was a check-in-the-box type of education 
that demanded little attentiveness. The instructors tap on the desk or clear their 
throat to let you know when to pay attention: the material that followed those 
"notices" was going to be on the next test. 
So, I wasn't surprised when Professor Murray complained about the quality 
of PME graduates. There's nothing wrong with golf. But I just wanted everyone to 
know that, when I think about the subject of PME, I try not to get all wrapped up in 
the information age and what's it going to do to us, how we should transform it, and 
how we should prepare ourselves for the future. I believe we should pause and 
think about fundamentals. 
The fundamental is the human ingredient - the type of individual we need to 
be a good officer. What type of man or woman do we need to serve successfully in 
an integrated military to win the next battle? 
Reflecting back, and borrowing from my Officer Basic Course notes, I see 
that following Prussia's defeats by Napoleon at Jena and Auerstadt in 1806, the 
Prussian military reformers led by Scharnhorst "professionalized" the officer corps 
with a goal of institutionalizing military excellence. 
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One of Schamhorst's initiatives was the creation of a military school for 
officers. Back then it was, "The officers lead by example." Put all the soldiers in a 
line and never permit small units to think and operate on their own." Schamhorst 
revolutionized that kind of military thinking. 
There's so much of what you do in military education today, and what is 
being done at other schools, that is focused upon permitting individuals to think, to 
use their educations and their intuitive skills. We understand now that success on 
the battlefield is determined by small unit tactics. So, let's not overthink it. 
There has also been some mention of the inter-world-war period, between 
1919 and 1941. It is important to think about that time. The general officers who 
led the successful campaigns of World War II were the ones who maintained the 
military educational system during that inter-war period - Eisenhower, Bradley, 
Ridgway, MacArthur, King, Halsey, Spruance, Arnold, Vandenberg. They all 
attended PME during that period, and that contributed to their tremendous success. 
So when I think about PME today I have to ask whether there really is 
anything but an "uncertain future". The very nature of the future is uncertainty. So, 
I was tickled when I heard one of the speakers talk about how we have to know 
exactly where we're going and we have to have a prepared vision. 
Uncertainty is another fundamental. It even comes right out of the Bible. A 
Bible proverb says, "If the bugler is uncertain, who will follow?" So what we. are 
struggling with here - not only in PME, but also in how we are going to fight future 
battles - is trying to figure out where we're going. 
The future is also uncertain for individual officers. They are going to have to 
operate in an austere fiscal environment, with budget reductions. Many of us are 
very critical in Congress about this ''Well, you can just do more with less" 
philosophy. That is not a strategy for success. 
What I am supposed to talk about today is what kind of officer will we need? 
I think it's very clear. We need one that is morally strong. As Tom Ricks pointed 
out in his recent book, Making the Corps, the values of today's society are not 
necessarily those required for an effective military. Honor, courage, commitment, 
dedication, duty, and selfless sacrifice are elements of a strong character that is 
still required by our military today. 
What is difficult for those of us in Congress to grapple with at the moment -
and those who serve in the military - is that military people are supposed to be the 
defenders of society. Yet today we have a society whose ideals are much different 
than the military's. And the schism is growing. 
So when society now looks inward at some of its own problems, who does it 
tum to? When society has a drug problem, who does it tum to? Well, it turns to 
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the military: "They will help us in the drug war." Just last week, we had the Indiana 
National Guard tearing down crack houses in Gary, Indiana. 
We also need officers who know how to think. One criticism of the PME 
system prior to the Skelton Panel was that the staff and war colleges emphasized 
format over the problem solving. It didn't matter if the tactical operation or the 
strategic solution was workable as long as the orders were issued in a proper 
manner. 
The uncertain future, coupled with a fast-moving CNN, will require officers 
who are intuitive thinkers, who can work through the complex problems quickly, and 
produce workable solutions to crises. 
We also need "techies" -- officers with technical skills. The information age 
has produced a variety of highly-technical battlefield systems that threaten to 
overload the mind of the commander or staff officer. 
At the same time, the military leaders are increasingly involved in 
nontraditional operations that require extensive knowledge of the culture, 
economics, language, and government of potential adversaries. These officers will 
need to meet a growing·number of criteria. 
We all learn early on, and we've heard it a thousand times, that knowledge 
is power. But we have to leverage that power and then somehow reduce the risk 
so that we can be successful. Think about the Gulf War chemical weapons 
problem for a moment, when even our own intelligence on chemical weapons never 
got to some of the highest decision-makers. And we find that out six years later. 
The technically competent military leader will need to understand the 
capabilities and limitations of technology - of those technologies that are available. 
I have to tell you a story. 
When I was asked - well, I wasn't really asked, they gave me orders - to 
deploy to the Gulf, they gave me a World War II vintage typewriter that was missing 
two letters: E and 0. Now, those are two letters that you sometimes need. I 
actually had to sign for it! Can you imagine this? Well, _I said, "I'm not signing for 
and I'm not taking this thing to the Gulf!" I actually did have to sign and take this 
World War II typewriter with me to the Gulf - without an E and without an 0, and 
the number 1 was the letter I. At that moment, I realized that there were three 
things that would survive a nuclear blast at Ground Zero: cockroaches, 
wing-tipped shoes, and that typewriter. 
Now, I was a practicing attorney in a small town, and was used to a very 
sharp legal secretary. I dictated everything. So now I end up in the Gulf and, as a 
result of my jokes and complaints about this World War II typewriter, they gave me 
a laptop computer. I didn't even know how to turn it on. I'm now at the Western 
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Army Prison War Camp with a laptop computer that I didn't even know how to turn 
on, with no staff and no support. I felt pretty awkward. 
So whenever I wanted to write, I had to do everything in longhand, and then 
I'd have to go down to KKMC. It is a rather sad statement, but I'd get the staff 
judge advocate, and I would dictate to him, and he would type the stuff for me. So 
this thing about being technically competent - I know exactly what they mean. 
Maybe I was caught between generations. I don't know. 
Another important issue is cultural awareness. When I think about having 
not so much an emphasis on training as on cultural awareness in the education 
environment, I wonder if General Wainwright would have surrendered at Corregidor 
if he had a better cultural awareness of the Japanese. If he had an idea of the 
atrocities the Japanese inflicted on prisoners of war, would he have surrendered? 
We didn't understand the Japanese culture, and how the Japanese then placed no 
value at all on human life - especially the life of an individual who would dishonor 
themselves and disgrace their family by surrendering. 
Thoroughly understanding how a Somali warlord thinks and operates is 
extraordinarily important. The cultural awareness in our studies, especially as we 
reach to all corners of the world, is very important. 
Intuitive thinking will become more and more important. The future leaders, 
more than ever, are bombarded with thousands, if not millions, of bits of 
information. And the leader must be able to use his or her experience and intuition 
to recognize key elements of a situation and make a sound decision. 
Every year I have the privilege of selecting individuals to go to the service 
academies. And I don't always select the individual who has all the straight As, 
with 1400 on their SATs. I look for the best well-rounded men and women I can 
possibly find who have the intellectual capacities to juggle many things at once. 
You give me that individual, and that will be a successful leader. 
An officer also has to be very comfortable with uncertainty. Our military 
education system has emphasized analytical problem solving - reducing the 
number of unknowns in a problem, comparing alternative solutions, and then 
making a decision. One of the alluring promises of the revolution of military affairs 
is that technology will be able to provide a complete picture of the battlefield to all 
levels of command, at all times. 
I believe this is a false promise. Uncertainty, now more than ever, will be the 
hallmark of modern battlefield. Officers must be able to deal with a lack of 
information and still make sound decisions. Remember that chess players have 
perfect "battlefield awareness" - they can see the entire board, but they do not 
know what the opponent is thinking. 
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Officers also must be able to think jointly. Twelve years after the 
Goldwater-Nichols Act, it is now accepted that no military operation will take place 
unless it is joint. Future officers will need to think jointly to ensure success on the 
battlefield. This requirement includes the reserve components. Educating the total 
force will certainly be a challenge for the PME system in years to come. 
We love to talk about a seamless military. The Air Force and the Air Guard 
are doing an excellent job, as are the Marine Corps and Marine Reserve, and the 
Navy and the Naval Reserve. The Army has to have a total focus to be successful, 
and they have a problem at the moment. 
The challenge of educating our future officers is how to include all of the 
requirements of PME with all of the "check-in-the-boxes" required for command. I 
don't even know how you can successfully negotiate a career today when you have 
to get your command slots; you've got to get your joint assignments; you've got to 
get your PME; and you've got only 20 years to do it in. Especially when we have 
reduced our forces and increased our operational tempo. We're stretched in all 
places of the world. If you've figured out how to make it work, I'm anxious to help 
implement that process. But I think we've got a problem. 
I also believe that PME begins at the pre-commissioning phase. Some of 
you may not agree with me on that, but I think it's important. If we've only got 20 
years to do everything, we'd better start earlier. And if the Service academies are 
doing one thing, the six military colleges are doing another, and the ROTCs are 
doing yet something different, we've got a problem. 
We can front load this. In our basic training, NCOs are started on "day one" 
with an innoculation process that will turn a civilian into a soldier, completely 
transforming their way of thinking into a military culture. Why don't we do that at " 
"day one" with PME for our officers? I think we should. And we should front load 
as much as we can. 
We got into a good discussion, and I must give great compliments to my 
good friend, Ike Skelton. There is this -1 don't want to call it a battle - there's this 
difficulty here trying to figure out where we are going to get the officers. We've got 
OCS. We've got the colleges and the ROTCs, and the six military colleges and the 
academies. 
Then there was this debate about whether you really need the academies. 
The academies are going to have to get their act together, because we're now 
producing as many CEOs of America as we are of the future generals of America. 
Now, that doesn't mean society doesn't get a benefit from the academy education, 
but where are the general and flag officers coming from? When we're getting more 
of them from the ROTCs and the six military colleges, the academies had better 
look inward. 
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The balance in the great discussion that we've had here is, as we're drawing 
down, who gets the ax in this process? When you look back, how did we get to 
where we are today? We started out with the academies and six military colleges 
and began to grow from there. Politically, how do you think it is when you have to 
tell a Senator from a particular state that his favorite university may lose its ROTC? 
Now, we're talking about political influences. 
There's a reality out there in drawing down the services, not needing as 
many officers, that complements the question of how we are going to train them. 
There is a tremendous focus, I believe, on what is necessary -- the importance of a 
crucible. And the crucible is not only what you're seeing in basic training. The 
crucible is also the six military colleges and the academies. 
I believe that we still need to maintain our OCS, and that we should begin to 
draw down some of the ROTCs around the country. But mostly I wanted to share 
with you that, I believe, PME has to start at the pre-commissioning phase. 
I'm in a learning process. I want you to know that. This is my sixth year on 
the Personnel Subcommittee. I'm a very young man, relatively new to Congress. 
I've had to work very hard. I'm a Major in the Army Reserves. I came to the 
Congress with a Major's military education. I've had to work very hard to 
understand jointness and joint operations, be able to communicate with the CINCs 
and the Joint Chiefs, and understand the other services. 
I've worked hard to be a good student of Ike Skelton. Bob Dornan -- sitting 
next to him permitted me to appear like the voice of reason. And I have become 
the chairman. As Chairman of the Personnel Subcommittee dealing with education 
issues, I share the following belief with my good friend Ike. We did 
Goldwater-Nichols under the Cold War scenario and there have been a lot of 
changes since then that we need to take a hard look at. 
I compliment my colleague, Glen Browder, for organizing this conference. 
will be a good listener, and I appreciate your having me here today. 
Thank you. 
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THE HONORABLE STEVE BUYER 
Fifth Congressional District, Indiana 
Since 1993, the residents of Indiana's Fifth Congressional District have been served by 
Congressman Steve Buyer (pronounced Boo-yer) in the U.S. House of Representatives. 
The district includes all or part of 20 counties in North Central Indiana. Congressman 
Buyer remains on the forefront on issues that effect Northern Indiana. He currently serves 
on the National Security Committee, the Veterans Affairs Committee, and the Judiciary 
Committee. 
Since coming to Congress, Congressman Buyer has been a leader in the fight to reduce 
government spending and bring responsible fiscal practices to the Congress. He has 
supported a balanced budget amendment, term limits, and efforts to rein-in federal 
spending. In 1995, he was a leading congressional proponent of the Telecommunications 
Reform Act. 
Congressman Buyer, a veteran of the Gulf War, maintains his commission in the Army 
Reserve with the current rank of major. He has been a pioneer on health issues affecting 
active duty military personnel, veterans, and their families. He has been the leading 
congressional advocate to provide health care and other assistance to Gulf War veterans 
who continue to suffer from yet undiagnosed illnesses. 
Congressman Buyer, as Chairman of the House National Security Committee's 
Subcommittee on Military Personnel, has become a nationally recognized leader on 
national security and defense issues. He has appeared on such television news pro grams 
as NBC's "Meet the Press," "McLaughlin's: One on One," "Nightline," and other 
network news shows. 
Chairman Buyer has been a strong advocate for increasing the quality of life for military 
personnel. In addition, last year he was appointed to lead the congressional investigation 
into the allegations of sexual misconduct, sexual harassment and fraternization in the 
military. His hands-on investigation has taken him to military training centers and 
installations around the world. His efforts have played a significant role in changing the 
way the military responds to such allegations. 
Congressman Buyer received a degree in Business Administration from The Citadel, and 
was commissioned as a 2nd Lieutenant in the United States Army. He obtained his law 
degree from Valparaiso University School of Law in 1984. 
Congressman Buyer and his wife, Joni, have two children, Colleen and Ryan. The Buyer 
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An earlier speaker mentioned that we are in the post-Cold War era, which 
means that if we're between world wars, it's an experience we haven't had in sixty 
years. If we are in between wars, then we are in an era that none of us 
understand, and we have never been in before. Couple that with the concerns that 
we in the U.S. Navy, at least, are having with officer retention - that we're seeing 
most notably right now with aviation, but also in our other unrestricted line areas --
and we spend a lot of time trying to understand the motivations for our young 
officer corps. 
Some of the things that General Sheehan mentioned with regard to trust, the 
dialogue between today's leadership and the next generation leadership, were very 
appropriate to our concerns. 
I don't have anything new, I fear. However, I would like to speak to four 
things that will reinforce some points that have been made earlier. Before I do that, 
I will just answer the question that we were asked to address: What type of officers 
will we need in the future? What characteristics will they need? They will have to 
be smart and principled. And do we have the proper educational paradigm now? 
My belief is, no. 
I want to stipulate a couple things up front. Number one is that you're talking 
to somebody who, by necessity, deals in a very pragmatic way with these times and 
with these things, and usually with a pretty short time horizon. I also speak 
primarily about U.S. Navy unrestricted line officers, which are those who drive 
submarines, ships and aircraft. I want to say right up front that, in my judgment, 
Goldwater-Nichols was a huge success for the purposes for which it was passed, 
and I think we are all much, much better off because of it. I thank Congressman 
Skelton, Arch Barrett, everybody involved in that. It was something that needed to 
be done, and we are lot better off for it. 
However, in anything like this that moves the military in a new direction, so 
much of what we do is zero sum. There are always unintended consequences. And 
I will address some of those in my four points. 
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Vice Admiral Tracey mentioned earlier that a CNO Executive Panel Task 
Force under the supervision of Dr. Bob Murray is looking at the continuing 
education of Navy officers in the next few decades. They will be addressing some 
of these things that I'll be talking about, and so these will not be new to those that 
are involved there. 
I liked Colonel Beauchamp's comment that PME is everything. It's a lot more 
than just a single curriculum at a particular school. What I'd like to do is put up the 
only slide I am going to put up. It's a simple slide, borrowed from a young man who 
characterized himself as a Generation Xer. He used this slide during a DoD quality 
of life symposium. 
The slide is pretty all-encompassing. It shows education as a continuum 
that goes from birth to death. Sort of soup to nuts, if you will. We can drop off the 
primary and secondary education parts and go directly to the tertiary part of this. 
He was describing himself and his generation, what their aspirations were, what 
motivated them, etc. The point he made was that lifelong, self-initiated learning 
was important to his generation. They were not looking for a lifetime of 
employment, but relying on some employer to assist them in building for 
themselves a lifetime of employability. 
How much that directly translates to what we're trying to do, I'm not so sure. 
But I was interested in the right-hand side of the slide, where it says "tertiary 
college and university graduate school," followed by "work-related learning" and 
"all sources of informal learning". 
Well, the military colleges and universities are the Service academies, 
ROTCs, and OCSs. That's sort of the price of admission. In his paradigm, the 
price of admission also included graduate school. And if you didn't get it before 
you started off on whatever your first of five to seven careers was, then you had to 
do it for yourself along the way, and you were going to look for an employer who 
would provide that for you. 
Do we do that in the military? Do we provide that graduate school? Is that a 
price of admission? Well, maybe it is and maybe it isn't, and that's why, I think, our 
paradigm is not exactly right. I'll give you an example in just a minute of 
"work-related" learning. We do that very well. 
We train our aviators how to fly airplanes; we train our surface warfare 
officers in the art of seamanship, and our submarine officers as well. We also train 
them in lots more than just that. We train in underwater acoustics, for instance, 
and tactics and doctrine, and all that other kind of stuff in what we call service 
schools. Lots of times we call it technical training. And then, of course, all sources 
of informal learning. We can throw tons of stuff into that. 
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Back to the graduate school piece just for a second. Graduate school is 
something that most of our young people think that they want as either part of 
compensation or as a price of admission to the workplace. It's either intrinsically 
good or not. 
But whether or not we provide it, and whether or not it's important to us, is 
problematic. Earlier today somebody mentioned my friend, Vice Admiral Don 
Pilling. He's the Vice Chief of Naval Operations and I'm sure he won't mind me 
using him as an example. Very successful; very well liked and highly admired and 
respected by all of his peers; Brookings Fellowship; a tour on the National Security 
Council; all of the operational tours that you would expect. He did not go to a war 
college, but he has a Ph.D. in mathematics, so he has checked the graduate school 
box. The question is, did any of that education matter to him in his career? Could 
he have had the same career without that Ph.D. in mathematics from Cambridge? 
My guess is yes. 
There's another Navy flag officer, an aviator, a highly respected C41 expert, 
who, because of his tours, has no master's degree; has no war college. You can 
ask, well, does he have any of these things: work-related learning, graduate 
school? What's his price of admission? Well, he commanded an aviation squadron 
in combat, commanded a nuclear aircraft carrier in a combat environment, and is 
obviously a graduate of the nuclear engineering course that qualified him to do 
that. So, does he have graduate education? It's not in his record, documented as 
such. He has some work-related learning. And yet his work-related learning was 
directly relevant to what he has ended up doing for us, the taxpayer, the country, 
etc. Whereas Admiral Pilling's graduate education, which has its own box, was hot 
necessarily that. 
All of this is my not very good but rambling way of getting around to stating 
that the first thing that we need to do - and I'm confident Bob Murray's doing this -
is to inventory what, in fact, we do. 
I've got a master's degree that was a whole heck of a lot shorter, less rigid 
and less relevant to what I have been doing in the U.S. Navy than the 24 months I 
spent getting what amounts to a master's degree in aeronautical application in flight 
training. So, maybe we don't have as good an inventory of what we do as we think 
we might have. 
Another reason we should inventory what we do is because, if we're going to 
sink cost into doing these things, we ought to know what they are, and we ought to 
know why we do them. Not to mention the fact that we in the military like tangible 
recognition of things, and probably if we had a ribbon for getting a master's degree, 
I would be wearing one. But that's pretty trivial, and I wouldn't submit we do it for 
that reason. 
The second thing I think that we need to do, the second point, is we need to 
look at prioritizing things. The Goldwater-Nichols requirement to get joint 
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education is important, but let me tell you what it did, I believe, to our junior officers 
in their career planning. A JO that comes in doesn't have much choice. They get 
the college and university. They get commissioned, and now they get their 
internship, which is either the aviation, the submarine, or the surface warfare 
indoctrination. They go off to do their division officer tours, and then they decide 
whether they are going to stay with us or not. 
If they do decide to stay, that's at about the six or seven year point. And 
they say, "Okay I'm going to try because I'm going to stick it out for 20 years, at 
least, and I'm going to command something. I'd like to command a squadron or 
major surface ship, or something like that." 
In the old days it used to be, ''When they give me a break from this rather 
intense, content-intensive career, I'm going to get a graduate degree, so if things 
aren't working out all that well at the 20-year point, I can go out and do something 
else with some credentials that will sell on the outside. All of these things I've been 
doing in the Navy don't sound very exciting to somebody on the outside if I don't 
have a degree that goes along with it." 
That was the incentive. Well, now they all get forced at the 12-year point, 
forced or incentivized actually, because it's become part of our culture, into 
clambering for · 1t job. They all know they want to go do that. And so when they 
get some discr~ .1ary time, as soon as they're eligible - which, quite frankh1 • is 
not until they make lieutenant commander - then they go to a joint job. ·~ · -t 
rrit·)ans that if they're going to go try to get a graduate degree, they do it in a window 
between the six- and ten-year point, or the 10- to 11-year point. Because at the 
10-, or 11-, or 12-year point at the latest they've made lieutenant commander, and 
now, if they've got that kind of time, they are going to go joint. 
So, we are forcing graduate degrees into a three-, four- or five-year period -
early, relatively speaking, in an officer's career, and certainly early relative to when 
they would ever come back as a flag or general officer and rely on that degree for 
any particular reason. It's just the way things are. 
Is that an unintended consequence? Maybe, but I'm not so sure. The point 
is, an officer looking for a job is thinking there are three things he or she would like 
to get out of a tour. They'd like to get credible, operational credentials with a 
competitive fitness report, to get "jointed", and to get a graduate degree, if possible. 
If they can only get one of those three, it's not as good as if they can get two of 
those three. And if they can get all three at one tour, all the better. So they are just 
things that we need to look at as we continue to push this thing along. 
The third thing I'd like to do is to caution against the use of blunt instruments 
-- blunt instrument being a term that was used in an earlier session. I don't think 
Goldwater-Nichols, in its entirety, was a blunt instrument. I think there are some 
features of it that are a little bit blunt. It would be easy to get most of the Navy 
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officers to war college. You only need to say that you can't be a flag officer without 
going to the Naval War College. 
I would support that, if we made it retroactive, because I'd like to go to War 
College. But we have, in a sense, done that by the requirement that all flag and 
general officers, with very few exceptions, be qualified joint specialty officers. And 
that's not bad. It's not bad to have all of our flag officers with JSO experience. But 
think about how much of the Navy is made up of flag officers for a minute. Captains 
are less than one percent of the Navy, and flag officers are less than five one-
hundredths of one percent. It's just a very, very small number. Ninety-five percent 
of all of those commanders at the 20-year point are not ever going to be flag 
officers in the United States Navy. 
We make rules that force behavior in folks at the 12- to 20-year point in 
order to qualify all of them for something that 95 percent of them are not going to 
be when they reach the end of their military career 10 to 15 years later. That 
qualifies, in my judgment, as a blunt instrument. It also has an effect that we need 
to think very carefully about, I believe. We only select a couple of dozen 
unrestricted line and flag officers every year. A couple of dozen. That's a very, 
very small number. We ought to be looking for things that incentivize that group to 
be as diverse as possible in order to cover the spectrum of requirements that we 
need at that rather rarefied level, rather than incentives that force more uniformity 
in that group. 
I use a line sometimes when I'm counseling very junior officers. I say, ''You 
need to figure out why you are going to stay in the Navy. It's a noble profession; 
it's going to be here; it's not going out of business; it has a lot of unique 
characteristics; it is service to your country. But when you set your career 
aspirations, set your aspirations at making captain. You can work towards that. 
The percentage that gets selected for flag is so small that, to aspire for flag officer 
when you're a lieutenant is like going into the priesthood with an aspiration to be 
the Pope. It may be a nice outcome, and it may be exactly the right thing for you, 
but it is the wrong reason to be in the business." And so, when we apply these 
instruments to the degree that they have the effects that I've described, I would 
describe them as blunt, and we should think about them very carefully. 
My fourth point, and last one here, is that there are some ideas that we need 
to explore as we think about how to fit all of these requirements into what seems 
like a very short period of time. Distance learning has been mentioned, and I 
applaud any of the applications there that can work. 
Making space in a career could be done in several different ways. We could 
make careers longer; we could hire more officers; we could give sabbaticals during 
which the clock stops on a career so an officer. can do something and then come 
back. Instead of competing with peers who have used that time to better career 
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advantage, they can compete with people who had formerly been behind them a 
couple of years. There are different ways that we could address this without having 
to necessarily make the current requirements go away. 
And then, to return to one of my earlier points, if we legitimatize, categorize, 
or recognize some of the things that we do a little bit differently, we could take 
better credit for some of the stuff we do, or at least cut out some career redundancy 
and make a better use of some of the education that is, in fact, going on. 
Here is a final point that's related to Congressman Buyer's suggestion that 
we do PME during pre-commissioning, with a different slant on it. We could reach 
the point where, even for our unrestricted line community, we could require more 
than a bachelor's degree for commissioning. Our recruiting command folks would 
go berserk over that, but there are professions that require more than that 
baccalaureate-level entry, and maybe we wouldn't have to do all of that education 
in house. 
So finally, in closing, I'll quote Colonel Beauchamp again. I think that a 
"more strategic and holistic approach in this very human endeavor" is called for. 
Thank you. 
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VICE ADMIRAL DANIEL TRANTHAM OLIVER, USN · 
Deputy Chief of Naval Operations, Manpower and Personnel 
Vice Admiral Oliver is a native of Camden, South Carolina. An NROTC graduate of the 
University of Virginia, he was designated a Naval Aviator in September 1967. 
His early operational assignments include tours with Patrol Squadron TEN, Patrol 
Squadron EIGHT, Patrol Squadron THIRTY, and Patrol Squadron SIXTEEN where he 
served as the Commanding Officer. He also served a tour as Associate Professor of Naval 
Science at the University of Virginia. 
In June 1982, Vice Admiral Oliver became a White House Fellow. During his 
Fellowship, he served as Special Assistant to the Secretary, U.S. Department of Health 
and Human Services. In September 1983, Vice Admiral Oliver reported to the Resource 
Appraisal Division (OP-81), on the OPNAV staff in the Pentagon, and in March 1984, he 
became Administrative Assistant to the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral James D. 
Watkins. 
In July 1987, Vice Admiral Oliver assumed command of Patrol Wing TWO based at 
Barbers Point, Hawaii, and in June 1989 he returned to Washington, D.C. to beco·me the 
Executive Assistant to the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral C.A.H. Trost. Following a 
subsequent tour as Director, Total Force Training and Education Division (OP-11), on 14 
August 1991, he assumed responsibilities as Commander, Fleet Air Forces Mediterranean 
in Naples, Italy. 
In September 1993, he returned to the Pentagon as Director, Assessment Division (N81). 
In March 1995, he became Director, Programming Division (N80), and in November 
1995 assumed a concurrent assignment as Director, CINC Liaison Division (N83). Vice 
Admiral Oliver assumed his duties as Deputy Chief of Naval Operations, Manpower and 
Personnel (Chief of Naval Personnel) on 20 September 1996. 
Vice Admiral Oliver holds bachelor and master degrees from the University of Virginia 
and is a graduate of the Harvard Business School Advanced Management Program. 
Vice Admiral Oliver's personal decorations include the Defense Superior Service Medal, 
four Legions of Merit, Meritorious Service Medal, Navy Commendation, and Navy 
Achievement Medal. 
He is married to the former Darriel Webster of New Canaan, Connecticut. They have five 
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Human capital - what is it? One definition is that human capital is the 
aggregate of the skills, knowledge and abilities of an organization's individuals and 
groups that produce value both within the organization and to its customers. Inside 
an organization, the correct skills, knowledge and abilities produce efficiency. 
Externally, skills, knowledge and abilities produce customer relations effectiveness. 
Using the above definition, the unified CINCs apply the human capital 
developed by the services to enhance military effectiveness around the globe for 
diverse missions. So the military needs a proper mix of skills and knowledge to gain 
internal operating efficiencies and to be effective on battlefields, however defined. 
Human capital has a pragmatic face. You do not build or develop it in 
organizations for itself; you develop it for a reason. You want human capital that has 
value to you in your military services, and to the CINCs who use your forces. At the 
end of my remarks, I will return to the subject of human capital and talk about the 
career management rules within which it is currently developed for officers. But 
before doing that, I will cover briefly four topics relevant to the question assigned our 
panel: 
1 ) Who are the future warriors? 
2) What will they do? 
3) How many of them may there be? 
4) How might their organizations support them? 
My comments are based on work that I did at RAND over the last few years, in 
examining officer and enlisted career management practices.1 I also add insights 
from my experience in, and observation of, these matters over the years. 
1 Bernard Rostker and Harry J. Thie, The Defense Officer Personnel Management Act 
of 1980: A Retrospective Assessment, R-4246-FMP, Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1993. Harry 
J. Thie and Roger A. Brown, Future Career Management Systems for U. S. Military Officers, 
MR-470-0SD, Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1994. Harry J. Thie, Margaret C. Harrell, et al., 
A Future Officer Career Management System: An Objectives Based Design, MR-788. 0, 
Santa Monica, CA: RAND, forthcoming. Sheila Nataraj Kirby and Harry J. Thie, Enlisted 
Personnel Management: A Historical Perspective, MR-755-0SD, Santa Monica, CA: 
RAND, 1996. 
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In our 1994 report on officer career management, we looked at future career 
practices in a context that took us out about 10 to 15 years, say to the year 2010. 
As the most likely case, we posited that the military would evolve in a straightforward 
way -- that certain changes already underway would continue in a readily 
understandable manner. A large military would become a smaller military -- there 
were over 1.2 million officers at the peak of WWII; over 400,000 at the peak of 
Vietnam; and there are about 225, 000 now. 
This scenario posited other changes in the environment within which officers 
would be developed and managed: 1) known threats would become varied threats; 
2) the unitary mission of global conflict would become diverse missions within an 
overall policy of selective and flexible engagement; 3) single missions for units would 
become multiple missions for units; 4) variable hierarchies would replace the fixed 
organizational hierarchies; 5) advanced weapons would become integrated systems 
and processes; and 6) a service focus in operational matters would continue to be 
replaced by a joint perspective. 
For those, who do not like this evolutionary case, we also examined more 
radical excursions based on variations in size, organization and technology. I will 
discuss the effects of these later. As we looked at careers, the starting question was 
"careers for whom." Who is a future officer, and what does a future officer do? 
Over three years, through interviews and focus groups, we asked many people 
those questions. Several of you here today were part of that process. We talked to 
political appointees, academics, serving officers, retired officers, people with 
legislative backgrounds, civil servants, enlisted, and policy makers. The followin~ is 
what emerged from the question, "Who is a future officer?" The suggestions sorted 
into three major clusters. 
1. People did not say an officer was a "member of a profession." They 
said things like: 
a) Officers must make a commitment; they must espouse norms 
and values such as integrity and selfless service. 
b) Officers must adhere to a formal code of laws and ethics, 
and must show virtue, honor, patriotism. 
c) Entry into and continuation as an officer must be based 
on competence; officership is a meritocracy. 
d) Officers share a common body of knowledge and expertise 
that comes about through study and deep experience. 
This knowledge includes history, political science, 
theory, doctrine, naval science, military science, leadership, 
and other high-value skills. 
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e) Jointness has become important in the last decade, and 
will continue to be so in the future. 
Statements like these represent the defining characteristics of a profession, 
so we stated that officership would continue as a profession. The implications of this 
are that acculturation in the profession's values will be needed at entry and 
throughout a career. Education -- keeping up with the profession -- will be important. 
Experience will be important. Professionals have deep knowledge and expertise. 
2. The second cluster dealt with a different kind of characteristic of future 
officers. We frequently heard the ubiquitous phrase "high quality." 
Eventually we pinned its meaning down to intellectual and physical 
vigor. Future officers would be expected to have high levels of 
cognitive ability and physical stamina. Future officers should also be: 
a) Conscientious -willing to expend energy toward goals 
b) Versatile - able to accomplish multiple tasks at a point in time 
c) Adaptable - able to learn and relearn over time 
Of particular interest is that these five characterisUcs - cognitive ability, 
physical ability, conscientiousness, versatility, and adaptability -- are what the 
psychologists call enduring characteristics. These are characteristics that are 
largely inherent in an individual and are not easily changed later in life. People have 
varying levels of these characteristics when they enter your organizations. You don't 
develop, train or educate for these characteristics, except at the margin. You select 
people with these characteristics as prospective officers. 
The military has had, and will continue to have, a "select the best" strategy. 
The military strives for a homogeneous entering group. Neither all militaries around 
the world nor all organizations can, or should, afford such a strategy; they instead 
should select a mix of people with varied levels of these characteristics. After all, not 
all are expected at entry to be able to rise to the highest levels of responsibility. But, 
if you want people with high levels of these characteristics and other related work 
style and personal interest characteristics, you must have the appropriate selection 
instruments in place. 
3. The third cluster of attributes that we heard about the future officer 
concerned what an officer does. 
In the broadest sense, an officer does what the nation asks - all missions, 
against all enemies, as the oath requires. Future officers would continue to wear 
uniforms, and, in the words of one navy admiral, "get shot at." This differentiates 
officers - indeed the military -- from the defense civilian and contractor work force, 
although I must note that the first casualty in Somalia was a defense civilian. 
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Future officers will lead in the broad sense of leadership. They set direction, 
align forces, and empower people. This differentiates officers from the NCO and 
Petty Officer corps, which has evolved in its own right to become the force managers 
and technicians. 
Last, officers apply particular knowledge and experience in solving national 
security problems and in attaining national security objectives. In contrast to the 
enduring personal characteristics that are selection criteria, the things that an officer 
does are developed attributes. You train and educate for these. 
After this litany of what a future officer is and does, it is fair to ask whether 
they can change with time. The answer is -- no and yes. Some stay the same, and 
some change. 
In the category of "not different from past or present" are membership in the 
profession based on acceptance of norms and values, continued competence, and 
adherence to laws and ethics. Also in this category are possession of certain 
enduring characteristics that underlie performance. 
In the category of "different from past and present" are knowledge and 
expertise that is the domain matter of the profession. In the profession of officership, 
this changes over time, as it does in all of the professions. History arguably is not 
changeable but is added to over time. On the other hand, doctrine and theory for 
military and naval science, and paradigms for leadership and management, are not 
constants. Change in the domain knowledge of officership is not unlike change in 
medicine wherein CAT scans, angioplasty and new drugs have changed the domain 
of expertise. Miniaturization, digitization and other advances change the domain of 
officer expertise. Tanks replace horses; steam replaces sail; turbines replace 
pistons. Is technology part of the domain of officership knowledge and expertise? 
Certainly. Technology - how you do things - has always been part of the core 
knowledge of the profession. 
Developed attributes - what particular officers must know how to do and have 
experience in - is also in the change category. The nature of the needed 
occupational knowledge and skills for the future should be no surprise. 
Occupational classifications derive mainly from what the military will be asked to do 
(missions), how the military organizes to do them (organization), and the systems 
and processes used by the military to accomplish the work (technology). 
In our career management research, we posited that developed attributes -
occupational knowledge and skill - would organize into four major groups. It is 
within these four groups that officers - members of a profession - will further 
specialize, and will require knowledge and varying levels of military experience. The 
four groups are: 
1) Line: this group is more broadly defined than current Navy usage. 
These are the unique military skills -- particularly those directly 
involved in operations and related military functions. 
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2) Specialist: any military skills, as defined above, that also require 
recurring assignments and repetitive use because of advanced 
education or high cost, long duration training and experience. 
Depth of knowledge is a characteristic of this group. Examples 
of such skills in the future are electronics, communications, acquisition, 
and nuclear. 
3) Support: skills generally analogous to civilian occupations that are 
needed to support functioning of military organizations, and 
where general military experience is needed or will assist task 
performance. Examples are supply, personnel and transportation. 
4) Professions: civilian professional skills not usually requiring 
any significant, or only limited, military experience. Medical, dental, 
legal and chaplain are the traditional core of this group. 
In summary, my observations about officership for the future are: 
1 ) The core of the profession does not change. 
2) The characteristics of the people you select for entry do not change. 
3) What you want people to know and to have expertise in and 
experience with does change. 
4) Missions, organization and technology drive change. 
In our research, we pulled apart the officer corps for all the services at the 
unit, grade and skill level of detail. The numbers and percentages I present below 
are for officers in operating accounts. These billets do not include the ten to twelve 
percent of officers who are carried in the individuals account. Many of the latter 
group are new officers in initial training and educa.tion. 
Under the reasonable assumptions earlier outlined - i.e., that the military 
evolves in a straightforward way - there will be about 177,000 officers in all of the 
services. They will be somewhat more highly graded than now, with about forty-
seven percent in the grades of 04 to 06. Aggregated, some forty-five percent will 
be in the line category; seventeen percent in each of the specialist and support 
categories; and twenty-one percent in the professions. These grade and skill 
percentages will vary by service, as they do now, but the differences become more 
pronounced as you go toward the year 2010. 
We also explored other assumptions about how the military might evolve 
based on varying size (smaller and larger), organizational change (outsourcing, 
streamlining, downgrading), and technology (user friendly; not user friendly.) When 
you do this, you find that the size of the officer corps could be as low as 128,000, or 
as high as 221,000 (excluding individuals accounts.) The grades of 04 to 06 can 
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vary from 53, 000 to 93, 000 - as low as 42 percent of officers. Content in the skill 
groups can vary by plus or minus 6 percent, with some groups gaining and some 
groups losing across the various options. Specialist and Support groups could be as 
low as 45,000, or as high as 70,000. 
There are lots of other combinations of options that could be explored as well. 
My point is that, in planning educational opportunities either for all officers or for 
selected groups of officers, you need to be aware of the magnitude of the challenge 
and how its dimensions could change significantly as the true environment unfolds 
over time. The vision that all officers must be given continuous or even periodic 
educational opportunity needs to have a plan of action with it. Otherwise, in the 
earlier words of Colonel Beauchamp, vision becomes hallucination. 
My last topic deals with what are called objective careers - that is, clear 
patterns of systemic advancement that are prescribed by the organization so that the 
organization builds and keeps the human capital needed for its internal and external 
uses. Objective careers can be contrasted with subjective careers, which are the 
stopping points in and out of organizations that individuals pick and choose for 
themselves across their lifetime of work. 
Personnel management practices that organizations use should have external 
fit - they should match their environment. I submit that the existing officer career 
management system did exactly that. I described its environment earlier - large 
military, global conflict, known threat, large organizations, fixed hierarchies, 
advanced weapons, and service focus. I can characterize the existing career 
management system as one that is standardized in that it prescribes but one path 
through the organization that constitutes success. All must hew to this path. The 
career is short, and many officers leave before the investment in human capital is 
recouped. High turnover exists throughout the career stream as a result. Uniform 
policy is mandated. The rules for entry, development, promotion, and 
separation/retirement are mostly fixed. Moreover, these uniform policies lead to a 
clamor for equal outcomes across all services and skills. Successful outcomes are 
judged solely on promotion and grade attained. 
This system produces what I call interchangeable officers. If a Lieutenant 
Colonel or Commander goes down, another springs up to take their place. The 
replacement thinks and acts exactly like their predecessor because they have been 
developed in exactly the same way. The gene pool is small, but precisely optimized 
for the environment. There is nothing wrong with this system per se. It does what it 
is intended to do. 
However, in the likely future environment - smaller military, varied threats, 
selective and flexible engagement, multiple missions, smaller organizations, variable 
hierarchies, integration of weapons and processes, and joint mission essential tasks 
-- the existing career management system does not appear as optimal. 
Our most recent research suggests that a different system should be desired. 
Such a system would be more customized, in that there would be many paths to 
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success through it. People who enter would need to surmount a second selection 
hurdle somewhere between eight and twelve years of service. Some would be 
channeled into other skill groups; some would leave. Those who stayed would be 
able to serve longer in careers than· now, but still largely at the service's choice. 
Greater stability would exist later in a career. More flexible policy would lead to 
equitable (fair) outcomes across service and skill groups. Development would· be 
deeper, with more education and a service and joint orientation. Emphasis would 
shift, from promotions and grade held, to skills and experience. 
I call this the unique officer. Each one is developed based on their choice of, 
and guidance into, one of many routes through the organization. As a result, a more 
diverse gene pool results, which seems to better fit the uncertain and more quickly 
changeable environment. While objective careers prescribed by the organization 
still exist, the multiple paths allow for more subjective choice as well, which seems to 
better fit the likely desires of a future officer corps. 
In conclusion, human capital needs for the future will be different. The 
profession remains, as does the prevalence of certain enduring characteristics in 
those who enter it. What is different is the domain of professional knowledge and 
experience that all officers must have, and the occupational knowledge and skill that 
each particular officer must have in their chosen field. The number of officers 
remains large, but how officers apportion by service, grade, and skill depends on the 
future size of the military and how mission, organization and technology change. 
Career management practices to include development will also need to change to fit 
the changed environment. 
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It is a pleasure and an honor to speak to such a distinguished audience, so let me 
thank Congressman Ike Skelton, the Naval Postgraduate School, and the Office of Naval 
Research for their gracious invitation to participate in this conference. 
To the questions, what kind of officers do we need for the 21st Century, and what 
kind of education and training infrastructure do we envision to support them, my answer 
comes in three parts. 1 
First, the United States needs the highest quality people who can be recruited to 
the colors. While that is a truism, accomplishing the goal will be increasingly difficult. 
As the military establishment shrinks, as technology grows in significance, as 
compensation comes under increasing pressure, as the conditions of service continue to 
stress individuals and families, as divisions over gender and other policies divide our 
military and civilian leadership - and lead some groups to disparage the quality and 
fighting capacity of the armed forces -- and, most importantly, as military affairs become 
less significant to the American people, a shrinking proportion of our brightest and most 
capable youth will be attracted to military careers. At the same time, our best officers may 
choose increasingly to leave for greater opportunities in the civilian economy. 
Those officers who do stay will need to be ever more diverse in this multi-racial, 
multi-ethnic, and multi-cultural nation - diverse beyond large numbers of women, blacks, 
and Hispanics, to include more Buddhists and Moslems and Hindus and Jews as well as 
Christians; people from all corners of the country; and, most important, people of all 
classes and perspectives. If our forces are going to serve all over the world, we will need 
people comfortable with other cultures, colors, languages, foods, and ways of living -
familiarity that comes largely from life experience and not from school. 
1 Session 5, titled "Human Capital," Conference Agenda, 3 pages, in possession of author. 
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Most of all, we need to attract people from the American elite, from the suburbs as 
well as the cities and small towns. If one-third of our nation lives on the crabgrass frontier, 
one-third of our officer corps should originate from there, also; but I doubt seriously that 
to be the case today. The strength of the American military has always been its diversity 
and its correlation with the heterogeneity of the population. There is growing evidence that 
such heterogeneity, at least in background, opinion, orientation, and perspective, has 
diminished. 2 
In order to compete for the best and most diverse cohort of our youth, the services 
may have to change the character of their recruiting and the conditions of service, 
experimenting with innovative approaches. For example, they could shorten enlistments, 
move ROTC back into our elite universities with comprehensive, four-year scholarships 
for each and every cadet and midshipmen, and reach out to populations that have been 
heretofore under-represented in the force. 
Let me provide a historical illustration. When, about ten years ago, the Air Force 
raised the service obligation of pilots to nine years, a significant slice of American youth 
probably ceased to be attracted to the service, unwilling to mortgage the decade of their 
twenties just to fly. A service that draws its leadership disproportionately from less than 
20% of its officer corps must assure the finest human capital at the beginning of the career 
cycle. 
Now, I know the reason for such polices is cost - the cost to train pilots who might 
leave for the airlines, or the cost per cadet in a college or university. Yet, given the costs 
of weapons, training, operating, and supporting the forces, and given the indispensability 
of leadership to the operation of our forces in battle and the winning of our wars, can we 
afford to let accountants control the quality of future leaders? Succumbing to the 
pressures -- length of initial term, obligations for specialty training, location of ROTC, 
limitations on scholarships - is simply penny wise and pound foolish. 
We spare no effort, and pay almost any price, to give our people the finest weapons 
in the history of warfare. We ought similarly to spare no cost when it comes to furnishing 
the finest officers to our young men and women, who, after all, are responsible for their 
lives in battle and the safety of our country. 
Remember that ugly acronym from the adolescence of the computer age: GIGO -
"garbage in, garbage out." G can stand for garbage, or good, or great. The choice will be 
up to our national leadership. 
2Thomas E. Ricks, Making the Corps (New York: Scribner, 1997). 
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Second, our officers will need to be broadly and deeply educated, as well as tough 
and competent - people of judgment, wisdom, balance, and depth - to operate their forces 
under a more disparate assortment of missions than ever before in American history. They 
must be people able to adjust to accelerating change, not just in technology but in concept 
and strategy. Knowing when to fight as well as how, and what to destroy as well as how 
to destroy it, will become increasingly significant. 
We will need a larger proportion of thinkers, as opposed to doers, than in the past. 
If Peter Drucker is correct, and the developed world is entering a post-capitalist age in 
which knowledge is the only meaningful resource, then the decisions of American officers, 
particularly senior leaders, will be the determining factor in war and military operations, 
more so than in the past. 3 
The United States, heretofore history's most ardent and effective practitioner of 
capital-intensive war, must learn to rely as much on strategy as resources, as much on 
cleverness as overvvhelming force. In the situations short of total war, in which the nation 
will be increasingly involved over the next generation, connecting ends and means will be 
critical for success, and for minimizing the number of casualties we will incur. 
The changes needed to assure that such officers will possess the qualities I just 
described conflict with cherished practice. 
First, the services will need to broaden the education of its officers. We ought to 
start with ROTC and our service academies, but my recommendations for reform are so 
radical as to be impractical at present. 4 However, to make one small suggestion, the 
service academies should undertake a mandatory program of '1unior year abroad". By that 
I mean spending the third year either at another academy or at a civilian school in the 
United States or abroad. My guess is that the only real impediment to such a program is 
the integrity of their football programs - a small price to pay if we are serious about 
breadth, and Jointness, in the military establishment. 
3Peter F. Drucker, "The Rise of the Knowledge Society," The Wilson Quarterly, 
17(Spring 1993):65. 
4Believing that a college education and initial education in the profession of arms are, in 
the information age, too important, too expensive, and too complex to be crammed into four 
years at a government institution, and remembering that higher education is acknowledged to be 
among the most successful American "industries," the academies should become post-graduate 
two-year courses for men and women who choose a military career. Each academy with its -
present facilities could graduate 2,000 officers a year and ROTC could be abandoned. Officers in 
each service would then possess a common education, indoctrination, and preparation. In order , 
to attract the best American youth, the services should each distribute by competition at least 
thousand four-year college scholarships to prospective officers, allowing "walk ons" to fill the 
remaining spaces. 
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Similar changes will be necessary elsewhere in professional military education, 
including foreign language fluency, multi-cultural curricula, rigorous historical study, 
specialty training in understanding technology and technological change, and increased 
emphasis on research and writing, so that officers learn critical thinking - learn to 
distinguish explicitly between rigor and hogwash. 
Second, a masters degree in residence at a civilian university should become as 
important for higher responsibility as attendance in residence at a staff college. Our 
officers need, in mid-career, to return among the American people, and avail themselves 
of the very best intellectual experience available in our society. I am, for example, dubious 
about granting masters degrees at service colleges because it may lessen the frequency 
with which officers educate themselves outside the government. Nothing is more 
dangerous to our officer corps than isolation and parochialism. 
Third, we will need many more officers expert in history, international relations, 
security and strategic studies, and other such subjects. Requiring education out on the 
economy will also encourage such programs in our civilian universities, thus broadening 
the American people's familiarity with military affairs, now a diminishing understanding. 
Civilian students love these courses. 
Now, I know there currently rages a controversy over the proportion of officers 
educated in technology and the social sciences. Obviously, we need both; but if the 
distinction in an uncertain future is to know whether to act as well as how to act, the tilt 
should be toward the softer subjects. 
The writer James Michener used to tell a story about his entry into the Naval 
service. Four prospective Navy applicants, including himself, were taken into small room 
at the very beginning of their service in World War II. 
A grim-faced selection committee asked, 'What can you do?" The first man replied, 
"I'm a buyer for Macy's, and I can judge very quickly between markets and prices and 
trends." The selection board replied, "But can't you do anything practical?" The man said 
no, and he was shunted off to one side. 
The next man was a lav.iyer. He replied, "I can weigh evidence and organize 
information." He, too, was rejected. 
Michener indicated that he was a writer, and you can guess how far that got him. 
The fourth man said boldly, "I can overhaul diesel engines." The committee 
members jumped up, embraced him, and made him an officer on the spot. 
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At the end of the war, the buyer from Macy's was an assistant to the Secretary of 
the Navy, in charge of many complex responsibilities requiring instant good judgment. He 
took courses in naval management and government procedures until he became one of 
the nation's real experts. 
The lawyer wound up as assistant to Admiral Halsey and, in a crucial battle, 
deduced where the Japanese fleet had to be. 
Michener was ultimately a Naval Secretary to several Congressional committees 
who were determining the future of America in the South Pacific. 
And what was the engineer doing at the end of the war? He was still overhauling 
diesel engines. 5 
Mitchener's conclusion that expertise, while necessary, could be hired, and that 
insight, judgment, and wisdom vvere indispensable even for a technological service, is fair 
warning. Some might argue that, fifty years ago, science and technology were less 
necessary than they are today and will be tomorrow, but such would be a misreading of 
the history of military technology. 
Fourth, the services will have to rethink their overwhelming bias in favor of 
operations in the assignment and promotion of their officers. Now, I recognize that 
operations will always be primary; but in times of change, especially whenever we cut 
organization and lower budgets, the careers of people with more varied assignments or 
who have taken time out for graduate education or faculty duty or career broadening 
experiences, get killed. 
Systems that require proscribed careers with zero defects, without opportunities to 
take risks and learn from mistakes, will not grow the best leadership, nor will promotion 
criteria that constantly privilege operations and command. The Navy is most guilty here, 
but I suspect the other services are hardly better. Only the Marines, perhaps because they 
have been cut less, seem to have improved on this score. For a brief moment in the 
1990s, under the influence of Commandant Al Gray and the leadership of Generals Walt 
Boomer and Paul Van Riper at Quantico, an assignment on the faculty at Quantico ranked 
second only to command in importance as a criterion for promotion to the highest grades. 
Perhaps it thus comes as no surprise that, earlier this year, there were five - an 
unprecedented number - of Marine four-stars. 
The Army's OPMS 21, under the leadership of David Ohle - now the DCSPER of 
the Army, the Air Force in revising the OER among other changes, and the Navy, if it 
5James A. Michener, A Michener Miscellany, 1950-1970 (New York: Random House, 
1973), 52, 54. . 
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implements some of the recommendations presented to this conference by VADM Tracey, 
Chief of Naval Education and Training, are beginning to address this challenge. 
However, the solution lays only partly in the Pentagon. Congress must allow the 
services to overpopulate their officer corps, to assure billets for schooling and as a basis 
for the expansion of the services in a future mobilization. It is not fashionable to speak of 
mobilization and citizen-soldiers, I know. People write that the age of mass warfare is 
over, and that the United States need not think of an expansible army, even though that 
has been the policy for our entire history. But the one thing that history does teach is that 
the future is unknowable, and that no matter what analytical techniques we employ, 
someday, sometime, at some critical point, we will be surprised. 
Finally, we need men and women who identify themselves as members of the 
profession of arms -- that is, people who identify themselves as professionals in the 
waging of war, officers who are not only outstanding in the management of violence (to use 
Morris Janowitz's classic definition of the military professional), but who have a broader 
understanding of, and perspective on, their role and place in American society. 6 F~r many 
in the services, particularly the Air Force and probably the Navy, this may involve a very 
deep cultural transformation. 
Two aspects of the profession of arms strike me as particularly weak in our officer 
corps today. 
First, officers must know, understand, and appreciate their client: the United States 
of America and the American people. Like the rest of the American population, military 
officers are frequently ignorant of American history; and, more than most, focused as they 
are on the technical requirements of their jobs and living apart from American society on 
their bases or overseas. The former deputy head of West Point's history department 
worried last year that only about thirty per cent of the cadets take a semester of American 
history -- mostly those identified by a diagnostic as deficient in the subject.7 
The recent book by the Pentagon correspondent for the Wall Street Journal, Tom 
Ricks, paints a grim picture of the Marines' view of American society, which seems to 
range from pessimism to contempt. 8 
6Morris Janowitz, The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait (Glencoe, IL: 
The Free Press, 1960). 
7Col. Charles F. Brower IV, remarks in discussion at "Teaching Military History," 
Organization of American Historians Annual Convention, San Francisco, CA, April 1997. 
8Ricks, Making the Corps, particularly 276, 281, 285-86, 293-95. 
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Second, military officers should possess a very sophisticated, deep, and detailed 
understanding of civil-military relations, and particularly civilian control of the military. In 
my discussions with audiences at the service academies, staff colleges, war colleges, and 
senior officer executive programs - -in most cases the top portion of officers in the year 
groups - I have found not only views similar to those discovered by Tom Ricks, but 
widespread misunderstanding of the proper role of a professional military in a democratic 
republic. 9 
Likewise, the prejudice against the press is troubling, particularly the propensity to 
blame it for American failures in Vietnam and afterwards - a largely discredited 
interpretation. The military's difficulty in dealing with this essential channel of 
communication with the public, particularly in recent peace operations, should disturb 
everyone in government - military and civilian. 10 
No profession can adapt to change, remain healthy, or even retain the 
independence to fulfill its core responsibilities if it loses touch with its client, or neglects 
the relationship. Nor can the United States undertake to teach democracy, especially to 
military establishments elsewhere in the world - a world where democracy is little 
understood and often leads to autocratic regimes suspicious of western values and the 
United States in particular - if our own officers "don't get it. "11 
Presently, there is abroad in the land a concern over a gap betvveen the military and 
society beyond what has existed in the past, a concern that the gap is growing, and that 
9Since publishing "Out of Control: The Crisis in Civil-Military Relations," The National 
Interest, No 35 (Spring 1994), 3-17 and "An Exchange on Civil-Military Relations" [Letters from 
Gen. Colin Powell, Secretary John Lehman, Lt. Gen. William Odom, and Professor Samuel 
Huntington with my response], ibid, No. 36 (Summer 1994), 23-31, I have lectured at West 
Point (1994, 1996), Leavenworth (School of Advanced Military Studies, 1994), Maxwell AFB 
(Air War College, 1994-1997; School of Advanced Aerospace Studies, 1994), National War 
College (1995 twice, 1996), and executive programs for 0-6/GS 15 and flag officers/SES (twice 
each in 1996-1997). 
10See Warren P. Strobel, Late Breaking Foreign Policy: The News Medial" Influence on 
Peace Operations (Washington: United States Institute of Peace, 1997). 
11For the fragility of contemporary democracy outside the developed world, see Robert D. 
Kaplan, "Was Democracy Just a Moment?" The Atlantic Monthly, 289(December 1997):55-80; 
Fareed Zak.aria, "The Rise of Illiberal Democracy," Foreign Affairs, 76(December 1997):22-43. 
See also Richard H. Kohn, ''How Democracies Control the Military," Journal of Democracy, 
8(0ctober 1997):140-53. 
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it may endanger military effectiveness or the subordination of the military to civilian 
authority. On the one hand the officer corps appears to be alienated more than in the past 
from American society, and vocal about it. On the other, elites know increasingly less 
about the military, do not care, and pressure the government and the military for changes 
and for policies that may harm the quality of the armed forces. 
Some survey data indicates that the officer corps has become political and 
politicized -- and partisanly so. Other data suggests that the American people trust most 
those institutions that are least democratic - the military, the police, and the Supreme 
Court - and distrust those that are most democratic - Congress and the presidency. 
Our officer corps may be more divorced from the American elite in values and 
attitudes than at any time in American history, becoming less diverse in this respect as the 
American elite has become more heterogeneous in its thinking. If this is the case, we may 
be heading for considerable civil-military conflict, with negative possibilities for American 
government and national defense.12 . 
My colleague at Duke, Peter Feaver, and I will undertake a major research project 
on this subject over the next two years, to review the evidence and consider the 
implications of the gap between the military and society. If the problem exists, we may be 
able to suggest some policy changes to avert trouble. 
Whatever the reality, the United States has been blessed with as loyal and 
successful a set of armed forces as any nation in history. The key to that loyalty and 
success has been the officer corps. Everything else comes and goes, but the officer 
corps remains. Officers lead our forces in war, recommend policies that prepare us to 
deter or best our adversaries, and operate our forces in peacetime. They provide the 
continuity; they have the expertise; and theirs alone is the responsibility, professionally, 
for American national security. The recruitment, training, education, and development of 
this group of Americans must be a national priority. 
12See Ricks, Making the Corps, 279-283; Ricks, presentation to the Triangle Institute for 
Security Studies, Raleigh, NC, November 5, 1997; Ole R. Holsti, A Widening Gap Between the 
:Military and Civilian Society? Some Evidence, 1976-1996 (Cambridge: Harvard University John 
M. Olin Institute for Strategic Studies Project on U.S. Post Cold-War Civil-:Military Relations, 
October 1997); Andrew J. Bacevich and Richard H. Kohn, "Grand Army of the Republicans," The 
New Republic (December 8, 1997), 22-25; Jonathan Broder, "The army of the right," Salon, 
<http://www.salonmagazine.com/news/1998/01/06news.html>, January 6, 1998; Richard C. 
Brown, Social Attitudes of American Generals (New York: Arno Press, 1979). 
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Ladies and gentlemen, I am your 25th speaker today, by my actual count. I'll tell 
you, the discussions have been extraordinary and I have taken copious notes. 
I want to say, like every other speaker has, that this conference is really necessary 
and quite timely. Thank you, Dick Elster, and thanks to the entire team of the Naval 
Postgraduate School, the Office of Naval Research, and our elected Representatives 
who have caused this to happen and who have attended and participated. Thank you 
all very, very much. 
I think we all can agree that there is work to be done in the Professional Military 
Education system - - in the joint system. I am one who does not believe that radical 
surgery is necessary, although there were a few "drive- by shootings" today that 
suggested that I do, however, come to this conference as a change agent. I've seen 
too much over the last three and a half years, as I mentioned this morning - graduated 
three resident classes, four nonresident classes, and talked to two classes currently in 
session at NDU. I will tell you that I am very proud of our educational staffs, our 
leaders, our students, our facility, and our institutions. 
I am an advocate for PME and JPME. But I certainly agree that some work is 
necessary. That work is largely in the management of change vice reform. I'm not 
going back before Goldwater- Nichols and the Skelton Panel and use examples that 
cause me to think about reform in the 21st Century. I'm going forward into the future, 
trying to understand what the implications of the future are for PME and JPME. Change 
management will be a theme throughout my presentation. It's very high on my list. 
On Monday, I visited Sarnoff Labs in Princeton, New Jersey, and gave pieces of 
this presentation to senior officials there who are leading- edge researchers thinking 
and trying to understand how technology and education can come together in 
substantive, substantial and profound ways. 
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I then hopped on an airplane to Boston, visited the JFK school at Harvard, and 
talked to a bunch of Russian generals about PME of the future. I had a very sad 
and sobering conversation with them. Throughout most of my career, I had always 
looked at the Soviet system as kind of - not co- equal, perhaps, like the old pyramid 
and hierarchical systems, which all of us cut our teeth on. Certainly it was a system 
to study and understand. But, clearly, their system is in decline, their senior leaders 
are really worried about it, and we had very interesting conversations. 
I then hopped in a taxi, went over to my old school, Harvard's Business School, 
and talked to them. In fact, Jim Locher and I were classmates from the "B" school in 
1974. Jim, you would be amazed. They are taking the venerated case study 
method and digitizing it. Jim and I were in a section where there were 80 students 
with one professor. Tim MacArthur came in and said we are going to transform the 
business school from the industrial age into the information age. And when you 
have a war chest of several billion dollars, as Harvard does, you can do lots of 
exciting things. I had a chance to share with them some of the ideas I'm going to 
share with you tonight. 
Yesterday, we had a great discussion session with all of the former presidents 
of the National Defense University. I was trying to point out some trends that I am 
concerned about. We talked about resources. That subject has come up here 
today, and I am going to bring it up again tonight. All of our discussions yesterday 
related to what we've been talking about today. 
In my presentation, I am going to try and talk about technology, information 
technology, and its relationship to PME. I am trying to 'vision' with you tonight ten to 
fifteen years into the future - to give you a glimpse of what an information age 
university might look like. And, as I have gotten into this, I couldn't vision without 
thinking about the system in its totality, what I call the JPME system -the JPMES. 
Tonight I am going to offer you a vision of that system. Jim Locher said today that 
he offered a modest proposal. I am offering a few other modest proposals as well. 
This is a great conference. I'm delighted to be here. And I thought I would talk 
during dinner, because it has been a long day. I would like to dialogue, if time 
permits, because we must dialogue on these issues. It's not enough to hear 
presentations. The discussion today was rich. but what I missed was dialogue. If 
·we are going to make some serious changes to our system, we want to make sure 
they are well thought out, well discussed, and that we know where we are going. 
We had some rich conversations about some unintended consequences of 
Goldwater- Nichols and subsequent reforms. When we create change and manage 
change, we are always going to have to deal with unintended consequences. That 
shouldn't cause us any anxiety as we think about and manage change in the Mure. 
I have been a great champion of Goldwater- Nichols. The Skelton Panel and 
its work has been lauded greatly today, and ifs well- deserved. It really did us a 
great service. I think the Services have capitalized on that great work. But there are 
some tough issues that remain. And I'm ready to go back and look at those issues .. 
- work them. That, I think is the beauty of this conference. 
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The conference report is very important. It's going to be tough to 
synthesize all the divergent points of view and everything that's been 
expressed. But it's worth doing. It's worth working hard to get it right, because I 
think you are going to add an important body of knowledge to all of these 
issues. The proceedings from this conference follow the Cheney Report; follow 
other work that's been done within the colleges and the universities; follow a 
great piece of work that I thought the Chairman's Review Panel in '95 did. We 
are adding to the body of knowledge that exists and, if we can build some 




• A Context for JPME/PME in the Information Age 
• A University in the Information Age 
• A JPMES in the Information Age 
"Visioning" 
Building NDU for the Future ........ ~....,...-===-"""""'""'"'""'-=="""""""""""'"""""' 
What I will do is to set the context and then give you a vision for a 
university and educational system for the information age. 
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Evolving from an Industrial Age University 
to an Information Age University 
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• 
I contend that we are evolving from the industrial age to the information age. I'm 
using NDU as an example here, and I'm still learning and have a lot to learn 
about the university. But NDU is evolving from what I would call an industrial 
age institution with simple networks and a pyramidal/hierarchical organizational 
structure where things happen sequentially and linearly. It's kind of reactive 
and adaptive. But it is transforming itself, and information technology is a big 
part of that transformation. 
The circles represent networks within a conventional organization. NDU is 
going from an institution of networks to a network of networks. This gets you to 
the heart of the information age and knowledge- based organizations. 
I'm also interested in learning organizations. We have an expert who is 
going to talk on that tomorrow. I believe in learning organizations and the 
concept behind them - because they give you shared situational awareness in 
the organization. Everybody understands the organizational vision, mission, 
goals and values. And every single person in the organization is able to 
contribute to all of those things because they are in a learning organization. 
The current guru in this area is a fellow named Peter Stringer. I 
tell Peter that there's a sixth discipline, information technology, that allows you 
to do things in a very powerful way. If you only have the in- box/out- box 
system and the normal distribution processes that traditional organizations use, 
I don't think you can hope to be a learning organization. 
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What We Are Not Talking About! 
• replacing the human dimension with technology ... 
(we want leverage!) 
• physically consolidating the JPME/PME schools ... 
(we want connectivity!) 
• "crowding out" the service schools ... 
(we want them both!) 
• displacing resident instruction with distant learning ... 
(we want the proper blend!) 
• sacrificing education for training ... 
(we want learning!) 
• developing tech no-geeks instead of warriors ... 
(we want warriors!) 
BuildingNDUfor~eFumre_.. ...... .....,. __ !E!!!!I!!,_.........,""""' ...... "'""""'"""""...,,__ 
With these changes, I'm not trying to replace the human dimension with 
technology. I want leverage. I'm not trying to physically consolidate all of the colleges 
and universities. What we want is connectivity. We're not trying to crowd out the 
service and joint schools. We need them. As long as we have four separate services, 
we have great justification for having separate institutions. The day we unify the 
Armed Forces of the United States, I'll be the first in line to unify all the colleges and 
universities. So, I want to get rid of that myth. 
I'm also not talking about displacing resident instruction with distance learning. 
We want the proper blend. Somebody said that Peter Drucker has predicted the 
demise of the traditional American university. He thinks it will become something quite 
different from what it is today. I know better than to take on Peter Drucker but, for the 
moment, my vision would be a blend of resident instruction and distance learning. 
As Joe Redden said today, we've got a ways to go with distance learning. But 
talking with folks at Sarnoff Labs makes your eyes water. They said the next 
revolution in information technology is digital video, and the systems and the 
technology we have right now are stone age compared to what we'll have in five years. 
We will find the proper role for distance learning. Ifs an exciting part of JPME, but I 
think Joe said, "It's not the panacea that it's sometimes portrayed." And we are sure 
not sacrificing education for training. 
I listened carefully to the dialogue on education and training today. I believe that 
the distinction between education and training is blurring. So I don't spend a lot of time 
arguing whether JPME is education or training. It's both, but there's some work that 
we can do to improve them. I've stood in front of seven war college classes and said, 
"We're not trying to make you computer scientists or techno- geeks instead of 






• Enables Direction & Focus 
• Promotes Efficiency & Effectiveness 
•Enhances Shared Situational Awareness 
• Provides Continuity, Change, Renewal, & Growth 
Building NDU for die Future __ ......, ________ _ 
If there's a single message in my presentation tonight, it's on this 
slide - Shared Vision. The Congressman referred to it, a number of you 
have referred to it, and I'm referring to it. We need a shared vision for 
PME and Joint PME. We at the National Defense University will tell you 
that we are in the midst of a serious intellectual drill to define our 
purpose, our vision, our mission, our values, and our goals. This serious 
intellectual work has to precede physical change. 
General Sullivan, former Army Chief of Staff, used to say, 
"Intellectual change has to precede physical change." That same 
thought, my friends, applies to the PME system as well. But this piece 
(pointing to the Joint Vision 201 O block) is missing right now. I don't want 
to be too critical, because we really have come a long way. The work the 
J- 7 folks are doing with the OPMEP, and all the work that was 
acknowledged early this morning is great work. 
There is a current vision for PME, and it is codified in the OPMEP, 
but it goes downrange only maybe to the end of the palm. We need to 
reach out, we need to go deeper - a lot deeper. We need to look into 
the future ten to fifteen years and develop this vision, and then we need 
to make sure that it's captured in JV 2010, or whatever JV 2010 is going 
to be in the future. A new chairman will take Joint Vision 201 O in new, 
exciting and expanded directions, and we need to make sure that PME is 
part of it. 
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If you look at the original vision for Joint Vision 2010, there were only 
a couple lines in there on Professional Military Education. Now there's 
an expanded version of the original articulation of JV 2010, and there's a 
lot more in there in terms of professional development, Professional 
Military Education, and joint education. 
But, for me, it still needs better clarity, more specificity, and we need 
to codify Joint Vision 2010 for PME. Then all of that, of course, needs to 
be made consistent with the service visions. I'm fascinated by the fact 
that it's only been in the last five years or so that the Armed Forces of the 
United States have had a vision. My hope is that as JV 2010 matures, 
and that may take a decade, it will have a synchronizing effect that will 
have profound implications for improving our of jointness. 
Shared vision will do a lot of good things for us. It will promote 
efficiencies and effectiveness we do not have at the moment. And it 
would accomplish what we're trying to achieve on the battlefield today in 
terms of shared situational awareness - answering the three simple 
questions "Where am I?", "Where's the bad guy?", and "Where are my 
buddies?" We need to do the same thing within our organizations, and 
within our PJE system. Shared situational awareness is as important in 
the schoolhouse as it is on the battlefield. It provides direction and focus. 
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We are facing many challenges at the National Defense University 
as we think about the future. In the '70s, the focus was strictly on JPME. 
Our core activities changed in the '80s and '90s - a divergent trend that 
for me sends up a red star cluster. Questions of focus and of proper 
resourcing of missions, and a whole host of other things come up. So 
now we are in the midst of a serious attempt to determine what the 
National Defense University of the 21st Century is going to be. \\'hat will 
be its purpose, its vision, its mission, its goals and its objectives? \\'hat 
values will we hold? And how should we update our charter. 
We're doing a lot for JPME in the National Defense University. We 
are heavily involved in acquisition - heavily involved in civilian education, 
and getting more so with the implementation of DLAMP - the Defense 
Leadership and Management Program. We set up a center for 
hemispheric defense studies, which will train and educate very senior 
leaders from within the western hemisphere, primarily from Latin 
America. The Honorable Deborah Lee talked about the need to provide 
JPME for reserve components, and we involved in that. Of course, we're 
involved in research and degree granting. And we are involved in 
information. 
The defense reform initiative has just had a major impact on us. As 
alluded to several times today, this raises a whole new set of questions 
and issues that have to be worked. Neither we at the university, nor 
anyone else I think, understands the full implications of all of this. 
SA-14 
Are we indeed, then, evolving from a PJE system to a defense 
system? In the trends I see working at the National Defense University, 
the center of gravity is shifting, and we need to understand the 
implications of that shift. The resources in question are extraordinary, 
and we have some serious challenges that we have to work. 
Now, these are my problems. I don't want to worry you about them. 
But as we talk about the larger, overall concepts of JPME, NDU is not 
alone - a number of colleges and universities in the system are also 
going to have to deal with these trends. I don't know if these trends are 
good or bad, but they do have serious implications. That's why I was 
· talking to the former presidents yesterday; and why I'll be talking to a 
board of visitors in February; and why, ultimately, I'm sure I'll find my way 
into the tank to talk to chairman and service chiefs about it. Our senior 
leaders, as many of you have said today, have got to be cognizant of 
these kind of trends. And that's one of the reasons I am delighted about 
this conference. 
This is a boulder that needs to be pushed uphill, and those of us in 
the community cannot do it by ourselves. This requires help from the 
Joint Staff, from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and from 
Congress. I'm delighted to see this collaboration, and collegiality, and 
teamwork in talking about these trends. 
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NDU Former Presidents 
Executive Session 
• Managing Change & Organizational Diversity 
• Matching Requirements & Resources 
• Linking Strategic Planning & Resource Allocation 
• Balancing Today's Mission with Tomorrow's Vision 
• Maintaining Excellence 
14 January 1998 
Fort McNair, Wash DC 
I am going to go fast now, because I think I have covered about four-
fifths of my message. This slide shows some of the issues on the table 
at the meeting of former NDU Presidents we had yesterday. 
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"Building NDU for the Future" 
• Capitalizing on Traditions of Excellence ... Accommodating 
the Factors of Change ... Creating Renewal & Growth 
• Making Best Use of Resources 
• Enhancing Education, Research, & Outreach 
• Transforming from Industrial Age to Information Age 
• Preparing Leaders for 21st Century 
The theme for my presidency is "building NDU for the future". This is 
a point worth making, because some serious criticism was rendered 
today of the PME system. I take that on board, but our challenge is as 
shown in the first bullet - capitalizing on the strengths of the current 
system. And there are current strengths. We have to recognize them, 
and know what they are. And then we need to accommodate the factors 
of change -. and there are many - that we have talked about extensively 
today. And then, we can talk about creating renewal and growth, even in 
an era of constrained resources. We are transforming ourselves, and the 
three core competencies of any great college or university are right here 
(bullet 3) - education, research, and outreach. NDU's best efforts are in 
these areas. 
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What Does the Future Mean ... 
for the Future of JPME? 
• Revolution in Military Affairs? 
• Revolution in Military Thinking? 
• Revolution in Military Education? 
Buutling NDU for the Future __ """""" __ ....., ____ __,,....,.... 
The other thing that got me thinking about the questions this 
conference is dealing with was mentioned this afternoon. What does the 
future mean - the future of JPME? If we are in a revolution in military 
affairs - a RMA - how should it impact our military thinking, and should it 
create a revolution in military education? I think so. I'm looking for a 
revolution in military education, but I do not want to do it precipitously. I 
want to do it rigorously. I want responsible reform. I do not want radical 
surgery within a short period of time. That would not be smart. 
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Why Think About It? 
• The world's changing. 
• The nature of future conflict is changing. 
• The U.S. Armed Forces are changing. 
• The demands on military leaders are changing. 
• The requirements for leadership, materiel, doctrine, 
training and education are changing. 
• Therefore, the JPME/PME system must change to keep 
pace ... must lead, not lag, change ... despite constrained 
resources ... and continue to provide our most important 
competitive advantage ... professionally competent 
leaders. 
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The PJE system has got to lead -- not lag -- change. My belief is 
that we may be lagging change right now. I was down at Fort Hood 
three weeks ago. The Army is conducting its digitized division 
experiments down there. The Armed Forces of the United States are 
digitizing themselves, and our schoolhouse is behind all of that. Yet we 
don't yet have the resources to experiment, discover, explore, learn, and 
create. I worry about that. But we've got to do it. It's been said a 
hundred different ways today, and I say it again here: it is the PME 
system that creates our most compelling, competitive advantage. We 
have great ships; we have great tanks; we have great airplanes. But, as 
somebody else said today, you can't make it happen without great 
leadership. 
The current system, I think, has provided that competitive 
advantage. I heard a senior leader say, not too long ago, that our 
advantage may be 10 to 15 years ahead of any other military force in the 
world. I don't know whether it's 10, 15, or 5, but I know this: we have the 
advantage. We do not want to fritter it away. So we've got to get system 
reform right, or about right, so that we don't get it exactly wrong. 
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The Nature of Future Conflict 
& The Environment 
• Regional dangers 
• Asymmetric challenges 
• Transnational threats 
• ''Wild cards" 
• VUCA ... Volatility, Uncertainty, Complexity, 
& Ambiguity ... and Constrained Resources 
• Technology & the Human Dimension 











• ''Wild Cards" 
Compression .•. Speed, Ambiguity, & Complexity 
These are the factors of change. They were the factors of change in 
the 1940s. So what's different today? It's what you've talked about 
today -- compression, or, as General Bob Scales said, "speed and 
knowledge." The delta in speed, ambiguity and complexity has 
exponentially increased from the industrial age to the information age. 
That's what's different. 
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Implications for U.S. Armed Forces 
• need "high-quality" people 
• need "innovative leadership" 
• need "agile organizations" [learning organizations] 
• need "enhanced materiel" 
• need "improved joint doctrine & training" 
• need relevant JPME programs ... must keep pace ... "our 
leaders must become perpetual students of the military art 
and supporting technologies. 11 
BuiJ.ding NDU for the Future 
~..f I Expanding JV2010 (May 97) I 1 .. ·
~ 
There are vast implications in all of this for PME. They have been 
captured in recent publications - to name just a few: perpetual students, 
the need for new supporting technologies, and, of course, learning and 
organizational theory. 
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Implications for Future Leaders 
• CJCS Blue Ribbon Panel (1995) 
• USAWC Flag Officer Surveys (1996-1997) 
• Cheney Report on PME (1997) 
Building NDU for the Future ......, ....... ;;;;a!!!!--==-,..._!!!ES!!!l,_!!!E!Ei!!E!!ll!!!!!!EE!!!! 
We've spent a lot of time today talking about what future leaders will 
have to be, and we've had some really good help. I paraphrase from the 
chairman of the CJCS Blue Ribbon Panel in '95: All of your war colleges, 
my friends, get tremendous feedback. They are not operating on remote 
control or automatic pilot; and gravity is not running your senior service 
outreaches. They have tremendous feedback mechanisms. We survey 
our graduates; we survey our students; we survey the senior leadership. 
We are not ignorant of what it's going to take to be successful in the 
future. 
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SSC Students: 1995 until 2010 
What Competencies Will They Need? 
•Think creatively, reason critically, and act decisively 
in ambiguous & uncertain conditions 
•Possess sufficient technical ability and insight to 
anticipate, welcome, and utilize ever-increasing 
technological advances 
•Possess a strong sense of jointness 
(and interagency, non-governmental, & multinationality) 
~f I CJCS Review Panel Report, 19951 s.. 
Building NDU for the Future ~ 
What are our future military leaders going to need between now and 
2010, or maybe even 2015? They've got to be thinkers. They've got to 
be comfortable with technology. They don't have to be technologists, but 
they've got to be comfortable with it - which has led me to believe that 
some degree of hands- on competency is necessary. They've got to 
have jointness, and they've got to be comfortable with joint, multinational, 
and non-governmental operations. 
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Personal & Professional Skills 
• Warfighting Skills ... the core activity 
• Political-Military Skills ... national & international 
• Interpersonal Skills ... consensus building, negotiating, 
peer leadership 
• Information Age Skills ... hands-on competency 
• Cognitive Skills ... how to think .. .inside & outside the 
box ... critical thinking ... higher-order learning 
• Communication Skills ... the global village 
• Leadership, Management, & Stewardship Skills 
• Personal & Professional Ethics ... character & values 
~irne~i~ I USAWC GO & Graduate Surveys I 
Building NDU for the Future 
In a nutshell, more than ever before, our leaders in the future are 
going to have to be multi-dimensional. We've talked a lot about that --
about the progression between the tactical and strategic levels of war. 
Developing the cognitive skills of our future military leaders is also 
critically important, and key to this is the notion of the interchangeable 
versus the unique officer. I tell my war college students that thinking is 
what it's all about. Harry Summers said it well today: "You can train for 
what you know about it, but you've got to educate for what you don't 
know about it." I also tell the students, ''You've got to be able to get 
inside the box and outside the box. But if you get outside that box, you'd 
better do it responsibly. Anybody can get outside the box, but you've got 
to do it responsibly." It's like doctrine. You've got to know when to use 
doctrine, and on the future battlefield, you've got to know when to deviate 
from doctrine. This is a thinking- man's game, in which education is 
important. Education - especially the highest levels of education - and 
training are both important. We must do both. 
We talked today about ethics and communication skills. I believe 
that the time has come to mandate, or at least strongly suggest, some 
computer skills for students and faculty in the schoolhouse. This is very 
controversial, but we need to talk about it. 
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Technology ... An "Enabler" to Education 
• Establish student [and faculty] technological 
core competencies 
• Create PME/JPME electronic connectivity 
["network of networks"] 
• Improve "system of systems" education and 
training [learning] 
I Cheney Report, 1997 j 2{ 
\Ii 
The Cheney report was interesting for me because of its emphasis 
on developing technological core competencies, and standards -- yes, I 
use that nasty word that no one in the educational world likes to hear 
mentioned - and it also talked about connectivity, which I will also preach 
about tonight. And, of course, it talked about improving learning on our 




What Is An 
Information Age University (IAU)? 
• The students, staff & faculty leverage IT to enhance 
education, research, & outreach. 
• The IT leverages the human dimension ... enables a 
"learning" institution. 
• The institution is a complete IT-based enterprise. 
• The University and "University system" are intemetted 
& intranetted (electronically connected) and integrated 
~,/ ("core missions" compatible). .h.. 
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Let me switch gears and describe what an information- age 
university might look like. In my opinion, the students, staff, and faculty 
have to be able to leverage information technology to enhance the three 
core missions. But it is a leverage of the human dimension - and it is 
that leveraging which allows us to deepen the educational experience 
and create what I would call a true learning institution. 
Let me be critical of my beloved university and say that we are a 
collection of stovepipes. It's outrageous for me to say that because it 
isn't true, but I always like to stretch a point to make the point. We need 
to find ways to increase collaboration, communication, and the creation 
of knowledge. The whole institution should be an IT-based enterprise, 
like what the business school at my former alma mater is doing. In one 
year, they have taken the institution not just paperless - they said, 
"That's nothing!" -but processless. From the time a student is admitted 
into the business school, it's all a matter of working with the Internet. 
And now they are even digitizing their case studies. Jim [Locher], we 
couldn't even get in the place today. Well, you might. Undoubtedly, you 
have more computer skills than I do. But it's incredible and impressive 
how they've digitized the Harvard Business School. And they're just one 
example of what's going on out there in the digital world right now. 
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The university and the university system - I'm using NDU as an 
example - are both intemeted and intranetted. That means 
electronically connected, outside and inside. And they are integrated -
probably the key word. Gerry Galloway, our great dean at ICAF, uses 
the word integration to say the same thing. It means you can move 
electrons. The faculty can move them from one to another; the students 
can move them from one to another, and the cross collaboration is 
incredible. 
With this kind of intemetting and intranetting, you can do your 
educational mission, your research mission, and your outreach mission, 
not only at your university, but also through links to the Armed Forces 
Staff College, the Information Resource Management College, the 
Institute for National Strategic Studies, and the newly- established 
Center for Hemispheric Studies. And all of those links are seamless! 
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Characteristics of an IAU 
• Students, staff, & faculty are IT competent. .. on the 
desktop, in the classroom & lecture hall, and in the 
simulation "center'' 
• State-of-the-art hardware & software are at hand 
• Institutional IT infrastructure (classroom, lecture 
hall, simulation "center'', campus) is state-of-the-art 
• IT support (training & maintenance) is robust & reliable 
• Academic programs are IT-based, "as appropriate" 
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Everybody is IT competent. To me, that means you've got to have 
some standards that are mandated. And I'm ready to do that. I've stood 
before a lot of war college classes over the last three years and said, 
here's what you need to do right now. And, by the way, this is a 
changing game. You've got to be competent on the desktop, in the 
classroom, in the lecture hall, and in the simulation center. And I'm 
already starting to put "center'' in quotes. 
Down at the Armed Forces Staff College, they are building a 
wonderful simuation facility. I know first-hand what wonderful facilities 
they have up at the Army War College,. Those facilities can do 
marvelous things for experiential learning. Interestingly, at the National 
Defense University, we thought we were never going to have that kind of 
capability. But you know what? We are now renovating both buildings at 
ICAF and National, and whoever did the specs was thinking out into the 
21st Century. They are going to be hard- wired; they'll have fiber; they're 
robust and they will be able to grow. So the simulation center at the 
NDU could very well be just the facilities both those colleges are housed 
in, with a small gaming and simulation center acting as a nerve center for 
all that. 
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The keys are the Internet and a lot of different technology that will 
allow us to use the facilities to deepen the educational experience of our 
students. In the future, we have got to have state- of- the- art 
technology, and training. And a tough lesson that we are all learning in 
the era of constrained resources, is that the IT has got to be robust and 
reliable. If it breaks, if it's never up, your faculty and students lose 
confidence quickly. Your programs should be IT-based as well. 
A great teacher with a blackboard and a piece of chalk can still do 
wonders, but I am slowly coming to the conclusion that five to ten years 
from now a blackboard and a piece of chalk may not get it. Or, at least 
that teacher may be disadvantaged relative to one who knows how to 
use information technology and bring it into the classroom in ways that 
are meaningful and deepen that experience. 
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Characteristics of an IAU 
(cont) 
• Curriculum is a blend of IT-based active learning (seminar), 
passive learning (lecture), and experiential learning 
(exercises, games & simulations) ... "an information age 
pedagogy" ... distinction between education & training is 
blurred .. .leaming is dt: :iired outcome. 
• University is a blend of resident and IT-based non-resident 
programs ... continuing education ... career-long learning 
... provides "learning on demand." 
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I'm coming to the conclusion that our curriculum should be a balance 
between what I call passive learning -- there's always going to be a place for 
the lecture - and active learning. Your war colleges have brought active 
learning - the adult learning methodology, the seminar - to a high state. I don't 
know how many educators I put through the Army War College over the last 
three years, and their eyes watered at what was taking place in the seminar. 
Now, thaf s contrary to much of what I heard this afternoon. And if anybody 
wants to challenge me, I will give you names. The Army War College Board of 
Visitors has former Secretary of Education Lauro Cavezos on it He marveled 
at the educational work that is being done at that senior service colleges. So, I 
don't accept assertions that there is not some good education going on here. 
I've had too many people come through the institutions and say otherwise. 
Plus, your senior service colleges are being accredited by regional accrediting 
associations who know what they're doing, and who say that we are doing a 
good job. 
So, the challenge is not reforming the current system. The current 
challenge is managing change, and figuring out how we take the current system 
and continue to keep it relevant and productive in the future. 
I've already talked about blending resident and IT-based nonresident 
programs to create career- tong learning, continuing education, and learning on 
demand. All of that has got to be part of the vision for any Information Age 
university. But we also have to develop an Information Age pedagogy. And the 
third element of that pedagogy, as has been mentioned a couple of times today, 
is experiential learning. 
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I've come to believe that the seminar system that we have is 
wonderful. I know a generation of students who will tell you so. But the 
next leap in learning is experiential learning -- the use of games and 
simulations and exercises to take that seminar which sits around the 
table and discuss scenarios and design strategies to get us military guys 
out of Bosnia, all in a shared experiential space. We need to get from 
around the table into the simulation center, using the technology that 
senior leaders will use in the future to make decisions, do their work and 
create virtual reality at the strategic level of war -- much like we have 
done in our tactical combat training centers at Twenty- nine Palms, Red 
Flag, Blue Flag, and the National Training Center. The NTC 
methodology is also relevant to teaching what I call the strategic art. 
This information age pedagogy, then, is a combination of passive-
active and experiential learning. Bob Brace, the great dean from the 
Army War College, and I used to debate what the blend is going to be? 
I'm big on experiential learning, so I want to get the students into the 
simulation center and get their hands dirty using theory, practicing, 
applying, etc. Bob, very wisely, has told me a number of times: "It's got 
to be the right blend - not so much passive, lots of active, and sufficient 
experiential learning to get the job done." 
We've had fascinating discussions with many folks on that issue, and 
that's not unexpected. That kind of tension goes on all the time in your 
academic institutions. It's proper. It's creative. It sometimes gets 
emotional, but it's tremendous dialogue for your students, staff and 
faculty. As I share these kinds of ideas with our students in the 
schoolhouse today, they thrive on them. They love them, because they 
know that we are trying to keep PME relevant to both today and 
tomorrow. 
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Characteristics of an IAU 
(cont) 
• University is a "learning organization" ... shared vision .. . 
shared situational awareness ... everyone contributes ... is 
flat, seamless, tailorable, & virtual 
• Students are taught and practiced in the art & science of 
"thinking in the information age" 
What about learning organizations at NDU? Everybody contributes. 
They are flat, seamless, tailorable, and, when necessary, virtual. The next 
best thing to actual hand-to- hand combat experience, for Army soldiers, is 
at the NTC. It is virtual reality. It creates virtual veterans. And we need to 
do the same thing in our schoolhouses. The bottom line needs to be 
students who can be experientially taught and practiced in the art and 
science of thinking in the information age. 
A lot of educators who are up in the step in the American Academy of 
Higher Education think technology will actually change the way we think. I 
believe that instinctively and intuitively. The problem is, I can't articulate to 
you how it's going to change. We are all familiar with Bloom's taxonomy of 
learning and thinking. He did that work in 1956. It's kind of been the 
benchmark for how we think about thinking and learning. Dr. Susan Studds, 
who works in NDU's Academic Affairs Office and is our academic 
conscience, thinks that perhaps the taxonomy in that ladder that Bloom talks 
about in his research may change - that the order or steps up the ladder 
from analysis, to synthesis, to evaluation may change. Others think that 
there may be an even higher step, perhaps discovery, on top of the ladder. 
But most serious educators who are thinking hard about technology, 
education and the future think that it is going to change the way we think. 
While we think linearly and sequentially, our kids are growing up immersed 
in this stuff. Do they think like we do, or in some other, circular or 
simultaneously parallel way? 
SA-34 
r-----------------------------------------
JPME GRADUATES [Faculty] 
Information Technology Competencies? 
• Master the power of the personal computer in creating, 
storing, remotely accessing & manipulating data 
• Master suite of software applications 
• Master the transfer of ideas and information via electronic 
networks 
• Master the power of the World Wide Web 
• Master the capabilities of DoD, Joint, and Service C41 
systems to practice the operational and strategic arts 
Information Technology ... The Strategic Leader's Tool ~ 
Building NDU for the Future • 
We need to be developing these IT core competencies. I tell Army 
War College classes, "I can't mandate these right now because my 
faculty won't let me. But I challenge you, when you leave the Army War 
College, to be able to do this. Because you're going out there into a 
digitized Army, instead of Services." 
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INFORMATION AGE UNNERSITY 
2010 
Footnote: international links ... 
reserve component links ... 
other links 
CONUS - BASED 
JPME NETWORK 
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This is what the system will look like. 
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MERLN 
(Military Education Research Library Network) 
• MECC Library resources on one website. 
• Cooperative MECC Library Working Group product for fast 
easy access: online catalogs, local databases, 
commercial databases, e.g., e-journals 
• Expanded research capability available to each MECC 
school 
• MERLN places MECC in prestigious company: Big 10, 
State of Georgia, Washington Research Library 
Consortium, National Association of Libraries 
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We've already done it with our libraries. And we are in very select 
company -- we are not in the dark ages. We are right up there, in the 
way that the MEC has tied our libraries together - right up there with the 
"Big Ten" schools. And this is just a microcosm of how we need to tie 
the entire system together. It was done by our librarians. We have some 
great libraries and librarians. 
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Changing to an Information Age University ... 
Dimensions in Perspective 
Structural 
Dimension 




(75% of the solution) 
Leaders must be Champions 
BuildingNDUfM~~~e~R~u;m~re;-;;;;;;;;~;;;;;;~~~;;;;;;;;;;;~--.....-
Research done at the National Defense University says that going to 
an Information Age university is tough. And the structural part is only 
about 25 percent of the problem. Seventy- five percent of the problem is 
behavioral. Those of us who are leaders in the community need to be 
champions, because, if we don't champion this, we'll never overcome the 
inertia which every academic institution and organization that has any 
kind of a bureaucracy has to deal with. 
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Resourcing 
• Initial program to establish baseline 
- 5 - 7 years 
- 10-15% of mission budget 
- must include IT support personnel plus faculty 
& staff training 
• IT investment must continue after 
establishing baseline to accomplish long-
term objectives 
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The management of various institutions I have spoken to indicates 
they typically spend 1 O to 15 percent of their operating budget on IT. 
They say that is enough to get their organizations into the information 
age. Tome, that's a reasonable investment percentage to become 
relevant in the information age. But there are very, very few institutions 
in our PME system that are spending that much, because we don't have 
it. We don't want to sacrifice our faculty, and we don't want to sacrifice 
people to make that kind of investment. And so we have a dilemma. 
And we've got to work it. 
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Joint Vision JPMES: Essential Elements 
Joint Professional Military Education System 
• The JPMES provides relevant military education to 
selected officers, civilians, and international fellows ... 
recognized world-over as a "system of excellence." 
• The JPMES is a key component of JV 2010 ... specifies human, 
educational, & technological objectives for JPME. 
• The JPMES is a single, distributed, seamlessly integrated 
architecture for education with electronic connectivity 
betvveen all Service and Joint schools, colleges, and 
universities, active and reserve components, national 
[and international]. 
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(1 of 4) 
This is the first slide of the Joint Vision part. I've just described the 
university, and now I'll try to describe the system. 
I've told my buddy, [Colonel] "Mac" McClain, from J- 7, "Mac, you've 
got to do this work. This is your work. I'm doing your work for you. And 
I think this ought to be codified in the next OPMEP." And Mac looks at 
me and says, "Chilcoat, you're crazy." But I'm serious about this. And 
here's what is probably the key thing: We have got to get JPME into the 
joint vision. It's not there now. If we don't get it in there, JPME will wither 
and die on the vine. 
If we can get JPME into the Joint Vision, the senior leadership will 
then sign up for resourcing and commitment and do what has to be done 
to protect this competitive advantage I've talked about. It's a competitive 
advantage that will only come when the whole PME system is a single, 
distributed, seamlessly integrated architecture for education with 
electronic connectivity. 
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Joint Vision JPMES: Essential Elements 
(cont) 
• The JPMES is expansible to the DOD civilian professional 
development system, the USG lnteragency, and the 
international community. 
• The JPMES fosters educational efficiencies and 
effectiveness by electronically interconnecting 
institutions, libraries, wargaming and simulation centers, 
students, staffs, and faculties ... provides connectivity, 
communication, coordination, cooperation, collaboration, 
and creation ... enables an "information-age pedagogy.k 
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From connectivity, we will get communication, coordination, 
cooperation, collaboration, and creation - that's C- 6. Right now we've 
got C- 3, C- 31, C- 4, and C41; but we'll go all the way to C- 61. This is 
the essence of information age pedagogy. And the system has got to be 
expandable to the DoD Civilian Professional Development System, the 
interagency, and the international community. 
There is a serious question in my mind right now, given the trends at 
work at the National Defense University, whether we are on our way from 
JPME to becoming a defense university to becoming an interagency 
university. That's profound stuff. Somebody raised this possibility late 
this morning. What are the implications of these kind of trends for 
JPME? Is it good? Is it bad? Does it dilute the effectiveness of this 
competitive advantage I argued for? 
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Joint Vision JPMES: Essential Elements 
(cont) 
• The JPMES synchronizes the educational potential of the 
system ... capitalizing on the expertise and diverse 
perspectives of the joint and service schools ... to create 
synergy for the overall system and its individual 
institutions ... establishes a "learning system." 
• The JPMES combines resident and IT-based non-resident 
programs to provide continuing education and career-
long learning opportunities ... "deepens" the educational 
experience. i 
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I have already spoken about this. 
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Joint Vision JPMES: Essential Elements 
(cont) 
• The JPMES continues to codify joint educational policy, 
learning areas, and objectives and perform 
accreditation ... and establishes core technological 
standards for institutions, students, and faculties. 
• The JPMES promotes the joint culture, its ethic and 
values ... while helping to sustain service-specific 
capabilities, cultures, and ethics. 
The system has got to promote the joint culture. Schneider and 
Graves have written about this recently. There is a joint culture out 
there, my friends. And it needs an ethic. But the joint system has got to 
help sustain the service-specific capabilities, cultures and ethics as well. 
So, I'm not one of these guys who's trying to crowd out service schools 
and service-specific education, because we need more jointness. I'm not 
about to do that, my friends. Don't put me in that box. 
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What Did Chilcoat Just Say? 
• Need a more explicit vision for JPME 
• Need to tie it closely to JV 2010 (and service 
visions) 
• Need to resource it, keep it robust, & manage its 
change 
"IT'S ALL ABOUT EDUCATING MASTERS 
OF THE PROFESSION OF ARMS" 
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We need a more explicit vision for JPME, and it needs to be tied 
more closely to JV 2010 and the service visions because, over the next 
ten years, the service visions and the joint vision will become shared. 
This is going to take us a while, but it will be an exciting process 
bringing it together. The most important thing is the need to resource it, 
keep it robust, and manage its change - not radical surgery, but 
managed, deliberate change. It is all about, and I take Jerry's phrase on 
this, educating masters of the profession of arms. 
You have been very patient with me, and attentive. And I thank you. 
I will be delighted to take any questions that anybody has, or comments. 
Believe me, I wish I had all the answers in this business. Kathryn? 
Q. Sir, you talked about the resources of today, and then you talked 
about five to seven years to get to the base line? 
A. Right. And I don't have a clue as to what this would take in terms of 
millions or billions of dollars. But, I've talked to a lot of folks who are 
working this challenge in education, in business, industry, and elsewhere. 
They talk 10 to 15 percent of their operating budgets to achieve this kind 
of change. I think it's affordable. I've worked the numbers at the Army 
War College; you helped work them over the years at the National 
Defense University. And I'm going to be an advocate for ensuring that 
we can resource it. But right now we are seriously not able to do that. 
Rich? 
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Professor Mitch Brown, NPS: You said you aren't sure about the 
general resources needed. My comment will be very simple. Today, 
Admiral Gaffney tallked about the resource investment process. If we 
actually believe that we will be needing JV military degrees in the 21st 
Century, then the alterative to not investing is ludicrous. If we don't, we 
will lose control and lose our money to management process if we don't 
advance the leadership. 
General Chilcoat: Amen, brother. We're not even competing now, in 
my opinion, because we are not yet in the Joint Vision. We're engaged, 
we're getting there, but we need to drive it home. It needs to be in there, 
explicitly -- just like the main operational concepts of precision strike, 
focused logistics, full dimensional protection, and - oh, by the way -
JPME. If you get it in there, then you can begin to compete seriously for 
the resources needed to make it work. 
The admiral said this morning that NPS has a great class out here in 
innovation. How many students have already experienced that class? 
Twelve. You know how many great classes I've seen over the years in 
innovation? About zero. If you have a great class out here in innovation, 
I'd love to be able to export it electronically throughout the JPME system. 
And it should be easy to do it. It should not threaten anything that the 
Naval Postgraduate School does. In fact, it elevates the prestige of the 
school by being able to electronically export that kind of instruction. 
But for us to do that today would be a very awkward concept. The 
video is not quite there yet. Incidentally, in a very short period of time, 
you will be able to create a virtual seminar with digital video in ways that 
we have not even been dreamed of before. We'll be able to have 
correspondence students around the world, doing their work not by using 
U.S. mail, the telephone, and the fax. We'll be able to bring them all 
together, show them a big screen like this - eight or twenty of them - to 
digitally create a seminar, and collaborate on strategy, on operations, 
and on tactics. It's coming. 
As I said, the guys at Sarnoff say it is the next revolution. We've 
been through the mainframe, the PC, and now the web. Toeffler can 
describe it better than I do. The next revolution in information technology 
is digital video, and we should be poised and ready to jump on it in the 
PME world. This conference is a great venue for beginning to do that. 
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HUMAN CAPITAL IN THE 
INNOVATIVE ORGANIZATION 
OF THE FUTURE 
1. THE KNOWLEDGE WORKER OF 
THE FUTURE 
2. THE INNOVATIVE 
ORGANIZATION OF THE FUTURE 
3. DILEMMAS AND ISSUES 
6-4 
© SCHEIN, E. H. JAN. 16, 1998 
Dr. Schein: In trying to figure out what to talk to you about, I had some 
conversations with Ruben Harris. He reminded me that one of the things you're 
trying to work on is a topic all the world is concerned with -- it's not just a military 
issue for the military. And it boils down to the three topics shown on this slide. 
Hopefully I'll have an opportunity to have you raise some questions, because 
none of what I am going to say is "cut and dried". I'm not going to lead you 
through 16 points, and present an answer. I'm going to speculate a bit about 
what we really mean when we talk about the "professionalization" of an 
organization of the services. 
What does it mean when we say, "In the future it's all going to be about the 
knowledge worker." I'm going to talk a little bit about some of the characteristics I 
see in this person called the "knowledge worker." A question immediately arises, 
"If the environment is changing very rapidly, aren't organizations going to have to 
be learning organizations?" They're going to have to innovate. So I want to spend 
the bulk of my time talking about what that really means. 
If we imagine an organization having a culture that would really be benign 
to this knowledge worker of the future, what would that culture look like? And then, 
finally, if we put these issues together, what are some of the real dilemmas and 
questions that arise around that topic? 
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WHAT WILL THE KNOWLEDGE WORKER 
OF THE FUTURE BE LIKE? 
--LESS RESPONSIVE TO FORMAL 
AUTHORITY, MORE RESPONSIVE TO THE 
AUTHORITY OF KNOWLEDGE AND SKILL 
--MORE CONCERNED ABOUT SELF AND 
TOTAL LIFE STYLE THAN SPECIFIC 
CAREER ISSUES 
--LIKELY TO BE INVOLVED IN A DUAL 
CAREER SITUATION, HENCE LESS 
MOBILE GEOGRAPHIC \LL Y 
--MORE MOTIVATED BY PROJECT AND 
JOB CHALLENGE THAN ORGANIZATION; 
LESS LOYAL TO ORGANIZATION 
--MORE MOTIVATED BY CONTINUOUS 
GROWTH AND LEARNING 
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Dr Schein: Let me start with the knowledge worker of the future. What are those 
folks like? This is, of course, speculation. None of us knows exactly where the 
world is headed, but it seems to me there are some characteristics of this 
knowledge worker of the future that are already visible; and it seems to me, if 
anything, they're going to be more characteristic than ever. They're going to be 
much less responsive to formal authority, and much more responsive to the 
authority of knowledge. 
When you think about someone who's very highly trained in a particular field, 
if their boss comes from another field, the fact is that the boss doesn't count for very 
much relative to a colleague whom they feel knows even more than they do. The 
way you see this is that, usually in academic departments, deans are viewed as a 
step down on the hierarchy rather than a step up. And if you're a senior 
professional in one of those departments, being a department chairman or being 
the dean is viewed often by such professionals as a sign that they have now failed 
as an academic, and they have to move over into administration. 
I think we have to take that tendency seriously. I'm being a little facetious 
about it, but I happened to grow up in an academic environment. My father was a 
physicist. This all happened at the University of Chicago at the time when there 
was this very powerful group of physicists who were creating chain reactions, and 
so on. And what I remember about this issue is the debate they would have about 
whose turn is it in the barrel to be the department chairman. It was clearly the less 
desirable job, to be in the position of authority. 
And I think that notion - that once you train someone to be an autonomous 
professional, they then automatically lose respect for formal hierarchy - is 
something that's going to be one of the major issues that we're going to have to 
deal with. How is that going to resolve itself in the future? 
I think we see all kinds of evidence - especially in our younger generations 
- that professionalization, more education, and today's social norms create people 
that are generally more concerned about themselves and their own lifestyles. In 
many industrial organizations, the concept of organizational loyalty is dead. Loyalty 
is no longer even expected. You're loyal to your field. You're loyal to the project. 
You're loyal to the particular thing you're doing, but if the company gives you an 
assignment that doesn't challeng you, it's "Goodbye, see you tomorrow. I'll go to 
some other organization where I can be challenged, and where I can really use my 
talents. 11 If this is really true, you can imagine what kind of problem this poses for 
a military organization that more or less depends on loyalty and commitment. 
I think one of the other characteristics, it's very clear, is that we are entering 
an age of dual careers. It's no longer possible to manage a professional person 
individually. You can't say, "Okay, you're next job is here," because the question 
immediately comes up, 'Well, what about my spouse?" If we can't move together, 
and if we can't both have jobs in this new area you want me to work in, then I won't 
go. 11 This is one of the reasons why organizational loyalty is not what it used to be. 
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I think that people are much more challenged today by the actual work they 
do than by a greater sense of mission or where their job fits within the bigger 
picture. I think the more we professionalize people and make them autonomous 
experts, the more we will find that their motivation is the use of their skill, and the 
increased knowledge that they get from using their skill. 
Saying, 'Well, we're going to professionalize the organization," and I hear 
this not only in the military; I hear this from lots and lots of companies, I think we 
have to ask what we are really buying into? Is this is really what we want? What 
kind of culture will we have to have in order to make professionalization possible? 
What effect will it have on our infrastructure? 
In the spirit of creating dialogue, let me ask if this make sense to any of you? 
Do you see this happening? And what, if any, questions does it raise for you? 
Unidentified: The one thing I don't see you addressing here is teamwork. One 
of the things that distinguishes the armed services from other organizations is the 
intensity of its teamwork. People do feel rewarded, even in corporate business, by 
being part of a team - part of something larger than themselves - and by realizing 
their own goals within the team. I don't think that's been completely vitiated by the 
trend you're talking about. That motivator is still very strong in the Services. It can 
be capitalized on to ameliorate some of the negative trends you're talking about. 
Dr. Schein: That's a great comment, and it reminds me of an experience I had 
some years ago when I was a human resource consultant for the Apple 
Corporation. One of the things Apple was very proud of was that they did not 
expect employees to be loyal to them. Similarly, they did not expect to be loyal to 
their employees. In other words, "If you're obsolete, out you go." 
The question then arose, 'Well, then how did they get going on any kind of 
coordinated effort?" They said that the loyalty and commitment to the project team 
was unquestioned, but they noted that the day the project ended, they dispersed 
and went off on their own way. In a way, this is paradoxical. The same people who 
are disloyal, in a sense, to an organization's larger mission, can get extremely 
committed to a project that requires a lot of teamwork. 
I've often thought about this. The organization of the future is going to have 
to be much more thoughtful about how it organizes its work and its tasks, and not 
expect people to be loyal to vague generalizations, but only to particular missions, 
particular projects, and particular things that they really care about. It's obvious to 
the professional that, unless we're a team, it's not going to work out. I think they 
have to see the logic. 
Lots of companies today are saying that teamwork is expected. But then, as 
one person said, "I wonder what kind of team we are." The word team," of course, 
can mean many things. This person figured out that they were a track team. Now, 
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think about what a track team is. A track team is a whole bunch of individual 
contributors adding up points, unless you're part of the relay team. Now, in the 
relay team, those four people really have to work together. But you can have a 
world-class shot putter and a couple of good runners, and the total points have to 
add up, but they are not necessarily interdependent. So they don't have to be a 
team at every level. 
RADM Marflak: Yesterday one of our speakers mentioned the fundamental 
doctrine of the Constitution of the United States, and said we had to provide for the 
common defense. Nowhere in there did he cite that we only had to provide when 
we felt motivated or challenged by the project. The continuity of mission is one of 
the distinguishing characteristics of a military organization. I would note that most 
of the ships and aircraft that we work with - when you're done with the project, you 
don't really have the option of leaving to go back. 
So maintaining that motivation, maintaining that continuity of mission, I think, 
is one of the distinguishing characteristics of the military organization. One of the 
challenges we face, I believe, is how we motivate people continuously, given the 
fact that that mission is liable to endure for considerable periods of time longer than 
their personal interest might otherwise dictate. 
Dr. Schein: It's an interesting issue. I am reminded of an experience with the 
Navy. For a number of years, MIT had a contract with the Naval War College. We 
were teaching a three week management course to captains who were newly 
promoted to admiral. Many of them were on their way to the Pentagon. During the 
evening dialogue, when people sort of let their hair down a little bit, we observed 
quite a bit of depression about the fact that they were moving from something that 
had real project focus - a base, a ship, a particular thing - to the bottom of a vague 
hierarchy that certainly had a mission, but their own role in it and what kind of team · 
player they would have to be, was suddenly very, very ambiguous. 
So I guess the issue is, if we talk about attachment to mission or project or 
whatever, for people to be motivated by it, there has to be a degree of specificity 
that allows them to link what they think they're good at with what the goal is. I think 
we're often a little vague about that. 
You get CEOs of companies saying -you know, we issue a slogan. It is 
printed on little 3x5 cards and everybody is given a card that says, ''These are our 
company values." Then you talk to the employees, and they say, "Oh, yeah, I've 
got the card someplace." It has no meaning to them because it's disconnected from 
whatever they see their own particular skills to be. 
So, if we take project mission as a larger concept, I think the question is, 
"Can we connect people's subjective sense of their career to the bigger whatever 
it is, and produce team players?" 
I want to make a remark about the U.S. culture in this regard. I've been 
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. struck by the fact that, ultimately, the U.S. culture is extraordinarily individualistic. 
That is the way the Constitution is written, the Bill of Rights, our legal system. It's 
all about, ultimately, protecting the individual. And so you ask yourself, "In an 
individualistic society, how do you create good teams? How do you get team'INOrk?" 
My answer is that you have to appeal to a higher, overarching value. In the U.S. 
culture, it is pragmatism. Above all else, we want to get the job done. If, in order 
to get the job done, one has to be part of a team, people will be part of a team. 
But it's not, as in some Asian cultures, an intrinsic motive for Americans to 
want to be a part of something. It's rather a particular necessity. If, in order to win 
the basketball game, hockey game or relay race, we have to be superb team 
players, we'll do that. But the deep motivation is to win; to get the job done. 
And so that's also something we also have to recognize - that the project, 
the mission, has to draw on that personal desire to get the job done; to win, to do 
it better than somebody else. We can't just expect that announcing a need for 
teamwork is going to produce an intensive level of motivation. 
Let me go on. Now, if this is a picture of the kind of individual that we think 
is going to be more characteristic of our future organizations, what would an 
organizational culture have to look like to support this kind of person and the kind 




CHARACTERISTICS OF INNOVATIVE CUL TURES 
1. PRO-ACTIVE OPTIMISM 
ONE CAN MANAGE ONE'S ENVIRONMENT AND FUTURE; 
LEARNING AND CHANGE ARE DESIRABLE 
2. COMMITMENT TO ALL STAKEHOLDERS 
OWNERS, CUSTOMERS, EMPLOYEES, SUPPLIERS, 
COMMUNITY, ETC. ARE EQUALLY IMPORTANT 
3. THEORY Y ATTITUDES IN LEADERS 
PEOPLE ARE CAPABLE AND WILLING TO WORK TOWARD 
ORGANIZATIONAL GOALS AND CONTROL THEMSELVES 
4. ORGANIZATIONAL SLACK 
SOME EXCESS RESOURCES ARE DESIRABLE FOR 
CREATIVITY AND INNOVATION TO OCCUR 
5. KNOWLEDGE AUTHORITY 
POWER AND INFLUENCE DERIVES FROM KNOWLEDGE AND 
SKILL, NOT FROM POSITION OR PERSONALITY 
6. TASK ORIENTATION 
FOCUS ON THE TASK NOTSTATUS OR POSITION 
7. BUILDING AND MAINTENANCE OF TRUSTING RELATIONS~HPS 
WORKING ON TASKS AND BUILDING RELATIONSHIPS ARE 
EQUALLY IMPORTANT FOR THE LONG RUN 
8. OPEN COMMUNICATION IN A FULLY CONNECTED NETWORK 
TASK RELEVANT INFORMATION MUST FLOW FREELY 
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DIVERSITY 
VARIETY AND DIVERSITY IN PEOPLE AND GROUPS IS 
NECESSARY AS A SOURCE OF INNOVATION 
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There are nine primary characteristics of what I think of as an innovative 
culture. Before I start, have some fun and rate your own Service organizations on 
a 10-point scale for each of these nine primary characteristics. 
First, it seems to me that one of the characteristics of the kind of supportive 
culture we're talking about has to be what I call "proactive optimism." You have to 
believe that you can manage your future environment, and that learning changes 
are intrinsically desirable. In most U.S. organizations, people say, "Yeah, well 
what's the deal? We, of course, think this way." But not all organizations, not all 
cultures, automatically assume that learning and change and innovation and 
improvement are a good thing, as we, of course, routinely do. 
Second -- and this is more in reference to industrial organizations - there 
has to be a feeling that all the "stakeholders" in a company matter, not just the 
owners or stockholders, but other entities as well. The results of a number of 
research projects suggest that really great companies that have survived for a long 
time have never taken the position that the only people who count are the owners 
or stockholders. Successful companies take the position that they should be just 
as concerned about customers, employees, suppliers, and the surrounding 
community. Somehow, the needs of all those "stakeholders" must be integrated, 
or the company will become too biased in one direction. 
I can't figure out how this would play out in a military organization. Who are 
your stakeholders? But, I would think the logic would be the same - that if you 
don't worry about all the human constituencies that are the stakeholders, you're 
going to end up with a culture that will be inimical to some of them, and that will 
undermine your ability to be innovative. 
Third, an innovative organization must fundamentally believe in people, and 
nurture what McGregor called Theory Y leaders. Innovation comes from the 
individual creativity of people. The theory X leader, who thinks people are 
fundamentally lazy and have to be controlled and motivated, inevitably produces 
organizations that are obsessed with control. They install time clocks and assume 
that if you're not watching workers all the time, they're not going to do the right 
thing, or not going to tell you the truth. 
I think, based on my experience with teaching in the military - particularly 
in programs like these at Newport and getting to know these admirals - that the 
military training system weeds out the Theory X people very early in their careers. 
They're the ones that, as the joke goes, get shot in the back as they lead their 
troops forward. They're the one's unable to motivate the people below them, so 
they don't make it through early rounds of leadership training. 
So, in fact, by the very nature of the military, I think most of the senior 
officers I met tend to be Theory Y people. I don't believe that, after the captain of 
a ship asks the radar operator what he sees on the scope, he runs over and double 
checks whether the radar operator is telling him the truth. This might happen in an 
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industrial context - where there's so much mistrust between the boss and the 
subordinate that the boss would actually want to check for himself. It seems to me 
the military, par excellence, is an organization in which you have to trust people. 
Therefore, leaders who are unable to trust get weeded out early. 
Dean Miller, USNA: I'm one of those "failures" you called a dean. My own 
perception, when I was wearing the uniform, was that the federal government 
certainly - and maybe even the Department of Defense - is a Theory X 
organization, and the challenge is being a Theory Y leader in a Theory X 
organization. 
Dr. Eoyang: Just a follow-up comment. Research done at the senior service 
colleges indicates we have a lot of Theory X leaders still around, and particularly 
at the higher levels. We are concerned about that, because they do get in the way 
of a learning organization. 
Dr. Schein: You know the data much better than I. But there's one qualification 
that I think is important, and that is not to confuse the Theory X leader with an 
autocratic leader. In the industrial literature, somehow McGregor's basic point that 
a set of inner attitudes correlates with leadership style got missed somewhere. So 
whenever we see an autocrat in a very tightly structured disciplinary organization, 
we say, "Ah, Theory X." The point I want to make is, and that McGregor made, is 
that the style, whether you're autocratic or participative or involve your people and 
so on, is more driven by the actual task to be performed. And that the Theory X 
person would naturally want to be autocratic and mistrusting, but they're lots of 
Theory Y managers who are also autocratic because the task requires it. But they 
nevertheless trust people and trust their particular information that's coming up to 
them. So, let's at least make that discrimination. 
Dr. Kohn, UNC Faculty: I would comment that the organizational structures, it 
seems to me, of ground forces historically are based on Theory X because you are 
instructing an organization and setting up a series of human interactions designed 
to get individuals to expose themselves to death and maiming. That is really a 
problem for Theory Y leadership in most situations. 
Dr. Schein: Again, I think maybe you should elaborate the comment. What you 
described was a situation that requires high discipline and high autocracy. But, 
would that platoon leader fundamentally mistrust his sergeant? Because that's 
where the issue is. Not whether they're autocratic or not, but will they trust each 
other? 
Unidentified: I think the issue of trust can be built in. I'm not a sociologist or a 
psychologist, but I have been thinking about this for a number of years. It seems 
to me that the organization assumes at its core the kind of structure and procedures 
that you have to have to counteract the natural human inclination either to succumb 
to an emotion, to fear, or to self-preservation. And so there is an inherent tension. 
Military organizations since ancient times have tried to balance those kinds of 
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conflicting motivations. Technical formations, for example, in ground forces are not 
just the products of technology. They are the product of the desire to keep human 
beings from breaking and running in battle 
Dr. Eoyang: I think the vast majority of literature, of both military sociology and 
military psychology, says that unit cohesion is the number-one factor that 
determines teamwork, and that affects combat effectiveness and survival. Loyalty 
to one's colleagues and teammates, and protecting each other, have more influence 
over combat behavior than authoritative rules and procedures. 
Unidentified: I agree with you about the sociological and psychological literature, 
particularly of the last 30 years. But there is some recent historical literature that 
raises the possibility that there have been varying influences in particular times and 
places; that unit cohesion is not a universal over time. 
Dr. Schein: I think it's a good debate. I agree with Carson (Eoyang) that the 
evidence that I see, both in industry and in the military, would suggest, as before, 
that it's the project, it's the work team, it's your buddy that are the most powerful 
sources of motivation. That's not the only theory of Theory Y. There's a more 
fundamental theory about Theory Y that, I think McGregor tried to get at. And that 
is whether I can trust the information or not. 
I gave you the example of the captain of the ship and the radar operator 
because it is difficult to imagine a military organization in this high-technology age 
working if you mistrusted every piece of information that came from an enlisted man 
who's manning a particular station because, fundamentally, you didn't believe that 
he was motivated to his job? 
It's at that level where Theory X really hurts. It is intolerable for 
organizations to have managers who, deep down, believe that their subordinates 
are out to screw them, that they're going to lie to them or give them misinformation 
in order to make their own job easier. That is the kind of leader who would be 
rapidly weeded out because, I think, his operation would fall apart quickly. 
Technical efficiency requires absolute trust in each other's information. You 
cannot simply check it off. 
VADM Blair, Director, JCS: I think we have a particular problem in the Navy 
because so much of our business is done with expensive, complicated pieces of 
equipment. That requires confidence that the maintenance and operating 
procedures are being done correctly. Whatever the attitudes of your leaders are, 
we have built a by and large Theory X system to keep our equipment up. 
The extreme is the control of nuclear weapons. We don't give people 
general guidance. We don't say, "Use your initiative and your ability. And if you 
tell me that that's the number of weapons you have, and that's their state, that's 
fine. I'll go about my business." We have double checks, triple checks. We have 
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things like two-man control systems, which are specifically built on not trusting one 
person. And, although that's the extreme case, we have an entire equipment 
maintenance system called PMS which is built on checks, double checks and 
sampling systems. The system is built around making sure that people have done 
what they were supposed to do :-- by checking on them at various frequencies. 
My experience is that most of us think of that as basis for operations. And, 
using a variant on your example, I think what you say is true. When the chips are 
down and the sonar man says you have a contact out there, you don't go in and 
pretend that you can read his waterfall diagram better than he can. He's been 
doing it for 20 years. You act on his information. 
But in the Navy, in particular, because of the consequences of a person at 
a very low level failing to check the oil level or do the maintenance on these 
complex machines we operate - that one guy who didn't respond to Theory Y 
leadership - we pay lots of money and devote lots of manpower to fix what went 
wrong. So, a lot of people are captured by that system. They think they can run 
whole organizations the way you maintain pieces of machinery. 
I think we've always had to balance this in the Navy, and this is also true in 
the other services. As Dick Chilcoat was saying, it's still a mixed picture. 
Dr. Schein: It's a mixed picture, but it's also an integrated picture, I think. If your 
relationship with that employee is a Theory Y relationship, that person is connected 
to the project and to the mission and is committed to doing the job. That same 
person, I think, will understand why they have to go through the checklist and why 
they have to go through the extra steps. 
I think in an effective airline, for example, the captain who knows he has to 
go through those 20 steps before he can take off doesn't resent going through them 
every time. He doesn't say, "Hey, I wish I could drop this stuff and just fly the 
airplane." If the relationship is a Theory Y relationship, that captain would 
understand that he shouldn't entirely trust his memory. He shouldn't entirely trust 
himself. 
And, therefore, some of the arbitrary impositions of discipline that are put on 
professionals can be acceptable to them as part of the job. And that's the 
relationship I think we have to look for. In no way can we dispense with the 
hierarchy and with discipline and with tight, formal procedures in a more 
technologically complex world. 
I think the issue is how to get professionals who do have some sense of their 
autonomy to see the rationale behind some disciplinary, autocratic, and arbitrary 
appearing checklist procedures that are imposed on them? We have to invent ways 
to do that. So I don't see it as an "either-or'' problem - that either we turn people 
loose and let them think for themselves, or we keep very tight control on them. It 
is, rather, how do we take these new people, who we want to be empowered, and 
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get them to accept the rationality of control systems that are imposed on them 
because of the great expense associated with a single mistake? 
Fourth, an innovative organization must have some "organizational slack". 
If you're so tightly structured that there's no excess time, there is going to be no 
room for innovation. Innovation requires a certain amount of excess capacity -
opportunities in terms of time and resources to work on them. 
Fifth, an innovative organization must have "knowledge based authority". 
We have already talked about that. · 
Sixth is task orientation. An organization that isn't demonstrably concerned 
about what it's doing stifles innovation. 
Seventh is trusting relationships. If you do not have trusting relationships, 
innovation will be undermined because creative thinking and new ideas are 
produced by interaction between people. If you can't calibrate who your fellow 
professionals are, if you don't trust them, if you're in a competitive relationship with 
them, it's guaranteed that you're going to undermine each other's ideas instead of 
building on them and, therefore, in the end will be a less innovative culture. 
Eighth is open communications in a fully connected network. You know, 
some of the great innovations of the last 20 years vvere produced after companies 
determined that they could create an engineering network where every engineer is 
connected to every other engineer worldwide. Companies used that network to 
share and solve each other's problems - to have, in a sense, the equivalent of the 
informal seminar on a worldwide basis. There's enormous evidence that the real 
learning of how to do something better, comes not from formal education, but from 
sharing with colleagues who are working in similar areas some of the know-how that 
they develop on the job. 
Finally, I think the companies that are beginning to really think hard about 
this learning organization issue are finding that they have to deliberately create 
diversity, not only at the individual competence level, but at vvhat you might call the 
subcultural level. An organization which has different units that are good at doing 
different things, and whose units have developed different sets of cultural norms 
and skills, is able, as the environment shifts and the need for new cultures is 
identified, to draw talent from these units to build the required cultures. 
For example, though this didn't happen inside the Navy, one could argue 
that one of the ways the nation's nuclear industry ·grew was that it drew from the 
strong nuclear base within the U.S. Navy. A very large number of the senior 
managers in U.S. nuclear companies come from the Navy's nuclear force. A 
subculture had built up a set of skills that, vvhen society needed them in another 
arena, was able to draw on it's own subculture for the talent needed. That goes on 
within organizations all the time, and, therefore, if you want innovation, you have 
to maintain a certain amount of diversity. 
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DILEMMAS AND ISSUES 
--THE CONTINUING BUT CHANGING ROLE 
OF HIERARCHY 
--GOAL AUTONOMY VS. PROCESS 
AUTONOMY 
--CONFLICT RESOLUTION MECHANISMS 
AMONG KNOWLEDGE WORKERS: WHAT 
IS THE COURT OF LAST APPEALS IN THE 
KNOWLEDGE BASED SOCIETY? 
--HIGH RATES OF TURNOVER AND 
DIFFICULTY IN BUILDING STABLE 
KNOWLEDGE BASE 
--BUILDING "FUNCTIONAL FAMILIARITY;" 
COMMUNICATION SYSTEMS AND TASKS 
THAT ALLOW MUTUAL CALIBRATION 
--THE ROLE OF SIMULATION 
--THE ROLE OF PRACTICE FIELDS 
--THE ROLE OF DIALOGUE; 
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I will now discuss dilemmas and issues. The requirement for hierarchy will 
not go away because hierarchy is still needed for coordination. You've given 
several examples of why discipline, hierarchy, and autocracy are relevant to certain 
kinds of task performance. However, I think the nature of hierarchy will inevitably 
change, and perhaps become more limited. 
We have hierarchies in universities, and they work perfectly well because 
the deans and the presidents and the provosts and the department chairmen know 
the limitations of their power are and don't attempt to interfere in areas where the 
faculty feels their power is. So, on career issues, promotions, and so on, the 
hierarchy functions very well. But if the dean tries to tell Professor X what he 
should be working on, he's likely to have a fight on his hands. So, the hierarchy 
doesn't disappear with knowledge based workers. It becomes redefined as to VI/hat 
its function is so it doesn't interfere with the professional function of the professional 
employees that you've got in the organization. We might want to discuss that a little 
bit. 
On this issue of goal versus process autonomy for the knowledge worker of 
the future, I believe we think we have to e~power them in setting their own goals. 
This is a mistake. Professionals want to align themselves with projects, with 
missions, with things that have a bigger meaning that allow them to self-enlarge. 
What they resent is having their process autonomy taken away from them. 
Research was done that showed that the scientists at Bell Labs didn't mind 
being told that they should be working on a particular line that was important to the 
telephone industry. What they resented was every other week some controller 
coming around and looking at their budget. What they would have liked is freedom 
on how they do their job. There's a real issue there. 
One of my biggest issues and dilemmas - and I think the military may be 
ahead of others on this - is how to resolve conflict among the experts and 
knowledge workers. If they disagree, VI/hat is the court of last appeals for resolving ~ 
the issue, particularly under the time pressure inherent in military operations? I 
don't know the answer to that. But the key may be that to build a team out of a set 
of autonomous experts, you have to help them to become "functionally familiar" with 
each other. That is, they have to be able to calibrate each other's styles and know 
how they work. 
I've had the experience of working with fellow faculty on designing 
workshops, and so on. If I don't know how the other person thinks, we get into 
fights about what we should do. If we work together for a length of time, participate 
in simulations together, have dialogues - I become functionally familiar to him, and 
visa versa. If that person says, "I can have it ready by tomorrow," I know whether 
that really means tomorrow, or "day after tomorrow," or whether that means he's not 
going to do it at all. That kind of "insider knowledge" is crucial to building effective 
teams among experts and getting conflicts resolved amongst them. 
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The single biggest problem that I foresee for you, it's that, as you 
successfully professionalize the military and have more and more knowledge 
workers out there, there's greater and greater potential for disagreement among 
them about what you should do next. The traditional hierarchy will begin to break 
do\IVl'l. Having someone whom knowledge workers don't respect say, "Okay, gang, 
I've listened to you, and here's what we're going to do" - which, I presume, is the 
traditional way you've done it - is not going to be a satisfactory answer. 
The boss will be no more expert than the two experts who are disagreeing. 
Therefore, the boss won't necessarily make a good decision. Instead, I think, 
there's going to be much need to develop reflective dialogue skills -practice fields 
where people get familiar with each other so that, under time pressure, people who 
disagree know each other well enough that they will be able to find a resolution in 
the time allotted. 
I think that's a big challenge, and that's the point I want to leave you with. 
The picture is to address these infrastructure issues so that functional familiarity is 
built between the professions. Thank you. 
Dr. Eoyang: Now, in the spirit of dialogue, I'd like to use the remaining time in the 
session to promote dialogue not only between the audience and Professor Schein, 
but also within the audience. I'll have the prerogative o the discussant to raise the 
first question with Ed, and then invite comments from the audience. 
Ed, in your last slide, you lay out a number of characteristics of what 
innovative organizations should look like and what they should do. Yesterday, we 
spent most of the time talking about PME in terms of educating and training 
individuals. Would training individuals in some of these processes be sufficient to 
bring about the institutionalization of these practices on an organizational level? 
Dr. Schein: What I see companies doing more and more is unit training, unit 
simulations, maneuvers that are done by groups, so that the teamwork and the 
functional familiarity gets built during the training period itself. My suspicion is that 
the military has been doing this much longer than companies have, by the way. In 
a lot of these areas, I think the military is way ahead. I seem to remember that, 
twenty years ago, there was already a movement to exercise platoons and 
squadrons as units, rather than bringing together a bunch of individually trained 
people. And, I think that's definitely the direction that these things have to go. 
As you define projects and missions, you decide who the key players are, 
who are going to have to work together, which experts are going to have to be 
functionally familiar with each other. You provide lots of opportunities for them to 
have dialogue, joint training sessions and simulations, so that that familiarity gets 
built up to a sufficient degree that they really calibrate each other under more tense 
conditions. 
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We're going to have to invent group and even organizational-level education 
and training activities. 
LCDR Perkins, NPS Student: First of all, let me say this is an extraordinary 
conference. I would gladly spend a third year here to edit the conference 
proceedings, if Vice Admiral Oliver would allow me. 
It's also nice to be able to talk to leaders like General Chilcoat, Admiral 
Meyer, Mr. Snider, and the other folks I've encountered so far. I have a comment 
about yesterday's proceedings, and it's based on generational issues. 
A large part of what I saw yesterday was generational thinking - the thinking 
of the post-Vietnam generation. I can say this because I was born in 1963. I'm 
included in a mixed generation, between the X Generation knowledge folks we just 
talked about and the Baby Boomer/post-Vietman generation of officers. I don't want 
to say I'm fluent in either one of them, but I can certainly point to familiars. What 
I saw yesterday was a generation that was -- I don't want to say ignorant - but not 
very much worried about civil-military relations. I saw a generation that 
demonstrated concern about the operational and tactical level of war, but let the 
politicians worry about the strategic level of war. What I saw was a generation that 
worried about technology in everyday life. 
What I didn't see, though, was substantial talk about the Generation X and 
the knowledge based workers that will enter our service and war colleges in the 
next five to ten years. The Generation Xers tend to be much closer to civilian life. 
The main difference between when I got into the Navy eleven years ago and now 
is, eleven years ago, when an officer was about ready to leave the service, that's 
when he started thinking about what he wanted to do after the service. 
When an officer comes in now, within two or three years, as an ensign or 
first lieutenant, he is already thinking about what classes he needs to take at NPS 
or other colleges, and what jobs he needs, to get out at 20 years and get a good 
job. He's less worried about command and more worried about what he's going to 
do after it. Officers now are less than officers used to be - I shouldn't say that -
It's just that a naval career now is more a job than a way of life. 
The Generation Xers are more comfortable with technology. So you can 
imagine that, when Generation Xer pops into General Chilcoat's classroom, it will 
be like a technology Romper Room. But the problem with the Generation Xers is 
they do not have the patience to think critically, think in conceptual terms, think in 
temporal terms, and to be able to think strategically and forward. And, just from 
your background, I'd like your comments and see if you have any insights along 
those same lines. Thanks. 
Dr. Schein: You know, the thing that strikes me most is that society has really 
changed in a very fundamental way in the last ten to twenty years, around the whole 
concept of career and the psychological contract between organizations and 
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individuals. It used to be that the concept of lifetime employment meant something. 
In the military, it couldn't be taken for granted. In a lot of organizations, it was taken 
for granted. If you look at the pattern of layoffs that has occurred 'M>rldwide over the 
last twenty years, that contract clearly has been broken all over the place. 
It is no longer possible for a person to grow up today - and I see this in my 
kids - believing that it's possible to count on a career without tremendous amounts 
of self-reliance, self-management, and worry about how you are going to take care 
of yourself in a 'M>rld that you can no longer trust. I expect that influences thinking 
about the military as much as it influences thinking about individual corporations. 
People are learning how to be more self-reliant. That's why there's no longer 
loyalty to organization - only to projects and, on occasion, missions. 
That means that the attraction of a career, whether it be military or industrial, 
really has to be built on whether it can enable that person to fulfill their personal 
needs. I don't think we can count on vague overarching notions of security or 
lifetime employment any more. That plays into the same point that you're raising. 
At the same time, because of the technological skills that people have, they are 
more capable of taking care of themselves. They're not as dependent upon others 
as they used to be. 
On the notion of organizational hierarchy, one very quick story showed me 
how stereotypical my thinking was. My daughter-in-law, who works in a managerial 
position for a high-tech company in Silicon Valley, was going to have her first baby. 
She was promoted approximately six months before the baby was due, and she was 
going to take maternity leave. She had built up a marketing team in her company. 
I got very curious about how she was going to manage as a manager, suddenly 
having a baby and taking all this time off. Would she assign a temporary manager 
or would she step down? What would she do? In due course, she had her baby 
and went on leave. We were talking at some point after that and I asked her, "By 
the way, what did you do about your team and its management?" Her answer 
absolutely floored me. "Nothing," she replied. 
She did not, apparently, even consider that just because she was the 
manager and had authority, that she must do something about her lack of on the job 
presence - either replace herself or assign somebody else. She said, ''The team 
can take care of itself. They all know what the reality is. They know I'm at home 
and can call me up." 
But this notion that you don't have to do anything about authority is a new 
attitude, isn't it? We sort of almost take it for granted that you've got to do 
something to fill a management void. Well, I expect that the new generations have 
many non-traditional attitudes that may surprise us about how they see work getting 
done, about how much they trust each other, and about how much they count on 
intrinsic motivations to get the job done. They have faith that people will exercise 
good judgment; that they will do what needs to be done even if we don't formally 
impose authority on them. Again, if the task requires it, of course, we impose formal 
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authority. But it's no longer the stereotypically correct, "only way" to coordinate 
things. Professionals cannot coordinate in a lateral way if they aren't functionally 
familiar with each other. 
So, again, I want to close with this important notion. We have to give these 
knowledge workers time to get to know each other, to calibrate each other, to learn 
to trust each other. Once that has happened, we can then leave them alone much 
more. If that hasn't happened, then they're just going to fight. 
Dr. Melich, NPS Faculty: I was wondering if you have any quantitative information 
about how much organizational slack you need to accomplish this level of 
integration -- to instill confidence amongst coworkers? It seems to me that one of 
the discussions that has been going on about JPME is that people need to have 
time together to build these relationships. It sounds very much like your "functional 
familiarity." 
Dr. Schein: Quantitative? Well, one could look at things like how much overhead 
3M, a company that is known for its innovation, devotes to research and 
development, to time off, and so. on. My hunch is it has more to do less about 
quantity and more with the strength of the organization's commitment to bring 
people together. 
I'm very struck by what I heard from General Scales, about the after-action 
reviews that have been developed in the Army, where you create, hopefully, a 
quality dialogue among various hierarchical and technical levels after an event, a 
set of maneuvers, or a simulation. That might be organically the best way to do it. 
Then you don't even have to define that as organizational slack. It simply becomes 
part of the learning process that you do, something you build in time for afterwards 
-- to create a set of dialogues where you really analyze what happened. And, of 
course, it's in that process of dialogue that people become functionally familiar with 
each other. 
Again, I think it's not so much a matter of time or quantity, as inventing ways 
of creating this kind of dialogue and creative time, preferably, around real tasks. In 
other words, just getting a bunch of professionals together and saying, "Let's have 
a dialogue" may not mean anything to them. But, let's have a simulation, or let's do 
something important together, and then have a dialogue about how we did. That 
may mean a great deal. 
Dr. Eoyang: In the Baldridge quality competitions, the most outstanding American 
corporations will invest anywhere from four to ten percent of payroll on training and 
human capital development for their entire work force. The Volcker Commission, 
in its recommendations for reforming the Federal Civil Service, recommended that 
two percent of payroll would not be an unreasonable investment in human capital. 
On average, across the federal government, we spend about 1.5 percent of payroll 
on training and development - not specifically on education, but on the whole 
range of training involvement activity. 
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As we're all aware, in periods of great budget austerity, training and 
education accounts are often the first to be cannibalized in the face of operational 
priorities, facilities, and hardware acquisition. And I think for an organization to 
make a serious commitment to growing human capital, they must protect their 
investment in training accounts, and not allow either the comptrollers, the 
budgeteers, or even Congress, to cut back on long-term investments in human 
capital. Those investments need to be stable, they need to be made explicit, and 
they need to be made wisely. 
Dean Brace, Anny War College: Sir, I've been a great fan of yours for over the 
thirty years of my career, and you haven't let me down today. I'd just like to make 
a few comments, if I could, about your presentation. 
It's with some trepidation that I make my comments, because I will put the 
subject of leadership and some of vvhat you talked about this morning in the 
category of sex, politics, and religion. We're all cautioned not to talk about any of 
those, particularly in an open forum, fearing what we might strike up. 
I would like to make some observations on your Theory X and Theory Y 
observations. One thing, I think, \Ne ~alked around. It is my experience that Theory 
Xis rooted in fear, a word we haven't really mentioned here this morning. But I 
think we've kind of talked around. Theory Y is rooted in trust, as we have 
mentioned. I think we all know that either one of those will get the job done. The 
question is how well it gets done. Fear has a tendency to close us, while trust has 
a tendency to open us. And I want to see if that's within your major points here this 
morning. 
You also mentioned styles. I completely agree with your comments that the 
Theory Y leader does, on occasion, have to be autocratic. In my mind, leadership 
is very much a constructive activity. We're building either an individual or 
something for the future. Nonetheless, it's a constructive activity. You all know, in 
the construction business, you have a set of tools, and one of those is a hammer. 
And for even a quality Theory Y leader, the real challenge he has is to know when 
to pick that hammer up and use it appropriately, and when not to. "Hammering" day 
in and day out will probably get you a lot closer to Theory X side of the scale than 
TheoryY. 
And finally, Sir, I'd like to share with you and my colleagues here perhaps 
one of the better lessons of leadership I've learned in my career. 
I had an opportunity one time to be sitting with a bunch of young soldiers, 
and one of them made a statement that got my attention. He said, "You know, Sir, 
we have the best noncommissioned officers in the Army in this outfit." And I said, 
'Well, you know, that's really saying a mouthful. What's the secret to their 
success? This young specialist thought for a moment, and he gave me a profound 
lesson in leadership vvhen he said, "Well, Sir, they share their knowledge rather 
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than show it off." And I think that's exactly what you're talking about here today, 
and it's a great lesson. Thank you very much. 
Dr. Schein: Thank you. Let me just give you one final anecdote because I know 
we're a little over time, because it helps focus for me the issue of sharing, the issue 
of team building, and so on. 
There is a fair amount of research on the behavior of airplane cockpit crews, 
and some very dramatic examples of commercial air crashes where the primary pilot 
had the information that would normally produce a good decision, but he focused 
on the wrong things and tragedy ensued. For example - and I think this happened 
in Oregon - the flight engineer yelled and screamed that the plane was out of gas; 
that they were going to have to land even though air traffic control was telling them 
to make one more circuit. They crashed three or four miles short of the field. 
United Airlines simulated the same situation in their simulators, and they 
found, to their amazement, that the same thing happened. If the Captain gets really 
focused on what he's trying to do - to get the wheels down to make that one more 
circuit and get a proper landing - he becomes blinded to tactical information that 
is very, very relevant to what he's doing. But he's so focused he doesn't hear it. So, 
they said, "Well, what would it take in that cockpit to get the captain to hear that 
information?" They found that if they put a peer pilot who had the same level of 
authority into the copilot's seat, and that peer yelled in his ear, 'We're out of gas, 
buddy," then he heard it. 
In other words, only if someone of equal or even higher rank was speaking 
to him would he pay attention. This was a powerful and disturbing lesson, and it 
has led, as I understand it, to now training cockpits as teams rather than seeing 
them as a hierarchy of captain and co-captain and a flight engineer. Because that 
flight engineer, if he's of a lower rank and it's not a team, his information might, 
under certain circumstances, be completely ignored. 
I think there's a huge lesson in that. Just having the expert there, in a 
hierarchical situation, does not guarantee that expert knowledge will be used. So, 
we have to simultaneously redefine what the hierarchy is and does to rebuild the 
team so that the expert is paid attention to - to get them thinking of a joint mission 
rather than a set of discreet jobs. · 
So, this functional familiarity and team building that Carson (Eoyang) 
referred to is really the import~nt part of what I'm trying to get across to you for this 
organization of the future. Thank you. 
Dr. Eoyang: Thank you, Ed, although, as Director of Training for the Federal 
Aviation Administration, it really pains me to end on a story about how airplanes 
crash. I'd like to add my respects to Congressman Skelton, the Postgraduate 
School, and the Office of Naval Research for creating this truly unique conference. 
As an indicator of the importance of this conference, I point out the enormous 
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human capital investment by the PME brain trust - the very busy and very 
important people in this room. As a member of the Federal Human Resource 
Development Council, and FAA's Chief Training Officer, I know that there is no 
other federal department or agency that would make, or would even conceive of 
making, an investment of this magnitude. Indeed, I doubt if there are very many, 
if any, private corporations that have the vision or the motivation to support such a 
conference by their senior leadership. 
The conference hosts and every participant here deserves great credit for 
attending to a neglected but vital component of the future, not only of our military, 
but of our nation. Thank you very much. 
* * * 
Dr. Schein requested that the accompanying article be added as an 
addendum to his presentation. 
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INNOVATIVE CULTURES AND 
ADAPTIVE .ORGANIZATIONS* 
Edgar H. Schein 
Both students of organizations and managers are today increasingly 
concerned about the capacity of organizations to adapt to rapidly 
changing environmental conditions. The rate of change in the 
technological, economic, political, and socio-cultural environments is 
increasing, and organizations are, therefore, finding it more and more 
important to figure out how to adapt. 
Adaptation in turbulent environments involves more than minor 
adjustments to the present way of doing things. It often requires 
genuinely innovative thrusts - new missions, new goals, new products 
and services, new ways of getting things done, and even new values 
and assumptions. Most importantly adaptation involves the 
development of the capacity to manage "perpetual change ". 
Organizations will have to " learn how to learn " (Schein, I 980 ; 
Argyris & Schon, 1978) and to become "self-designing" (Weick, 
1977). 
The difficulty is that organizations are by their nature and often by 
design oriented toward stabilizing and routinizing work. Organizations 
develop cultures that are expressed in structures and processes that 
permit large numbers of people to coordinate their efforts, a·nd that 
permit new generations of members to continue to perform effectively 
without having to reinvent the organization each time (Schein, 1985). 
How then, can one conceptualize an organization that can function 
effectively yet be capable of learning so that it can adapt and innovate 
in response to changing environmental circumstances? How can one 
conceive of, an organization that can surmount its own central 
dynamic, th.at can manage the paradox of institutionalizing and 
stabilizing the process of change and innovation ? 
• The ideas expressed in this paper arc the result of extended conversations with Tom Malone, 
Diane Wilson, and various other colleagues. Our goal was to identify the main characteristics of 
innovative, adaptive, creative systems and cultures. Special thanks also to Lotte Bailyn, Marc 
Gerstein, Randy Davis, Bob McKcrsie, Michael Scott-Morton, and John Van Maanen for their 
insightful comments on an early draft of this paper, and:to the Management in the 90's project 
for the financial support that made the research on which this paper is based possible. 
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In this essay I want to address some aspects of these questions and 
to present a point of view based on my research into the dynamics of 
organizational culture. In particular I want to focus on innovation as 
itself a property of culture. In other words, what kind of 
organizational culture would consistently favour innovation? 
This question is of especial interest at the present time because of 
the rapid advances that are being made in the field of information 
technology (IT). There is ample evidence· to suggest that the 
introduction of IT into organizations not only forces cultural 
assumptions out into the open, but that the potential of IT as a 
strategic aid to organizations. will not be fulfilled unless, at the same 
time, those organizations develop (or already possess) what I will 
define as " innovative cultures ". 
The definition of "innovation" is itself a major problem. For 
purposes of this paper I will adopt a broad and imprecise definition -
new ideas, behaviour patterns, beliefs, values, and assumptions 
covering any aspect of the organization's functioning. In particular I 
want to ensure that we consider both I) " content innovation " - new 
products, services, and ideas pertaining to the mission of the 
organization, and 2) "role innovation " - new ways of doing things, 
new definitions of roles, and new approaches to performing in roles 
(Schein, 1970; Van Maanen & Schein, 1979). 
Defining what is "new" is, of course, also problematic. In analyzing 
a case of culture change in a ·large corporation, I found that some of 
the major changes that the organization felt it had made really 
reflected an affirmation of some of its most basic assumptions (Schein, 
1985). What then had changed? Was there any innovation? My sense 
about this issue is that we must define innovation ultimately by the 
perceptions of both members of the organization and those outsiders 
who are in interaction· with the organization and, therefore, in a 
position to perceive changes. If both insiders and informed outsiders 
agree that something is really "new'', then we are dealing with an 
innovation. 
This definition will not satisfy the positivistic empiricist. Measuring 
consensus in perceptions is difficult and messy. However, if we are to 
understand what really goes on in this organizational domain, and if 
we are to develop better concepts and theoretical insights, we are at 
this stage better off with the rich and messy insights of the 
ethnographer and the clinician (Schein, 1987). 
IO 
The paper is divided into several parts. In Part I, I will provide my 
own view of the central variables needed to analyze organizations: 1) 
A socio-technical paradigm ; 2) Culture; 3) Information technology; 4) 
Structure; and 5) Process. In Part II, I will spell out in hypothesis 
form what I consider to be the necessary assumptions of an innovative 
culture. Part III explores some of the key characteristics of IT and 
states several hypotheses about the relationship of IT. to innovative 
capacity, and Part IV states some conclusions and unresolved issues. 
In order to be efficient in laying out these ideas I have made 
minimal references to what is a vast literature on organization design 
and innovation. My goal is not to summarize what we know, but to be 
provocative and push into an area of cultural analysis that has not, to 
my knowledge, been explored very much as yet. 
I. A Basic Socio-technical Paradigm for Analyzing Organizations 
I will start with some of my underlying assumptions about the nature 
of organizations. There are many models available for the analysis of 
organizational systems. Many of them are flawed from the outset, 
however, because they conceptually separate the task and technical 
elements from the human and organizational elements. For example, 
most models of strategy and organization design advocate that one 
should start with a concept of mission or goal, and then design the 
organization to fulfill that mission or goal. The human elements are 
typically thought of as something that follows and must be adapted to 
the mission and the technical/ structural elements. 
In contrast, a socio-technical model would argue that one must 
integrate the human considerations with the technical ones in the 
initial design process. The initial formulation of the mission and goals 
of the organization is, after all, a product of human beings in 
entrepreneurial, technical, and managerial roles. The assumptions, 
beliefs, values, and biases of these human actors will limit and bias 
the technical and structural options considered, and will certainly 
affect the kind of organizational design that is evolved. 
Furthermore, if the people who will be using a given system 
(however it may have been invented) are not involved in the initial 
design of the system, all kinds of unanticipated problems may arise 
that make the system less effective than its technical designers had 
forecast. We see this especially in the realm of information technology 




For example, when an inf9rmation system is initially designed, the 
human consequences are often either totally misunderstood or actively 
ignored. First a "small" example observed by Lotte Bailyn where the 
introduction of Personal Computers (PCs) to an executive group was 
slowed down by the frequently discovered fact that executives do not 
type and do not like to go into a learner mode. The enthusiastic 
implementers created a typing program to deal with this issue and, to 
provide effective feedback to the learners, arranged to have a bell ring 
every time a mistake was made (on the theory that an aural signal 
would get better attention than a visual signal). But, the signal was 
also public and no-one wanted others to know when they were making 
errors, so the system had to be redesigned with the less vivid but more 
private feedback signal. 
A "larger" example occurred in one division of an aerospace 
company. The general manager needed detailed performance and 
schedule information for each project and program in the company, 
and designed a system that would provide such detail. The system 
allowed him to identify schedule or performance problems as soon as 
they arose, so he could check on what was going wrong. He felt he 
needed that information to deal with outside stake-holders. 
~ What this manager did not anticipate was that the project managers 
and engineers would feel very threatened by the knowledge that their 
day to day behaviour was being monitored. If· the manager asked 
questions about problem areas, they found it difficult to respond 
because they had not had a chance to look at the reasons for the 
observed deviations from plan. The system designers should have 
anticipated this problem inasmuch as it is a well-known phenomenon 
in the psychology of control. What typically happens is that 
subordinates who feel threatened or embarrassed by revealed 
information attempt to subvert the system by refusing to enter data or 
feeding in false information to protect themselves. Such behaviour 
typically leads the system designers to invent more elaborate 
information devices that cannot be falsified, leading to an escalation of 
resentment and tension in the organization. 
An even rriore dangerous outcome is that the subordinates become 
dependent on the boss to be the control system and cease to exercise 
whatever self-control they had been exercising (McGregor, 1960, 
1967). " If the President has all the information, we will fix only those 
problems that he shows himself to be concerned about ". 
The socio-technical solution is initially to involve all the people 
concerned in the system design. This was eventually done in the above 
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case because the manager realized that it was dysfunctional to create 
resentment in his subo.rdinates. The whole organization launched into 
a "redesign " of the system and invented a solution. It was concluded 
that the manager had a valid need for the information but he did not 
need it simultaneously with all of the employees. So the project 
members suggested a time delay - they would get the information as 
soon as it was available so that they could get to work on any 
problems that were identified. The manager would get the same 
information a couple of days later so that by the time he inquired 
about problems, or even before he inquired, the project teams could 
tell him what was wrong and how they were dealing with it. The time 
delay solved everyone's problem and led to a much .more motivated 
effective organization. The essential control stayed where the 
information was - in the project teams. 
Enough is known today about the human problems of information 
and control systems, about the design of equipment, and about the 
human problems of automation to make socio-technical design 
entirely feasible. What typically stands in the way is cultural 
assumptions about the role of management and the role of technical 
designers in the initial creation of innovations. It is for these reasons 
that organizational culture must be analyzed first in defining the 
conditions for adaptation and innovation. (See Fig. I) 
1 UNDERLYING CULTURAL ASSUMPTIONS 1 
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FIGURE I. A SOCIO-TECHNICAL MODEL OF ORGANIZATIONAL INNOVATION 
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The model emphasizes that one can study adaptation and 
innovation from the point of view of the organizational processes that 
must be present, from the point of view of the organizational structure 
that must be in place, and from the point of view of the information 
technology that must be available. However, inasmuch as the culture 
will determine how the technology is ultimately used, and will 
influence both the .structure and . the processes used by the 
organization, it is the cultural assumptions underlying innovation that 
will influence each of the other elements. Adopting a socio-technical 
model reminds us that we cannot bypass the analysis of the cultural 
and human forces at work in organizations. 
Culture 
The overarching determinant of how organizations work is the culture 
that is evolved in the organization as its members cope with the 
external problems of survival in the environment and their internal 
problems of integration (Schein, 1985). Culture can be defined as the 
pattern of learned basic assumptions that has worked well enough to 
be considered valid and, therefore, to be taught to new members as the 
correct way to perceive, think, and feel in relation to the problems of 
m survival and integration. 
w 
O Culture manifests itself in overt behaviours, norms, and espoused 
values, what can be thought of as the artifacts of the culture. Culture 
is also expressed in some of the less conscious and operational values 
that members share. But unle~s one deciphers the underlying, often 
implicit and unconscious pattern of taken for granted assumptions, 
one has not really analyzed the culture per se. 
Culture and its overt manifestations stabilize the daily life of 
members and provides meaning to what they do. Stability and hence 
predictability is essential for the members of an organization. Without 
predictability they cannpt function and cannot avoid the anxiety that 
attends loss of meaning. Culture, once in place, is, therefore, an 
inherently conservative force. 
The "strength" of a culture will be a function of several variables : l) 
the strengths of the initial convictions of the organizational founders ; 
2) the stability of the group or organization : 3) the intensity of the 
learning experience in terms of number of crises survived and the 
emotional intensity of those shared crises; 4) the degree to which the 
learning process has been one of anxiety avoidance rather than 
positive reinforcement. The more the culture serves to reduce anxiety, 
the more it will resist change. · 
IA 
Cultural assumptions tend toward a consistent paradigm to the 
extent that the culture creators have a consistent set of assumptions in 
the first place and to the extent that the organisation's learning 
experiences provide consistency. If the members of an organization 
learn inconsistent things in order to survive and remain integrated, 
they will have inconsistent and possibly ambiguous assumptions that 
they can nevertheless feel comfortable with (Martin, 1987). 
To the extent that culture is a learned product of group experience, 
there will be a culture wherever there is a group, in the sense of a set of 
people who share common experiences over a period of time. Inas-
much as most organizations differentiate themselves over time into 
many sub-groups, one will have sub-group cultures in each of them, 
their strength varying as a function of the same factors identified 
above. A total organization, then, can have a total culture as well as a 
set of sub-cultures, and any given member of the organization will 
simultaneously "possess" elements of all of the cultures that he or she 
is a member of (Van Maanen & Barley, 1984). And soltle of these will, 
of course, be family, community, occupational, and other groups that 
the person belongs to and identifies with outside of the organization. 
Given that members of organizations have multiple group 
memberships and that they will identify to different degrees with these 
various groups, it is not at all anomalous to have a strong overall 
culture, yet have \'deviant" elements within it, or to have entire sub-
cultures that are deviant or "counter-cultural" because of their 
external connections such as to a strong professional group or an 
international union (Martin & Siehl, 1983). · 
We know that culture evolves and can be changed, but we have not 
analyzed carefully enough what the characteristics are of any given 
culture that would more or less facilitate change and innovation. Or, 
to put the question more directly, is it possible to conceive of a type of 
culture that would be innovative, that would have as its learning 
dynamic the invention of environmentally responsive new solutions 
rather than conservative self-preservation? And is it possible to 
conceive of a type of culture that would favour socio-technical design 
innovations instead of the traditional technology driven ones? 
Before answering these questions in Part II, some attention must be 
given to the other elements in the model. 
Information Technology 
Cultures are built around and respond to the core technologies that 
caused the organization to be created in the first place. One may 
expect organizational cultures to vary, therefore, as a function of the 
kind of core technology that is involved. Chemical, high-tech, heavy 
manufacturing, financial, and other service industries will each evolve 
somewhat different "industry" cultures that will influence 
organizational cultures. 
But all organizations have in common the need to communicate, to 
get information to the right place at the right time to make it possible 
to appropriately divide labour and coordinate the effort of 
organization members. The flow of information can be likened to the 
life blood of the system, and the information channels can be likened 
to the circulatory system. The state of IT in use at any given time is, 
therefore, likely to be an important determinant of the organization's 
capacity to learn. What then should be the characteristics of the 
information system to maximize the capacity of the organization to 
learn, adapt,· and innovate? 
Information technology is central to this analysis because its own 
evolution has made possible innovative leaps of extraordinary 
magnitude. Today some organizations are being designed on totally 
different premises by taking advantage of the capabilities of IT. We 
can conceptualize this best by distinguishing three kinds of utopian 
visions that have grown up around IT: 
I) The Vision to Automate: Most of the critical functions in the 
organization are taken over by robots or computerized systems run by 
highly skilled and trained professional operators. 
O> 2) The Vision to lnformate: By building accurate models of 
w critical processes in the organization it is possible not only to 
__... automate such processes but to make the processes themselves visible 
and understandable to everyone in the organization. This is what 
Zuboff (1988) calls" informating "the organization, and obviously has 
tremendous implications not only for workers but for managers at all 
levels. · 
2a) lnformating Up: In this vision, IT is used to aggregate and 
centralize as much information about all the parts of the organization 
as possible to facilitate planning and control by top management. The 
organization becomes transparent to its top management. 
2b) lnformating Down: In this vision the design of systems forces 
an analysis of the core .. production and other processes of the 
organization and makes those transparent to workers. Instead of 
understanding only a small piece of the total process, workers become 
familiar with the whole process and can, therefore, make decisions 
that previously were made by various layers of management. 
3) The Vision to Trans/ orm : A few organizations think of even 
more radical innovations by asking how one might organize the basic 
work, the communication patterns, and authority relations, to fully 
take advantage of the possibilities inherent in IT. Socio-technical 




Such organizations may take a totally different form, being more 
like complex networks in which communication and authority chains 
shift around and change according to the requirements of the task and 
the motivation and skills of the people. ' 
Adaptation and innovation are involved to varying degrees in each 
of these visions, but in the vision to automate and the vision to 
informate up, we are only talking of converting processes that are 
already resulting in more efficient execution of those same processes. 
Thus robots and various other kinds of machine controlled work are 
important innovations in the production process and sophisticated 
information systems that permit high levels of centralized control are 
innovations in the degree to which information can be rapidly 
collected and centralized, but it is only with informating down and 
transforming that we get more radical innovation in the nature of the 
organizataion itself. In these instances IT creates new concept of how 
work is to be done and how the management process itself is to be 
defined. What this means is that the cultural assumptions about the 
nature and use of IT will themselves be a crucial determinant of how 
IT will be used to create further innovation. 
Organizatio~al Processes 
Over time every organization develops a set of processes, recurrent 
events that insure that the primary task of the organization is fulfilled 
and that permit the members of the organization to coordinate 
effectively with each other. Such processes concern how members 
communicate with each other, how they solve problems and make 
decisions, how they implement decisions arrived at, how they organize 
work, supervise, reward, punish, and, in general deal with people 
(Schein, 1987, 1988). 
Such processes are a reflection of the culture as defined above, but. 
the basic cultural assumptions are largely implicit and invisible, 
whereas the processes that evolve over time are visible and analyzable. 
In order to fully understand any given organization, therefore, we 
need to specify both the underlying assumptions and the observable · 
processes. For purposes of this analysis, then, the question is what 
kinds of cultural assumptions must be present to facilitate 
organizational processes that will increase the likelihood that the 
organization will be able to learn, adapt, and innovate? 
Organizational Structure 
Some processes become stable and are articulated in rules, manuals, 
organization charts, and other more permanent documents reflecting 
how management feels things should be done. The ultimate division of 
labour as embodied in job descriptions and organizational units, the 
basic organization design in terms of who reports to whom and who is 
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accountable for what are typically thought of as the major elements of 
the "formal" structure. But as in the case of organizational processes, 
these structures are ultimately a reflection of the underlying cultural 
assumptions. One of the common misconceptions in this area is that 
structure can be analyzed as a factor separate from culture. If one 
starts with a socio-technical model of organizations, one cannot 
separate structure from culture. One can, however, ask whether some 
formal structures are more likely to facilitate or encourage ·1earning, 
adaptation, and innovation, and, if so, what kinds of cultural 
assumptions will favour the evolution of such structures? 
In most organizations one also finds an ·'informal" structure, those 
processes that are observed to be relatively stable but are supported 
only by implicit norms and are often regarded to be unsanctioned or 
even to run counter to the formal structure. It is the existence of such 
counter structures based on sub-cultures that may be "counter-
cultures" that may determine in important ways what kind of 
innovation is possible. 
The informal structure also includes "compensatory" or "parallel" 
structures that are designed to offset or supplement what -may be 
weaknesses and dysfunctional elements in the formal structure 
(Schein, 1980, 1988). Such compensatory or parallel structures may be 
relatively permanent such as standing committees or may be 
Cf> temporary processes such as task forces and project teams set uo to ~ work only on specific and time bound tasks. 
Most organization theories acknowledge the fact that without the 
informal organization things simply would not get done effectively, 
and, therefore, that the informal structure must be explicitly analyzed 
and well understood if we are to understand the total system and how 
it works. For purposes of this paper the question then becomes what 
kind of cultural assumptions would favour the evolution of patterns of 
formal and informal structure that would most favour learning, 
adaptation, and innovation? 
To sum up, it is my argument that in order to determine the 
necessary and sufficie11Lconditions for an innovative organization, we 
must specify the characteristics of the culture that favour the kind of 
information technology, organizational processes, and formal and 
informal organizational structure that increases the likelihood of the 
occurrence of innovation. 
II. Characteristics of an Innovative Culture 
Organizational cultures can be analyzed along many dimensions. I will 
specify a minimum set, as shown in Table I, and state in hypothesis 
form the assumptions necessary for innovative capacity. Table I can 
also be used as a diagnostic device for analyzing any given culture. 
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TABLE 1 
CULTURAL DIMENSIONS THAT INFLUENCE 
INNOVATIVENESS• 
I. ORGANIZATION-ENVIRONMENT RELATIONSHIP 
Environment Dominant Symbiotic Org. Dominant 
-------------------~~~~~~-X~~~ 
2. NATURE OF HUMAN ACTIVITY 
Reactive, fatalistic Harm< · · -
-~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~-X~~~ 
3. NATURE OF REALITY AND TRUTH 
Moralistic Authority Pragmatism 
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~-X~~~ 
4. NATURE OF TIME 
Past Oriented Present 1 Driented 
-~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~-X~~~ 
Short Time Units Medium Time Units , Long Time Units 
5. NATURE OF HUMAN NATURE 
Humans are basically evil Humans are basically good 
Human nature is fixed Human nature is mutable 
6. NATURE OF HUMAN RELATIONSHIPS 
Groupisms Individualism 
Authoritarian/ paternalistic Collegial/ Participative 
7. SUB-CULTURE DIVERSITY/CONNECTEDNESS 
Low High 
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~X-




1. Organization-Environment Relationships 
HYPOTHESIS Cl. THE CAPACITY OF AN ORGANIZATION 
TO INNOVATE WILL INCREASE TO THE EXTENT 
THAT IT ASSUMES THAT ITS ENVIRONMENTS ARE 
CONTROLLABLE, CHANGEABLE, AND MANAGEABLE. 
Organizations can be distinguished by the shared assumptions they 
hold about the degree to which they dominate or are dominated by 
their various environments. At one extreme we have organizations 
that feel completely dependent and assume that their existence and 
survival is out of their own control. They act fatalistic and are passive 
in the face of environmental turbulence. They accept whatever niche 
the environment provides. 
At the other extreme we have organizations that hold the shared 
assumption that their own behaviour will influence the environment 
and that survival and growth are a function of the extent to which 
they actively are able to dominate some aspects of their environment. 
Implied is the further assumption that progress and improvement are 
possible, a basically optimistic orientation toward the environment. 
Innovative capacity will increase to the extent that members assume 
that innovation is possible and necessary, which derives from their 
optimistic assumption that the environment can be influenced. 
Organizations that pessimistically assume either that they are 
dominated by others and/ or assume that their environments are fixed 
will find it difficult to conceive of new ideas and will find it even more 
difficult to marshal the energy to try out new ideas. 
2. The Nature of Human Activity 
HYPOTHESIS C2. THE CAPACITY OF AN ORGANIZATION 
TO INNOVATE WILL INCREASE TO THE EXTENT THAT IT 
ASSUMES THAT TflE APPROPRIATE HUMAN ACTIVITY IS 
TO BE PROACTIVE, ORIENTED TOWARD PROBLEM 
SOLVING AND IMPROVING THINGS. 
All organizations make implicit assumptions about whether the 
appropriate behaviour of members is to be I) reactive, fatalistic, and 
oriented to getting what pleasure one can out of one's lot in life 
(Dionysian), 2) to be proactive, optimistic, and oriented toward 
improving things (Promethean), or 3) to take a middle ground of 
trying to harmonize and compromise between one's own needs and 
whatever environmental constraints and possibilities exist 
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(Apollonian). As will be noted these assumptions are the individual 
level counterpart to the assumptions relating the organization to its 
environment. 
An innovator in the midst of reactive or harmonizing people will 
find it virtually impossible to get even an audience much less a 
commitment to new ways of doing things. In Dionysian or Apollonian 
organizations, innovators are likely to be called whistle-blowers, boat-
rockers, or trouble-makers, and thus to be neutralized. And if the 
culture is too fatalistic it will of course not attract or retain innovators 
in the first place. 
One may wish to speculate whether there is an upper limit to 
activity orientation. If there are too many innovators and if the culture 
strongly encourages innovation will that cause other problems that, in 
the end, will undermine innovation by making life too chaotic and 
unpredictable? I believe not, because if too much innovation becomes 
a problem, the organization will invent and evolve processes and 
structures that reduce innovation to a tolerable level. In other words, 
if the organization is going out of control, its own innovativeness will 
enable it to invent mechanisms to achieve greater discipline and 
control. 
The reverse is not true. An organization that is too passive or 
fatalistic cannot invent "proactivity." It will stagnate until it fails or is 
taken over by others who will forcibly change the culture by massive 
replacement of people with a different activity orientation. I am 
hypothesizing, therefore, that one cannot have too much 
innovativeness but one can have too much conservatism and passivity. 
3. The Nature of Reality and Truth 
HYPOTHESIS C3. THE CAPACITY OF AN ORGANIZATION 
TO INNOVATE WILL INCREASE TO THE EXTENT THAT IT 
ASSUMES THAT TRUTH IS TO BE ARRIVED AT BY 
PRAGMATIC (VS. MORALISTIC) MEANS. 
Organizations can be distinguished by the degree to which they hold 
shared assumptions about how one determines whether something is 
true or not. When a co.mplex decision has to be made involving 
uncertain futures and information of uncertain validity, what criteria 
does the organization use to determine when it has enough and the 





At one extreme one finds a heavy reliance on tradition, dogma, the 
authority of moral principles, or the wisdom of elders. At the other 
extreme one finds pragmatism embodied either in a search for 
scientific verification or a trial and error attitude if formal verification 
is not possible or practical (England, 1975). If the decision is in a 
domain where verification by physical means is not possible, 
pragmatism would imply that the decision makers debate out the 
issues and subject each alternative to sufficient scrutiny that the one 
that survives can be accepted with some measure of confidence. 
In organizations dominated by dogma or autho~ities of various sorts 
it is not only difficult to articulate new ideas but even more difficult to 
get the sanction to try them out. An exception is, of course, the 
situation where the innovator is the person in authority, a situation 
that arises from time to time in history but that is hard to specify as an 
organizational condition or to predict. To increase the innovative 
capacity generally, a positive value must be put on novelty, on 
breaking tradition, on trying out new things even if they are risky, and 
such a value must be supported by an underlying assumption !hat "the 
truth" is not already known. 
The pragmatic end of the continuum also implies a more positive 
attitude toward trial and error, risk taking, and the acceptance of 
unsuccessful efforts or failures. The more the organization is 
committed to dogmas, rules, systems, and procedures that become 
institutionalized, the harder it will be for members to take the risks 
necessary for innovation to succeed. The message in such moralistic 
organizations is "try new things only if you are sure you will not 
break rules or fail," a prescription for conservatism and playing it safr.. 
4. The Nature of Time 
HYPOTHESIS C4A. THE CAPACITY OF AN ORGANIZATION 
TO INNOVATE WILL' INCREASE TO THE EXTENT THAT IT IS 
ORIENTED TO THE NEAR FUTURE(VS. PAST. PRESENT OR 
FAR FUTURE). 
HYPOTHESIS C4B. THE CAPACITY OF AN ORGANIZATION 
TO INNOVATE WILL INCREASE TO THE FXTENT THAT IT 
USES MEDIUM LENGTH TIME i.iNJTS : .. S. SHORT ONES 
THAT DONT ALLOW INNOVATION TO DEVELOP OR LONG 
ONES THAT MAKE INNOVATION DIFFICULT TO 
EVALUATE). 
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All organizations hold implicit assumptions about the relative 
importance of the past, the present, and the future, and all 
organizations have implicit assumptions about the appropriate length 
of time units for different kinds of tasks. Some organizations measure 
themselves in short units such as weeks or months, some use 
intermediate units such as quarters and years, and some use longer 
units such as 5 or 10 year spans. All organizations use all of these units 
for various different purposes, and, as Lawrence and Lorsch (1967) 
pointed out years ago the different functional units of an organization 
such as sales and Research and Development (R & D) will have very 
different assumptions about what it means to be "on time" and how 
long units of work are. 
It is likely that in each organization's culture there will be found 
assumptions about the "really important" time units. The actual size of 
the relevant time units will vary from company to company, so the 
determination of what is "past," "present," "near future," and "far 
future" must be determined for each organization studied by getting 
members' consensus on these units. The size of such time units is also 
influenced by the core technologies that the organization is •working 
with. The development of new products, for example, takes much 
longer in the pharmaceutical industry than in the consumer goods 
industry. 
Organizations that live in the past or present will find it difficult to 
place· a value on novelty because they are focussed on what has 
worked or is working now. People with new ideas can be dismissed 
easily because their ideas do not "fit" what the organization likes to 
think about. On the other hand, if the organization is focussed on the 
far future it may be· unable to launch any innovation because it is 
assumed that there is always plenty of time to try things "in the 
future." A near future orientation should, therefore, be most 
favourable to innovation. 
It is also clear that too short a time orientation will always make 
innovation difficult because ~ne can always show that short-run costs 
are too high to justify continuation of the trial and error involved in 
innovation. On the other hand, if the time units arc too long, some 
innovations that are failures will be allowed to continue too long, the 
organization will lose money, and the whole innovation process will be 
undermined because people will remember how they were hurt by past 
innovations. The ability of the organization to develop a sense of an 
optimal length of time for an innovation thus becomes a very 




This optimal length of time will be subjectively defined in most 
organizations, and must be measured within each organization, as 
indicated above. The precise length of the units is not as important as· 
the members' ability to recognize that giving an innovation too little or 
too much time is equally destructive to the overall innovation process. 
Optimal length time units also play a role in the selling of an 
innovative vision, whether that comes from leaders or from other 
innovators in the organization. The vision of the future cannot exceed 
the ability of members of the organization to understand what is 
proposed, nor can it promise benefits that will only be realized by the 
next generation. To be motivated to implement something new, people 
have to be able to see what benefits that will bring them within their 
own "lifetime." 
As Jaques has argued (1976, 1982) the length of time over which 
organization members have "discretion" appears to vary with 
organizational rank. On the shop floor supervisors check on 
employees by the hour or the day. At lower managerial levels one has 
discretion over weeks, and so on up the ladder until the most senior 
management is supposed to define its tasks in terms of years.· In 
communicating the future impact of proposed innovations it becomes 
critical then to consider over what time units the audience is used to 
thinking. "Optimal" time units, in this context, are partly defined by 
the actual innovative task that is being proposed or undertaken. 
5. The Nature or Human Nature 
HYPOTHESIS CS. THE CAPACITY OF AN ORGANIZATION 
TO INNOVATE WILL INCREASE TO THE EXTENT THAT IT 
ASSUMES THAT PEOPLE ARE ULTIMATELY NEUTRAL 
OR GOOD, AND, IN ANY CASE, ARE CAPABLE OF 
IMPROVEMENT. 
Organizations make implicit assumptions about human nature, both 
in terms of whether it is ultimately good, neutral, or evil, and in terms 
of how malleable or fixed it is. If organizations are cynical about 
human nature (McGregor's Theory X) they will not encourage 
innovation or, worse, will mistrust innovators as having ulterior 
motives. In such organizations innovative capacity often is devoted to 
defeating organizational goals. Workers invent elaborate processes 
and devices to make life easier for themselves at the expense of 
organizational efficiency (Argyris, 1964; McGregor, 1960; 
Roethlisberger & Dickson, 1939). 
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On the other hand, if the organization holds optimistic assumptions 
about human nature (McGregor's Theory Y), it will expect people to 
be innovative, will encourage innovation, will listen to new ideas, and 
will be more likely to trust them. At the same time, for innovation to 
be encouraged organization members must feel that they are all 
"perfectible" in the sense that one's personality and contribution is not 
fixed. If one knows one can grow and improve, this knowledge 
(assumption) acts as a powerful stimulant to personal development 
and innovation. 
6. The Nature or Human Relationships 
HYPOTHESIS C6A. THE CAPACITY OF AN ORGANIZATION 
TO INNOVATE WILL INCREASE TO THE EXTENT THAT IT 
ASSUMES THE IDEAL OF INDIVIDUALISM AND THE 
PURSUIT OF INDIVIDUAL DIVERSITY. . 
HYPOTHESIS C6B. BUT, IF AN ORGANIZATION HAS A FEW 
INNOVATIVE INDIVIDUALS WHOSE IDEAS ARE ADOPTED, 
IT CAN IMPLEMENT SOME TYPES OF INNOVATIONS 
FASTER TO THE EXTENT THAT IT ASSUMES THE IDEAL OF 
GROUP/SM. 
HYPOTHESIS C6C. THE CAPACITY OF AN ORGANIZATION 
TO INNOVATE WILL INCREASE TO THE EXTENT THAT IT 
ASSUMES THAT COLLEGIAL/PARTICIPATIVE METHODS 
OF DECISION MAKING ARE THE MOST APPROPRIATE. 
HYPOTHESIS C6D. BUT, IF AN ORGANIZATION HAS 
INNOVATIVE PEOPLE IN SENIOR LEADERSHIP ROLES, IT 
CAN IMPLEMENT SOME INNOVATIONS FASTER TO THE 
EXTENTTHATITASSUMESAUTHORITARIAN/PATERNAL/S11C 
METHODS OF DECISION MAKING. 
This dimension of. culture has to do with prevailing assumptions 
about the ideal human relationship. Two dimensions are involved 
here: 
1) The degree to which the organization assumes the ideal of 
"individualism" (that all good things ultimately come from individual 
effort) or "groupism" (that all good things ultimately come from the 
group, implying that ultimately all individuals must subordinate 
themselves to the group), and, 
2) The degree to which ideal relationships are seen as 
collegial/ participative (implying that power and influence in decision 
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making is a function of who has what expertise relevant to any given 
task to be accomplished) or as autocratic/paternalistic (implying that 
power and influence reside in positions, statuses and roles, or are a 
function of the specific personality of the individual). 
The hypotheses around these two dimensions are more complex and 
contingent because under certain conditions innovation could occur 
anywhere along these two dimensions. Basically a culture that values 
individuals and individual diversity will have more ideas to draw from 
and create more incentives for ideas to be put forward. However, 
when it comes to acceptance of ideas and implementation, the strongly 
individualistic organization may be at some disadvantage. In other 
words, in a groupist organization it will be harder to get new ideas to 
be articulated, but if they are adopted, such an organization will be far 
more effective in implementing them because individuals who may 
dissent will suppress their dissent for the sake of the total group's 
welfare. 
In such organizations the burden of innovation probably falls on the 
leadership in that they are the most likely to be able to get an idea 
en adopted in the first place. What the determinants are of innovativeness 
W in the leaders of groupist organizations then becomes the secondary 
en but critical question. 
Collegial/ participative decision making is more likely to identff) the 
relevant areas in which innovation is needed, to surface good ideas, to 
stimulate creativity, and to produce a state of affairs where everyone 
understands the idea so that it will be properly implemented. This 
assumption is central because collegial/ participative decision making 
influences so many phases of the total innovation process from 
invention to implementation, particularly if the new idea or process is 
complex and hard to understand. 
If, on the other h~nd, an autocratic or paternalistic leader has 
innovative ideas that are sound, if the ideas are no: :ao complex to 
communicate, and if the socio-technical implications have been 
correctly thought through, it is possible for the organization to 
implement such ideas more rapidly and totally. 
The danger in this situation is threefold: I) That the leader will 
impose an idea that is wrong under conditions where subordinates are 
neither motivated nor rewarded for pointing out the potential 
problems; 2) That the idea will not be successfully communicated 
leading to paralysis and frustration; or 3) That the idea will be 
implemented incorrectly because the leader did not discover that 
subordin.ates did not fully understand what he or she had in mind 
and/ or did not accept the consequences of the innovation. 
One additional point bearing on this assumption needs to be 
brought out. If predictions about the ultimate impact of IT are 
correct, then leaner, flatter, more highly networked organizations are 
the likely consequence (Drucker, 1988; Malone, 1987). Such 
organizations cannot work effectively, however, if their managers are 
still operating from hierarchical models buttressed by autocratic or 
paternalistic assumptions (Schein, 1989). The basi~ of authority in 
such networks will more likely be the degree of skill or expertise that 
any given member has at any given moment in time relative to the task 
to be done. Positional authority will mean very little. Obviously such 
systems will function better if they hold collegial/ participative 
assumptions in the first place. 
7. Sub-cultural Diversity 
HYPOTHESIS C7. THE CAPACITY OF AN ORGANIZATION 
TO INNOVATE WILL INCREASE TO THE EXTENT THAT 
IT ENCOURAGES DIVERSE BUT CONNECTED 
SUB-CULTURES. 
As organizations grow and mature they develop sub-cultures as well 
as overarching cultures. The nature and diversity of such sub-cultures 
will influence the organization's innovative capacity. For any given 
group, culture is a homogenizing force. However, if the organization 
contains within its total system, enough diverse sub-systems with their 
own diverse sub-cultures, it can manage to innovate by empowering 
people and ideas from those sub-cultures that are most different from 
the "parent" yet best adapted to a changing environment. Drawing on 
diverse sub-cultures is, in fact, the commonest way that cultures 
evolve, and this process, if properly managed, is therefore one of the 
most important sources of potential innovation. 
The sub-cultures must be connected and part of a parent culture or 
their elements will not be seen as relevant if introduced into the 
parent. For example, in a highly geographically decentralised 
organization new ideas may well spring up in an overseas subsidiary, 
but those ideas are only importable into the parent organization if the 
subsidiary is perceived to be genuinely part of the larger culture. lithe 
ideas are brought in via transfer of people from the subsidiary, those 
people will only have credibility and influence if they are perceived to 






It is this diversity within unity theme that accounts for so many 
current management statements that the effective organization is one 
that can both centralise and decentralise, that can be loose and tight 
at the same time. To restate the point, diversification and 
decentralization are effective as innovative forces only to the extent 
that the separate units are perceived to ~e and feel themselves to be 
connected to the whole. If they do not feel connected they will not be 
motivated to innovate on behalf of the whole. If they are not perceived 
to be connected, their ideas will not be perceived as re'levant. · 
To summarize, in order to be innovative an organizational culture 
must assume: 
I) That the world is changeable and can be managed, 
2) That humans are by nature proactive problem solvers, 
3) That truth is pragmatically arrived at, 
' 
4) That the appropriate time horizon is near future, 
5) That time units should be geared to the kind of innovation 
being considered, 
6) That human nature is neutral or good and is, in any case, 
"perfectible'\ 
7) That human relationships are based on individualism and the 
valuing of diversity, , 
8) That decision making is collegial/ participative, 
9) That diverse sub-cultures are an asset to be encouraged, but 
that sub-cultures have to be connected to the parent culture. 
Having stated these;, conditions for what must be true in the overall 
culture, what further conditions must be present in the state of 
information technology? 
III. Characteristics of an Information Technology for Innovation 
I am making the assumption that any open system can function only if 
it can take in, move around, and appropriately process information. 
Information is the life blood, and information channels are the 
circulatory system of the organization. If the organization is to be 
capable of innovation, what must be true of the information system? 
Parenthetically, I am assuming that if the above specified cultural 
conditions are not present, ihe organization is not likely to develop or 
implement an ideal information system, or if such a system should for 
some reason be present, it will misuse the system in ways that I will 
detail below. So having an ideal system from a technological point of 
view will not by itself solve the problem of innovation. Technology 
alone will not cause things to happen. However, given the right 
conditions for innovation in 'the culture, it is possible to specify how 
an information system will enhance the chances for innovation. 
1. Networking Capacity 
HYPOTHESIS ITI. THE CAPACITY OF AN ORGANIZATION 
TO INNOVATE WILL INCREASE TO THE EXTENT THAT IT 
HAS TOTAL NETWORKING CAPACITY. 
My assumption here is that both the capacity to invent new ideas 
and the capacity to implement innovations may require at any given 
point in time connecting everyone to everyone else. I am not assuming 
that those connections have to be operational at all times, only that it 
will favour innovation if the capacity is there. Especially important 
will be channels between sub-cultures so that new ideas that may arise 
in sub-cultures have a chance of being perceived by other sub-cultures 
and the parent culture. ' 
The network does not have to be electronic. It can exist in the form 
of frequent meetings that involve everybody, a heavy travel schedule 
that gets everyone to all parts of the organization, an efficient mail 
system, a good phone system, etc. The more sophisticated technologies 
become more relevant as the constraints of time and space become 
more costly. 
2. Routing and Filtering Capacity 
HYPOTHESIS IT2A. THE CAPACITY OF AN 
ORGANIZATION TO INNOVATE WILL INCREASE TO THE 
EXTENT THAT IT CAN OPEN AND CLOSE CHANNELS AS 
NEEDED. 
HYPOTHESIS IT2B. THE CAPACITY OF AN 
ORGANIZATION TO INNOVATE WILL INCREASE TO THE 
EXTENT THAT IT CAN FILTER INFORMATION IN THE 
CHANNELS AS NEEDED. 
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My assumption here is that fully connected network is not desirable 
at all times. For certain kinds of tasks and for certain stages of the 
innovation process, it may be more efficient to keep open only those 
channels that are necessary for efficient implementation. The 
organization must have the process capacity to diagnose its 
information needs but it must also have the technical capacity to 
implement its diagnosis in the sense of opening and closing channels as 
needed. 
In arguing for this capacity, I am not reverting to an authoritarian 
system, i.e. some higher authority that opens or closes channels as 
needed. l am suggesting that such capacity can be available in a 
collegial{ participative system as well in that members can choose to 
open and close channels themselves as they perceive this to be 
appropriate. 
Just as the organization needs the technical capacity to open and 
close channels, so it needs the capacity to filter information flows 
along given channels to I) avoid information overloads, 2) to prevent 
inappropriate information getting to some members, and 3) to insure 
that appropriate information gets to those members who need it. 
Again this implies diagnostic capacity along with the technical 
capacity of the system, and again, it implies that such filtering can be 
<f> designed without reverting to an authoritarian hierarchical system. A 
~ good example of such a system is the Information Lens and Object 
Lens technology developed by Malone that allows the members of the 
network to specify rules for routing and filtering that are then 
automatically implemented (l,ai & Malone, 1988~ Malone, et al. 1989). 
3. Connectivity to Environment; "Openness" of the System 
HYPOTHESIS IT3. THE CAPACITY OF AN ORGANIZATION 
TO INNOVATE WILL INCRESE TO THE EXTENT THAT IT 
HAS MULTIPLE OPEN CHANNELS TO AND FROM ITS 
ENVIRONMENTS. 
Organizations are open socio-technical systems embedded in 
multiple environments. If they cannot accurately track what is going 
on in those environments they cannot identify areas in which 
innovation is more or less important. Similarly, they cannot assess the 
effects of their own innovative and adaptive efforts if they cannot 
observe the effects of their innovative behaviour on those parts of the 
environment that are intended to be impacted. 
Multiple channels to the environment are nece, /, but they must 
also be connected to the appropriate decision points within the 
organization so that the incoming information can be processed 
appropriateiy. Many organizations know a great deal but the 
knowledge stays in departments that cannot effectively utilize, 
integrate, and act on the knowledge (Schein, 1980). 
4. Capacity to Evolve Own IT System Technologically 
HYPOTHESIS IT4. THE CAPACITY OF AN ORGANIZATION 
TO INNOVATE WILL INCRESE TO THE EXTENT THAT IT 
HAS THE CAPACITY TO FULLY UNDERSTAND AND 
IMPLEMENT INNOVATIONS IN INFORMATION 
TECHNOLOGY ITSELF AS THESE MAY APPLY TO VARIOUS 
ASPECTS OF THE ORGANIZATION'S TASKS. 
What is implied here is the organization's capacity to modify its own 
use of IT as new possibilities become available and as new idea: arise 
on how to use existing technology. This means that somewhere in the 
total system must reside good information on current capacities and 
good information on future possibilities. Such information may come 
from internal or external sources, but the information has to get to the 
right places to be acted on appropriately. Various aspects of IT such 
as office automation, CAD/CAM, and so on must not only be well 
understood, but must be flexibly adopted to support the basic mission 
of the organization (Thomas, 1988). 
IV. Int~• 'lttion of Culture and Information Technology 
Implied in the above analysis is that cultural assumptions can and will 
limit the degree to which JT can be and will be used. The kind of 
information network described above will simply not be installed in 
organizations that do not believe in proactivity, in mastering their 
environment, in participative decision making, and so on. But that is 
not the whole story. The technology itself can and will gradually af(ect 
organizational cultures by what it makes possible, · and in so'ttte 
cultures the interaction between the culture and the technology will: in 
the long run, be destruc11ve to adaptive capacity and innovation. In 
order to examine these interactions we must first examine some of the 
properties of I.T. and show how those can become forces to unfreeze 
the present culture: 
1.T. as a Force Unfreezing Culture 
If one thinks of the information technology community as itself a sub-




implemented lead to the unfreezing of other cultural assumptions. 
Specifically, the IT community assumes that it is intrinsically good for 
organizations to have more information, more widely distributed, and 
more rapidly disseminated. The designers of IT are therefore likely to 
highlight the following properties of the technology. IT increases: 
1) Accessibility: more people can more easily access information 
that is electronically available in a network; 
2) Rapidity: information and feedback can be obtained much 
more rapidly by electronic means in computer based networks; 
3) Simultaneity: information can be presented to large numbers of 
people simultaneously even though they are geographically dispersed 
and are in different time zones; 
4) Presentational flexibility: information can simultaneously be 
presented in different ways_to different people; 
5) Complexity: complex relationships and contextual factor:> in 
information can be more easily represented with computer aided 
systems (e.g. three dimensional modelling); 
6) System awareness: creating information systems requires 
accurate modelling of processes, and these models then become 
transparent to information users (the essence of what Zuboff means by 
"informating'') ; 
7) System/network accountability."networks make it possible for 
all members to become aware of their mutual inter-dependence, of the 
fact that there is no necessary higher authority in the network, and 
hence that all members of the network can be simultaneously 
accountable for network output ; 
8) Team work capacity: the combination of simultaneity and 
network accountability makes it possible for real team work to occur 
where every member realizes his or her part, and where all 
contributions are transparent, thus forcing mutual trust (i.e. any abuse 
by any member is immediately visible to all other members of the 
network); 
9) . Task -based authority: in a functioning network it is possible to 
designate decision-making power to whoever at any given moment in 
time has the most relevant information, and this authority can rotate 
among members of the network as the task changes ; · 
~'I 
10) Self-designing capacity: it is technologically and 
psychologically possible for the network to constantly redesign itself 
and to adapt to changing circumstances if the necessary power and 
flexibility have been built in initially. 
As can be seen, these characteristics introduce a strong bias toward 
collaborative team work in that such work becomes not only much 
more feasible in an electronic environment, but also more appropriate 
to the complex tasks that most organizations will face in the future. 
What all this means is that the introduction of IT is a force that may 
stimulate culture change by first of all forcing some cultural 
assumptions out into the open (i.e. assumptions about formal 
authority and managerial prerogatives), and second, by clearly making 
alternative methods of coordination possible. Thus if either the 
leadership of a total organization or some sub-culture within the 
organization introduces sophisticated IT networks, this will force 
cultural re-examination and reveal which cultural assumptions will aid 
or hinder further utilization of IT. The further implic11tion of this line 
of argument is that the introduction of IT may be one of the most 
powerful ways of unfreezing a culture and starting a process of change 
toward more innovative capacity in general. 
1. Presence of an IT Sub-culture 
HYPOTHESIS l/C I: THE CAPACITY OF AN 
ORGANIZATION TO INNOVATE WILL INCREASE TO THE 
EXTENT J'HAT IT HAS SOMEWHERE WITHIN 
ITSELF A FULLY FUNCTIONING TECHNOLOGICALLY 
SOPHISTICATED l.T. SYSTEM THAT CAN BE A 
DEMONSTRATION OF l.T. CAPACITY AND A SOURCE OF 
DIFFUSION TO OTHER PARTS OF THE ORGANIZATION. 
In other words, there must be among the sub-cultures of the 
organization at least one sub-subculture that is congruent with the 
assumptions of IT or there will not be any place within the 
organization where IT. can be appropriately utilized. However, such a 
sub-culture is only a necessary and not a sufficient condition for 
organizational innovation, because the larger culture may prevent 





2. Destructive I. T ./culture interactions 
HYPOTHESIS l/C 2A: THE PROVISION OF I. T. FOR 
PURPOSES OF AUTOMATION TO A' MANAGEMENT THAT 
OPERATES BY THE ASSUMPTIONS OF THEORY X WILL IN 
THE SHORT RUN PRODUCE PRODUCTIVITY 
IMPROVEMENTS BUT IN THE LONG RUN WILL PRODUCE 
EMPLOYEE DEPENDENCE AND ANXIETY THAT WILL 
REDUCE THE PROBABILITY OF INNOVATION. 
HYPOTHESIS l / C 2B: THE PROVISIOf:I OF I. T. FOR 
PURPOSES OF UPWARD /NFORMAT/NG TO A 
MANAGEMENT THAT OPERATES BY THE ASSUMPTIONS 
OF THEORY X WILL ALLOW SUCH MANAGEMENT A LEVEL 
OF SURVEILLANCE AND CONTROL THAT WILL ALIENATE 
EMPLOYEES, CAUSE RESISTANCE, REBELLION, REFUSAL 
TO USE THE SYSTEM. FALSIFICATION OF DATA ENTRY IF 
POSSIBLE. AND ULTIMATELY. TOTAL DEPENDENCY AND 
ABDICATION OF PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY. 
HYPOTHESIS l/C 2C: THE PROVISION OF I. T. FOR 
PURPOSES OF INFORMATING DOWN TO A MANAGEMENT 
THAT OPERATES BY THE ASSUMPTIONS OF THEORY X 
WILL PRODUCE SHORT RUN PRODUCTIVITY AND 
INVOLVEMENT GAINS, BUT WILL, IN THE LONG RUN. BE 
SUBVERTED BY MANAGEMENT'S NEED TO CONTROL AND 
TO ASSERT WHAT IT REGARDS TO BE ITS PREROGATIVES 
AND RIGHTS. 
HYPOTHESIS l/C 2D: A THEORY X MANAGEMENT WILL 
NOT BE ABLE TO TRANSFORM AN ORGANIZATION IN 
TERMS OF l.T. CAPABILITIES BECAUSE THE 
HIERARCHICAL 'CONTROL MENTALITY WILL PREVENT 
THE NECESSARY EMPLOYEE INVOLVEMENT IN SYSTEM 
DESIGN AND UTILIZATION. 
If one examines cases of IT implementation failure, there are some 
specific patterns that not only explain the failure but that suggest 
certain interactions which, even if successful in the short run, would be 
d_estructive to the organization's longer range capacity to innovate and 
adapt. These interactions involve specifically the cultural assumptions 
around participation and control, and are shown in Table 2. 
·1 
I TABLE2 
POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE INTERACTIONS BETWEEN l.T. 
AND CULTURE 
l.T. VISION THEORY X* THEORY Y* 
AUTOMATE Negative Positive 
INFORMATE UP Very negative Positive 
INFORMATE DOWN Very negative Very positive 
TRANSFORM Not feasible Very positive 
•Theory X is used here as shorthand for hierarchical, authoritarian control orientation, based 
on cynicism about human nature. Theory Y is used here as shorthand for idealism about human 
nature and a belief in collegial/ participative relationships that permit high degree of self~ontrol 
The various IT visions are shown down the left side and the two 
cultural extremes with respect to participation and control are shown 
along the top. These can most easily be characterized in terms of 
McGregor's Theory X and Theory Y, especially as these apply to the 
Chief Executive Officer (CEO) or senior management as individuals. 
The specific hypotheses embedded in Table 2 have been stated 
above. The logic behind the first of these hypotheses derives from 
prior and current research on automation, especially the research of 
Hirschhorn (1987), which shows that workers in highly automated 
plants become anxious because of their high level of responsibility, 
and the absence of supportive bosses. Because they often do not 
understand the complex technology they become highly dependent on 
information that they do not understand. This combination of 
dependency and anxiety can lead to psychological denial and the 
inability to manage any crisis conditions that may arise. That is, when 
the system sends alarm signals, the anxiety level is so high that 
workers assume that the information must be wrong and ignore it. 
The scenario underlying the second hypothesis has been played out 
in a number of organizations, and is potentially the most dangerous 
because the sub-culture of IT plays directly into the assumptions of a 
control oriented Theory X management. In the short run there is the 
illusion that the IT system has given management the perfect and 
ultimate control tool, especially if the system designers can also be 
categorized as Theory X. If one has control oriented designers 
working with control oriented managers one is bound to get an 
organization that will look perfectly controlled but that will sooner or 
later fail for lack of employee commitment and involvement. And 






Evidence for the third hypothesis comes from Zuboffs study of the 
paper mill that dramatically increased its productivity as workel'.s 
learned the logic behind the automated system they were using and 
discovered that they could run the plant perfectly well without lots of 
managerial control. But managers were not willing to give· up this 
control; they started to order workers to do things that they already 
knew how to do, and to take credit for some of the improvements, 
leading workers to resentfully abdicate and consequently to 
underutilize the system. 
What is important to note is that the same system implemented with 
a Theory Y management would have entirely positive results because 
the managers would be happy to have workers exercise more control 
and take over the system. It is only the control need characteristic of 
the Theory X manager that prod1,1ces the destructive/·negative results. 
The fourth hypothesis is self-evident, in that the Theory X 
dominated organization will not have transformational visions in the 
first place, and will not be able to elicit the innovative capacity to start 
a transformation process. 
In summary, the capabilities of IT in combination with a 
hierarchically control oriented management will produce negative 
results in each of the IT visions, though those results may not show up 
initially. If the designers of the system are also operating from 
hierarchical control assumptions we have the potential of great harm 
to the organization in terms of its long run ability to innovate and to 
adapt to changing environ.mental circumstances. 
The implication is that the cultural assumptions around employee 
involvement, the importance of hierarchy as a principle of control, the 
prerogatives and rights of managers, and the nature of authority are 
the critical ones to examine in any IT project, because the potential of 
IT as a force for innovation will not be achieved if those assumptions 
are too close to Th~9ry X. 
Summary and Conclusions 
We can summarize the hypotheses about IT by stating that an 
organization's capacity to innovate will increase to the extent that it 
has: 
I) The capacity to connect everyone, 
2) The ability to open and close channels as needed, 
3) The ability to filter information in the channels, 
4) Multiple channels into and from the relevant environments, and 
to the relevant decision centers, 
5) The capacity to use the most advanced IT systems, 
6) At least one fully functioning advanced IT system somewhere 
within the organization, 
7) A Theory Y management that will use the IT applications 
appropriately and sensitively. 
We noted that culture will constrain the ability to implement IT 
solutions, but, at the same time, IT is a powerful force .to surface and 
unfreeze cultural assumptions if it can be introduced anywhere in the 
organization. 
If the IT capacity is present and if the cultural assumptions favour 
innovation, the organization will develop processes and structures 
that will increase the likelihood of members inventing and 
implementing those new• ideas that will make the organization more 
adaptive in a rapidly changing environment. 
The crucial point of this analysis is to note that if such technological 
and cultural conditions are not present, it is pointless to work on 
organizational processes and structures directly. People will simply 
resist the kinds of changes that may be necessary. Only if we can 
create the appropriate synergy between culture and IT capability will 
we get the long range benefits we are looking for. 
The interweaving of cultural and technological factors is the essence 
of the socio-technical model of organization design. I hope that the 
above hypotheses can stimulate thinking about how to increase the 
probability of innovation, and can serve as a kind of diagnostic grid to 
assess in any given group the degree of "innovativeness." Above all, I 
hope that by focusir~g on culture I have made it clear why resistance to 
change and the desire of organizations not to innovate are entirely 
normal and understandable phenomena. 
REFERENCES 
Argyris, C. 
Integrating tht Individual and tht Organization. New York: Wiley, 1964. 
Argyris, C . .t Schon, D. A. 
Organiza1ional Learning. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1978. 
Drucker, P. F. 





Tht Managtrand Hit Valuts. Cambridge, Ma.: Ballinger, 197S. 
Hirschhorn, L. 
Tht Workplace Within. Cambridge, Ma.: MIT Press, 1987. 
Jaques, E. 
A Gtntral Thtory of Burtaucracy. London: Heinemann, 1976. 
1ht Forms of 1imt. London: Heinemann, 1982. 
Lawrence, P. R. &. Lorsch, J. W. 
Organization and Environment. Boston: Harvard Graduate School of Business 
Administration, 1967. 
Lai, K. Y. &. Malone, T. W. 
"Objecl Lens: a Spreadsheet for Cooperative Work," Procudings of tht ACM Strond 
Conftrtnct on Computer Supporttd Cooptratlvt Work. Portland, Ore., Sept. 1988. 
Malone, T. W. 
"Modeling Coordination in Organizations and Markets," Managtment Scitnct, 1987, Vol. 33, 
1317-1332. 
----,Yates, J., &. Benjamin, R. I. 
"Electronic Markets and Electronic Hierarchies." Communications of ACM, 1987, Vol. 30, 
No. 6, 484-497. . 
-----,Grant, K. R., Lai, K. Y., Rao, R. &. Rosenblill, D. A. 
"The Information Lens: An lntelligenl System for Information Sharing and Coordination," in 
M. H. Olsen (Ed.) Ttchno/oglcal Support for Work Group Collaboration. Hillsdale, 
N.J.: Erlebaum, 1989. 
Martin, J. 
Personal Communication, 1987. 
Martin, J. &. Siehl, C. 
"Organizational Culture and Counter-culture: an Uneasy Symbiosis," Organizational 
Dynamict, Autumn, 1983, 52-64. 
McGregor, D. 
The Human Sick of Enttrprut. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1960. 
McGregor, D. 
1he Proftssional Manag~r. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1967 . 
. .
Rocthlisbcrger, F. J. &. Dickson, W. J. 
Management and the Worker. Cambridge, Ma.: Harvard Univ. Press, 1939. 
Schein, E. H. 
"The Role Innovator and His Education," Technology Rtview, 1970, Vol. 72, 33-37 . 
. 
Organizational Ptycho/ogy, Jd Ed. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1980 . 
. 
Organizational Culture and uackrshlp. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 198S • 
. 
Process Consultation. Vo/.1. Reading, Ma.: Addison-Wesley, 1987. 
Proctss Consultation. Vol. I (Rtv.) Reading, Ma.: Addison-Wesley, 1988. 
"An Inquiry into the Divine Right of Managers." Sloan Managtmtnt Revitw, 1989. 
Thomas, R. J. 
1ht Politics of Ttchnological Change: An Empirical Study. MIT Sloan School Working Paper 
2035-88, July 1988. 
Van Maanen, J. &. Barley, S. R. 
"Occupational Communities: Culture and Control in Organizations." In B. M. Slaw &. L. L. 
Cummings (Eds.) Rtstarch in Organizational Bthaviour, Vol. 6. Greenwich, Conn.: 
JAi Press, 1984. 
----,&.Schein, E. H. 
"Toward a Theory of Organizational socialization." In B. M. Slaw & L. L. Cummings (Eds.) 
Rtstarch in Organizational Bthaviour. Vol. I. Greenwich, Conn.: JAi Press, 1979. 
Weick, K. E. 
"Organization Design: Organizations as Self-designing Systems ", Organizational Dynamict, 
Autumn, 1977, 31-46. 
Zuboff, S. 
Jn tht Agt oftht Smart Machint. New York: Basic, 1988. 
39 
© PME for the 21st Century Warrior @!» 
SESSION SEVEN 
Observations on Professional Military Education a 
Decade after the Skelton Panel Report 
By 
Congressman Ike Skelton 
NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL 
and 
OFFICE OF NAVAL RESEARCH 
CONFERENCE ON 
MILITARY EDUCATION FOR THE 21st CENTURY WARRIOR 
Remarks by 
Congressman Ike Skelton 
Thank you so much, Admiral. After hearing such a kind introduction, I can 
hardly wait to hear what I'm going to say. 
Were my parents still living and present to hear your generous words, 
Admiral, my mother would have believed them and my father would have been 
amused by them. Thank you very much. I do appreciate this opportunity to share 
some thoughts with you. But in sharing thoughts, particularly on the military, you 
have to be very accurate. You can't come close. You have to say exactly what you 
mean. 
As the admiral told you, I'm a country lawyer by profession. I have practiced 
law and tried lawsuits for some 20 years before going to Congress. 
There is a story about two elderly country trial lawyers that illustrates what I 
mean by accuracy. One was Lawyer Sam; and one was Lawyer Bill. They were 
great friends, but great competitors as well. One day, they had a jury trial in which 
they both gave profound closing arguments. Lawyer Sam got up and gave his 
closing argument to the jury. The remarks were, of course, very well done, as only 
a country lawyer can do. 
During his closing argument, Lawyer Bill got up and proceeded to 
inaccurately invoke the Bible. He spoke about Moses walking to Rome, he talked 
about Peter giving the Sermon on the Mount, and various other inaccuracies based 
upon the Holy Book. When the closing arguments were over, the judge sent the 
jury to the jury room for deliberation. 
A large crowd milled around while waiting for the jury to return. Lawyer Sam 
went over to Lawyer Bill and said, "You old hypocrite. You don't know anything 
about the Bible. Trying to tell the jury that you're religious! Shame on you!" 
Lawyer Bill said, "I am too religious. I used to teach Sunday School!''. 
Lawyer Sam says, "Why you can't even repeat the Lord's Prayer." 
Lawyer Bill said, "I certainly can." 
Lawyer Sam said, "All right." He pulled out a five dollar bill, put it on the 
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counsel table and said, "Five dollars says you can't repeat the Lord's Prayer. 
Lawyer Bill opened his wallet, put five dollars down on the table, and said, "I can too 
repeat the Lord's Prayer." 
By this time, all the spectators had gathered around the two. Lawyer Bill 
raised his hand and everybody bowed their heads, and he said, ''The Lord's Prayer 
is: Now I lay me down to sleep, I pray the Lord my soul to keep. If I should die 
before I wake, I pray the Lord my soul to take." Lawyer Sam looked at him, looked 
down, shook his head and said, "Go ahead! Take the money. You did know it after 
all." 
I thank the Provost, Dick Elster, the Superintendent, Jim Burin, and, of course, 
my good friend and former House colleague Glen Browder for inviting me today. It's 
good to be among such a distinguished group - to see so many familiar faces: 
Emma Aver, Karen Heath, Fred Pang, Bob Goldich, Mark Smith, Don Cook and so 
many others whom I have known so well through the years. Special thanks to Sam 
Farr who represents this district so ably and well. And many of you have met my 
long-sUffering and dedicated staffer, Bill Natter, who is in the audience with us 
today. 
Together we've experienced and witnessed dramatic changes over this past 
decade: Glasnost, the fall of the Berlin Wall, German unification, the Persian Gulf 
War and, most incredibly, the disintegration or implosion of the Soviet Union. 
Today, Europe is reshaping itself into a European Union. Asia, after more than a 
generation of phenomenal economic growth, is undergoing economic difficulties. 
The United States has been described by the Secretary of State Madeline Albright 
as the "Indispensable Nation." 
Our successful performance leading a coalition force in the Persian Gulf 
serves as sufficient testimony to our critical role in this world. Only the political 
leadership of the United States, bolstered by the professionalism and strength of its 
military forces, could have put together and led such a coalition. As a result of the 
changed international security environment over the last decade, our military forces 
have undergone significant reductions, both in size and in funding. This has been a 
difficult and painful process - for those in industry, DoD civilians, but most 
especially for those of you in uniform. 
Against this backdrop of events, I would like to share my thoughts about the 
nature of Professional Military Education - or, as it's known, PME - nearly ten 
years since chairing a special panel of a former House Armed Service's Committee 
that reported out in 1988. Our report contained a quote from the noted British 
soldier-author, Sir William Francis Butler, regarding the relationship between 
education and military field experience. 
Sir William Francis Butler wrote, "The nation that will insist on drawing a 
broad line on demarcation between the fighting man and the thinking man is 
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liable to have its fighting done by fools and its thinking done by cowards." 
This quote, a favorite of mine, remains as true today as when it was first 
penned. Indeed, it would seem even more important today that such a line not be 
drawn - for today's military leaders face a challenge that is far greater than military 
leaders have ever faced. 
Today's military leaders must have, first of all, the technical skills to employ 
effectively the sophisticated weaponry and equipment at their disposal. Second, 
they must have the ability to manage these "hardware" assets. Third, they must 
have the ability to manage the highly trained, skilled manpower in their command. 
Yet technical and managerial skills are not enough to make a military leader. Much 
more is required to meet the leadership challenges of the future. Military leaders of 
today and tomorrow - and that's you - must understand the importance of military 
history, the study of tactics, operational art, and strategy through the ages. 
In the afterglow of the Allied victory over the Axis powers in World War II, 
Winston Churchill best described the crucial role played by the American officer 
corps during that war: "That you should have been able to preserve the art not 
only of creating mighty armies almost at the stroke of a wand, but of leading 
and guiding those armies upon a scale incomparably greater than anything 
dreamed of, constitutes a gift made by the officer corps of the United States 
to their nation in time of trouble." 
Those officers benefited immensely from an excellent military educational 
system before the war. The period of the 1930s - with the United States in the 
grips of the Great Depression -were lean times for the American military. Too poor 
to hold maneuvers, the services invested in the educational development of their 
career officers. The Army sent its best to the Command General Staff College in 
Fort Leavenworth and the Army War College, then at Fort McNair. The Navy sent 
its finest to the Navy War College at Newport, Rhode Island. This was the golden 
age of military education: George Marshall, Dwight Eisenhower, Joseph Stillwell, 
Omar Bradley, Hap Arnold, Chester Nimitz, Bull Halsey, and Raymond Spruance 
were just some of the distinguished American leaders of World War II who benefited 
from study at these institutions. Later they heiped put together and execute a 
national strategy that won the war. 
As those of you having visited Newport know, Admiral Nimitz, speaking of the 
Op Plan Orange, later remarked that the entire Pacific campaign had previously 
been thought out and fought in the classrooms of the Navy War College. The only 
major surprise was the deployment of the Kamikaze toward the end of the Pacific 
war. 
Regretfully,· in the early postwar war period after Hiroshima and Nagasaki, 
our military leaders neglected this attention to the study of military history. Our 
nation paid a heavy price in blood and treasure for this neglect in a place called 
Vietnam. However, in decades past, the United States has been blessed with 
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outstanding strategic thinkers: Alfred Thayer Mahan, the father of modern naval 
thought; George C. Marshall, the architect of victory in World War II; and Maxwell 
Taylor, the man responsible for NATO's strategy of "flexible response." Each of 
these Americans made profound contributions to our nation's security by sound and 
original strategic thinking. 
It is that " ... no commander or military historian sufficiently dedicated to his 
profession could possibly be surprised by any development in warfare, whether it 
concerns strategy and tactics, methods and weapons, equipment and uniforms, 
discipline and morale, civilian and political attitudes." A study of history's pivotal 
battles shows that the great captains - Hannibal, Caesar, Napoleon, MacArthur -
were in the debt of outstanding soldiers of the past. 
Stonewall Jackson's successful Shenandoah Valley Campaign resulted from 
his study of Napoleon's tactics; and Napoleon, who studied Frederick the Great, 
once remarked that he thought like Frederick. Alexander the Great's army provided 
lessons for Frederick two thousand years before Frederick's time. The Athenian 
general Miltiades, who won the battle of Marathon in 491 B.C., also won the battle 
of el-Alamein in 1942. The Macedonian Alexander the Great, who defeated the 
Persians at Arbela in 331 B.C., set the example for the Roman victory at Pydna 155 
years later. The English bowman who won Crecy in 1346 also won Waterloo in 
1815. Montgomery, Bradley, MacArthur - who won battles in the 1940s - might 
well win battles a century or so hence. 
More recently, General Norman Schwarzkopf profited from his study of 
military history in his familiarity with Stonewall Jackson's use of the flanking 
maneuver. The famous left hook of armored forces, cutting through Iraq's right 
flank, avoided the fixed defenses that Saddam had built up along the Saudi-Kuwaiti 
border. Thus, I believe every truly great commander has linked himself to the 
collective experience of earlier great captains by reading, studying and having an 
appreciation for history. . 
Now this does not mean that today's soldiers should simply copy from the 
past. While the essence of major tactics can and must be learned from the past, the 
thinking student in military history will learn much more than that. He will learn how 
to apply tactics innovatively, in varying situations and under difficult conditions. He 
will learn how to be flexible and how to adapt rapidly to change. 
The battles of Bushy Run, Cowpens, and Blue Licks in early American history 
offer tactical lessons, as do the Indian War battles of the Rosebud and the Little Big 
Hom. More recently, the Marines at Skopje and the First Calvary Division in the at 
Wadi al Satin. Our leaders must be students of human nature under war conditions. 
How men react to discipline, fear, hunger, lack of confidence and shock. And they 
must know about the minds and emotions of potential adversaries. Such examples 
begin with Gideon of the Old Testament, who proved to be an early propagandist 
spreading stories of his invincibility among the enemy Midianites. At night, Gideon's 
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force of a mere 300 men - blowing trumpets and waving torches - caused panic to 
sweep throughout the Midianite's encampment, resulting in an easy victory for him. 
Further, the student of military history must learn a profound respect for 
things such as the weather, which are beyond his immediate control. When the 
Germans invaded Russia in 1941, they failed to take into consideration the bitter 
and devastating winters on the Russian steppes, which was experienced by 
Napoleon in the previous century. Thus, those who are aware of the element of 
fortune in warfare will be better prepared to deal with it when, inevitably, it goes 
against them, or to exploit it when, just as inevitably, it works in their favor. 
Military leaders of today and tomorrow need to manage the force and handle 
the big, expensive and highly technical new weapons. But they need to be more 
than technically competent and managerially proficient. They also need to be 
exemplary leaders. History teaches that it's difficult to translate technological 
advances into battlefield successes, that the consequences of new technologies 
aren't easily predictable in advance, and that even profound technical superiority is 
not a guarantor of success in combat. Our ability to prevail in any future conflict 
may well depend less on the quality of our weapons than on the theories and 
strategies and tactics through which they are employed. Where are the strategic 
thinkers of today? Today it seems this country excels in training tacticians, but is it 
producing the kind of strategic thinkers who helped win World War II or the Cold 
War? 
We are, perhaps, succumbing to a tendency to pragmatize -- what Alexis 
deTocqueville described as "our tendency to take a straight and short road to 
practical results." So today we must ask if our military now has a place for strategic 
thinkers. Does the professional military system foster such people? Do we, in fact, 
now need them any less? Or more? 
These were some of the questions our Professional Military Education Panel 
set out to address in 1987. That effort represented the first comprehensive review 
of Professional Military Education in the 200-year history of Congress, and, in short, 
brought us to ''Yes!" 
Yes, we have a military that has a place for strategic thinkers. Yes, we have 
a professional military system that can foster such people. And, yes, we need them 
as much now as ever before. 
Earlier speakers at this conference -- Mark Smith, Major General Don Cook, 
who worked with our Military Education Panel - reviewed the recommendations for 
Professional Military Education that came about as a result of our work together. I 
need not go over those recommendations in detail now, but I will tell you that we are 
very pleased that most of the recommendations were adopted by the Department 
and service's voluntarily. 
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One of the few legislative changes we made enabled the Secretary of 
Defense and Secretaries for the Army and the Air Force the same flexibility in hiring 
and paying civilian faculty that the Secretary of the Navy has had since 1956. 
Now the Department of Defense and the other two Services could compete 
with the leading universities in the country and attract excellent faculty, as 
Stansfield Turner had done at the Navy War College in the 1970s. Over the past 
decade, Professional Military Education, and especially Joint Professional Military 
Education, has received greater attention from the services and the department. 
This conference is a reflection of that greater attention. · 
PME is a part, an extremely important part, of a process to develop the officer 
corps from each of the Services. To win at all levels - tactical, operational, and 
strategic - we must be ever mindful that second place does not count on the 
battlefield. As I review the various topics to be covered at this conference, I realize 
that such leaders need to be aware of and understand the developments in policy 
and technology. I realize that more will be said about the technological dimensions 
of this challenge in the next panel and in the address of Admiral Tuttle at lunch 
today. 
As many of you know, we are in the midst of a revolution affecting all of 
society. The industrial age is giving way to the information age. Computers at the 
office, computers at home, cable television, and the development of the internet are 
just some of the broader manifestations of the information revolution. The 
birthplace of that revolution is here in this state - in Silicon Valley -- and its 
stronghold is just up the coast in Redmond, Washington, corporate headquarters for 
Microsoft. The greatest impact of the revolution is taking place in this country, but 
other countries are feeling the effect, too. 
Those of you at this institution know very well that the information age is 
having profound effects on the military. Nikolai Ogarkov, the Soviet Chief of Staff, 
was talking about the revolution in military affairs back in 1984. The Gulf Wa;· 
provided glimpses of that revolution: laser-guided bombs, F-117 aircraft, the 
JSTARS ground-surveillance aircraft. The technologies of the new military 
revolution include digital communications, GPS satellites, stealth, simulators, and 
computer processing. 
As the Services confront this latest military revolution - this latest 
manifestation of technological change - what are the implications for Professional 
Military Education? 
First, as many of you already know from your own children, we have a 
younger generation that feels quite comfortable with the changes produced by the 
information age. A seven-year-old child can do amazing things with a keyboard 
and a computer screen. 
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Second, for the military, that means there will be a greater impact at the two 
lower levels of Professional Military Education, the primary and intermediate levels. 
Today's newly commissioned ensigns and second lieutenants, up to those who are 
now commanders and lieutenant colonels, have to understand and be comfortable 
with the technological innovation spawned by the information revolution. They are 
the ones who will employ the new weapons at the tactical and operational levels of 
war. 
Third, incorporating the latest manifestations of technological change in PME 
does not mean changing its fundamental nature. Understanding the political and 
economic changes taking place in the world today - the emergence of China, the 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, innovations taking place in the 
business sector - is every bit as important as understanding the newest 
developments in technology. My own view is that these changes must be examined 
from the historical vantagepoint and placed in a historical context. This has been 
the traditional approach of military education, and should continue to be. 
The history of the past 200 years is one of increasing technological change, 
changes in international power structure, and debates over the proper use of 
military forces. Military officers must understand this history and use it as a 
foundation to understand and work in the turbulent times we encounter today, and 
which you may well face in the years ahead. 
Ladies and gentlemen, let me finish my comments by drawing together a few 
of the matters I touched today on with specific regard to the Navy. I mentioned that 
most of our panel recommendations were adopted by the Department and Services 
voluntarily. However, one recommendation that still lies unfulfilled is getting the 
Navy to send its most competitive officers to both - and I will repeat - to both 
intermediate and senior professional military education schools. 
The Navy has two excellent educational institutions: The Naval Postgraduate 
School and the Naval War College. The former is more technically oriented, and 
the latter less so. So the question arises: Could the Navy adapt the Naval 
Postgraduate School as its school for intermediate level education, and keep 
Newport's Naval War College as its senior level school? Is there a way that this 
unfulfilled recommendation could finally be remedied? 
Years ago, when I went to law school, I had a contracts professor named 
Professor Pittman. Mr. Pittman would ask very difficult questions during the class 
hour, and at the end of the class he would gather his books, walk up the center aisle 
toward the door of the back of the classroom, pose a very interesting and difficult 
question to us students and, then, _in his deep voice, resonating voice, would say, 
"Think about it." 
So, in the words of Professor Pittman to you on this last question I say, 
"Think about it." 
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QUESTIONS TO CONGRESSMAN SKELTON FROM THE CONFERENCE FLOOR 
Vice Admiral Blair, USN Director of the Joint Staff: Congressman Skelton, it is 
good to see you again. You have thought more than many people about the utility 
for military officers of studying history. It seems to me that, in the infancy of a 
technological revolution, the study of recent history is probably more relevant than 
looking too far back. 
Congressman Skelton: I would disagree with that, Sir. 
VADM Blair: Let's talk about it, Sir. When I think about those in the Navy -- the 
service I'm familiar with - those giants of the '30s who said that they planned the 
campaigns of World War II on the gaming floor at Newport, they missed the relative 
role of the battleships and aircraft carriers pretty badly. Although they talked about 
sweeping west across the Pacific, their idea of what they would sweep across the 
Pacific with was pretty misguided. 
It took December 7, 1941 to get the relative roles of those two platforms 
straight. In fact, they changed about twice during the war, as you know. Towards 
the end of the war, the battleships were the anti-aircraft vessel, and the carriers were 
the strike weapons, whereas conventional wisdom had it the other way around. 
Similarly, it seems to me that the generals who went into World War I 
completely missed some of the important lessons of the Civil War - the last major 
conflict before theirs. They underestimated the impact of trenches, barbed wire, and 
machine guns, and they paid a terrible price in terms of misleading and 
mismanaging their forces. 
It seems to me, as we stand at the leading edge of the technological 
revolution - this information age about which you spoke -- that the intense study of 
technology and recent military experience, coupled with the lessons of the past, is 
going to put us more in the right direction than simply thinking about the study of 
military history as we have traditionally known it. 
I'm interested in your looking back at how the study of history has been used 
to do better - whether you would agree with this, or whether you think it's 
unchanged by the technological change that has swept across us. 
Congressman Skelton: Admiral Blair, I don't really think we would disagree. I think 
it's very important to understand, number one, that tactics - pure and simple tactics -
really don't change. Whether you have a sword or spear in your hand, or whether 
you have a tank at your di~posal, the tactics themselves do not change. 
How you perform those tactics with the latest technologies makes a great 
deal of difference. There are only so many ways to take a hill. There are only so 
many ways to capture a fleeing enemy. But I think it's very important to understand 
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the very roots of tactics, operational art, and strategies, and then overlay it with the 
studies of which you speak. I don't think you should start at the end of this whole 
intellectual effort, just looking at technological changes and what's at your disposal. 
I think you'd better understand basic tactics. Sometimes, many times, we've seen 
good old-fashioned tactics, operational art, or even strategy outfox those with better 
weapons. 
So I think that overlaying a very basic, strong foundation at all three of the 
levels is very important. What you said about World War I, and how the devastation 
of the machine gun was not taken into consideration, is true. Many other types of 
technological advances have not been taken into consideration at opportune times. 
But I still think a very basic understanding of how you do things is very, very 
important. 
In law school, the first year we studied some pretty basic things. Whether 
you're studying law, how to win in court, how to win on the seas, or how to win on 
the battlefield, it's not all that different. You learn the more advanced ways of 
success as you go along. But you still need to understand the very basics that you 
learn in some of these battles to which I referred. 
Dick Kohn, University of North Carolina, at Chapel Hill: I would just add to the 
dialogue between you and Admiral Blair by remarking that technological change is 
not an instantaneous process. It sometimes takes a very, very long time for 
technological change to work itself through. The difficulty for military leaders is to 
recognize that change, when it occurs, and exactly what is happening. 
The gunpowder revolution, in which we still live, took many decades to play 
itself out in the 16th and 17th centuries. I believe the information revolution might be 
dated as far back as 1940, with the construction of the large computer at Bletchly 
Park for the breaking of German codes and for the beginning of the Bean War 
between the British and the German Air Forces. 
So I agree with you that basic understandings must be applied to what is 
almost a continuous process that frequently works itself out in technological change. 
The information revolution is likely to be a very long-standing and evolutionary set of 
changes that move at different paces. 
Congressman Skelton: Thank you, Dr. Kohn. The Gulf War involved some early 
use, Admiral Blair, of technology. The Global Positioning System (GPS) used by the 
Colt teams enabled them to call back, after using their laser, and get the first round 
from a very skilled 155 TOW gun team on target. But it went to a very "basics-
educated" crew of 155 soldiers. So you have a combination of the advanced 
technology of GPS and the "basic education" of a gun crew, which goes back for 
ages. Anything else? 
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Unknown: Congressman Skelton, I have a comment, and a question for you. The 
comment concerns Admiral Blair's initial question, which clearly indicates that he 
didn't attend his own service's war college. I would sugg~st the curriculum at 
Newport indicates very clearly, as George C. Marshall suggested, that if you want to 
understand strategy, you start with Thucidides, which is about as far back as you 
can go in militarily historical works. 
My question to you, Congressman, is how do you feel about the subject of 
rigor and what the Service's have done in the Professional Military Educational 
system to address that question over the last ten years? 
Congressman Skelton: As Don Cook and Mark Smith will attest, we started out 
our military edue<4 ion panel down at the Air War College and shifted to the Marine 
Command and neral Staff college by the number two or three hearing. It 
appeared quite · .rly to us that there was not a lot of rigor. 
In one hearing session, we got rid of everyone -- all the colonels at the Air 
War College - and one major stood up and said, "I can get through here without 
cracking a book. 11 Another one stoc - 0.!p and said, ''This place is a snap. 11 That 
changed our entire thinking and startt- _ JS looking at this thing called rigor. 
Those of you who defend our nation and our nation's interests should study 
as hard for one year or two years as I did in three years of law school. That's 
bringing it to a personal level, but I think we were successful, Dick, in causing that to 
pass. 
I have been to most of the war colleges in the last two years, and it appears 
to me that they are studying quite hard, quite well, quite thoroughly, and none of 
them can stand up and say, 'This place is a snap" any more. 
Beverly, you had a question? 
Former Congresswoman Beverly Byron, CNO Executive Panel: I'm wearing my 
CNO Executive Panel (CEP) hat today. The CEP is currently doing a task force on 
military education at the request of the Chief of Naval Operations. One of the things 
we are looking at - and one of the things that I look at while wearing another hat as 
Chairperson of the Naval Academy Board of Visitors - are the time constraints on 
our young officers. 
I'm totally in agreement that advanced degrees are required in this day and 
age. But, how can we take a young officer off his career track for the two years 
needed to get an advanced degree, while at the same time they have the 
Goldwater-Nichols commitment? 
At the same time, we are drawing down the total numbers we have in service, 
and as we look at the core that is going to be left as we continue to draw down, we 
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have to find the brightest, the best, and the most capable. How do we meet all these 
criteria at the same time, and keep the morale of the young officers up? 
Congressman Skelton: Next question. (laughter] When we had our panel, it was 
apparent that the Navy -- and I suppose your question is broader than the Navy, but 
it's aimed there, Beverly - would send its aspiring young officers to one of the two 
schools -- the intermediate or the senior school - at Newport, if it fit into their 
regimen while so many were at sea. 
Obviously, as was explained to me by the late Admiral Boorda, they didn't 
have enough sailors to go around. You weren't on the subcommittee when I chaired 
it, but I made a deal with him that I would provide 200 additional Navy officers - 50 
per year over four years - if he would do his best to get the officers to the war 
colleges. He lived up to his side of the agreement, and I lived up to mine. 
It's not easy to do so. The Navy -- in particular those who are submariners --
have a more difficult time fitting all of this together. But I think it's absolutely 
important that the Navy work even harder to see that those who will make decisions 
are given that opportunity. They're not going to be lieutenants forever. Some of 
them are going to be admirals. Some of them are going to be making decisions and 
recommend decisions that have huge stakes - life or death - victory or defeat. And 
the officers who are best able to handle those decisions will often be those who have 
participated in the rigors of a war college or, preferably, two. 
I think the Navy is just going to have to do its best to do that. It has done 
better, Beverly, in recent years. Now, with the drawdown - with the size of all 
military decreasing - this is a very serious problem. If I had my druthers, I would do 
my best to keep a strong officer corps in all Services in the eventuality of the need 
for enlargement, which, of course, we hope never comes to pass. 
But the Army makes it happen. The Air Force makes it happen. The Marines 
are beginning to make it happen. I think the Navy, even with its specialty in 
deployments, could do so as well. I give them great credit for making giant strides 
thus far. 
Professor Ron Tammen, National War College: Mr. Skelton, I am on sabbatical 
from the National War College, currently at Monterey Institute for International 
Studies, here in Monterey. 
A question about congressional relations. If we look at PME's relationship 
with Congress over the last five years, we see the following pattern: five years ago 
the Congress, specifically the Defense Subcommittee of the Senate Appropriation 
Committee, took a look at consolidating all the PME institutions, and a consolidation 
report was done by DoD. 
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The committee found the report to be inadequate. It then put language in that 
cut the PME budgets of all the schools by 14 million dollars. Failing that, the next 
year they cut the student end strength of all the schools by approximately one-third. 
Failing that, they took on ICAF's budget by reducing all their military construction 
funding. Failing that, they took on the National War College's military construction 
budget and cut it all out. All those funding cuts were restored, in no small measure 
due to your heroic efforts on Capitol Hill. 
My question for you, though, is how, and using what patrons, should the PME 
establishment try to establish a better, long-term relationship on Capitol Hill? What 
patrons can we look to, aside from yourself? Do you have some recommendations 
for us? 
Congressman Skelton: This is not brain surgery. This is a matter of the Chiefs, 
the Head of Personnel and the Secretaries making this an important issue in 
testimony. It has to be done. If you do'"''t do it, you're eating your seed corn, 
because these are the ones that win, or pr .. mt battles, by thinking. 
I've been up to my eyeballs in PME understanding, and appreciate what 
those on my panel did and do. I might point out that John Kyle, who is now over in 
the Senate, was on our panel. I think that the Service Chiefs, Secretaries and others 
who testify will have to make this a lead item, rather than "also ran" item. We do pay 
attention to hearings, and those issues that are in the forefront are the issues we 
work on more thoroughly. 
So the Service's and the Service Chiefs and Secretaries are going to have to 
ring the bell much louder, because it's so absolutely necessary that we not eat our 
own seed corn - the seed corn being the bright young men and women that go to 
each of these schools. 
James Kittfield, National Journal Magazine. Congressman, one of the lessons of 
Goldwater-Nichols and Skelton Panel seems to be that, on occasion, the active 
military needs a nudge from the outside. I think the people who are now retired four 
stars who were behind that - like Shawn Meyer and David Jones - will say that that 
kind of change just cannot happen from within the institution. 
Yet there are a lot of us in Washington who observe that the sort of 
intellectual giants behind Goldwater-Nichols have retired from the Congress. You 
think of Sam Nunn, Les Aspin, and a host of others. We're waiting to see people 
coming up behind them who have the interest and the intellectual curiosity about the 
military to take their place and, quite frankly, we're not seeing them. 
How concerned are you that, as this trend continues and fewer and fewer 
people in Congress have military experience or an inclination to learn about the 
military, at some future time another Goldwater-Nichols type reform will be needed, 
and there won't be a guiding hand from Congress to supply it? 
7-12 
Congressman Skelton: It concerns me, but I don't think it's absolutely necessary 
to have worn the uniform to have great interest in the military. Some of the military's 
best advocates have not, for one reason or another, or did not, or could not be in the 
military services. It's a matter of interest. Time takes its toll. 
Those who were there when Goldwater-Nichols was passed - and I 
remember it so very, very well - Arch Barrett is in the audience today, really the 
heart, soul, and brains of what turned out to be Goldwater-Nichols. He's a national 
treasure, in my opinion. And what it did was something that was absolutely 
necessary. 
Shawn Meyer and David Jones lit the fire. A Congressman by the name of 
Dick White had a group of hearings and retired, and Arch prevailed on me to take up 
the gauntlet. And I put a bill in, my very first bill on this issue, and it did not sit well 
with the Joints Chief of Staff. I'm here to tell you -- not one of them had a sense of 
humor. I have a special asbestos folder in my office in which I keep a letter I 
received from PX Kelley. 
But it was a long effort that took four years and more. Bill Nichols, Chairman 
of the subcommittee that handled this jurisdiction, went to Beruit in 1983 and had 
hearings aboard a ship, and I think Arch was with him. Karen, you may have been 
with him. Bill took it up as his own cause. 
I was there to be of some little help. Barry Goldwater was the chairman of the 
Armed Service Committee in the Senate. We had passed it - what, three times, 
Arch?-- and it was killed in the Senate. The chairman at that time was Senator 
Tower. When Barry Goldwater became chairman and Sam Nunn took a great 
interest in it, Jim, Bob Locher, and Sam Nunn, for whom he worked, worked really 
hard on that end, and we were finally able to get the bill that originated in the House 
passed in the Senate. Of course, it took its name from Bill Nichols and Barry 
Goldwater. 
It worked - not perfectly - but it worked. It created a much shorter chain of 
command. I remember going over to the visit with the Marines in Beirut, when they 
were still digging out from the bombed barracks. We found that the chain of 
command from the President over to that Marine colonel had 22 links in it. 
Well as a result, we and Goldwater-Nichols changed that considerably. We 
lowered the power and influence of the Service chiefs. That did not set well with 
them. We increased the power of the Chairman, created a jointness requirement, 
and created a Vice-Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Interestingly enough -
and, Jim and Bob, you may remember - that was the very last provision that we 
were able to agree on in conference. 
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Thanks to Sam Nunn - I remember sitting there arguing the matter -- thanks 
to Sam, a Vice-Chairman of the Joint Chiefs was adopted. They bitterly fought that, 
but we prevailed. It's interesting that Bill Crowe, then Chairman of Joint Chiefs of 
Staff, came back a year later and said that giving him a Vice-Chairman was the best 
thing we had ever done. 
It concerns me a little bit that the corporate knowledge of Goldwater-Nichols 
is not in either the House or the Senate, with some exceptions. Should Goldwater-
Nichols issues be reopened? You can bet your bottom dollar that the services would 
each come over and want to make substantial changes that would probably undo 
some of the jointness. It concerns me that we're not totally joint yet, and I don't see 
it happening in the immediate future. 
Well, ladies and gentlemen, thank you. This has been a real thrill and 
highlight for me. And, Admiral Tracey, I thank you for your kind comments. I look 
forward to being on the panel this afternoon. 
Thank you very much. 
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THE HONORABLE IKE SKELTON 
Fourth Congressional District, Missouri 
U.S. Rep. Ike Skelton (D-MO) has represented Missouri's Fourth Congressional District 
in the U.S. House of Representatives since 1977. His district includes 23 counties 
stretching from Blue Springs, to Missouri's state capital, Jefferson City, to the Ozark 
region of the state. 
Skelton, a native of Lexington, is a graduate of Wentworth Military Academy and the 
University of Missouri at Columbia where he received A.B. and L.L.B. degrees. He was 
named as a member of Phi Beta Kappa and the Law Review. Prior to his election to 
Congress, Skelton served as Lafayette County Prosecuting Attorney and as a Missouri 
State Senator. 
A leader in the House on defense issues,· Skelton is a senior member of the National 
Security Committee, currently serving as ranking minority member of the Subcommittee 
on Military Procurement. He is also a member of the Subcommittee on Military 
Personnel. Skelton also serves on the House Permanent Select Committee on 
Intelligence. Skelton's district is home to two military installations -- Fort Leonard Wood 
and Whiteman Air Force Base. Skelton was instrumental in bringing the Army Engineer 
School to Fort Leonard Wood and the B-2 Stealth bomber to Whiteman. 
As most of the Fourth Congressional District is comprised of small towns and farming 
communities, Skelton looks after the needs of rural America. He is a former chairman of 
the Small Business Subcommittee on Procurement, Tourism and Rural Development and 
the Congressional Rural Caucus. 
Skelton is an Eagle Scout, a member of Sigma Chi social fraternity, a Lions Club 
member, and vice chairman of the Board of Trustees of the Harry S. Truman Scholarship 
Foundation. Skelton is an elder of the First Christian Church in Lexington. He and his 
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REAR ADMIRAL ROBERT NUTWELL, USN 
Deputy Director, Space, Information Warfare, Command and Control (N68) 
Admiral Nutwell grew up in Silver Spring, MD, and New Providence, New Jersey. He 
was graduated from the U.S. Naval Academy in 1966 and entered flight training shortly 
thereafter, achieving designation as a Naval Aviator in October 1967. He has served in 
three A-7B/E Corsair II squadrons: V A-215 from 1968 to 1970, including combat 
operations in Southeast Asia; VA-25from1973 to 1976; and VA-105 from 1978 to 1980 
as Executive Officer and Commanding Officer. 
Following assignments to the Commander Naval Air Force Atlantic Fleet staff from 
December 1980 to January 1983 as the Attack Readiness Officer and Flying Hour Budget 
Manager, Admiral Nutwell completed nuclear propulsion training. He was assigned as 
the Executive Officer of USS NIMITZ (CVN 68) from June 1984 to July 1986. He then 
served in the Office of Chief of Naval Operations (Naval Warfare Directorate) as the 
leader of an intelligence assessment team 
From February 1988 to August 1989, Admiral Nutwell was Commanding Officer of the 
Amphibious Transport Dock USS TRENTON (LPD-14). He was then assigned as 
commissioning Commanding Officer of the nuclear-powered aircraft carrier USS 
GEORGE \\.-_ASHINGTON (CVN 73). Adm1ral Nutwell was Deputy Director for Plans 
and Policy 1J-5), U.S. European Command, Stuttgart, Germany, from May 1993 to June 
1995. His most recent assignment was as Commander Carrier Group THREE I Lincoln 
Battle Group. 
Admiral Nutwell has flown over 3,000 hours in tactical jet aircraft, including the A-7 
Corsair II and FA-18 Hornet strike fighter, and accumulated over 700 carrier landings. A 
graduate of the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School and of the Naval War College, he holds a 
Master's Degree in Operations Research and is qualified as a Surface Warfare Officer. 
His decorations include the Defense Superior Service Medal, Legion of Merit with three 
gold stars, the Meritorious Service Medal with two gold stars, and the Air Medal. 
Admiral Nutwell is a co-recipient of the 1992 Navy League John Paul Jones Award for 
Inspirational Leadership. 
Admiral Nutwell is married to the former Lynn Greenley of New Providence, New 
Jersey, who is a reference librarian. They have two sons, Brian and Kevin. 
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Innovation in Naval Warfare JMA 
Network Centric Warfare 
This briefing contains Planning, Programming and Budgeting 
System (PPBS) data and is not to be di.Sclosed outside the 
Department of Defense (DoD) and other government agencies 
directly involved in the defense planning and resource 
allocation process. Disclosure of PPBS information to 
Congress and the General Accounting Office (GAO) is 
covered by statute and other procedures. Information in this 
document is controlled by the disseminator. Further use or 
dissemination is prohibited without consent of the originator. 
Good morning, Admiral Tracy. Thank you for the invitation to speak. 
Admiral Blair, Admiral Oliver and other distinguished members of 
audience, I'm really delighted with the chance to participate in this 
conference. My boss, Vice Admiral Arch Cebrowski, and I spend as 
much time as we possibly can going to conferences because we really 
enjoy them and it gives us a chance to preach the gospel according to 
N6. 




"What is the optimal combination of task 
organization, force structure, and distribution of 
capabilities for Naval forces to implement the 
Network Centric Warfare concept?" 
Before I start on the slides, let me see if I can connect a little bit to 
this conference. The slides I'm going to give show you were presented 
yesterday. They are a distilled version of what we will be presenting to 
the Joint Mission Area Assessment Conference that OPNAV is holding 
to prepare for the Year 2000 POM process. It's kind of kicking off the 
investment planning for the next six years. Its place as a keynote brief at 
the JMA conference shows you the level of importance that OPNAV 
assigns to network- centric warfare as a new warfighting concept. 
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Overview 
• Description of the NWCW concept 
• Implications of NWCW 
• Recommendations 
I know a lot of folks have at least a dim understanding of network.- centric 
warfare. I'm going to try to explain it a little bit, at least from the N- 6 perspective, 
to convey to you our concept of network.- centric warfare. 
I'll be very candid. Our thinking is evolving here. There's no single story line, 
and we don't pretend to have the final answer. We're thinking through this together. 
As far as the connection with this conference, we in N6 are strong believers in 
the idea of top- level warfighting concepts driving everything else we do: our 
activities, our investments and all the other functional areas, such as training and 
education, doctrine, operations and acquisition. Everything needs to derive from a 
top- level, war- fighting concept. 
Network.- centric warfare is the N6 offering. The CNO, I think, understands it as 
the warfighting concept that is going to drive our development of the Navy of the 
21st Century. It applies to warfighting; it has warfighting in the title. But the 
philosophy applies equally to the business sector, and it may ultimately have as 
great a reward for the business side that supports the Navy, as it has on the 
warfighting side. 
If you want to talk about Professional Military Education and the implications of 
this concept, you need to start by understanding the concept itself. I'm going to try 
to persuade you that network.- centric warfare is the embodiment and the 
application of the information revolution - of the revolution of military affairs - to 
naval warfare. lfwe think of it that way, then we can see how it fits. 
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What is Network Centric 
Warfare? 
• A new warfighting concept which 
multiplies combat power by linking 
platforms, advanced sensors, long-range 
precision weapons, and command nodes in 
a robust information network. 
This is a first attemp• '3t an overview. It's more than networking. 
That's what I'd like to emphasize. It's folding in the different elements of 
the revolution in military affairs: the long- range precision strike, 
dominant battlespace awareness, and advanced sensors into an 
integrated concept. 
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NWCW -The Warfighting Concept 
for the 21st Century 
• Adapts Information Revolution to warfighting 
• Exploits the Revolution in Military Affairs 
• Implements Joint Vision 2010 
• Preserves combat power in declining force 
The question is not whether Network Centric Warfare will happen. 
The real question is whether the Naval Services and the U.S. Military will 
lead this revolution or be victimized by it. 
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Network Centric Warfare Defined 
• Warfare which derives its power from the robust 
networking of a well informed force which may be 
geographically dispersed. 
• Enabling elements include 
- a highly webbed information service 
- access to all appropriate information sources 
- weapons reach with precision and speed of response 
- value-adding command and control processes (to include high 
speed automated assignment of resources to need) 
- integrated sensors hosted on the information network and closely 
coupled in time to the shooters and C2 processes 
This is the official N- 6 definition, which emphasizes the importance 
of information networks, and the fact that this is an integrating concept 
that pulls together all the elements of the RMA, with the networking 
concept being the glue that pulls it all together. 
Network Centric Warfare is applicable to all levels of warfare and 
contributes to the coalescence of strategy, operations, and tactics. It is 
transparent to mission, force size and composition, and geography. 
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I'd like you to think of it as an umbrella concept that embraces the 
different elements of the RMA. That's important. It's great to 
understand that we've got long- range weapons and dominant 
battlespace awareness, but how we are going to actually use that in an 
integrated way to produce the desired effect? That's what we're trying to 
do with network- centric warfare - to articulate a concept of operations 
that shows how all it's all going to fit together. And we've got a ways to 
go. What I'm going to show you is some of the initial thinking, and how 
this concept of operations will eventually develop. 
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NWCW Integrates JV 2010 Concepts 
~~~w.~~ D~~~~·nt-~~~~~~-· ._. •-·:., ... ,., 
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. full·Olmenstorial Protection ... .. \Ji,, •>:J.:ffec~ ·>.i 
Another way to think of network-centric warfare is as an integrator of 
the various pieces of Joint Vision 2010. Joint Vision 2010, again, takes 
the traditional principles or elements of warfare - engagement, 
maneuver, protection, and logistics - and gives them fancy, new names. 
But if you read the fine print in JV 2010, the things that enable those 
new pieces are information superiority and information technology. So 
you still need something that says, "How is that all going to work 
together in an integrated way?" And that, again, I think is the role that a 






Putting It All Together 
Forward from the Sea 
\:;~-
Maneuver 
From the Sea 
Finally, in the big picture of where network- centric warfare fits, I would 
propose that the top- level doctrine that emanates from the 
"Forward .. .from the Sea" and the earlier "From the Sea" documents 
implements the Navy's and Marine's top- level operating concepts. 
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How Does NWCW Multiply 
Combat Power? 
• Gets the right info to the right place at the right 
time 
• Exploits advanced sensor products 
• Enhances C2: improved situational awareness, 
comms, planning and decision support, execution 
oversight (I.e., provides speed of command) 
• Fully enables use of advanced weapons: targeting, 
synchronization, BDA 
How does network-centric warfare multiply combat power? I'm going 
to show you some examples of how this idea has a dramatic effect on 
the integrated, net combat power of a force by getting the right 
information to the right place at the right time. It's nothing more dramatic 
than that. A very simple concept that is difficult to implement. 
It fully enables the capabilities of advanced sensors and advanced, 
long- range, precision weapons by linking them into an integrated 
architecture. It takes the command and control process -the guts of 
any military organization - and greatly enhances its effectiveness. 
I'll show you how we think that's going to work in a minute. 
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Network Centric Warfare Model 
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This is the model of a combat force that Admiral Cebrowski and his 
staff have developed. To help articulate how this all works, in any force 
you've got sensors; you've got shooters; and you've got a command 
node. The idea behind network- centric warfare is to lash all that 
together in the most efficient way to achieve the desired result. Sensor-
to-shooter is an example of the architecture many people are talking 
about. 
You get the information that a shooter needs, the targeting 
information, directly from the sensor without having to go through a 
command node. That applies in some situations, and not in others. But 
that's an example of how you need to look at the architecture to get the 
best use out of all these components. 
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The Command and Control Engine 
Observe 
Act Orient 
Most of you are familiar with Colonel John Boyd's infamous OODA 
loop. To really understand how network- centric warfare works, you've 
got to get down to that level of detail - to the basic functions of 
command and control: observing, orienting, deciding and acting. Some 
people don't like the OODA loop because it looks too sequential to be 
useful in a dynamic combat situation. We're only going to be doing all 
that on a continuous basis, and that's okay. But you still have to get 
through all those functions in some way. So you have to think about 
how that's going to be done in your architecture. 
Network- centric warfare networking enhances processing in two 
ways. One is through effectiveness - the ability to process more 
effectively for a better result. Take, for example, the common tactical 
picture. In the modern networks that we're building now, such as GCCS, 
with the common operational picture that will be fielded this year, we all 
have a much better picture of the battlefield than we've ever had before. 
With GCCS 3.0, the Navy will, for the first time, have the ground 
picture. We've never had an adequate picture of the ground battle in the 
battle group before. That's an example of how you enhance this 
process. The other way is by speeding it up the processing. That's 
where you get into the idea of speed of command. 
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Speed of Command 







Speed of command is another term Admiral Cebrowski has coined. 
The idea here is to get through your command process more rapidly 
than the enemy gets through his. This goes back to Colonel Boyd's 
original philosophy, which is still very valid: "If you get through that 
decision cycle quicker than the enemy, you will retain the initiative." 
That's one of the most fundamental principles of warfighting. History 
is replete with examples where the inferior force that took the initiative 
was able to achieve victory. So how you retain the initiative is to go 
through speed of command. You move the execution of the results 
curve to the left on the time line, and, hopefully, the enemy's curve looks 
something like this. That's why he's always reacting to us instead of the 








Self-Synchronization and Leaming 
Another idea is synchronization. If you have a very good 
communications connectivity- if everybody has an accurate tactical 
picture - then you can do a lot more self- synchronizing than we do 
now. 
In other words, you let your subordinate forces synchronize 
themselves based upon some mission- type orders and general 
commander's intent. 
The other way of synchronizing is command directed, but that takes 
time. Everybody waits for the commander to tell them what to do. V\lhen 
you're command synchronized, you get the kind of function where 
nothing is happening for awhile until the commander decides what to do, 
and then you get a burst of energy; then another lull. This is combat 
power applied in pulses. What you'd like to do is apply speed of 
command where it is appropriate and in a continuous process. 
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It's important to understand the basic information technology 
architecture - what we like to call the information back-plane that's going 
to enable network- centric warfare. What we've got right now is a three-
tiered hierarchy. If you include the DSN, it is a four-tiered hierarchy. 
There are three different levels of information networks which will 
enable network- centric warfare. We're also dealing with the data links -
- Link 11 and Link 16 are still being fielded; but that's going to be the joint 
architecture of our back plane for tactical- level command and control. 
At the sub- tactical level, many of you are familiar with cooperative 
engagement capability - CEC - which was initially developed by the 
Surface Navy for air- defense application. That's basically for weapons 
direction, at the sub- tactical level. 
IT21 - information technology for the 21st Century- is basically an 
intranet. Some of you, I hope, are familiar with the concept of a Navy or 
DoN intranet that will provide planning and coordination, and support at 
the IT- type network at the operational level of war. In the joint lingo, 
this is the joint- planning network, the joint- tactical network, and the 
joint- composite-direction network. Then you've got the DSN in the back 
plane that you know overlooks all that from long haul communications. 
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The Information Grid -- Future 







·-~ IT21 ~J DoD Long-Haul 
Intranet Comms 
These networks are evolving. The future is probably going to look a 
lot like this - with a lot more nodes, and a lot better connectivity 
everywhere. Just to show you how our thinking is still evolving, this slide 
is probably out of date already. I think what's really going to happen is 
that the upper three, or maybe even all four, levels of networks are going 
to merge together. 
It's already happening at the IT21 and Link 16 levels. I've already got 
tactical commanders who want the IT21 network, your JMCIS, GCCS, 
command and control applications - that kind of tactical information --
on JMCIS. So there's a merging of these networks. That's what's 
happening right now. 
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Examples of NWCW 
• Air Defense - CEC 
• SEAD - HARM Sensor to Shooter 
• Strike/Naval Fires - Ring of Fire, Silent 
Fury 
• Networked Undersea Warfare - Distant 
Thunder 
I'm going to give you a glimpse of how network- centric warfare is 
being applied with great success in several different warfighting areas 
today. 
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Cooperative Engagement Capability 
SENSOR BENEATS 
• NEAR REAL TIME EXCHANGE 
OF SENSOR MEASUREMENT DATA 
•CUEING OF REMOTE SENSORS 
•JAM RESISTANCE/LOW 
PROBABILITY OF INTERCEPT 
I've told you about CEC - Cooperative Engagement Capabilities -
already. We're going to have a very high- speed data link between 
AEGIS platforms and the E- 2. It's going to pass fire- control quality 
data that enables one ship to fire using the fire control solution of another 
ship. 
This gives you two huge benefits. First, it gives you a much more 
accurate track through composite tracking, where you've got several 
different sensors from different angles looking at the same target. With a 
high- speed computer in this high- speed data link, you'll fuse all that 
into a single track. It will take out all the ambiguity - resolve all the 
multiple tracks - and give you a much cleaner picture, particularly 
against low- observable targets. Composite tracking will give you a 
much better chance to pick your target out of the clutter. 
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Cooperative Engagement Capability 
The second benefit is that it greatly extends the firing range of an 
otherwise horizon-limited-by-its-sensors surface combatant. The SM-2, 
Block Ill and Block IV missiles can go way, way over the horizon. So 
what you do is enable a ship to fire over the horizon on another ship's 
solution. The result is to multiply the combat power of a force by two or 
three without adding a single weapon or a single sensor. It's the 
network that does it. That's the power of network- centric warfare. 
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Network Centric SEAD 
Results for Precision Engagement 
Improved Shooter Grid Awareness+ 
HARM BLK 6 + ATACMS 
Improved Shooter Grid Awareness+ 
HARMBLK6 
urrent Shooter Grid Awareness 
+ HARMBLK6 
Time 
Network Centric Warfare can also be applied to the Suppression of 
Enemy Air Defenses. 
The Joint Staff "Sensor to Shooter" study analyzed the number of SAM 
sites killed in a hypothetical scenario using HARM Block 6 under three 
assumptions: 
- the lower curve shows the number of sites projected to be 
destroyed using the current sensor grid 
- the next curve shows the number destroyed with an improved 
sensor grid - the "Dominant Battlespace Awareness" of the RMA 
- the highest curve shows the dramatic results obtained if we add a 
long-range, precision-guided hard-kill weapon such as AT ACMS or 
JSOW to Case 2. 
This capability would change the whole game of SEAD. In fact, the new 
rule would be, "if you radiate, you die." We might have to change the name 
of the mission from "suppression" to "destruction of enemy air defenses -
DEAD"! 
Two points to emphasize: the significant improvement in combat power 
came from the synergistic effect of networking advanced sensors and long-
range precision weapons. Second, the effect was dramatically non-linear. 
This is the kind of effect that stops offensives by making the enemy 
question the viability of his strategy. 
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Ring of Fire 
ART'Y 
During Fleet Battle Experiments Alfa and Bravo, VADM Herb Browne 
and his staff demonstrated a new concept in the coordination of naval 
fires called the "Ring of Fire". 
In the scenario, the simulated shooters - surface ships, submarines, 
and tactical aircraft employing GPS-guided weapons as shown on the 
slide - were linked to USS CORONADO via SATCOM and line of sight 
radio. Calls for fire from FOFACs ashore were transmitted by SATCOM 
to the prototype Land Attack Weapons System - the heart of "Ring of 
Fire" - onboard CORONADO. LAWS automatically recommended an 
assignment of shooter and weapon for each mission based upon pre-
assigned guidelines and priorities and weapon availability. It also 
deconflicted fire missions. 
This system will provide "spee(j of command" in land attack warfare -
another application of the concept of Network Centric Warfare. 
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A second exercise conducted during Fleet Battle Experiment Bravo 
was "Silent Fury". This exercise demonstrated the ability to plan a large 
number of strike missions for GPS-guided weapons, such as will be 
required when JDAM and JSOW are deployed in quantity. 
The demonstration was conducted with CVW-9 on USS NIMITZ. It 
relied heavily on SATCOM-enabled "reachback" for target planning 
support to the Naval Strike and Air Warfare Center at Fallon, to the 
LANT and PAC Cruise Missile Support Activities, and to NIMA. 
"Reachback", though not a new concept, is a key feature of N .,+work 
Centric Warfare and Warfare Support. It makes the most curre: 
information from non-organic sources available to the battle group, and it 
will be central to reducing operating costs by moving support functions 
such as disbursing and personnel management off of the ship. 
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Implications ofNWCW 
• Distribution of Capabilities 








The network-centric warfare concept has profound implications for 
every functional area of the Navy. The information revolution and the 
revolution in military affairs - that's what network- centric warfare is all 
about. 
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Distribution of Capabilities 
• Sensors, shooters, C2 need not be co-
located 
• "Thin Shooters" (and "Thin Sensors"?) 
-How thin? 
• "Reachback" 
Regarding distribution of capabilities, you no longer need to co-locate 
sensors, shooters and command nodes. You can have things like thin 
shooters that don't have sensors - that was the arsenal ship - basically 
a shooter with no commander, control, no sensors, and dependent 
totally on the network for its C3 support. 
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We need to think of networks as key elements of the force structure, 



























Architecture has become very important - functional, operational 
architecture. How is it all going to work together? How is the JST ARs 
going to get its targeting information to the cockpit of a Hornet, or to the 
DDG that's going to fire a TLAM? 
You've got to work the functional architectures, but right now we're 
not organized in OPNAV to do that. This is a major issue we're working 
on the OPNAV staff - the need for an operational requirements 
architecture, and how we're going to put that together. 
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Requirements/Programs 
• Must buy bandwidth and C2 applications to 
optimize overall capability 
• Balance of investment shifts toward C4 
• Need more emphasis on integrating C4 into 
platform, sensor, weapon requirements 
• Need a REQUIREMENTS ARCHITECT 
In our requirements and resourcing programs, we need to think of the 
importance of those networks. One of the questions from the Joint 
Military Assessment studies was, "Are we buying enough bandwidth to 
go with all the exciting new warfighting applications we're buying, such 
as tactical TLAM, which requires a data link?" The answer, in general, 




• Treat C4 systems as combat systems 
(design, engineering, installation, support) 
• Need better integration with sensors and 
weapon systems 
We need to treat C4 systems as combat systems in the way we 
design, engineer, procure and support them. It's not ADP and we 
shouldn't treat C4 systems the same way we treat ADP. 
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Doctrine/Operations 
• Need to develop CONOPS for NWCW 
and new CONOPS for each warfare area 
reflecting network centric approach 
d ~..,,,,~ 
• ::ene~~~~!ect a : z z :~ : :~ : : * 
• Implications of 
loss of electronic 
stealth 
There are a couple of things we really need to think about in the 
doctrinal area, in the operational area, here. We're building ourselves a 
pretty healthy vulnerability, in the sense of our growing reliance on 
information technology and these new networks. We have to think about 
how we're going to protect them; and we know the enemy is going to 
take some of them away - if we fight a smart foe. So the networks must 
be able to degrade gracefully and still be able to get the job done. There 
are lots of implications in the support area. I won't dwell on those. 
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Support 
• NWCW enables "Just in time" logistics 
concept 
• NWCW information grid is a necessary 
condition for USMC' s Seabasing concept 
• Need to integrate tactical support with 
tactical IT 
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Typical Staff and ewe Organization 
How best can we use improved ... ? 
• situational awareness 
• information access 
• communications 
I want to just hit a couple more points. We were talking about this 
earlier, with Admiral Tracey and Admiral Oliver. There are some 
profound implications for organization, leadership and command of the 
new information technology. 
Everybody talks about flatter organizations. In a sense, we certainly 
have flattened the organization in terms of information flow. It's much 
easier for everybody in an organization to communicate - vertically, 
horizontally, diagonally. Anybody can send the CNO an e-mail, for 
example, and he can send one to anybody else. That's a net plus, 
although I know there is some concern about seniors having such good 
visibility at the ranks. But, in general, that's a wonderful thing. It enables 
us to share the information, as needed. 
What's the implication for command and control of this new 
information flow? And do we really want to change the hierarchy, the line 
of command, as we are changing the lines of communication? Do we 
want to flatten the organization from a command and authority 
standpoint? We have to think about things like span of control and 
responsibility and accountability before we go about reengineering our 
structures and flattening our organization in that way. 
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Alternative Organizing Schemes 
Subordinate Commanders 
Modified CWC JV2010 NWCWGrid Medium 
sec Protection Sensors Land 
ACC Engagement Information Sea 
AADC Logistics Shooters Air/Space 
MIWC Maneuver C2/Cyberspace 
Information 
The CWC concept as currently evolving has a Surface Combatant 
Commander, an Air Component Commander, an Area Air Defense 
Commander, and a Mine Warfare Commander. 
Another approach would be to divide subordinate commanders by the 
JV201 O functions of Full Dimensional Protection, Precision Engagement, 
Focused Logistics, Dominant Maneuver, and Information Superiority. 
A third approach would be to assign subordinate commanders by the 
three grids in the Network Centric Warfare construct. Thus, there would 
be subordinates for Sensors, Information, and Shooters. 
The final proposed structure breaks subordinates' responsibilities 
along geographic lines. 
Note that this list has not been exhaustive, so other structures are 
possible. Note also that all of these except the Modified CWC structure 
have a subordinate commander for Information. 
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Role of Command 
I CLF I 
I GI II G2 I I G3 / I cM I I G5 I I ~ I 
• No longer a conduit for crucial info 
• Value added is "command" - assessment, 
guidance, decision, synchronization 
• Must preserve authority and accountability 
of commanders 
Where is the role of command? Command is no longer a conduit of 
information. That's the benefit of the new means of communicating, and 
that's probably good. We're not husbanding information like we used to. 
So, now you reduce command to its true value-added essence -
strategic leadership; visioning, providing guidance, and adding value to 
and assessing the information. That's what command is really all about. 
That function is still there. Technology hasn't changed that. 
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Personnel 
• Training and Education - we need people 
who understand Information Technology 
and Information Management; need to 
redesign curricula (e.g., from 
Thermodynamics to Information Science) 
• Information Warrior Community/Career 
path 
• Retention? 
Finally, in the area of personnel - - of most interest to this 
conference - - I think there will be some very profound implications for 
education and trainind at the undergraduate level, the graduate level, 
and the r ifessional military education level. 
As far as the undergraduate level goes, I think we need to take a look 
at the technical part of the curriculum - at the balance between 
traditional science and information science. Maybe you don't need two 
years of steam engineering or two years of electrical engineering - you 
may need something less than that - and a lot more information 
science, to understand the basic underlying technology that's 
revolutionizing everything we do. 
. At the PME level, we need warfighters who understand how to use 
this new technology. You don't need to get into the science, but you do 
need to get into the applications, how to use it, and what the doctrinal 
impacts are. So network- centric warfare, the concept of operations that 
goes with that, would be a key element of the PME. 
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Recommendations 
• Reassess balance of investments 
• Improve integration of C4 into functional warfighting 
requirements 
• Improve integration of C4 and combat systems 
• Establish study groups to assess implications and make 
recommendations in each functional area - doctrine/ops, 
organization, training & education, support 
• Recommend two organizational constructs be chosen and 
wargamed (perhaps at Global in July 1998) 
- INW JMA recommends the Network Centric Warlare Grid 
Organization and the Geographical Organization as the two test 
cases 
These were the recommendations we presented to the JMA 
conference, and I won't go into those in detail. 
As far as education goes, it is most important that we exploit the 
information revolution. I know this is happening, to some degree, with 
the Naval Academy's Curriculum 21 study, and I know there have been 
some fundamental changes here at the Naval Postgraduate School in 
the information science curricula - in the new arms course for flag 
officers. Those are the kinds of things we need to be doing across the 
board to fully exploit this exciting information revolution. 
Thank you for your attention. I'll defer to the next speaker, and look 
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• Space capabilities apply 21st century 
technologies to warfighting now 
• Warfighters lack knowledge to fully 
realize potential of space today 
• Current problem foreshadows greater 
challenges as JV 201 O technologies are 
achieved 
• PME is key to the solution 
I'd like to start by putting my remarks in the context of this conference. Over 
the last several months we have been actively engaged in trying to get space 
integrated into the core curricula of our service and joint PME schools. In 
November, I presented a version of this briefing to the Military Education 
Coordination Conference, and I was asked to give it here, as part of the 
broader issue of integration of technology into Pl\.1E. 
And, I do believe that our current efforts directly apply to where we should be 
going in applying N 2010 technologies to warfighting. Essentially, space 
capabilities represent the application of 21st century technologies to 
warfighting today, and, to be honest, we, the DoD are not doing a great job of 
it. Our warfighters just don't have the knowledge to fully realize the potential 
of what's out there now, much less the incredible technological advances, both 
in space and otherwise, looming on the horizon. 





:·· U .. S. Space.Command 
< jf:;$pace .;essential to Warfighting 
·;·Tb~Problem 
. ·' th~:Solution 
.. ~ Edttc~tion Objectives 
• U.S. Space Command Assistance 
• Conclusions 
Here is an overview of our effort to advocate the integration of space into 
PME. I'll start with a brief introduction to U.S. Space Command, who we are 
and what we do. 
Then I'll use a quote from the Officer Professional Military Education Policy, 
again to put space cababilities into a context of JV 2010 technologies. 
I'll show you that space is important to warfighting, and that our warfighters 
don't know enough about it. 
I'll describe what we think are the solutions to the problem, a big part of which 
is the doctrinal foundation built by our professional military education system. 
Our objective, then, is to educate warfighters in what they need to know about 
space to improve their warfighting capability, now and in the future. 
And I'll describe what we at SP ACECOM can provide to help make it better. 
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U.S. Space Command is one of the nine unified combatant commands. Were 
headquartered in Colorado Springs. Our current CINC is General Estes. 
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One of our key Unified Command Plan responsibilities is to advocate space 
requirements for all the Unified CINCs. It is in this role that we are working 
towards integration of space into PME. 
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Our primary interfaces with the other combatant commands are through our 
Joint Space Support Teams and our component space support teams during 
exercises and real world operations. We also coordinate space requirements 
with the other CINCs through our Integrated Priority List process, fulfilling our 
space advocacy role. 
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"The other major component of JV 2010 is the 
skilled, capable men and women leveraging 
future technologies. These warfighters require 
an understanding of the capabilities inherent 
in this system of systems. Fostering this 
understanding must be one of the central 
goals of PME programs." 
CJCSI 19800.01 
Ofi""'r Professional Military 
Education Policy 
SPACE CAPABILITIES - INTEGRAL 
TO THE JV 2010 SYSTEM OF SYSTEMS 
I pulled this quote from the Chairman's Officer Professional Military 
Education Policy. 
We don't think you can achieve Joint Vision 2010 without total integration of 
space capabilities into the system of systems. 
To do this our warfighters have got to understand these space capabilities. 




St.UD LAUNCHER I 
LOCATIOllS 
SPACE IS CRITICAL TO WARFIGHTING TODAY 
I think the best way to show the impact of space on warfighting today is to 
look at warfighting functions; the Anny's Battlefield Operating Systems, 
the Air Force Core Competencies, and Naval Expeditionary Forces Critical 
Operational Capabilities (I've listed some of their components around 
here), and see how the space functional areas, communications, 
position/navigation, weather/terrain, warning, and reconnaissance/ 
surveillance, influence them. 
For example, the space based navigation system, Global Positioning 
System enhances the Army Fire Support BOS by providing precise artillery 
firing unit locations. The new Paladin Howitzer has a GPS card built right 
in to its black box computer system. 
GPS also enables precision engagement by providing navigational 
information to the cruise missile weapon systems. 
In fact GPS receivers have proliferated throughout our forces enabling just 
about every combat function. Interestingly, GPS is used not just for 
locations, but for accurate time information. In Korea they are using 
PLGR time to synchronize frequency hopping SINCGARS radios across 
the 2 ID, and for synchronization of all combat operations. They no longer 
have to do the old time hack routine. 
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Likewise, space-based communications play a key role across the warfighting 
functional areas, from strategic command and control of forces world-wide, to 
fleet command and control, to tactical communications on the battlefield, with 
deep long range patrols for example. 
Space-based warning assets play a critical role in force protection. From DSP, 
information is provided to support all TMD pillars - active cueing information, 
impact locations for passive defense, launch locations for attack operations, and 
communications capability for BMC3. 
Weather information from space also has significant impact on operations, 
supporting aviation in all the services, as well as how weather affects infrared, 
laser, and other weapons systems. The capability now exists to direct downlink 
the kinds of weather information you see on CNN to units on the battlefield. 
MSI satellites like LANDSAT and SPOT provide terrain information, not only 
for accurate mapping, but for trafficability information too, enabling maneuver 
on the battlefield 
And of course, reconnaissance and surveillance satellites provide battlefield 
intelligence to commanders. 
At the strategic level, space plays a key role, enabling our National Military 
Strategy, providing early warning for nuclear deterrence, and indications and 
warning for go to war decision making. 
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l.1----------S~;pace Tomorrow 
.. t · c:::::JDDDDDODODD 
~~ 
As we work towards JV 2010, our CINC's vision builds on current space 
functions, fully integrating space capabilities into dominant maneuver, 
precision engagement, full dimensional protection, and focused logistics. In 
fact, the total situational awareness and information dominance envisioned for 
JV2010 will be impossible to achieve without space. 
Global engagement from space will be possible, allowing for National Ballistic 
Missile Defense, protection of the U.S. from cruise missiles, and potentially 
even engagement of enemy forces from space. 
Control of Space, the assured access to space, protection of space assets, and 
space denial, will be critical, not only to our military capabilities, but to free 
market economies worldwide. 
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• Warfighters not knowledgeable enough 
to realize full potential of space 
capabilities today 
• Warfighters not knowledgeable enough 
to apply future potential of space 
capabilities to Joint Vision 2010 
The problem, which we have observed during exercises and real world 
contingencies, is that our warfighters do not understand how to employ, or 
even ask for the capabilities that space provides. 
I talked earlier to how space impacts warfighting functions at the strategic, 
operational, and tactical levels of war. At least once a month I speak to the 
B's of various geographical CINCs involved with actual contingencies or 
exercises, and they are always surprised at the capability space brings to the 
battlefield. And, they want to know how they can get it. 
Along with the capabilities space provides, come limitations and 
vulnerabilities. We are working hard to minimize these, but we must guard 
against taking space capabilities for granted. For example, we are hearing 
about a relatively inexpensive GPS jamming capability that could bode ill for 
the kinds of applications I spoke about earlier. 
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As space technology advances by leaps and bounds, we seem to be falling behind 
in military applications of these technologies. Particularly exciting are the 
capabilities represented by Personal Communications Systems and Direct 
Broadcast Service. In the near future, your cell phone, through low earth orbiting 
satellite systems like lrridium and others, will be able to reach anywhere in the 
world from anywhere in the world, not just for voice, but for rapid data 
transmission. Being able to bring in 120 channels of television through a very 
small satellite dish like those sold by DirectTV and Prime Star is a capability that 
boggles the mind in terms of military situational awareness. Lack of knowledge 
of these technologies and their potential applications will not help the attainment 
ofN2010. 
At the strategic level, the protection of the U.S. homeland, a vital national 
interest, against ballistic missile attack, will occur in space. Many people think 
that capability already exists, while in fact a decision has not yet been made that 
we need it. 
And, as free market economies become increasingly dependent on space, 
protection of those assets will become a key strategic mission. 
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This slide highlights what every four-star who comes back to play space 
wargames at any of our service schools highlights in the wargame lessons 
learned. Given all of the capabilities of all the sensors we have in space, 
whether commuinications, intelligence, or those that provide other operational 
pieces of the puzzle, who do you call, how do you task it, how do we get the 
information that we get from space based assets to the 'Yarfighters. That is our 
teaching challenge. 
When we start warfighting these sensors, the same way we warfight any other 
platform we have, then we will start getting the battlefield situational 
awareness that Admiral Nutwell just covered in his network centric warfare 
brief. That is where our potential is as a nation to have the greatest advantage. 
Someone has said that our choices in the future are going to be greater. Well, 
these are the choices we have today - that warfighting commanders need an 
understanding of. How do you put that into effect operationally? 
Again, not the understanding of the technical part of the system, but at least 
enough understanding of the technology to know how it applies and how it 
enhances what you are doing operationally in your campaign plan. 
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·---------~ Solutions -..:r- ___________ __,c:::::JCJDDDDDDDDu 
Integrate Space Education into the Joint and 
,f1\ Service Professional Military Education 
\!) Systems as Part of the CORE CURRICULA to 
build a doctrinal foundation. 
Integrate Space into Field 
@Training and Command Post Exercises across the Force 
to build experience on 
doctrinal foundation. 
DOCTRINAL FOUNDATION + 
FIELD EXPERIENCE = CAPABLE WARFIGHTERS 
We are attacking the problem in two ways. 
The first is why I am here today. We feel that it is extremely important to 
build the doctrinal foundation of space literacy, and the application of JV 2010 
technologies, through professional military education. 
We are also trying to build an experience level with space capabilities with our 
participation in exercises, over 55 exercises and wargames this fiscal year. 
Our efforts include the services' futures wargames such as Army After Next, 
Global, and Global Engagement. These, however, touch relatively few people, 
compared to the education process that reaches a broad based population. 
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• Educate Warfighters in How Current 
Space Systems Impact Their 
Operations, How Their Effectiveness 
Can Be Improved Using Space 
Systems, and What Their 
Vulnerabilities Are 
• Educate Warfighters in How Additional 
Space Systems Can Be Exploited, Now 
and in the Future, to Meet Operational 
Requirements 
• Educate Senior Leaders, Current and 
Future, on Direct Impact of Space 
Systems and Space As a Warfighting 
Medium on the Defense of the US. 
tl 
CONFIDENT 
We break our space education goal into three objectives. 
They are understanding of current capabilities, limitations, and vulnerabilities; 
understanding of technological advances that can enhance warfighting today 
and in the future (N 2010); 
and understanding of the ramifications of the warfight in space on the defense 
oftheU.S. 
The most recent Space Architect vision for space operations recommended 
that we develop and teach doctrinal concepts for space integration. That 
translates into what resources are there, what can the warfighter task, and what 
can the warlighter expect. That's what we have to teach. 
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.r~ ___________ Execution 
~- ____________ __,c:::JCJDDDOODDOu 
• Establish Specific Learning Objectives for 
Respective Schools 
• Build Space Body of Knowledge 
• Train Current Resident Instructors 
• Leverage information Technologies 
• CD ROM 
• Homepage/Internet 
• Interim Instructor Teams 
• Assign Resident Space Qualified Instructors 
• Provide Briefings and Demos 
• Participate in Wargames 
CINCSPACE PROVIDES GUIDANCE AND ASSISTANCE 
We at SP ACECOM are not in the position to be directly involved in the 
education process. We do feel however that we should try to influence 
education policy, provide space education requirements, and guidance in the 
form of specific learning objectives, and reference materials, we're calling it a 
space body of knowledge. We can also provide training for instructors, JSSTs 
as interim instructors, with the eventual goal of assignment of space smart 
instructors to schools. We will of course continue to provide briefings and 




·. SPACE MUST.BE INTEGRATED INTO PME 
· . CORE CURRICULA NOW 
TO'/~.QtflEVE JV 2010, WARFIGHTERS MUST BE 
'. ii .:EQUCATED ON APPLICATIONS OF 
··. TECHNOLOGY TO WARFIGHTING 
·~--" : .. ,.~::.. .... ::~~H~ffp·~· 
TO DEVELOP "SKILLED, CAPABLE MEN AND WOMEN 
LEVERAGING FUTURE TECHNOLOGIES" 
We have concluded that we must integrate space into PME now, to enhance 
current warfighting capabilities and build understanding of future space 
applications. 
On a broader scale, it seems clear to me that the same logic applies to future 
technologies in general; we must teach their applications in our schools. 
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MAJOR GENERAL RODNEY P. KELLY, USAF 
Director of Operations, J-3, Headquarters U.S. Space Command 
Peterson Air Force Base, CO 
Biography under revision - promoted August 1, 1997 - reassigned as director of 
operations, J-3, Headquarters U.S. Space Command, Peterson Air Force Base, Colo. 
Brigadier General Rodney P. Kelly is director of plans, Headquarters North American 
Aerospace Defense Command, Peterson Air Force Base, Colo. He is responsible for 
planning for the safeguarding of the air sovereignty of North America (Canada, Alaska 
and the continental United States); originating joint and binational plans and agreements 
to accomplish surveillance, warning, aerospace control and counterdrug missions; and 
programming the development, employment and sustainment of Canadian, U.S. Air 
Force, U.S. Navy and Marine Corps forces at contingency and wartime bases. 
The general was commissioned as a distinguished graduate through the Reserve Officer 
Training Corps program at Southern Illinois University, Carbondale, in December 1967. 
He is a command pilot with more than 4,000 flying hours to include combat. 
His 30-year career has included assignments in Europe and Asia. His most recent 
responsibilities have been as assistant for air defense, NATO policy, Office of the 
Secretary of Defense, international security policy, the Pentagon, Washington, D.C.; 
Commander, 3rd Wing, Elmendorf Air Force Base, Alaska; Pacific Air Forces assistant 
director of operations, Headquarters Pacific Air Forces, Hickam Air Force Base, Hawaii; 
director of plans, Headquarters Pacific Air Forces, Hickam Air Force Base, Hawaii; and 
director of plans, Headquarters North American Aerospace Defense Command, Peterson 
Air Force Base, Colorado. 
General Kelly received a Bachelor of Science degree in agriculture, and a Master's 
degree in business administration from Southern Illinois University. He is a graduate of 
Squadron Officer School, Air Command and Staff College, and Air War College. 
Among his awards and decorations are the Defense Superior Service Medal, Legion of 
Merit, Meritorious Service Medal with three oak leaf clusters, Air Medal, Air Force 
Commendation Medal with oak leaf cluster, Air Force Outstanding Unit Award with "V" 
device, Combat Readiness Medal, National Defense Service Medal with bronze service 
star, Armed Forces Expeditionary Medal, Small Arms Expert Marksmanship Ribbon with 
bronze star, and the Republic of Vietnam Gallantry Cross with Palm 
General Kelly is married to the former Mary Ann Missavage of Royalton, IL. They have 
two sons, Chase and Chad. 
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OFFICE OF NAVAL RESEARCH 
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MILITARY EDUCATION FOR THE 21 5T CENTURY WARRIOR 
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Brig Gen Ralph Pasini, USAF 
Vice Director, Operational Plans and Interoperability Directorate 
Deputy Director for Military Education 
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BRIGADIER GENERAL RALPH PASINI, USAF 
Vice Director, Operational Plans and Interoperability Directorate 
Deputy Director for Military Education 
Brigadier General Ralph Pasini serves on the Joint staff as Vice Director, Operational 
Plans and Interoperability Directorate, and Deputy Director for Military Education. He is 
responsible for a staff that coordinates conventional war plans; develops joint doctrine 
and implements Joint Vision 2010; monitors joint training and exercises; coordinates 
joint professional military education, and evaluates and analyzes joint exercises. 
Born and raised in Monongahela, Pennsylvania, General Pasini earned a Bachelor of Arts 
degree from West Virginia University, and a Master of Arts degree from Southern Illinois 
University. He entered the Air Force in 1970 and was initially assigned as a biomedical 
scientist, Wilford Hall Medical Center, Lackland AFB, TX, He then served as Team 
Chief, 3415th Special Training Group, Air Training Command, Lowry AFB, CO. 
After completion of pilot training at Vance AFB, OK, he served as co-pilot, pilot and 
flight commander, 46th Bomb Squadron, Grand Forks AFB, ND. He completed 
Squadron Officer School in 1976 and subsequently served as a section and squadron 
commander at the Squadron Officer School. In 1981 he attended the Combined Air 
Warfare Course and Air Command and Staff College. 
From June 1982 to May 1986, he served as aircraft commander, flight commander, 
operations officer and commander, 668th Bomb Squadron, Griffiss AFB. In 1987 he 
attended Air War College, and subsequently served in succession as Chief, Research and 
Analysis Division; Chief, Philippine Bases Relocation Study; and Chief, Policy and 
Strategy Division, United States Pacific Command at Camp H.M. Smith, HI. Promoted to 
the rank of Colonel in July 1988, he was assigned as a Senior Controller, Strategic Air 
Command Underground Command Center, Offutt AFB, NE. 
From September 1990 until August 1993, be served as Assistant Deputy Commander for 
Maintenance, 96th Bomb Wing; Commander, 96th Operations Group; and Vice 
Commander, 96th Wing, Dyess AFB, TX. From August 1993 to August 1995, he was the 
Commander, 5th Bomb Wing, Minot AFB, ND. He was subsequently assigned as the 
Deputy Director, Allied Command Europe Rapid Reaction Force Air Staff, Kalkar, 
Germany. 
General Pasini is a command pilot with more than 6,750 military and civilian flying 
hours including time in various models ofT-39, B-52, B-1 and KC-135 aircraft. 
In addition to numerous unit awards, General Pasini wears the Defense Superior Service 
Medal, the Legion of Merit, the Meritorious Service Medal with two oak leaf clusters, 
and the Air Force Commendation Medal with oak leaf cluster. 
General Pasini and his wife, Dolores (Dolly), both Pennsylvanians, are parents of three 
children: Nina, Michael, and Dolores Marie. 
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A Pathway to 
the Future 
Implementing 
Joint Vision 2010 ~ 
Good morning everybody. Before I get started, I'd like to thank the Naval 
Postgraduate School for having us out here. They did a tremendous job 
getting us in here and getting us set up - except for one small thing that 
happened to me. As I got to my room the first night and put my key in the 
door, the door would not open. I assumed that I had a technical problem and 
started banging - - this was at 0200 mind you - and shaking the door, as 
most bomber pilots would. I beat the hell out of it, and it wouldn't open. 
So I went and got my able assistant (Colonel) Mac Mclean, and he 
came up thinking there was a technical deficiency in the operator. He 
inserted the card and it still would not open, he finally went and got some 
assistance. About 2:45 in the morning, I was finally able to get into my room 
- - or rather, I found out they had given me another room. And that's a 
good thing, because the next morning, I found out that there was a young 
female in the room I was trying to get into. The headlines flashed before my 
eyes, "Another Air Force Brigadier General Commits Crime." 
So I'm happy to be here, and I'm happy to be able to talk to you about a 
subject that I've been totally immersed in over the last four months, and 
that's JV 2010. 
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... on Introducing Change 
DDDDDDDDDm 
And it ought to be remembered that there is nothing more 
difficult to take in hand, more perilous to conduct, or more 
uncertain in its success, than to take the lead in the introduction 
of a new order of things. Because the innovator has for enemies 
all those who have done well under the old conditions, and 
lukewarm defenders in those who may do well under the new. 
The coolness arises partly from fear of the opponents, who have 
the laws on their side, and partly from the incredulity of men, 
who do not readily believe in the new things until they have had a 
long experience of them. 
Thus, it happens that whenever those who are hostile have the 
opportunity to attack they do it like partisans, whilst the others 
defend lukewarmly ... 
The Prince, 1513 
There are a lot of people doing a lot of good things with JV 2010. I'm 
here to tell you that JV 2010 will not fail due to lack of support from the 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the vice chairman or the director. 
This was General Shali's program, and it is now General Shelton's 
program. It could fail because we do not have the technical capability to 
do JV 2010, but I doubt that very much. It would be a great shame if it 
failed because of a lack of information, or misinformation, or 
disinformation. 
So, I'm here today to try to clear up some of the concepts of JV 2010, 
and to give you my cut on it as a new guy to the program. I've only been 
at the Joint Staff four months, and I believe my cup is about half-full. As 
I said, many, many people are working very hard on this program . 
. I received a calendar in the mail, as I'm sure some of you also did the 
other day, from Rand Corporation, and I hung it on the wall in my 
bathroom. I was looking at it one day, and I said, ''VVhat's on this 
calender is a good segue into what I'm going to talk about at the Naval 
Postgraduate School." 
The calendar talks about change. JV 2010 represents a significant 
change in the way we are going to do business in the Department of 
Defense over the next few years. We are not indifferent to change. 
We've been going through a lot of change over the last few years. But, 
again, it would be a shame if change were the reason that people didn't 




Provide information on the 
implementation of JV 2010 
•JV 2010 
• Implementation Process 
• Assessment Roadmaps 
•Progress to Date 
•The "Road Ahead" 
I'm going to try to cover the basic road map of where we are right 
now and where we're going in the implementation process. Some of you 
already know that my boss, Major General George Close, Jr., U.S. Army 
is the executive agent for JV 2010. Obviously, also the Joint Warfighting 
Center and J- 7 are involved as the implementers of JV 201 O in that 
process. And there are a lot of other folks out there who are involved in 
this process. 
We are joined at the hip with the J- 8 folks who work with Vince 
Roske. Like any potato- sack race where you have a three- legged 
vehicle, people occasionally stumble and fall. We're working very hard 
to fix that. 
8-61 
Joint Vision 2010 
------~LJLJ LJLJLJLJLJDOm 
• America's Military Preparing for Tomorrow: 
Quality People, Trained, Equipped, and 
Ready for Joint Operations 
- Persuasive in Peace 
- Decisive in War 
- Preeminent in any Form of Conflict 
• The vision is a conceptual template that 
provides a common direction and framework 
for our Services to develop their unique 
capabilities as they prepare to meet an 
uncertain and challenging future. 
A Pathway to the Future ... 
Today's Vision ... Tomorrow's Armed Forces 
When you all came in the auditorium door, you probably noticed that 
we had some propaganda to hand out to you - which were these two 
items. Most of the stuff I'm going to talk about are in these two books. 
If you have an opportunity to read those, I think they will capture the 





Full Spectrum Dominance 
~-------LJLJDLJDLJLJDDm 
Yesterday Vince Roske put this slide up, and here we're talking primarily about 
what's on the right- hand side -- about full- spectrum dominance. Everything in JV 
2010 is geared towards full- spectrum dominance in the U.S. military in the year 
2010, plain and simple. However, it starts at a rather low level. It starts with 
peace- support, peace- keeping, and peace- enforcement operations. On the 
upper end are humanitarian operations - things like we're doing in Haiti right now; 
things like our troops are doing in Macedonia and on the Golan Heights, as well as 
in Bosnia. These are all the way through the middle range -- small brush- fire-type 
things we might be required to do. Now look all the way at the bottom, where we've 
got to do major warfare in two theaters and/or nuclear operations. 
The operations are all encompassing, and that's really nothing new, is it? We're 
pretty used to doing those kinds of things. On the left- hand side of the diagram, 
you'll notice our four key parameters: dominant maneuver, precision engagement, 
focused logistics, and full- dimensional protection. 
You've probably heard those words before. There's not a lot of change in them. 
But in the ideas, in the concepts of what they mean internally, there is a significant 
change, because we're going to bring all forces to bear to accomplish these four 
goals. As someone said the other day, those on the left are two hoops that we've 
got to jump through to get to full- spectrum dominance. I like to characterize them 
as lenses that, again, focus things on full- spectrum dominance. The first lens on 
the far right- hand side represents two of our enablers, and those are information 
superiority and technological innovation. 
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As General Steele said several weeks ago, "If we do not get the information 
superiority part of this thing right up front, we are doomed to failure." I think 
everyone agrees with that. The technological innovation will come. And as my 
boss, Admiral Blair often says, "If Rip Van Winkle were to go away for the next 
thirteen years and suddenly show up on the battlefield in 2010, he would recognize 
it immediately. There would be M1 tanks and M2 Bradleys. In the air, we'd see F-
15 and F-16 fighters, and maybe some new F-22s. At sea, we'd see carrier 
battlegroups. There wouldn't be a whole lot of change in terms of what we'd see, 
would there? But there would be a significant change in the information, and in the 
ability to communicate information, to bring all these wonderful things we have in 
space and on the ground into focus. So, that's the really tough part of this 
equation: information superiority. And we need to pay a lot of attention to it. 
In the second lens we have what's called DOTML-P. If you we're a green 
uniform out there, you'd probably understand that pretty clearly. If you wear a blue 
uniform, or you're in the Navy, you probably have a less better understanding of 
what DOTML-P is all about. 
We're talking about joint doctrine, and I think that pretty much speaks for 
itself. We're talking about agile organizations, the ability of organizations to flex as 
they grow. And we're talking about training and education, which is the key part of 
this thing, which we haven't really attacked very hard so far. This is something I 
think we should all listen to very carefully over the next few hours in this room, and 
certainly over the next few weeks, as General Shelton makes some 
pronouncements about the role of education in this DOTML-P process. 
Enhanced material will come. We've heard a lot about innovator leadership 
today because you play a key role in developing that. And high-quality people are 
the single most important part of this equation. So, I'm going to refer to this as 
DOTML-P. 
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Concept and Capabilities Assessment 
j .w 2010 Experimentation I ~~~~t~L j.w 2010 Exercise Program I 
6 
Up at the top, we have Joint Vision 2010 -- the purple book you should all have 
a copy of. We think it's important that you read this 33-page document. It came 
about when, several years ago, General Shali brought General Wes Clark down to 
his office and said, "I need you to put together some ideas. The Cold War is over. 
We were triumphant in Desert Storm. It's time for us to look ahead about how we're 
going to fight and win on the prairie in 2010." 
The second part in this equation was published in May 1997. It's called the 
Concept for Future Joint Operations. It steps further down the road from what's in 
the purple book. It lays out how we're going to go about getting through the four 
concepts, establishing the five or six challenges that are under each of those 
concepts, and the desired operational capabilities that will result from that process. 
So, this is also a key part of what we're doing. It's good reading -- about 90 
pages. Yet, frankly, you have to read it several times until what we're trying to do 
here settles in. We're trying to take desired operational capabilities we have today 
and translate those into required operational capabilities (ROCs) for the 2010 
battlefield. We're going to do that with JV 2010 experimentation and exercise 
programs. We've already started some of this with things that the Army and the 
Navy have been doing, some of which you've already heard about from previous 
speakers at this conference. 
What we have to do though, is integrate all this information and get it up to the 
decision-makers -- up through the JRB, and the DEPOPS DEPs, the OPS DEPs, 
the JROC, an the JCS - for full integration, so that the DOTML-P piece can be 




• Coordinating Authority (CA) - An individual assigned responsibility for 
coordinating specific Joint Vision functions or activities. Authority to require 
consultation, but not to compel agreement. Refers unresolved matters to the 
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. Each individual has latitude to task organize 
and develop appropriate relationships unique to each functional area. 
• 21st Century Challenge -- A security challenge relevant to the future 
environment Ytlhich serves as compelling rationale for investigating desired 
operational capabilities. A "Linchpin Challenge" is the most leveraging and 
demanding 21st Century Challenge(s) within a coordinating authority's area. 
• Core Tasks - Describes Ytlhat the Joint Force Commander must be able to 
accomplish. Consists of a logical grouping of Desired Operational 
Capabilities. 
• Desired Operational Capability (DOC) -A concept-based statement of the 
ways and means to satisfy the Joint Force Commander's Core Tasks. Stated 
in terms of subordinate tasks, conditions, and criteria for measurement. 
• Postulate --An "if-then" statement that relates core tasks and desired 





• J-6 Information Superiority J 
(with J-2 ISR and J-3 Info Ops support Enabling 
• J-8 Technological Innovation 
Concepts 
• J-8 Dominant Maneuver 
• J-8 Precision Engagement Operational 
• J-8 Full Dimensional Protectio Concepts 
• J-4 Focused Logistics 
• J-7/JWFC Full Spectrum Dominance The Goal 
(with J-3 support for C2) 
8 
The Chairman recently assigned coordinating authorities -- Joint Staff 
directors at the three- star level - for each of these particular concepts. 
One of the recent changes is that the J- 7 and the Joint Warfighting Center 
have picked up the full- spectrum dominance part. 
Full- dimensional protection has moved from the J- 3 down to the J- 8. 
The C2 part also has moved from information superiority down to 
full- spectrum dominance. (None of this is hard and fast, by the way -- it 
can all change as time goes by). Is C2 now in the right place? I don't know. 
Will it stay there? It may, or it may not. We thought it cut across all the 
items in the model, so that's why we put it down there for now. 
When the Chairman assigned these coordinating authorities, he also 
assigned them the responsibility for putting together the teams that would 
interact with the services, the CINCs, OSD, and all the other agencies 





Staff Services OSD 
DOD CINCs Agencies Others 
,.., .--, .--, ,--, ,--, r-1 
JS I STRIKE lJ 
JS I LAND & LITTORAL WARFARE -a 
J4 I STRATEGIC MOBILITY & SUSI AlNABILITY u 
JS I SEA, AIR, & SPACE SUPERIORITY -a 
JS I DETERRENCE I COUNTER PROLIFERATION 1JJ 
J6 I COMMAND & CONTROL [J 
J3 I INFORMATION WARFARE [J 
J3 COMBATING TERRORISM J 
J2 I INTELLIGENCE, SURVEILLANCE & RECONNAISSANCE Ul 
JS REGIONAL ENGAGEMENT I PRESENCE u 
Jl/J3/P JOINT READINESS u 9 
I'm going to be talking about JWCAs here. There are currently 12. 
J-8 does JWCAs for the for the CINCs in response to shortfalls or seams 
in weapon systems. But the CINCs have asked for more. 
One example of a JWCA that's being worked fairly heavily is 
anti- personal land mines. Brigadier General Jim Grazioplane, USA, is 
working that real hard. And there are other examples. I recently went 
on a JWCA road show for two weeks, where we visited the CinCs - a 
very interesting process. Just recently, the Chairman approved the use 
of the JWCAs for this particular process that we're involved in with JV 
2010. 
So, one of the key elements of JV 2010 is the co-evaluation of this 
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We're trying to marginalize, remove or eliminate the old stovepipes that 
used to exist between the left and right- hand sides of these charts --
between the materiel side on the left- hand side, represented by the 
JWCAs, and the DOTML- P represented on the right- hand side --what the 
services and CINCs are trying to do. 
In the middle are the key areas that require coordination by my boss, 
General Close, the J- 7. Major General Hal Homburg, who runs the Joint 
Warfighting Center, is working there as the integrator. The coordinating 
authorities work with the Joint Vision Working Group, a two- star level 
board, and continually pass information back and forth to make sure that 
each agency knows what's going on. The board finally reports to the JRB 
and DEPOPS DEPs, two different sets of people up through the OP steps 
to JCS, to JROC, keeping that information loop going all the time. 
We're trying to keep this process plugged into the JWCA process, and 
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The first time I saw this slide, I was totally confused. You may be as 
well. Let me try to keep this really simple. We have four JV 201 O 
operational concepts. So, what will be the characteristics of 21st Century 
warfare? We get the input from the National Military Strategy and the 
Defense Planning Guidance. 
By the way, we had our first meeting on the Defense Planning 
Guidance day before yesterday. It's going to come out in the year 2000. 
There's a significant change in the way this is going to be operated. It's 
going to be written; we're going to have it done by about the 31st of 
March; and it's going to be internally organized according to dominant 
maneuver, precision engagement, and so on. That's a significant 
change from the way it's written, and is something for you to pay 
attention to. 
So we come through the DPG, and we come down to 21st Century 
challenges. We think there are probably a number of challenges and 
some four or five sub-bullets for each one of those. We've established 
some postulates: "If this happens, then that should happen." And we 
have necked those 21st Century down to some core tasks, which are on 
the vertical scale of the diagram on the right- hand side. And we're 
trying to identify desired operational capabilities, of which there are 
probably thousands. 
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• Battlespace Awareness 
•Information Operations 
Precision Engagement 
•Integrating Precision Effects 
•Mobile Targets 
•Counter WMD Operations 
•Hard/Deeply Buried Targets 
Dominant Maneuver 
•Rapid Joint Force Projection 
•Batt/espace Control 
•Integration of Coalition Warfi 
•Joint Forced Entry 
•Urban Operations L-,-.,...---,-----...,..--......-' •Command & Control Warfare 
Full Dimensional Protection 
•Air/Missile Defense (Theater/National) 
•Combating Terrorism 
•Combat Identification 
•Defensive Information Operations 
•Information Fusion 
•Joint Deployment!Rapid Distro 
•Force Medical Protection 
•Agile Infrastructure 
•Multinational Logistics 
•Joint Theater istics CZ 
These are the 21st Century challenges. We think there should 
probably be only about four or five challenges for each of these specific 
areas. And, by the way, these challenges change regularly. In fact, 
right before I left, I had to change a slide because one of the challenges 
had changed just as I walked out the door - and that was "seam less 
operations" in our agency, PBOs, NGOs. There are also others on the 
slide that are changing. We're going to take a look at one of these. 
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Full Spectrum Dominance 
21st Centurv Warfare Environment 
Adveisaries with both high· and low-tech asymmetric 
conventional capabilities; some with WMD 
• Lower threshold of acceptable risk 
• Wider range of interoperability requirements with 
partners (multinational, interagency, and NGO/PVO) 
• More use of information as a weapon 
• Less nlannina and execution time 
Postulate 
Challenge: Joint Command and Control 
ISSUE: 
In any operation, conduct decisive 
operations by integrating JV 2010's new 
operational concepts through joint 
command and control 
!f we can provide the Joint Force Commander vvith -
•The capabilities resident in OM, PE, FL, and FOP, enabled by Information Superiority 
• The training, education, experience, judgment and instincts to effectively execute the art of command 
Then 
•Joint forces will provide the NCA with deterrent options across the range of military operations 
• Our 2010 JFCs will have the skills, knowledge, and attitude to meet 2010 challenges 
• Our 201 O JFCs can apply the proper balance of the new operational concepts to any mission (decisive 
operations) in order to: 
• Dictate the tempo of operations 
• Gain a decisive advantage in "speed of command" 
• Detennine the right balance of centralized vs. decentralized planning and execution 
• Identify and attack adversary centers of gravity 
• Increase the joint force's operational reach 
• Achieve leverage by properly arranging symmetrical and asymmetrical actions 
• More accurately determine, and effectively operate within, an acceptable level of risk 
• Tenninate operations on tenns favorable to NCA objectives 
When we take a look at full spectrum dominance, the one challenge 
that stands out is joint command and control. This is to show you the 
process we're using as we go through each of these challenges. 
What's the issue? What will be the characteristics of 21st Century 
warfare? The if- then postulate is at the bottom, with the detail required 
to pull this off. 
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DOC Sample 
. ______ CJDDDDDDDDrn 
DOC Number: FSD-02 Trtle: Real-time, secure info between forces and leaders 
Description: Provide assured comms, sufficient bandwidth, controlled access & ability 
to manage multiple users With multiple access levels & permissions 
CA Sponsor: JWFC/J-7 
Challenge: Unity of Action 
Core Task: Dominant Battlespace Awareness 
WTL Ref: OP 5.1.1 Communicate Operational Information 
Conditions: Obstacles to Movement; Electromagnetic Effects; Command Arrangements; and 
Telecommunications Infrastructure 
Measures: Minutes queuing time for message; Percent of time info passed within established criteria; 
and Percent accuracy of info transmitted/disseminated. 
Candidate Critical Performance Measure: Percent of JFC employment decisions supported with 
required, timely, fused, and analyzed info. 
Means: Integrated planning, partners, and comms; multi-level access/security; database of networked 
info; and uninterrupted info exchange 
Assessment Strategy: Information Superiority Exercise (ISX) conducted in a EUCOM Environment 
within a Regional Contingency, Attack Defend Mission. Incorporates appropriate ACTDs. 
Hypothesis: /fwe provide real-time, secure comms between forces and leaders, Then we can give the 
JFC the capability to control the battlespace; reduce risk to forces and materiel; and realize the 
prerequisites for FSD. 14 
We now move to one of the small areas from the previous slide -- a 
desired operational capability - and you can see the level of detail all 
the way down to what part of the UJTL this thing refers to, and further 
down to the bottom of the hypothesis. We're going to be doing this for 
many, many different issues, with those seven or eight areas I've 
already briefed to you. 
Information not pictured here but also included in the template is: 
• Other affected CAs who might be interested in participating in 
the assessment of this DOC or the results of assessment; 
• Once a catalogue match is found (from the JV 2010 Catalogue 
of Assessment Events), the template will indicate whether or not 
the event sponsor (Service, CINC, Agency, etc.) has agreed to 
give JV 2010 access or whether coordination must still be 
completed. 
• CA and sponsor administrative information. 
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Progress to Date 
. _____ ____,IDDDDDDDDDm 
• Joint Vision Working Group (23 Jul) 
» 2-Star level reps from 33 organizations 
» Purpose: Review implementation & identify/develop issues 
• JROC approved roadmap methodology and use of 
JWCAs (10 Sep) 
• Common implementation process and terminology 
(11 Sep) 
• Coordinating Authorities "moving out" 
• Conducted Integration Conference #1 (21-23 Oct) 
» Updated joint community, strengthened ownership, and 
brainstormed challenges and DOCs 
» Issues: CINC involvement and DOTMLP integration 
15 
What's our progress to date? How are we doing? Some people would tell you that we're 
doing very well. If you talk to people outside the beltway, they will ask you, "Where's the 
beef?" - if you remember the old Burger King commercial years ago. 
At this point, I'll tell you that the beef is in the role of the joint staff, the CINCs and services 
that produce a lot of the material, and circulate that information. I think we're doing a 
reasonably good job at that. The responsibility of the folks on the outside is to read the 
materials we pass out, and I think we're having difficulty getting them to do that. That's the 
reason General Close and I are spending so much time on the road recently talking to 
audiences like you, trying to spread the word on what we're doing and to get some feedback -
- some good, honest feedback - so we can make our course corrections. 
We had a Joint Vision Working Group on 23 July, and we had another one the other day --
at the two- star level and representing 33 organizations. We went over the same kind of 
things we went over today, in significantly more detail. We got their feedback, and made our 
modifications. 
I've already told you that the JROC approved the use of the JWCAs. That took place as a 
result of that first meeting. We developed a common implementation process, of how we're 
going to write the road maps between all the services, the CINCs and the Joint Staff. 
The coordinating authorities are moving out, and they're moving out very rapidly. They've 
made a lot of progress. There are a lot of people working many, many hours on this JV 2010 
process, and it doesn't all just focus on that Wednesday morning meeting with Admiral Blair. 
It focuses on working with the folks down at Joint Warfighting Center, who are really doing 
yeoman work, the people down at ACOM, and all over various CINCdoms. 
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Progress to Date 
, ______ IDDDDDDDDDm 
• Brief to combined JRB/DEPOPSDEPS (18 Nov) 
»- JRB: MG Adams, USA; RADM Craine, USN; Maj Gen Wax, 
USAF; MajGen Braaten, USMC 
»- DEPOPSDEPS: MG Von Kaenel; RADM Moore, USN; Maj 
Gen Peterson, USAF; BGen Gregson, USMC 
»- Formal staffing (JS-136) of major JV 2010 products 
»- Integration of Ops reps into CA teams 
• Brief to OPSDEPS (3 Dec) 
»- LTG Burnette, USA; VADM Ellis, USN; Lt Gen Gamble, 
USAF; LtGen Steele, USMC 
• JWFC developing Assessment Database & CA Web 
pages ( http://www.jwfc.js.mil/Pages/jwfc04.htm) 
16 
We conducted our first integration conference on October 21-23, 
1997. At it, the CINCs said, 'We want more involvement in the process. 
We want to have action officers assigned permanently. And we really 
want to be kept plugged into what's going on." 
We briefly combined JRB and DEPOPSDEPs on the 1 ath of 
November. These are the individuals who attended. The basic results 
of that meeting were similar. They said, "We want a chop on what 
comes out of these meetings. We want to be kept informed. We want 
you to take our ideas." We agreed to do that, not only for the services 
and the CINCs. That process is ongoing as we speak. 
We briefed the OPSDEPs on the third of December, with similar 
results. Down at the Joint Warfighting Center, they have a page on the 
web, as listed here. If you want to know the current status of where we 
are in JV 2010, it's there in tremendous detail. 
I'd recommend it to any of you, particularly those of you who are 
students. If you have a chance, take a look at that. If you're writing a 
paper that has anything to do with JV 2010, it is a great source of 
information. 
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JV 2010 Master Timeline 
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Starting at the upper right- hand corner, if we're going to field that 
201 O force to take on all comers, we've got to get some things working 
backwards. We've got to have those forces exercised -- and that's not 
just part of the force. That's not just a small exercise done by the Air 
Force, Army, Navy, Marines, Coast Guard. That's one by all the forces 
prepared to fight in 2010. 
Before we do that, of course, the doctrine folks Admiral Blair is 
responsible for have to write understandable, clearly discernible 
doctrine. That's not easy to do, I can tell you. We may have to change 
the UCP as a result of what we're trying to do here. You heard General 
Sheehan talk about that yesterday, and other people have other 
suggestions. We're going to have to work the POM and QDR very hard. 
We want to have what we call a Superbowl event -- a joint warfighting 
experiment. 
We really do not know - - and we're really just in the formative 
stages here - - what it's going to look like. We don't know if ACOM is 
going to do that. We don't know if the services are going to do that. It'll 
probably be a combination of all of them. But that Superbowl event will 
be designed to prove the theories we're putting together on JV 2010. 
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"Challenge" and "Focus" Series 
~---------'IDDDDDDDDDm 
• Establish a series of joint assessments/experiments 
~ "Challenge" series of FTX and CPX events 







PE, OM, FOP, FL 
IS 
• Develop ties to and build upon Service and other 
joint efforts 
A "challenge and focus" series is what we think they're going to be 
called if it's approved by the chairman. We'll have a challenge series 
that focuses on FTX and CPXs, a focus series on studies and war 
games, a global challenge focus, a man challenge focus, and so on. 
These will be the advance we build, develop, exercise, and train to 
determine whether or not we can do what we say we're trying to do. 
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JV2010 
Here is a roadmap that shows when we envision subsequent exercises 
will fall out. 
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This is the JV 201 O timeline. As we go across the road, we have 
planned about a year ahead. We're now working two to three years out, 
to try to plan exactly how we're going to do this. You can see that in 
December we briefed the JRB, DEPOPS DEPs, and OPS DEPs. Right 
now, as we speak, we're probably winding up the second integrating 
conference at the Joint Warfighting Center on prioritizing. I understand 
that the Joint Vision Working Group, which kicked off the first day with 
senior flag officers, went extremely well, and that it was a great 
exchange of information. Some key problems were identified for 
additional study. Coming out of that conference, the Joint Staff will put 
together a "136" that will go out to the CINCs and services for 
coordination and feedback. 
Integrating conference number three will be up in March, on exact 
synchronizing between the services, the Cl NCs and the Joint Staff - on 
how we're going to go about putting this JV 2010 master plan together. 
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The key item up is publishing the JV 2010 implementation master 
plan (JMP) sitting on my desk right now. If you read nothing else, if you 
have a chance to read the JMP, do it; because it really lays out JV 2010, 
and what we know, and how we think we're going to proceed on this. 
We'll do more integrating conferences down the road, and will hopefully 
get feedback from the key people involved in this process. 
I was given the opportunity, as I told you, to go on the road show with 
J- 8. On the first of February, my boss, General Close, will be going on a 
JROC road show to do the same thing -- to talk and get feedback from 
the CINCs, and the general and flag officers that represent them. 





NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL 
and 
OFFICE OF NAVAL RESEARCH 
CONFERENCE ON 
MILITARY EDUCATION FOR THE 21 5T CENTURY WARRIOR 
Remarks by 
RADM Wayne E. Meyer, USN (Ret.) 
Former Ordnance Officer of the Navy; 
Former Deputy Commander for Weapons and Combat Systems, 
Naval Sea Systems, Naval Sea Systems Command 
I've been wondering how to reflect to you in the ten minutes we have 
remaining, and I can't help but notice that, whenever the subject turns to 
technology, the audience starts to thin. I feel a little bit like Red Barber, who was 
fond of quoting one of his cousins who always said, "As you get older, do a little 
plowing every day, because if you stop, you're a goner." After having spent over 
half a century in the Navy, reflecting on what I view as the needs of officers in the 
future, I feel constrained to look a little bit backwards. 
First, I want to say that this is an important conference. The subjects 
covered are important ones -- important to the nation, and are certainly important to 
the profession in which we work. But there are a number of other aspects I would 
like to discuss -- to give you something to think about and to create a little bit of 
balance. So, please don't translate this as my being against anything. I'm certainly 
not against Joint Vision 2010, for example. But I couldn't help but take note of the 
general's expression. It did hurt my head a little bit when he mentioned it. 
I take the position on 2010 that Admiral Rickover used to take repeatedly 
when I testified with him. When we got asked a question about a gun or a 
launcher, he always said, "Mr. Congressman, you have to ask someone else. 
That's not my field of expertise. My field of expertise is nuclear power." 
Now, I come from the Sixth Congressional District in Missouri, which is north 
of the river. I was born in the "gumbo" (the muddy bottom) of the river - in a town a 
bit further down-river from where Ike (Skelton) was born. The folks from Ike's side 
of the river have a different accent than we have on my side. We're a lot easier to 
understand, I think, most days. I want to say something about my own life. It's 
easy to go on forever about it, but I want to talk about it in the context of why I think 
that education needs balancing. I'll also discuss the importance of this very 
institution in which we sit. · 
About a year and a half ago, Secretary John Douglas came alongside me at 
a social and said, "Wayne, we're creating an Acquisition Hall of Fame for the Navy, 
and we're going to have a display in the Pentagon." And then he said, ''You're 
going to be my first pioneer." I took note of that and said, "Okay, got it." And I 
8-83 
heard nothing more about it for months. 
Last April, though, Lieutenant Commander Patty Van Belle called me up on 
Saturday morning at home. She said, "Admiral, we're setting up this Hall of Fame 
in which you're a pioneer. We're going to have an affair on the 18th of April, and 
we'd like for you be present." I told her that I planned to be in California on a gig, 
and asked whether she could make it another time. 
"Well, no," she said. "It's already pretty well locked in and all the others are 
set up." After a pause she said, "You know, there are seven pioneers." 
I said "Oh, I didn't know that! I got the feeling from the Secretary that I was 
the pioneer." 
"Well," she said, "the reason we have seven is that it got to be too hard." 
"Oh," I said. "I understand that, because you're very democratic and 
politically correct back there in that structure." 
By then my curiosity was up, so I said, "By the way, who are the other 
pioneers?" 
"Well," she said, ''We can't tell you that unrn that day. But, you'll know some 
of them." Then she added, "But most of them are dead." 
And I said, "I'll be there." 
So, I went traipsing over to this affair, which was held in the Pentagon's 
E-ring. Secretary Kaminski came, and the Secretary of the Navy, and a number of 
other people. It was a very, very fine affair. 
It started with the naming of John Ericsson as a pioneer. Now, John 
Erickson designed the USS Monitor, but, more importantly, he also invented the 
screw propeller. So, that's going back a little bit. 
The next pioneer named was Admiral Moffett. Admiral Moffett, who has an 
airfield named after him here in California, was the Chief of the Bureau of 
Aeronautics and a great officer. Popularly, he is sometimes thought of as the 
father of modern carrier aviation. 
The next one was Marine Corps General Moses. General Moses, in the late 
'30s, was the officer who oversaw and supervised the designs and experimental 
construction of the various landing craft, which became popularly known as LCACs. 
Thousands were manufactured during World War II, and excellently so. 
The next one was Admiral Hyman Rickover - the first person whose widow 
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was present to accept the award. 
Next was Admiral Smith, of the Polaris program, whose widow was likewise 
present to accept the award. 
Then they finally got down to me -- I was the first living one to accept it. 
The final one out of the seven was Admiral Walt Locke, who had been the 
Tomahawk project manager, and was the director of the infamous JCMPO, the 
Joint Cruise Missile Project Office, in the era of Dr. Bill Barry. 
When it was all finished, we had a social. Captain Mike Cassidy, now 
retired, who was not always respectful of older people, walked up to me and said, 
"You know," he said. "I've noticed something interesting about this. Three of the 
seven pioneers were fired by Secretary John Lehman." 
Well, I couldn't wait to rush up and tell Mr. Douglas this important fact. I 
pointed out to him that Meyer, Rickover, and Locke were all fired by Secretary of 
the Navy John Lehman. This really took him by surprise. He'd never thought about 
this -- I mean, it drew him up. He paused, maybe 30 seconds, and said, "That tells 
you something. I don't know what it tells you, but it does." 
That's the end of that sea story. My point is that, insofar as I know, not one 
of those great people who had something to do with really shaping the Navy ever 
attended a war college. They did not have the advantage of Goldwater-Nichols. 
And I don't believe a single one of them ever set foot in Fort Belvior to study 
acquisition reform, or any of those other movements. They were all able to achieve 
something great without having had the benefit of that. 
Also look at their careers. I can't say this for John Ericsson, specifically, but 
if you look at the others, all of them were significant operators. They had practiced 
the art of naval ships, and each had technical education of some kind or another. 
My point is, every one of them had advanced education, which they 
achieved inside the naval structure. I think that's important. I want to rail on that in 
the two or three minutes I have left. It seems to me that one of the stars we must 
be guided by is naval design, and, for that matter, any military weaponry. Two 
questions have to be posed repeatedly: "What's the price of failure?" and "What 
are you willing to accept for failure?" 
You can make things really cheap. You can reduce your manning to 
nothing. You can make your craft unattended - use UAVs, for example. When I 
was an ensign 50 years ago, UAVs were "just around the corner," and they're still 
"just around the corner." 
The big storm today in the Northeast, in Canada and New England, tells us 
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something. You've all seen those pathetic pictures of the collapse of all the power 
lines. If you looked at CNN this morning, you saw hundreds and hundreds of irate 
people, having been in the shelters for many days by now, in the cold, deprived of 
electricity and all the amazing wonders that go with electricity. Now, that's 
something we cannot tolerate in the military. Thafs how you're going to lose the 
battle. We cannot tolerate designs that produce those kinds of problems. 
Yet when most of you officers who are still active recently put to sea, you 
went assuming your gear was sound, that it was ready to go - just as we'll leave 
here today and get in an automobile, or get on board an airplane and make some 
incredible assumptions about its availability, its safety, and the mission it should 
fulfill. 
Here in this assembly are a number of former battlegroup commanders, all 
of whom who, at one time or another, have had some remark to make to me about 
gear performance. I can start Admiral Denny Blair, and I see Jerry Smith and 
Admiral Quast. All of them learned repeatedly that they'd better have some 
cohesive, coherent structure that knows how the hell to make their gear work. 
Because, as Admiral Jim Doyle is fond of saying, "The Navy is its ships, its 
airplanes, and it's submarines; and the way the Navy fights or exercises is thrr" •0h 
its people." And the expression of that is its ordnance. 
Now, ordnance comes in a lot of flavors: missiles, bombs, electronics, radio 
signals, and so forth. And I mean ordnance in its broader context because, while 
command and control has a mandatory requirement to be able to exercise, it has 
another very important requirement, and that is to serve. It must be focused on the 
employment of weapons because, in the end, landing and taking and occupying 
territory is what keeps you from being vanquished - sets you apart as the victor. 
For this, ordnance in particular is critical. My God, what incredible 
assumptions we make about our ordnance. We have missiles now that cost 
several million dollars each, with millions of electronic parts in them. We have 
convinced ourselves that we can design a test that will guarantee that they will 
work -- that, through some statistical process, we can have assurance that a whole 
batch of them will work. Yet, they're put together by thousands of people 
throughout the land who do not even know what the whole round looks like - but 
every one is constructed that way. And you're completely dependent that someone 
did not make an error in a details, because ordnance works on details, not 
generalities. 
One of Admiral Rickover's favorite sayings was, "The devil is in the details, 
and everything we do in the military is a detail." 
Why am I harping on that? There's not been very much said at this meeting, 
and I think appropriately so, about one really serious thing that we're confronted 
with in our country, from both a theoretical and also from a homeland viewpoint. 
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And that's defending ourselves against missile attack. Someone alluded yesterday 
-- and correctly so -- that you don't have to be much of a country now to come by 
ballistic missile capability. That's fact. Most of our leaders tell us that there are as 
many as 35 or 40 countries with such capability. 
I've now been been serving on a task force for several months called the 
Ballistic Missile Defense Task Force for testing, where we've been tasked by 
Department of Defense officials on the technique of hit-to-kill. Because National 
Missile Defense, Patriot Three, standard missile three in the Navy, and the THAAD 
missile in the Army, are all based on the principle of hit-to-kill. The record to date 
isn't much. I tell you, what really bothers me, is that I cannot find the officer 
leadership in place within that structure, in any service. It has fallen. The 
development of operationally experienced, technically-adept leaders has fallen, 
and our "weaponeering" process is floundering as a result. 
This institution (NPS) and others like it are in great danger, not by active 
attack, but by neglect. So I urge you, when you consider your further deliberations 
after this conference, do not forget how important education to produce 
operationally experienced, technically-adept officers is, too. 
There are three papers I'd like to see in the conference proceedings. The 
first is a distillation from Admiral Arleigh Burke's action reports during the war about 
what is important in battle, and what is important in leadership. I bring this up 
because Tom (Marflak) mentioned earlier that Nimitz himself was technically 
dexterous; so was Admiral Burke, who was an ordnance engineer. 
The second is paper, written by MIT mathematics professor Gian-Carlo 
Rota, provides some food for thought about education in general. There are 
lessons in it for all who consider themselves part of the PME establishment. 
The third is the 1995-1996 academic year report of Dr. Charles M. Vest, the 
President of MIT. It talks about the very subjects discussed here yesterday, about 
boldness, and the complacency that has set in on us technologically. 
All these people believed in strong sub-technical educations, and in the 
importance of basics. So I would urge us all to review them again, because I think 
you can become uncomfortable really quick as a commanding officer or battlegroup 
commander if you, or those close to you, do not have an adequate understanding 
of the laws of thermodynamics and electrical engineering. 
Thank you for your attention. 
Editor's Note: Dr. Vest's report is used with permission from the MIT News 
Office. Dr. Rota's article is used with permission from the author. 
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REAR ADMIRAL WAYNE E. MEYER, USN (Ret.) 
Rear Admiral Wayne E. Meyer, a native of Brunswick, Missouri, retired in 1985 as the 
Deputy Commander for Weapons and Combat Systems, Naval Sea Systems, Naval Sea 
Systems Command and Ordnance Officer of the Navy. His career began in 1943 as an 
apprentice seaman. He was commissioned Ensign, U.S. Naval Reserve, in 1946 and was 
transferred to regular Navy in 1948. 
Rear Admiral Meyer holds a B.S. degree in Electrical Engineering from the University of 
Kansas, a B.S. in Electrical Engineering, and a M.S. in Astronautics and Aeronautics 
from the MIT, and a B.S. in Electrical Engineering from the Naval Postgraduate School. 
His first sea duty in GOODRICH (DDR-831) was followed by sea tours in 
SPRINGFIELD (CL-66), SIERRA (AD-18), and STRICKLAND (DER-333). He served 
on the Staff Commander, Destroyer Force, Atlantic. He also served on the T ALOS 
cruiser GALVESTON (CLC-3) as Fire Control and subsequently Weapons Officer. He 
then reported to the Secretary of the Navy's Special Task Force for Surface Missile 
Systems in Washington, D.C. He transferred to the Naval Ordnance Engineering Corps in 
1965. 
In 1967, he reported as Director of Engineering at the Naval Ship Missile Systems 
Engineering Station, Port Hueneme, CA. In 1970, he was assigned to the Naval Ordnance 
Systems Command, as Manager, AEGIS Weapons System He was named Project 
Manager for Surface Missile Systems in 1972 and in 1974, he was named the first 
Director of Surface Warfare, Naval Sea Systems Command. In 1975, he assumed duties 
as Project Manager, AEGIS Shipbuilding. In 1983, he assumed duties as Deputy 
Commander, Weapons and Combat Systems Naval Sea Systems Command. 
Rear Admiral Meyer's personal decorations and service medals include: Distinguished 
Service Medal, Legion of Merit, Meritorious Service Medal, Navy Meritorious Unit 
Commendation Ribbon with Bronze Star, China Service Medal, American Campaign 
Medal, World War II Victory Medal, Navy Occupation Service Medal, National Defense 
Medal with Bronze Star, Armed Forces Expeditionary Medal, Vietnam Service Medal, 
Republic of Vietnam Gallantry Cross with Palm Unit Citation, and Republic of Vietnam 
Civil Actions Unit Citation. He holds the American Society of Naval Engineers Gold 
Medal (1970), Silver Medal from the Old Crow Electronics Countermeasure Association, 
the Distinguished Engineer Alumni Award from the University of Kansas, and the 
Missile Systems Award from the American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics. In 
1985 he received the Navy League's RADM William Parsons Award, and the Harold E. 
Sanders Award from the American Society of Naval Engineers. In 1988, the National 
Security Industrial Association recognized him with its Admiral J.H. Sides Award. In 
1997 he was designated a Pioneer in the U.S. Navy's newly-created Acquisition Hall of 
Fame in the Pentagon. 
Rear Admiral Meyer is widower to the former Margaret Garvey of Dorchester, 
Massachusetts. He lives in Falls Church. Virginia and has three grown children. He 
presently operates a consultancy in Arlington, Virginia. 
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A SUMMARY OF ADMIRAL ARLIEGH BURKE'S AFTER BATTLE REPORTS 
In July and August 1945, then-Commodore Ar1eigh A. Burke, USN, dictated a series of "After-
Battle Reports"1 that outlined his experiences both as a destroyer squadron commander in the Solomons 
and as Chief of Staff to Admiral Mitscher's fast carrier task forces in 1944 and 1945. Totaling about 140 
pages, these reports are more than just fascinating historical documents. They contain observations 
based on an exceptional breadth and depth of combat experience and, as such, include many lessons 
that are applicable to combat afloat today as well. This paper tries to summarize these lessons through 
appropriate quotes. Admiral Burke reviewed an ear1ier draft of these notes and offered many useful 
suggestions. 
Linton Wells II 
October, 1983 
1 Naval Records Library films, numbers 411 (Recorded 31 July 1945), 411-1 (Recorded 31 July 
1945), 411-2 (Recorded 1 August 1945), 411-3 (Recorded 8 August 1945), 417 (Recorded 20 August 
1945), 417-1 (Recorded 20 August 1945), 417-2 (Recorded 21 August 1945), and 417-3 (Recorded 21 
August 1945). Originally classified SECRET. Declassified 25 April 1962. 
Admiral Burke's comments can be divided into eight categories: (I) General conditions of combat, 
(2) command, (3) staff, (4) planning and coordination, (5) logistics, (6) training, (7) tactics, and (8) 
miscellaneous observations. The admiral's remarks are not all-encompassing. They were not meant to 
be a definitive treatise on war at sea, but they do represent valuable insights from a perspective not 
available to most of us who joined the fleet in the years after Wor1d War 11. 
GENERAL CONDITIONS OF COMBAT 
TIME CRITICALITY 
"Time is all-important." (411, p. 5) "(It) is the only commodity which you can never regain. An 
attack right now may mean much more than an attack a minute from now." (411-1, p. 13) 
UNCERTAINTY 
"Nothing in a battle (is) ever going to go right, but nobody ever realizes it until he gets into a 
battle." (411, p. 5) 
FATIGUE 
"There was no possibility of getting any sleep at night while we were under air attack by the 
enemy, and there wasn't very much chance of getting sleep during the daytime because of ... all the 
(actions needed) to keep a task group, no matter how small, moving." (411-1, p. 14) 'We were tired, 
sleepy and needed rest, ... (but) ... there is never any time that you cannot be alert, (you) must always 
have someone ready." (411-1, p. 14) · 
SHORTAGES 
"Fuel in destroyers was always a problem." (417, p. 6) 
"The Little Beavers went hungry a couple of times because we didn't have supplies, because we had to 
choose between replenishment and getting up on the firing line. We always chose the firing line." (417, 
p. 2) 
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"The ships slowly wore out. We never had time to make the minor repairs which, .. .if not corrected, would 
soon develop into a serious deficiency." (417-2, p. 23) 
COMMAND 
LEADERSHIP 
Concern For Personnel: "One of the most important things for any commander is to watch out for his 
personnel.... Fleets are just like destroyers... . They're fought with people.... There are many ways men 
can be affected. One of the principal ones is if they feel their top commander is paying complete attention 
to his people. Admiral Mitscher had this quality to an extreme condition. Consequently, his pilots 
worshiped him. He went to great efforts to perfect the air-sea rescue system .... Another thing that the 
Admiral watched out for in handling his personnel was the operational conditions. He did not operate his 
people when the conditions were too hazardous and when the payoff was not great enough. He never 
willingly expended a pilot, as is sometimes thought of in peacetime.... If a ship were damaged, he 
invariably tried to get it back to port. He never abandoned a ship." (411-3, p. 1,2) 
How far to push: "It was always hurry, hurry, hurry, and it was very difficult for me (COMDESRON 23) to 
keep my mouth shut and not heckle the captains to hurry just a little bit more. I knew this wasn't 
necessary because they were doing everything possible." (4112, p. 1) Admiral Mitscher agreed that "You 
could drive (the men) as long as they wanted to be driven .... As long as they felt they were accomplishing 
something, the men would go until they dropped." (411-2, p. 16) "At the same time, experience indicated 
that people's capacity increases under strain." 
"Before we had made contact, people were tired; they were groggy; their tempers were short. Yet, just as 
soon as contact was made, everyone threw everything he had into it, working all night long at hard, dirty 
work." (411-2, p. 13) 
FATIGUE 
Despite the increase in a person's capacity under stress, there are limits. "Everyone that was fighting got 
tired. But the pilots ... felt the effects of combat fatigue sooner than the rest .... " (and Admiral Mitscher was 
very careful to watch this.). "There are very few people who suffer from combat fatigue who realize it, or 
who realize its importance. They will try harder, they will try to do more, and the harder they work, the 
more tired they get and the less they can do.... They'll land in the sea; they'll wash themselves out; they'll 
risk their men and not understand why - not know they're just so tired they can't think clear1y. This 
happens to high command, too, and all the way down to the lowest, newest seaman." (417-3, p. 2) 
" ... It behooves officers to check very carefully information received from tired people." (411-1, p. 7) 
DECISIONS 
Time: " ... You're never going to have everything perfect, you're never going to be sure that you know 
what you should do, or what the enemy is doing, or that you know where your forces are. You must take 
your reports and act quickly. Time is all-important.... I had to accept the reports that people gave me. I 
could try beforehand to get those reports as accurately as possible, but in the midst of battle, I could not 
ask 'was he sure?' He was giving me what he saw, and it was up to me to make up my mind, make up 
my decision, an do something now!" (411, p. 5). 
Instinct/Training: "In the heat of battle, you don't remember very much, you don't think very fast. You act 
by instinct, which is actually training. So that you've got to be trained for battle, and you will react just 
exactly the way you do in training." (411, p. 5) 
Change: " ... Usually changes (to plans) made under stress are not good. Consequently, the lesson ... 
was not to try to change the plans in the heat of battle unless I thought it was extremely important.. .. 
Minor changes should not be made because the making of (such changes) would cause more confusion 
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than the results you would obtain.... A major change should be made only when the outcome of the battle 
will be made surer, rather than to change from one possibly good solution to another possibly good 
solution." (411, p.5) 
Strain: " ... without the stress, and the strain, and the limit on time, nobody can actually duplicate the 
strain a commander is under in making a decision .... it's a brave man, or an incautious one, who criticizes 
another man for the action he took in battle unless it is obviously an error caused by lack of character." 
(411-3, p. 15) 
CONTROL BY DELEGATION 
"Delegation of authority is always hard, and, under such circumstances as a battle when such delegation 
of authority may result in disastrous consequences if a subordinate makes an error, it requires more than 
is usually meant by confidence -it requires an act of faith .... Yet, past actions in this and other wars 
indicate successful action resulted from the exercise of initiative by well-indoctrinated subordinates." 
(411, p.11) 
"Communications channels are always crowded in actions. So the squadron commander notified his boss 
every time he did anything, but he notified him as he was doing it. He did not ask permission to do 
something, and he never asked permission to attack .... " (411-1, p. 13) 
"It is probable that the enemy is manning our circuits, just as we man theirs, with the added advantage to 
the enemy of having interpreters available who understood our language." (411, p. 11). 
UNITY OF COMMAND 
" ... In spite of the complete cooperation that the Army was willing to give, and the complete cooperation 
that the Navy was willing to give, (the landings on Hollandia) exhibited once again (that) in any attack, in 
any operation, there must be one man in charge .... There cannot be two commanders." (417, p. 3) 
THE PERFECT OPERATIONAL DISPATCH 
" ... We received the perfect operational dispatch from COMSOPAC as follows: '31-knot Burke, get aboard 
the Buka-Rabaul evacuation line about 35 miles west of Buka. If no enemy contacts by 0300(L) the 25th, 
come south to refuel, same place. If enemy contacted, you know what to do.' Such orders are ideal. 
They were plenty flexible. They gave us all the information we needed, and how we did the job was 
entirely up to us." (411-2, p.2) 
STAFF 
SIZE/FUNCTION 
"The Communications Officer on my staff - the entire staff he was - used to catch me in an unguarded 
moment and ask me for the information on which to send a contact report now. If I couldn't rattle it off, he 
would break out the book and read it to me again. This embarrassment lasted for about a week, after 
which I could send a contact report in my sleep." (411-2, p. 13). 
"Admiral Mitscher insisted on a small staff. There was always the temptation to increase the size of the 
staff in order to obtain an officer of peculiar qualification.... A small staff can coordinate its work easier. 
There are fewer people who have to know things and, although those few people have to work much 
harder, ... the total overall work done by a too-small staff is more than the total overall work done by a too-
big staff. And certainly the work will all be headed in the same direction." (417-3, p. 4) 
CLASSIFICATION 
"In all probability, most things were over-classified." (417-3, p.7) 
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INTELLIGENCE/INFORMATION 
"There is never enough digested information available." (417-3, p. 2) "The people who were responsible 
for delivering information to an attacking force usually got that information out just prior to the time that 
they thought the attacking force was going to need it... Consequently, (the force) has no time to study the 
charts, no time to evaluate the information, no time to correct anything that happens to be wrong .... 
(Thus), we recommended .. .that there always be a combat information officer who coordinates all the 
information for all services which are going to use it." (417, p. 5) 
"Information that is most desired, that is most needed, is current information, which is awfully difficult to 
get. In order to obtain this information, (Admiral Mitscher) interviewed returning pilots ... (and) obtained 
quick reports from other task group commanders." (417-3, p. 2) 
PLANNING AND COORDINATION 
PLANS 
Simplicity: "Plans must be kept simple. And by simple, I mean very simple, not just so that an educated 
man can read them quickly and understand them, but so that a tired, harassed man can read them and 
understand them and carry them out." (417-3, p. 3) "It was evident a lot of people would read and study a 
simple plan, where there were very few people who would ever bother to read a complicated plan, 
regardless of whether or not somebody at a desk assumed that he should read it ... The desk plan was 
very likely to take care of all contingencies. It was likely to be complete, with every probability taken care 
of...but it doesn't work, because you can't plan for all contingencies, and when (you do), you usually let 
the contingencies run away with it.... Mostly, those things weren't read, or if they were read, they weren't 
remembered." (417, p. 9) 
Standardization: "So it became evident that we had to have something standard. Lots of things, such as 
methods of flying CAP, ... methods of resupply, (etc.) could go into a set of standard instructions .... The 
boys could read those standard instructions with the expectation that they would last the period of several 
operations. Consequently, they would study those ... , but even they had to be short. One of the most 
important results was that it reduced the size of the OPORDERS and OPLANS to a point where they 
could be read in a short while ... and understood in the time they were read." (417, p. 10) 
Structure. "In order to use (complicated OPORDERS), work sheets had to be worked out, schedules had 
to be made from the plans and coordinated.... We decided that, as long as this had to be done, it might 
as well be done only once on the flagship, and consequently, we would print the work sheets and deliver 
them.... This meant a great deal more staff work on our part ... but the coordination paid off.... This type 
of OPORDER was a usable work sheet. It was necessary to create an outline which was not voluminous, 
which was not repetitive, but which gave all the information which was not included in the other plans, and 
tell where information included in the other plans could be found.... Operation plans should be measured 
by the value they produce, not by the pound. It was necessary that the plans be made so that pilots or 
ship's crews or anybody else could be briefed directly from the plan. It worked." (417-3, pp. 3-4) 
COOPERATION AND CONFERENCES 
Cooperation: "It is absolutely necessary that all hands learn to cooperate.... Everybody remarks that this 
is a truism, but there are times when there is very little cooperation. In order to cooperate with a man, 
you've got to have conferences with him; you've got to know what he is thinking; you've got to give when 
he expects you to give, and you don't want to ask for things that you feel he cannot spare. You've got to 
study his problems, and he has to study your problems, so that both of you head in the same direction at 
the same time ... lt's essential that the top people bend their utmost efforts to do the job, because if they do 
not, their lack of cooperation will be intensified in the lower echelons." (411-2, p. 21) 
Conferences: "During the time we were in port, we held frequent conferences, ... not only with the Task 
Force Commander and the cruiser captains, but daily we also had a destroyer conference .... Everybody 
8-92 
must know as much as he possibly can." (411-1, p. 14-15) "Post operation conferences also were held, 
even though everyone was tired. At these, we decided what we had done wrong, and what we would do 
again under the same circumstances, ... and all the things that come up and are fresh immediately after a 
cruise, but which people forget so quickly within two days." (417-1, p. 19) 
Cross-pollinization: At several points, the narrative cites the value of cross-pollinization through 
conferences between aviators and destroyermen, Navy and Marine pilots, Army and Navy planners, etc. 
LOGISTICS 
Admiral Burke gives considerable attention to logistics, logistic forces, and the forward area repair of 
damaged ships. 'We could see in the future that this logistics business was going to be very important." 
(417, p. 2) Most of his comments dealt with the process of bringing support forward from rear areas 
directly to the fleet. Without doubt, this is the key to sustained combat operations afloat, and most of the 
concepts discussed have become so ingrained in our present day procedures that it is hard to realize just 
how revolutionary they were in World War II. These lessons have been reaffirmed in Korea, Vietnam, and 
the Falklands. Unfortunately, our present and programmed support ship levels may no longer be able to 
meet our wartime UNREP needs. 
INDIVIDUAL UNIT TRAINING 
" ... There was no panacea which would ensure success in battle.... The best that could be done was to 
train individual ships for battle, and place them in the positions where they would most probably be 
effective, and then aggressively fight the battle under competent leadership." (411, p. 9) 
PERSONAL REATIONS 
"You had to train properly. You had to know what you wanted to do before-hand; you had to know what 
your people were going to do, and you had to expect exactly the same performance in battle that you 
would get in a drill -- no better, no worse." (411, p. 4) 
DAMAGE CONT~OL 
"One example of a well-taught damage control ship was the ENTERPRISE.... She had battle rations at 
every station. All of her crew wore flash-proof clothing, and they wore it all the time. They had fresh water 
all over the ship in proper water containers. When they dogged down doors, they meant them to stay 
dogged down. The dogs just weren't haphazardly put over the doors. The doors were really dogged 
down. There was no other ship that we rode with that was as good as the ENTERPRISE in this 
respect .... However, there is probably no way of training a crew to be as efficient as the ENTERPRISE 
without going through the same type of training - being hit four or five times." (417-2, p. 24) 
TACTICS 
AGGRESSIVENESS 
"Luck usually rides with the bold. It is believed that the chances of success are greater for wholehearted 
attack at the first opportunity than they are for waiting ... No force will ever be ready for attack; neither will 
the enemy. If our forces could attack and hit first, the prospects for success were good (411, pp. 10-11) 
TIME 
"In order to attack, to take advantage of surprise, timeliness must be well-known to the commander and to 
everyone in the force ... time is the only commodity which you can never regain. An attack right now may 
mean much more than an attack a minute from now." (411-1, p. 13) ''Be there just as fast as you can 
possibly getthere." (411-1, p. 1) 
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CONCENTRATION 
"It is necessary that the force remain concentrated. There is no other means of identification that is as 
effective as knowing where your own people are." (411-1, p. 13) The narrative reinforces this point by 
noting the unreliability of IFF in action, and the delays to decision-making caused by cluttered PPI 
scopes. Although based on surface actions in the Solomons, the point also applies to AAW, and probably 
to over-the-horizon missile engagements today. Admiral Burke also recommends that destroyer units be 
formed well before the action commences, since "the result of attempting to form destroyers after the 
contact will probably be individual ship attacks and retirements 
DOCTRINE 
"Attack by a simple doctrine. There is no time in battle to fire orders. People must know what they do 
before they go into battle. Consequentiy, the doctrine must be simple so they will remember it under very 
adverse conditions." (411-1, p.13) 
"This doctrine that we had adopted was not new.... The idea was to keep the enemy on two horns of a 
dilemma so that, no matter which way he went, no matter what he did·, somebody would always be able to 
hit him, and the man who did not hit him was always available to cover the force that was striking. 
The division that attacked, attacked with torpedoes at once and from very close range. The other division 
stood by out of torpedo range, but ready to open up on the enemy with gunfire if the first division were 
attacked.... The attacking commander had just one thing to think about, nothing else.... The other man 
looked out for surprise maneuvers from the Japanese, kept track of everything which might affect the 
organization, ... and he was not under the terrific strain of conducting an attack while he was doing it." 
(411-1, p. 13) 
MUTUAL SUPPORT 
" .. .If you have various units attacking the same target, it is always better to have them in mutual support 
of one another, or if they are not in mutual support, to have very good reasons for not being in such a 
position. Mutual support is most important - most people forget it." (417-2, p. 22) 
"As a result of a great deal of experience, Admiral Mitscher decided that the fast carrier task group should 
consist of four carriers, six to eight support ships, and not less than 18 destroyers." (417-2, p. 21) 
"Throughout the war, destroyers have been misused ... destroyers fight as teams. They fight as units. They 
are not good single ship fighters. A division of four ships is 1 O times as strong against multiple enemy air 
attack as a section of two ships. It's hard to prove this mathematically. It's not so difficult to prove when 
you look at the results of the ships sunk." (417-2, p. 22) 
FLEXIBILITY 
" ... We learned that tactics are ever changing .... Tactics that are good today may not be good week from 
today. For example, sometimes fighter sweeps are very valuable. Other times, they aren't ... The enemy 
chan0r:-..:; his tactics, and you must be able to change your pace and change your pace quickly ... You must 
be a~ to adapt your methods to those of the enemy, or you must be able to force the enemy into 
adopting your pattern .... You cannot become inflexible." (417-3, p. 4) 
AIRATIACK 
We always fishtailed during air attack, so as not to give a setup to any plane." 
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ol an MIT 
Education 
BY GIAN-CARLO ROTA 
Gian-Carlo Rota is a professor of mathematics and philosophy at 
MIT known for his fl.air as a lecturer. 
On the strength of that reputation for 
content delivered with style, he was 
asked to give a talk at the Alumni Asso-
ciation's Family Weekend last fall on the 
10 lessons learned by every MIT under-
graduate. The editors of MIT news think 
alumni and alumnae from every decade 
will see aspects of their own experience 
in Professor Rota's list. We leave it to 
readers to judge when he is tongue in 
cheek, and when he is an astute 
observer, when he approves, when he 
simply reports. 
••••••u••••••••••••"••u•o•uoo'..••••••H•o•••••ooo•a.•oo••••••••••••• 
LESSON ONE: You can and will work at a 
desk for seven hours straight, routinely. 
For several years, I have been teaching 18.03, differential equations, the 
largest mathematics course at MIT, with 
more than 300 students. The lectures have 
been good training in dealing with mass 
behavior. Every sentence must be perfectly 
enunciated, preferably twice. Examples on 
the board must be relevant, if not down-
right fascinating. Every 15 minutes or so, 
the lecturer is expected to come up with 
PHOTO: MIT NEWS OFFICE 
an interesting aside, joke, historical anec-
dote, or unusual application of the con-
cept at hand. When a lecrurer fails to con-
form to these inexorable requirements, the 
students will signify their displeasure by 
picking up their books and leaving the 
classroom. 
Despite the lecturer's best efforts, how-
ever, it becomes more difficult to hold the 
attention of the students as the term wears 
on, and they start falling asleep in class. I 
believe that observing students asleep in 
class under those circumstances should be 
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a source of satisfaction for a 
teacher, since it confirms that 
they have been doing their jobs. 
These students have been up half 
the night-maybe all night-fin-
ishing problem sets and preparing 
for their midterm exams. 
Four courses in science and 
engineering each term is a heavy 
workload for anyone; very few 
students fail to learn, first and 
foremost, the discipline of inten-
sive and constant work. 
LESSON TWO: You learn what 
you don't know you are learning. 
"'"T"'he second lesson is demon-
1 strated, among other places, 
in 18.313, a course I teach in 
advanced probability theory. It is 
a difficult course, one that com-
presses the material typicaily 
taught in a year into one term, 
and it includes weekly problem 
sets that are hard, even by the standards 
of professional mathematicians. (How 
hard is that? Well, every few years a stu-
dent taking the course discovers a new 
solution to a probability problem that mer-
its publication as a research paper in a ref-
ereed journal.) 
Students join forces on the problem sets, 
and some students benefit more than others 
from these weekly collective efforts. The 
most brilliant students will invariably work 
out all the problems and let other students 
copy, and I pretend to be annoyed when I 
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MIT Connections of a Mensch 
Former U.S. Senator Paul Tsongas, 
who· succumbed to cancer in 
January, h.ad a notable number of 
MIT connections. He took time 
from a weekend with his family to 
address an alumni symposium on 
water resources on Cape Cod in 
1987. He was the Commencement 
speaker in 1989 and the 
enthusiastically received keynote 
speaker for a forum on K-12 
education sponsored by the Class 
of' 62 during its 30th reunion. 
Tsongas also had been a member 
of the Board of Directors of the 
Whitehead Institute since 1987, 
and its ch.air since 1993. Only 
months before his death, in failing 
health, Tsongas hosted the dedica-
tion of the Whitehead's new 
research wing. He was a politician, 
a profession distinguished more by 
its cynicism ·and opportunism, but 
he was willing to take unpopular 
stands and held to his principles. 
A mensch, and the country is 




what" courses is often the most memo-
"""'~z;.no"" rable. A serious study of the history of the 
,,_.,"""'"'""'n 
learn that this has happened. But I know 
that by making the effort to understand the 
solution of a truly difficult problem discov-
ered by one of their peers, students learn 
more than they would by working out 
some less demanding exercise. 
LESSON 1HREE: By and large, 
"knowing how" matters more than 
"knowing what." 
Half a century ago, the philosopher Gilbert Ryle discussed the difference 
between "knowing how" and "knowing 
what." "Knowing how" courses are those 
in mathematics, the exact sciences, engi-
neering, playing a musical instrument, 
even sports. "Knowing what" courses are 
those in the social sciences, the creative 
arts, the humanities, and those aspects of 
a discipline that are described as having 
social value. 
At the beginning of each term, students 
meet with their advisors to decide on the 
courses each will study, and much of the 
discussion is likely to revolve around 
whether a student should lighten a heavy 
load by substituting one or two "knowing 
what" courses in place of some stiff 
"knowing how" courses. 
To be sure, the content of "knowing 
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United States Constitution or King Lear 
may well leave a stronger imprint on a stu-
dent's character than a course in thermo-
dynamics. Nevertheless, at MIT, "know-
ing how" is held in higher esteem than 
"knowing what" by faculty and students 
alike. Why? 
It is my theory that "knowing how" is 
revered because it can be tested. One can 
test whether a student can apply quantum 
mechanics, communicate in French, or 
clone a gene. It is much more difficult to 
assess an interpretation of a poem, the 
negotiation of a complex technical com-
promise, or grasp of the social dynamics 
of a small, diverse working group. Where 
you can test, you can set a high standard 
of proficiency on which everyone is 
agreed; where you cannot test precisely, 
proficiency becomes something of a judg-
ment call. 
At certain liberal arts colleges, sports 
appear to be more important than class-
room subjects, and with good reason. A 
sport may be the only training in "know-
ing how"-in demonstrating certifiable 
proficiency-that a student undertakes at 
those colleges. At MIT, sports are a hobby 
(however passionately pursued) rather 
than a central focus because we offer a 
wide range of absorbing "knowing how" 
activities. 
LESSON FOUR: In science and 
engineering, you can fool very few. 
oftbe people very little oftbe time. 
~ A" ost of the sweeping generalizations 
l V .lone hears about MIT undergradu-
ates are too outrageous to be taken seri-
ously. The claim that MIT students are 
naive, however, has struck me as being 
true, at least in a statistical sense. 
Last year, for example, one of our 
lllcSTRrnONS: JON McINTOSH 
mathematics majors, who had accepted a 
lucrative offer of employment from a Wall 
Street firm, telephoned to complain that 
the politics in his office was "like a soap 
opera." More than a few MIT graduates 
are shocked by their first contact with the 
professional world after graduation. 
There is a wide gap between the realities 
of business, medicine, law, or applied 
enginering, for example, and the universe 
of scientific objectivity and theoretical 
constructs that is MIT. 
An education in engineering and science is 
an education in intellectual honesty. Stu-
dents cannot avoid learning to acknowledge 
whether or not they have really learned. 
Once they have taken their first quiz, all 
MIT undergraduates know how dearly they 
will pay if they fool themselves into believing 
they know more than is the case. 
On campus, they have been accus-
tomed to people being blunt to a fault 
about their own limitations-or skills-
and those of others. Unfortunately, this 
another healthy lesson, namely, a profes-
sor may well behave like a fumbling idiot. 
The drive for excellence and achieve-
ment that one finds everywhere at MIT 
has the democratic effect of placing teach-
ers and students on the same level, where 
competence is appreciated irrespective of 
its provenance. Students learn that some of 
the best ideas arise in groups of scientists 
and engineers working together, and the 
source of these ideas can seldom be pinned 
on specific individuals. The MIT model of 
scientific work is closer to the communion 
of artists that was found in the large shops 
of the Renaissance than to the image of 
the lonely Romantic genius. 
LESSON SIX: You must measure up 
to a very high level of performance. 
I can imagine a propective student or par-ent asking, "Why should I (or my child) 
take calculus at MIT rather than at 
Oshkosh College? Isn't the material practi-
cally identical, no matter where it is taught, 
intellectual honesty is sometimes inter- while the cost varies a great deal?" 
preted as naivete. One answer to this question would be 
LESSON FIVE: You don't have to 
be a genius to do creative work. 
The idea of genius elaborated during 
1 the Romantic Age (late 18th and 
19th centuries) has done harm to educa-
tion. It is demoralizing to give a young 
person role models of Beethoven, Einstein, 
and Feynman, presented as saintly figures 
who moved from insight to insight with-
out a misstep. Scientific biographies often 
fail to give a realistic description of per-
sonality, and thereby create a false idea 
of scientific work. 
Young people will correct any fantasies 
they have about genius, however, after 
they come to MIT. As they start doing 
research with their professors, as many 
MIT undergraduates do, they learn 
the following: One learns a lot more when 
taking calculus from someone who is 
doing research in mathematical analysis 
than from someone who has never pub-
lished a word on the subject. But this is 
not the answer; some teachers who have 
never done any research are much better at 
conveying the ideas of calculus than the 
most brilliant mathematicians. tyi/.. 
What matters most is the ambiance in 
which the course is taught; a gifted student 
will thrive in the company of other gifted 
students. An MIT undergraduate will be 
challenged by the level of proficiency that 
is expected of everyone at MIT, students 
and faculty. The expectation of high stan-
dards is unconsciously absorbed and 
adopted by the students, and they carry it 
with them for life. 
8-97 
MIT news 
LESSON SEVEN: The world and your 
career are unpredictable, so you are better 
off learning subjects of permanent value. 
Some students arrive at MIT with a career plan, many don't, but it actually 
doesn't matter very much either way. 
Some of the foremost computer scientists 
of our day received their doctorates in 
mathematical logic, a branch of mathe-
matics that was once considered farthest 
removed from applications but that 
turned out instead to be the key to the 
development of present-day software. A 
number of the leading figures in experi-
mental molecular biology received their 
doctorates in physics. Dramatic career 
shifts that only a few years ago were the 
exception are becoming common. 
Our students will have a harder time 
finding rewarding jobs than I had when I 
graduated in the fifties. The skills the mar-
ket demands, both in research and indus-
try, are subject to capricious shifts. New 
professions will be created, and old profes-
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sions will become obsolete with the 
span of a few years. Today's college 
students have good cause to be appre-
hensive about the future. 
m1ffe + c ~+ k:x:""O a plug for my own field, mathematics. 
When an undergraduate asks me 
whether he or she should major in 
mathematics rather than in another 
field that I will simply call X, my 
answer is the following: "If you major 
in mJthematics, you can switch to X 
anytime you want to, but not the other 
way around." 
The curriculum that most under-
graduates at MIT choose to follow 
focuses less on current occupational 
skills than on those fundamental areas 
of science and engineering that are 
least likely to be affected by techno-
logical changes. 
LESSON EIGHT: You are 
never going to catch up, and 
neither is anyone else. 
M IT students often complain of being overworked, and they are 
right. When I look at the schedules of 
courses my advisees propose at the begin-
ning of each term, I wonder how they can 
contemplate that much work. My work-
load was nothing like that when I was an 
undergraduate. 
The platitudes about the disappearance 
of leisure are, unfommately, true, and fac-
ulty members at MIT are as heavily bur-
dened as students. There is some satisfac-
tion, however, for a faculty member in 
encountering a recent graduate who mar-
vels at the light work load they carry in 
medical sd1ool or law school, relative to 
the grueli~·- ;chedule they had to maintain 
during tl .·J.r years at MIT. 
LESSON 1'11.iNE: 1beju.ture behmgs 
to the computer-literate-squared. 
Much has been said about com-puter literacy, and I suspect you 
would prefer not to hear more on the 
subject. Instead, I would like to propose 
the concept computer-literacy-squared, 
in other words, computer literacy to the 
second degree. 
A large fraction of MIT undergraduates 
major in computer science or at least 
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acquire extensive computer skills that are 
applicable in other fields. In their second 
year, they catch on to the fact that their 
required courses in computer science do 
not provide the whole story. Not because 
of deficiencies in the syllabus; quite the 
opposite. The undergraduate curriculum 
in computer science at MIT is probably 
the most progressive and advanced such 
curriculum anywhere. Rather, the students 
learn that side by side with required 
courses there is another, hidden curricu-
lum consisting of new ideas just coming 
into use, new techniques and tools that 
seem to come from nowhere and that 
spread like wildfire, opening up unsus-
pected applications that will eventually be 
Alumni who return to visit invari-
ably complain of not having taken 
enough math courses while they were 
undergraduates. It is a fact, confirmed 
by the history of science since Galileo 
and Newton, that the more theoretical 
and removed from immediate applica-
tions a scientific topic appears to be, the 
more likely it is to eventually find the 
most striking practical applications. 
Consider number theory, which only 20 
years ago was believed to be the most 
useless chapter of mathematics and is 
today the core of computer security. The 
efficient factorization of integers into 
prime numbers, a topic of seemingly 
breathtaking obscurity, is now cultivated 
with equal passion by software designers 
and code breakers. 
I am often asked why there are so few 
applied mathematicians in the department 
at MIT. The reason is that all of MIT is 
one huge applied mathematics department; 
adopted into the official curriculum. you can find applied mathematicians in 
Keeping up with this hidden curriculum practicially every department at MIT 
is what will enable a computer scientist to 
stay ahead in the field. Those who do not 
become computer scientists to the second 
degree risk turning into programmers who 
will only implement the ideas of others. 
LESSON TEN: Mathematics is 
still the queen of the sciences. 
H aving tried in lessons one through nine to take an unbiased look at the 
big MIT picture, I'd like to conclude with 
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except mathematics. • 
Alumni and alumnae who would like to 
read more of Professor Rota's observa-
tions may refer to his new book of essays, 
Indiscrete Thoughts, published recentlv by 
Birkhauser, Boston. Rota was honored 
with the Killian Faculty Achievement 
Award for 1996-97 by his colleagues and 
was scheduled to give a lecture open to the 
entire community on March 5. 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT 
for theAcademic Year 1995-96 
IN TJUS AGE, IN TJUS COUNTRY, THERE IS AN OPPORTUNfIY FOR l'HE DEVELOPMENI' OF ( HUMANKINlJSj INTEEt.ht1TlAL, CULTURAL, AND 
SPIRII'UAL POJENTIALITIES THAT HAS NEVER EXISTED BEFORE IN l'HE JUSI'ORY OF OUR SPECIES. /MEAN NOT SIMPLY AN OPPORTUNfJY 
FOR GREAJNESS FOR A FEw, B[Jf AN OPPORTUN!IY FOR GREAJNESS FOR l'HE M4NY. 
n 1957, nearly 40 years ago, 
Edwin Land, the founder of 
Polaroid, gave the Arthur 
Dehon Little Memorial Lecture 
at MIT.1 His address was enti-
tled Generation of Greatness: The Idea 
of a University in an Age of Science. In 
it, he set forth his conviction that every-
one is born with the potential for great-
ness and that we must be far bolder in 
our vision and commitment to develop 
the full creative powers of our young. 
His proposal for how universities 
might meet this challenge was to create 
within each university small communi-
ties of faculty and students who would 
work together as colleague_s in scholar-
ship and research ... where learning 
would become, once again, an exciting 
adventure. This proposal led to the 
establishment in the 1960s of the Under-
graduate Research Opportunities Pro-
gram at MIT - still one of the strongest 
features of an MIT education. 
But the point here is not that Land 
had a major influence on education at 
MIT, but that he had a vision of great-
ness and a-boldness of spirit that were 
e'mbraced by others Certainly his influ-
ence can be attributed to the power of 
his intellect and his dream. Bui: perhaps 
it also had something to do with the 
times, the dawn of the 1960s, when the 
country was ready to dream of greatness 
and to take bold action, and did so in 
many domains - in science and technol-
ogy, in education, in civil rights. 
IS BOLDNESS A 1HING OF 
11IE PASf? 
~--~•oday - in 1996 - we live in 
an age that seems to reject 
b.Ofd thought and bold 
·-action. This is true in Amer-
.-ica, and it is true in Europe·. 
.-
Why is this? Does boldness come with 
a price tag we can no longer afford? 
Does it imply excess or waste or imprac-
ticality? Are we too cynical to embrace 
visionary new ideas? Have we turned 
from boldness because such vision and 
action usually call for shared commit-
ment ... and we only care for what 
affects us personally and immediately? Is 
this a natural outcome of our matura-
tion as a nation and as a society? Per-
haps all of the above. Or perhaps, at 
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century's end, we have become so con-
cerned with eliminating the budget 
deficit in order to protect future genera-
tions from economic grief that we are 
blind to the equal importance of mak-
ing the investments necessary to assure 
the vitality and quality of their lives. 
I do not believe, however, that for 
most Americans, or for most people 
around the world for that matter, such 
limited vision is a conscious choice. ~­
have slipped into complacency and self 
interest, but we need not, and cannot, 
-remain there. As a society we must once 
again believe that we can envision and 
generate greatness in our time, and build 
the foundation for future generations of 
greatness. 
ScIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY - GREAT 
ExPECTATIONS? 
I am not alone in this belief or desire. Take science and technology, for 
example. 
A new national survey2 finds that the 
vast majority of Americans want this 
country to be the world leader in scien-
tific and technological progress as we 
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enter the next century. They believe that 
public policy and federal investment 
should encourage education, research, 
and careers in science and technology -
in order to build a better future for the 
nation as a whole and for the everyday 
lives of individual citizens. 
And yet, we do not seem to have the 
will to stay on this course. 
Superconducting Supercollider 
One major scientific project illustrates 
.._.. 
the po.!!!t. A decade ago the United States 
'committed itself to constructing the 
Superconducting Supercollider (SSC), a 
huge new particle accelerator that would 
have helped us to answer critical ques-
tions in particle physics and perhaps dis-
cover another force of nature. The fron-
tier technology required to build this 
project also could have led to important 
technological innovations of practical 
benefit to the general society. We 
invested over $2 billion and got con-
struction well underway. Then we sim-
ply changed our mind_. ~ked aw~, 
and left a rusting hulk in the arid Texas 
desert - too expensive. 
But more than just expense was 
involved. We - the science community 
and the federal government - knew that 
this was an expensive undertaking when 
it was conceived and given the go-ahead. 
It could have been a truly international 
project, but it was supported in part in 
order to do it all ourselves, in a nation-
alistic spirit. Yes, the· Japanese were 
invited to help fund it, but only after the 
concepts and designs were completed 
and construction was underway. -
hardly a true international undertaking. 
Then there was the matter of location. 
The SSC was vigorously supported by 
the Congress and by the public in several 
parts of the country - until it was sited. 
Not surprisingly, it is more attractive to 
support an activity in one's state or dis-
trict than if it is located thousands of 
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miles away. Yet, in reality, facilities like 
the SSC would be shared by researchers 
- faculty and graduate students from all 
around the nation and the world. 
My purpose here is not to argue that the 
SSC should have been built; many good 
people disagreed about that. My point is to 
ask why we cannot conceive and carry 
through such bold ventures - why our 
commirrnems have no staying power. 
The Magnetic Fusion Program 
Other science and technology programs 
also illustrate the point. Take, for exam-
ple, our nation's magnetic fusion pro-
gram. As the trauma of the 1970s' oil 
embargo and other "wakeup calls" 
regarding worldwide energy needs have 
receded in our memorieS.z>Y€ have ceasej 
to think much about the future of energy 
supplies and utilization. The most con-
servative analyses indicate that we will 
need at least to double worldwide energy 
production by 2050 if nations around 
the world are going to have the oppor-
tunity to become industrialized and 
improve their standards of living. At the 
same time, doing this in a way that does 
not degrade the earth's atmosphere to an 
intolerable extent represents a major 
challenge. Just consider one country, 
China, with a population of 1.2 billion 
people, which is developing its industrial 
base and meeting its heating needs pri-
marily by burning coal. Meeting the 
demand for energy throughout the world 
will require new technologies for large-
scale generation of heat and electricity 
that are relatively environmentally 
benign and that utilize readily available 
fuels. It is difficult, if not impossible, to 
construct a scenario that does not involve 
·-substantial use of thermonuclear fusion 
~ctors for rhjs pmpnse. They offer the 
potential of using essentially inex-
haustible fuel, producing very little 
radioactivity, and releasing no carbon 
dioxide into the atmosphere. 
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The problem is that fusion science and 
technology are very complex and the 
state of the art must be advanced con-
siderably over the next few decades. A 
great deal has been learned, but much 
remains to be done. In 1995, the US 
magnetic fusion program was funded at 
a level of $375 million and scheduled to 
increase substantially in the years ahead, 
in large part to meet our obligations to 
the International Thermonuclear Exper-
imental Reactor (ITER) project. ITER is 
a large joint undertaking of the United 
States, Europe, Russia, and Japan. In 
1996, however, funding for the US mag-
netic fusion program has been cut to 
$244 million - and is headed toward a 
still lower level in 1997. In order to 
maintain a viable program in the most 
essential basic fusion science and tech-
nology, the US likely will need to drop 
its commitment to ITER. Reducing our 
overall fusion program to such levels 
decreases the probability that our com-
panies will be major players in the pro-
vision of power generation plants in the 
expanding world markets as we 
approach the middle of the next century. 
Furthermore, we greatly increase the risk 
that no acceptable means of meeting 
world energy needs will be available. 
Now let us turn to two bold ventures 
that, in fact, appear to be moving 
toward realization: The Space Station 
and the Human Genome Project. 
The Space Station 
The Space Station is primarily a t~£h­
nology, rather than a science, project. 
~ o a far greater extent, however, it is 
about humans in space. I believe that 
reaching beyond the boundaries of 
earth has an intrinsic value' - it is as 
sttfely a part of the ongoing human 
adventure as Hillary and Norgay's 
ascent of Mount Everest, the Lewis and 
Clark expedition, the sixteenth-century 
explorations of Vasco da Gama, or the 
fifth-century Polynesian expeditions 
across 2,300 miles of open ocean to 
Hawaii. 
Some of the most wondrous and 
important explorations of space have 
been made remotely, by spacecraft with 
no crews aboard: the Hubble Tele-
scope's observations of the Shoemaker-
Levy Comet collision with the planet 
Jupiter, or the Galileo Space Probe's 
magnificent exploration of Europa, 
Ganymede, and other Jovian moons. 
Remote exploration through technology 
should continue to expand our under-
standing and sense of wonder about the 
universe. 
Still, the human presence in space cap-
tures the imagination of most people. 
The realization that in the entire sweep 
of human history, my generation was 
the first to go beyond the bounds of the 
earth is both a marvel and an inspira-
tion. Children, in particular, remain 
entranced by this adventure - always a 
sure sign that something is worthwhile. 
Now, fundamentally, the Space Sta-
tion can do only two things that cannot 
be done in other ways. It can put 
humans into a microgravity environ-
ment for very long periods of time, and it 
can put very massive objects into orbit 
for very long periods of time. Why 
should we want to do this? For one 
thing, we will be able to perform empir-
ical medical studies that are necessary 
preludes to future interplanetary flights. 
And while the Space Station is basi-
cally a technology project, the ability to 
place massive objects in orbit for sus-
tained periods of time appears to be 
leading to an important, though initially 
unintended, role for the Station in fun-
damental science. The Alpha Magnetic 
Spectrometer, conceived by MIT/CERN 
physicist Samuel Ting, will be placed on 
the Station. There the device, which will 
weigh two tons and be about a meter 
high and a meter in diameter, will allow 














cosmic particles and nuclei, including 
antimatter and dark matter. Discovering 
the presence of either material will 
increase our understanding of the early 
universe and could potentially lead to a 
clearer understanding of the actual ori-
gin of the universe and to the discovery 
of antimatter stars and galaxies. 
The Space Station, whose history and 
congressional support is checkered, to 
say the least, appears to be moving 
toward reality for two reasons. First, it is 
an international project that overtly 
became a tool of US foreign policy. Sec-
ond, there is broad public enthusiasm 
for human space travel. 
The Human Genome Project 
The Human Genome Project is the one 
bold, high-profile, large-scale science 
project that appears to be moving at a 
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direct, determined pace toward i rs 
intended goal. The idea is to tap cur 
newly discovered knowledge of •.he 
structure of genes and chromosome' in 
order to improve our understanding of 
the physical structure of human life, and, 
ultimately, to make possible dramatic 
advances in medical science and health 
care. Originally, it was thought that a 
map of the entire human genome could .· 
be completed by 1998. In fact, this pm 
gram has been so successful that the 
mapping was completed in 1996, and 
work has now begun on the vastly larger 
task of sequencing the human genome. 
The pace of success has been so rapid 
because project leaders such as Eric Lan-
der and his team at MIT/Whitehead 
Institute recognized early on that this 
was not a task for thousands of biolo-
gists and technicians working ploddingly 
with micropipettes. Rather, it was a 
problem to be solved through the cre-
ative and careful application of combi-
natorial mathematics, computer sciem "' 
and robotic automation. Technologic::; I 
innovation, combined with hum~'''· 
imagination, made the difference. 
In addition, this project has been ab!• 
to proceed on course because Congress 
and the public understand that the med 
ical advances so important to all of r:·; 
spring from such basic biomedin•.' 
research. They are willing to support ;J,, 
necessary investment in this area becc..•:sc 
they share the vision and can understam: 
the potential for dramatic returns - ir. 
the form of better health and improved 
quality of life. 
It is much more difficult, however, t( 
generate such shared vision for basi\' 
research that does not hold such immc 
diately recognizable benefits. We have« 
quandary. Most Americans, when 
asked, say that they expect science and 
technology to solve some or most of the 
problems faced by our society, and that 
in order for that to happen, we should 
invest in research and put more emphasis 
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on science in our schools. But at the 
moment, at least as far as the long-term 
prospects for research funding go, we seem 
to be moving in the opposite direction. 
Somehow, as a nation we are unable 
or unwilling to make the sustained 
investment or have the confidence that 
will ensure the kind of future we want -
a furure made brighter by cures for can-
cer and mental illness; by clean, renew-
able energy; by sustainable industrial 
development; by broadly accessible 
transportation and information systems; 
by affordable food and shelter; and by 
expanded horizons. 
There is legitimate concern about 
how much we can afford to do. We 
need to balance the national budget so 
that future generations will not be bur-
dened with our debt. Fair enough. But 
we need to distinguish between spend-
ing for the moment and investing in the 
future. Just as we cannot saddle the 
coming generations with our financial 
debt, neither can we saddle them 
with our societal debt through lack of 
concern for the future. We must invest 
in that future-through education, 
through research, and through attaining 
common purpose. 
EDUCATION - PASS, FAIL, OR EXCEL? 
The American educational system. certainly developed through a series 
of bold assertions and actions. It is an 
essential part of our national heritage. 
What assertion could have been more 
bold in the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries than the belief that for a 
democracy to function and a nation to 
thnve, education must be the universal 
right of our young? What action cocld 
have been more bold than the passage of 
the Morrill Act, providing a large grant 
of land to each state to enable the estab-
lishment of universities that would pro-
vide higher education to vast numbers of 
young men and women, mostly of mod-








est means? And, in our own century, 
what step could have been more dra-
matic, or have better provided for our 
future, than the establishment of the GI 
Bill? This is the stuff of greatness, nation 
building, and empowerment. -
Today, however, we have evolved into 
a truly paradoxical situation. We have, 
by a huge margin, the greatest and most 
effective system of higher education in 
the world- in terms of quality, accessi-
bility, and creation of new knowledge. 
At the same time, we have a system of 
primary and secondary education that 
is a national shame, one that is a sure-
fire determinant of national decline if it 
is not corrected. 
Repeatedly we have set national goals 
to be met by our schools by the year 
2000 - just four years hence: goals that 
call for our students to be first in the 
world in science and mathematics 
achievement, and for every school to be 
free of drugs and violence. But few seem 
serious about accomplishing such goals. 
Too ambitious. 
Our schools, especially in large cities, 
have had thrust upon them social ills 
with which they are not prepared to deal 
- parental indifference, students with 
low expectations, outmoded and decay-
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ing infrastructure, political infighting, 
misplaced ideology, meaningless bureau-
cracies, and insufficient financial sup-
port. But these are symptoms. They are 
symptoms of a loss of national will and 
vision, uncertain or nonexistent values, 
and lack of respect for our most impor-
tant profession - the profession of teach-
ing our children. 
I do not profess to know the answer to 
improving America's public schools, but 
it must begin with a bold reassertion that 
nothing is more important than prepar-
ing our young to face the future. 
To do that, I suggest that we must give 
our students the ability to live, act, and 
contribute meaningfully in a world that 
is ever changing. This will require far 
more than simple mastery over a body 
of knowledge. We need to prepare our 
students with a solid foundation in the 
sciences, social sciences and the human-
ltles to appreciate what they encounter, 
and we need to do so in ways that will 
provide them with the skills to negoti-
~ the unkn.own-:f o be prepared for the 
ture, our students must be intellectu-
ally _advenrurous. 
This is not the place to lay out a set of 
educational goals for our schools, but I 
would suggest that there is much to be 
learned from a set of national standards 
for science education recently developed 
by the National Research Council. 3 
These standards are based on principles 
that could apply to many fields. They 
are based on studying the changing 
needs of our populace, the changing 
nature of science itself, and successful 
educational practices. The standards 
promote science as discovery, rather 
than science as a collection of facts to be 
memorized and accepted. Students are 
encouraged to develop skills of analysis 
and synthesis and perspective. Our edu-
cators should explore these standards as 
well as the associated pedagogical tech-
niques. If they were to be adopted, we 
would see some fundamental changes in 
the way we assess the progress and 
preparation of our students. There is 
much to be learned that could inspire a 
whole new generation of students and 
teachers. 
Setting ambitious educational goals is 
one thing. But we will not attain them 
unless there is broad societal recogni-
tion of the importance of the teaching 
profession. Vf e must support our com-
mitted teachers, and we must create a 
new generation of teachers who are well 
educated, future-oriented, technologi-
cally ITterate, willing to be accountable, 
ana excited to explore new ways of 
teaching and learning. 
Th!Sis ortl";" the necessary condition, 
.____....,. 
however; it is far from sufficient. These 
teachers must be supported by our citi-
zenry of all ages, by government at all 
levels, by the mass media and the enter-
tainment industry, by sports figures, by 
the criminal justice system, and, above 
all, by the parents and guardians of the 
young. They must be provided with the 
tools, the resources, the financial 
rewards, and the respect to do t)le job 
that must be done. 
There is progress on at least one of 
these fronts. There appears to be enthu-
siasm and action at both federal and 
state levels, and within the private sec-
tor, for connecting all of our schools to 
the Internet by the end of the decade. 
This is a bold move, and it is appropri-
ate. But the technical and financial 
requirements and capabilities must be 
thought through with great care, 
though expeditiously. Then the real 
question must be addressed: How can 
this new technology enhance learning? 
First, of course, teachers must have 
the necessary understanding of and 
access to computers and information 
systems. But beyond that, the commu-
nity of educators must become a learn-
ing and sharing organization. Herein 
lies the promise: There must be ways 
of sharing and learning from each 
other's experiences. The theory and 
practice of learning organizations must 
be tapped for techniques applicable to 
our educational system in the large. 
The use of the World Wide Web and 
related tools holds huge promise for 
sharing learning resources. In the hands 
of skilled educators networked across 
the country, one school can produce a 
small, effective video, text, or other seg-
ment on, say, basic cell biology. 
Another school can produce brief seg-
ments about elementary algebra, 
another can address instruction in 
Spanish, and yet another may develop 
an exciting history unit. Individual 
teachers can then pull different units 
together to form coherent learning 
tools for the use of each class or stu-
dent. By making all of these units avail-
able through the World Wide Web, it 
will be possible to share expertise, and 
achieve savings, on an unprecedented 
scale. There is no reason that this kind 
of collaboration need be restricted to 
the United States. The opportunities to 
share and work in education across 
national boundaries should be seriously 
explored; they will serve future genera-
tions well. 
ARE WE STILL A LAND OF 
OPPORTUNI1Y? 
hen we think of the 
future, scientific and 
technological inno-
vations often come 
to mind. But the 
quality of our future will have even more 
to do with human relations than it does 
with science and technology. If this 
nation is to thrive - economically, 
socially, politically - we must do all we 
can to ensure that all of our citizens are 
able to reach their full potential. Only 
then will we realize the full benefits to be 
found in a society peopled with differ-
ent cultures, races, and nationalities. 
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RACE AND SoCIETI - ONE NATION 
OR MANY? 
I n the 1950s and 1960s, we as a nation determined that we would 
build a racially integrated, nondiscrimi-
natory society, and we recognized that 
mous mtenm commitments and cor-
rective actions would be required until 
we reached that goal. Full attainment of 
that goal has proved more elusive than 
most anticipated. We now seem to be 
backing off in many ways,_ too ideolog-
ical; too uncomfortable; too difficult. · 
Educational institutions have had cen-
tral roles in both the action and debate 
throughout this period. Fundamentally, 
this is because of our special responsi-
bility to prepare young people to take 
their full place in our society. Indeed, 
America's course in these matters was 
largely set by the 1954 Supreme Court 
decision in Brown v. Board of Educa-
tion that laid the foundation for the 
affirmative action initiatives of the 
1960s by ordering racial integration of 
public schools with all deliberate speed. 
Today, more than 40 years after 
Brown v. Board of Education, we still 
find ourselves at the center of discussion, 
evaluation, and legal decisions about 
race and diversity. Largely because of 
explicit actions to increase access to our 
colleges and universities, most have 
become much more diverse racially, cul-
turally, and economically. The presence 
and role of women on our campuses 
have improved dramatically. Still, most 
campuses cannot be judged to be 
broadly representative of the makeup of 
contemporary America. Statistics 
regarding most measures of academic 
success and access of young people to 
career, professional, and leadership 
tracks tell us that the goals set in the 
1950s and 1960s have not yet been 
achieved. My sense is that we are losing 
will, ignoring realities, falling into polit-
ical partisanship, and, not infrequently, 
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introducing mean-spiritedness into the 
national debate on these matters. 
Effectively addressing issues of race 
and diversity is too essential to the future 
of the United States to allow it to be dis-
sipated in partisan rhetoric. Maintaining 
our momentum is too urgent to allow it 
to be defined away through narrow, 
technical judicial decisions. Reinvigorat-
ing a national commitment is too 
demanding·ro allow it to drown in a sea 
of red tape. We need both idealism and 
pragmatism, but we cannot, through 
what Father Theodore Hesburgh refers 
to as "combat fatigue," enter the next 
century without making real progress 
toward broad equality. 
It astounds me how frequently the 
issue of diversity is addressed as if it were 
an abstract concept. Racial diversity is a 
reality of American life in 1996, and we 
know with certainty that it will be an 
even more dominant reality in, say, 
2015, when the children being born this 
year are of college age. In 2015, the 
college-age population of the US will 
be 16-percent African-American and 
19-percent Hispanic-American, and the 
mix of new immigrants to our shores, 
especially from Asia and Southeast Asia, 
also will contribute more substantially to 
the makeup of our citizenry. 
By the year 2015, the work force will 
be one-third white male, one-third white 
female, and one-third people of color. 
All these workers will be toiling to sup-
port not only themselves, but all of us 
who, as retirees, will be dependent upon 
them - and they will constitute a much 
smaller proportion of our population. 
(In 2015, there will be only half as many 
people working and supporting the 
retired population as there were in 
1960.) If they do not form a cohesive, 
productive society, the future will indeed 
be bleak. This prognostication is truly 
daunting, especially when combined 
with the fact that we will need to com-
pete in a marketplace and economy that 
MIT 52 NOVEMBER/DECEMBER 19')6 
will be even more globalized and inte-
grated than today. 
Thus, even if we are willing to ignore 
the historical imperative and noble goal 
of equality and true integration, we must 
be problem solvers and set a sound 
course for our rapidly changing nation. 
It is sorely tempting to declare victory 
and turn our back on affirmative action 
and related processes in America. How 
pleased I would be if we could legiti-
mately assume that all of our citizens 
have reached a sufficient state of actual 
equality of opportunity and access that 
we could adopt simple, race-blind 
approaches to all that we do. That, of 
course, is the goal. But is it an honest 
evaluation of the situation today? One 
need only peruse the extensive tabula-
tions of national statistics regarding 
wages, crime, education, health, and 
many other parameters in Andrew 
Hacker's book, Two Nations: Black and 
White, Separate, Hostile, Unequal to 
know that we have not achieved any-
thing approaching equality across the 
racial boundaries of our society. If that is 
not convincing, read the front page of 
any urban newspaper on any givgi day. 
Yet we are retreating. The federal dis-
trict court ruling in Hopwood v. Uni-
versity of Texas has already had reper-
cussions around the country - as orga-
nized efforts to end affirmative action 
continue to grow. The actions of the 
University of California's Board of 
Regents are well known; and in Col-
orado, the governing board of the uni-
versity system has cut back on affirma-
tive action programs. Other efforts 
include legislative moves in Pennsylvania 
and Arizona to outlaw affirmative 
action, and more than a dozen cam-
paigns to amend the constitutions of var-
ious states. 
In this context, I use the term "affir-
mative action" rather broadly to refer 
to programs or actions that specifically 
foster access or participation of minority 
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groups or women in educational prn-
grams or jobs. This breadth seems 
appropriate in discussing universities in 
light of recent court decisions. MIT's 
admissions process is consistent with the 
Supreme Court's 1978 Bakke decision 
that universities may consider race "as 
one factor among many" in making 
admissions decisions. We build our 
admitted class to bring together students 
from diverse geographic, economic, cul-
tural, racial, and experiential back-
grounds, all of whom have exhibited the 
intellectual capacity, achievement, and 
motivation that are needed to succeed 
ancl benefit from MIT. Furthermore, our 
undergraduate financial aid is awarded 
solely on the basis of demonstrated 
financial need. 
Yet in 1996, in Hopwood v. Univer-
sity of Texas, the Fifth Circuit Court of 
Appeals effectively reversed the Bakke 
decision for public institutions in Texas, 
Mississippi, and Louisiana, by declaring 
that "any consideration of race or eth-
nicity by the law school for the purpose 
of achieving a diverse student body is 
not a compelling interest" and therefore 
is not permitted. 
I do nor wish to defend across the 
board all federal affirmative action laws 
and set-aside policies, with their atten-
dant red tape, cumbersome bureaucra-
cies, and often artificial metrics. But I do 
want to defend the core concept that 
determined, often race-specific consid-
eration and effort are still essential to 
move us toward the integrated, cohesive 
society we will need in the.years ahead. 
The society I believe we will need is one 
in which individuals can realize their 
potential, and in which we can draw 
effectively on the individual and collec-
tive strengths and talents of our citizens 
of all colors and ethnicities. We cannot 
command, decree, or wish into existence 
such a nation. Rather we must work . 
proactively to build it through the envi-
ronments and opportunities we create 
fof learning and working. 
The idea that affirmative action pro-
grams are unnecessary or even unconsti-
tutional is gaining momentum just at a 
time when we in science, engineering, and 
higher education are beginning to see 
some real results from these programs. 
Last summer, the American Council 
on Education released its study on 
minorities in higher education,4 and 
reported a record number of Ph.D.'s 
awarded to black graduate students in 
1995. And over the past eight years, the 
National Science Foundation reports, 5 
there has been a 75-percent increase in 
the number of science and engineering 
doctorates awarded to black graduate 
students -from 319 in 1987 to 557 in 
1995. The media and others have hailed 
this as a dramatic increase. It is, indeed, 
real progress; nonetheless, the absolute 
numbers are stunningly small. Last year, 
for example, the number of blacks 
receiving the doctorate in electrical engi-
neering in the US rose 40 percent over 
the previous year - to 24. Yet this is out 
of a total of 966 doctorates awarded in 
that field. 
And yet there are arguments over the 
reasons for this progress. Supporters of 
affirmative action claim the increase as 
evidence of the programs' effectiveness, 
while critics argue that it is the result of 
increased educational opportunities, and 
that any benefits of affirmative action 
are offset by the negative effects of what 
they regard as preferential treatment of 
minorities. 
Did "affirmative action" play a role in . 
this modest success? It should not be a 
difficult matter to assess how many of 
these new Ph.D. graduates were defini-
tively encouraged or enabled to reach 
this high level of attainment by specific 
programs or support. It should not be a 
matter of guesswork; the data should be 
obtained and affirmative action and out-
reach programs should be objectively 
evaluated on the basis of outcomes over 
Racial 
and ethnic 
diversity is not 
an abstract 
concept; it is 
the reality of 
American life 
in 1996, and it 
will be an even 
more dominant 
reality in the 
next century. 
time. It should not be a matter of ideol-
ogy of the left or of the right. We should 
assess where we are, demonstrate what 
does and doesn't work, and get on with 
the job. 
In the current legal environment, 
attorneys are recommending to organi-
zations that were established specifically 
to promote educational opportunity for 
minority students that they modify their 
eligibility criteria to indicate that they 
will review applications without regard 
to the applicant's ethnicity. Frankly, this 
strikes me as a strange and artificial 
approach. 
My own view is that we must hold to 
our principles if our nation is to benefit 
from the full range of talent needed to 
meet the challenges of a changing world. 
Our journey is not over. Our goal is.not 
attained. 
I believe that the time will come when 
affirmative action programs will no 
longer be necessary, but for now, we still 
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have2...compelling need for proactive 
~ despite calls by some that what 1s 
needed instead is simply stronger 
enforcement of antidiscrimination laws. 
Indeed, as Tom Wicker put it in his 
recent book, Tragic Failure: "If enforce-
ment of antidiscrimination laws is the 
alternative to affirmative action, race, 
sex, and ethnic discrimination will be 
with us for a long time." 
AN OPEN Soc1E1Y - To WuoM? 
Race is not the only focus of the argument about how open our 
society should be. These are economi-
cally difficult times in America - at least 
relative to our aspirations and to the 
post-war boom years. And as times get 
tight, there is a natural tendency to .turn 
inward. So once again, we hear concerns 
that we should' not be educating so 
many foreign graduate students. We 
-hear that immigrants are a major cause 
of our woes. And we keep pulling apart 
into homogeneous groupings of one sort 
or another. But just because these are 
natural or understandable tendencies 
does not make them right. 
America has always been a nation of 
immigrants and we have always been a 
land of opportunity. These statements 
perhaps sound quaint or old fashioned, 
but they are true, and we must retain 
their spirit. 
Each year, my wife Becky and I host 
a dinner in our home for the men and 
women who are retiring from the 
tenured faculty ranks of MIT. These are 
always extraordinary assemblages of tal-· 
ented and accomplished colleagues -· 
people who have defined MIT' and who 
have defined their pro~essional and 
scholarly fields. No lack of bold though1 
there! 
Yet, as I survey that room each spring, 
I realize how much MIT and indeed 
America have benefited from our being 
open to those from other countries, and 
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how wise has been our tradition of 
selecting and advancing people on the 
basis of their talent and accomplishment 
rather than their wealth or nationality. 
Now, some might say that this repre-
sents a passing era, that what I am 
observing has its origins in the intellec-
tual migrations from Europe associated 
with the turmoil of the World War II 
era. Or it might even represent the ves-
ti_ges of the times during which the lead-
ing universities in science and engineer-
ing were in Germany and England. 
No, it is an ongoing fact that the excel-
lence of our institutions is due in very 
large measure to our openness to jnrer-
natio~al scholars. MIT faculty who have 
received the Nobel Prize include individ-
uals who were born in Japan, India, Italy, 
and Mexico. Our provost was born in 
Israel. We have deans who were born in 
Canada and Australia. Almost all came 
to the US as graduate students. 
In fact, about one-third of all Ph.D. 
degrees in science and engineering earned 
in US universities are awarded to foreign 
citizens. (In engineering alone, half of the 
Ph,l).'s are earned by foreign citizens.) 
Many of these doctoral recipients initially 
pursue their careers in the US, and about 
40 percent of them appear to remain here 
permanently. What a magnificent 
resource for our industries, universities, 
and government laboratories. Openness 
and meritocracy are what have made our 
universities gre'!.S and we must continue 
that spirit and philosophy in our national 
endeavors. 
At the same time, we should concen-
trate on improving both science educa-
tion and general education in this coun-
try's K-12 system in order to increase the 
number of motivated, well-prepared stu-
science and technology. This is the way 
to ensure that, in the long run, our grad-
uate programs have a larger, more stable 
base of US students. 
We must, however, continue to pro-
vide access, opportunity, and welcome 
to the brilliant immigrants who con-
tribute so much to our society- people 
like Institute Professor Hermann Haus, 
who received the National Medal of Sci-
ence this year. Recollecting the call from 
John Gibbons, the President's Science 
Advisor, Professor Haus said, "I did not 
trust my senses, at first. After the news 
sunk in, the thoughts that came to my 
mind were that I was grateful to my fate 
for having come to the US, a victim of 
the 1945 ethnic cleansing in Yugoslavia; 
for becoming a citizen; and for the 
recognition I received on account of 
work I thoroughly enjoyed and for the 
privilege of association with outstanding 
students and colleagues." 
I can think of no more eloquent 
description of what it means for this 
country to be the land of opportunity. 
We must retain our commitment to this 
bold dream. 
END NOTE 
oldness and openness are 
qualmes that we as a nation 
rriust seek to preserve and 
adv;nce. We in America's 
-research universities have a 
particular duty to do so. 
Boldness flows from a spirit of adven-
ture and a "can do" attitude long associ-
ated with America. These characteris-
tics must again be dominant. To be 
effective, however, we must remember 
that boldness must be accompani~ by 
dents entering universities and colleges ..• st~er. Staymg power is wan~' 
We should value more highly intellectual \ ing. We increasingly are better at startin 
pursuits and celebrate the accomplish- 1
1
. things than at carrying them through. 
ments of those who contribute to our Contemporary politics demands 
health and quality of life by advancing "change" and new vision at least every 
two to four years. Our budget cycles 
cause us to be unreliable international 
partners as we start and stop projects. 
Staying power does not mean stagna-
tion, it permits the fulfillment of bold 
ideas, with plenty of correction, evolu-
tion, and adaptation along the way. 
Openness flows from a spirit of gen-
erosity that has long characterized 
America, but which today appears to be 
in peril under the stresses of change, 
slow economic growth, and increasing 
uncertainty of the future. We must not 
allow this to happen, for openness and 
generosity can only be replaced by nar-
row expectations and selfishness. 
We must, instead, choose to be bold 
and to be generous of spirit. We must 
believe in the possibility of greatness, for 
our society today and for the generations 
to come. 
CHARLES M. VEST 
September 1996 
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I must say this is a daunting prospect. If we succeed today in linking 
doctrine, technology and strategy with a dash of policy and 
forethought, we should get tickets to the Super Bowl, or at least an 
honorable mention in the hereafter. 
I have been, as many of you know, Commandant of the National War 
College for just over two months. My experience to this point, in 
Washington and at sea, has been that of an employer of talent, not 
exclusively a producer of talent. Now, from the splendid vantage point 
of Fort McNair, I want to offer you my first impressions of how we can 
improve a system that has served our nation well over the past 
decade. 
I am talking to you today as someone who has been both a practitioner 
and user of joint military education and education in general. As an 
Aegis cruiser skipper, I profited from the education provided by a 
highly developed system. designed to provide the right measure of 
technical awareness. As a joint planner, I relied on a staff that had 
been educated in the post-1986 Goldwater-Nichols legislation 
environment. Today, I want to share my thoughts and perceptions 
with you as we discuss how best to proceed in a new generation 
where technology imposes new demands, but where the stakes for 
military education and strategic insight are higher than they have ever 
been. 
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The essence of the question we should be asking ourselves is, "What 
education is appropriate to which stage of our career growth?" We cannot, or 
should not, proclaim that there is only one statutory answer that applies to all ranks 
at all times. We do need officers with advanced technical qualifications. We also 
need officers with a strategic appreciation that transcends their service and their 
platform or weapon systems background. 
If we agree that such considerations have merit, how best can we provide for 
the needs of the nation? I submit that the most difficult challenge we face today 
and in the foreseeable future is how to both gauge and provide technical 
appreciation for non-technically educated decision-makers. In an environment 
where career planning is critical, what adjustments should we make to today's 
system to ensure we have leaders with an adequate technical base who also have 
the strategic vision needed to lead us into the next century? 
Let me elaborate. We are engaged in a time management problem. There 
is only so much time in an officer's career for formal education. Technical 
education, for those officers not destined for the acquisition specialty, must be 
efficiently delivered in an appropriate forum (which, by the way, might not be a 
resident PME school) and must achieve relevance in decision-making. Propulsion 
technology, fire control and space-based systems all can be interpreted for the line 
officer with limited time in a compressed career pattern so as to convey the key 
elements of the technology in question without requiring an education from the first 
laws of thermodynamics upwards. 
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A Continuum of Education I 
There are basically three stages in an officer's career -- entry 
qualifications to professional competency, advancement qualifications 
to command level, and finishing qualification to senior leadership with 
national and international responsibilities across service lines that 
requires a refined appreciation of the interaction of politics, diplomacy 
and strategy. Given the recent changes in legislation, this last phase 
may last as long as twenty years, during which time an officer may 
exercise significant responsibilities as a CINC, Chairman, or senior flag 
or general officer. We can't slight preparing officers for this latter, 
strategic level phase in favor of providing extensive preparation for the 
earlier tactical and operational phases, which is made doubly hard by all 
our Services' compressed patterns. We had best get it right early on. 
I have had the honor to serve with officers of all services, educated in 
the present JPME system. Without exception, they have been 
exceptional - a joy to work with. To the question whether our present 
system is adequate, I would say that the system is working. That does 
not mean it is perfect. There is much we can, and should do, to relieve 
pressure on those officers as they develop, and to relieve pressure on 
their Services as they seek to deal with the imperatives of career 
management. 
8-112 
First and foremost, we should begin a program to provide for the 
accomplishment of the skills and knowledge-centered portions of the intermediate 
level of PME through distance learning, to include the educational requirements for 
qualifying Joint Specialty Officers -- the Program for Joint Education. Put it on CD-
ROM and/or make it available through the net - but let us subtract the months 
required to complete that from an officers highly charged mid-career timeline. 
We may have to evaluate, as a matter of course, the way in which Phase I is 
presented. Means for qualification and certification will, no doubt, be required. 
Certainly, as we realize the advantages of a data-based first phase, we may have to 
recognize that officers who avail themselves of such internet-based training will still 
need the relationship building that comes from attending a formal course of 
instruction together. 
Next, let us make a pact that officers, before they accede to senior 
responsibilities, will have the opportunity, through service war colleges or through 
the joint war colleges, to dialogue with their peers over a demanding course of 
study. Those peers should include not only officers from their own service, but 
also, to the maximum extent possible, officers from sister services and senior 
civilians from the various government agencies engaged in national security 
matters. And the course of study should be one that will enable them to 
contemplate major responsibilities from a joint perspective. 
Where Should Education Take Place? 
I am a strong believer in the theory that education is a continuous process. 
have had to learn, in turn, pressure fired boilers, diesel engine plants, 1200-pound 
steam and gas turbines. In another vein, as many of you have had to do, I 
graduated, progressively, from duplicating fluid, to Xerox 860's, from Word 
Processors, to 266 MHz computers and associated software. Today's officers are 
surpassingly literate in all technologies. Let's give them credit. They will, however, 
over the course of their careers, likely have to reeducate themselves in at least 
three generations of technology. How can we help them? 
Distance Learning: The Time Has Come 
Distance learning can be a powerful tool. We should mobilize our resources 
to make it into a force multiplier - teaching preparatory courses, basic 
qualifications, and certification - seeking to make every eventual classroom hour 
count. There are economies to be gained, both financial and time. 
Once we have such a system in place and operating, we will be in a position 
to offer our officers the right mix of technical and non-technical military education, 
one that will suit them for the responsibilities we expect them to fulfill in the years to 
come. 
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Career Planning in the 21st Century 
It would be a mistake to place a turning point too early in an officer's career. 
After all, Chester Nimitz was a diesel engineer early in his career, but we would 
have been lost had we restricted him to acquisition duties only following his early 
years. A great question is, how do we provide technical appreciation and 
awareness to future commanders as they head for command? I submit that the 
best way to do that is to offer dedicated courses, much as we do now -- through 
distance learning to the maximum extent possible -- that offer the prospective 
commander an appreciation of the limits of technology as they apply to his or her 
platform. 
We will always need officers with a deep technical background. Those who 
choose such a career path will contribute dramatically to our future. But they may 
not accede to group and fleet command. Instead, their expertise will be applied in 
determining correct choices for our acquisition programs. In short, we need officers 
of both technical and non-technical persuasion if we are to maintain our 
preeminence. 
Goldwater-Nichols II 
We have now had ten years of experience with the philosophy embodied in 
the original legislation. Distance learning would not dismantle its original 
proposition. Rather, it may give us the opportunity to maximize the effectiveness of 
joint education, timing it in an officer's career so that it occurs at a point when it will 
have the most positive effect. Let me add that each service has its own 
imperatives, but that the basic division I have outlined - initial qualifications, mid-
level leadership and senior preparation -- apply to all services with slight variations. 
Permit me to add further that this progression should not be a matter of 
contention between the services and the relevant committees of the Congress. We 
received the message of the original legislation, and the benefits thereof have been 
understood without question. How will we progress from here with a shared 




• Is our present system adequate? 
• Where should education take place? 
• Can we distinguish education from 
training? 
• Can we leverage distance learning to 
gain effectiveness? 
In conclusion - make no mistake --1 believe technology is crucial to our 
success. At the same time, an officer is going to reach a point in his or 
her career when mastery of technology will, in and of itself, not be 
sufficient. At that point, that officer will, going back to that continuum, 
be at a point where he or she will make decisions that will affect you 
and your r children for years to come. We had best be prepared to 
provide the right mix of education - a full spectrum of education in 
strategy, politics, yes, history, economics, all of the pieces that will give 
them the basis for national decision-making in a world that will continue 
to be dynamic for decades to come. 
The panel this morning has taught you some things about technology --
JV 2010, network centric warfare, and so on. But we have not yet 
talked about some of the really far, hidden things that will change 
technology in the future - that will drive us to different forms of warfare 
-- as we proceed to a world where national boundaries are no longer as 
relevant as they have been, where time is of the essence, and where 
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Good Afternoon savants, magi, pundits, sapient mahatmas, sages -- you who are 
blessed to have the minds to think about and appreciate the magic of everyday, ordinary 
miracles; you who reside intellectually on the other side of Pluto and appreciate the 
tremendous value of education; ladies and gentlemen. 
I am delighted to have the opportunity to again visit this lofty cathedral of wisdom 
and exchange nirvanas on how best to impart the appropriate knowledge to our marvelous 
military personnel. This is the site of my most humiliating moments. If the gent that I set 
by had applied himself, I would have amounted to more in life. 
I am awed by the eloquence and brilliance of those whom have preceded me to this 
platform, and by those whom will follow in my wake. I will skip the pabulum and immerse 
us immediately and totally into the task at hand. To give credence to my commitment to 
education, I place in evidence the fact that I spent five years in the fifth grade. 
At the outset, I wish to take issue with the stated purpose of this conference, i.e. 
"Given that technology must be integrated with politics, strategy, and doctrine, what kind 
of educational processes will produce the cultivated intelligence and mental acuity this 
nation's military officers will need to dominate the projected operational environments of 
the 21st century?" 
Technology is not to be integrated with anything. It is the other functions and 
disciplines that need to exploit the wonders that emerging new technologies offer. The 
search for someone to blame is always successful. 
Brilliance in commanding forces inevitably has its roots in the masterful handling of 
technology. As warfare becomes increasingly a high-technology challenge, our military 
forces must change doctrine, tactics, strategic thought, operational concepts, 
organizations, culture, reward systems, training and education. It is essential that our 
officers are aware of, appreciate and are able to exploit the latest technologies' great 
potential. If we think education is expensive, we should consider the cost of ignorance. 
When the world moves into a new age, technological changes occur approximately 
two decades before cultural, organizational, operational and, regrettably, educational 
changes catch up. We unmistakably have entered the Information Age, and although 
COPERNICUS, IT-21, C41 for the Warrior, the digital battlefield of the 21st century, 
battlespace dominance, and other perfumed sobriquets are parroted from speakers' 
platforms and echoed throughout the forces, there remains scant appreciation and less 
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respect for the Information discipline. There are fewer yet rewards and recognition for 
those responsible. If you really want to know what our military will look like in the next 
century, do not listen to the rhetoric. Look at where the money is appropriated. Too little 
is, regrettably, appropriated for education. 
Once, the battlespace was determined by the distance one could sense, detect and 
identify targets, and the range of one's weapons. The long lance of our arsenal of modern 
weapons -whose accuracy is independent of range -- expands the battlespace to global 
dimensions. Our country's heroes' horizons necessarily have expanded from the next 
trench to a vast global perspective. There should be a continuum of education, from 
commissioning to retirement, including interactive education while deployed. This will 
create a whole new dimension to the meaning of the expression "self paced." 
There will be a Global Information System, forged on the anvil of technology and 
continuously nourished by epic information that will present the world with a miracle the 
likes of which has not been witnessed since that certain stroll across the Sea of Galilee. 
This Global Information System will liberate us from the dependence on people, 
geography and time. It will bring to the living rooms of every American family in living 
color the atrocities of war. Farmers will have better satellite imagery than nuclear strike 
pilots had in the recent past. The manner in which conflicts will be planned for and 
conducted will be necessarily changed drastically. 
We are at a rare moment in history, whereby we have an opportunity -- actually an 
obligation - to make a major transformation in the world's security posture, composition 
and profile that will have a profound effect on the entire world. A force that would be more 
effective, more lethal {while reducing collateral damage), less expensive to build and 
sustain, and more appropriately tailored for actual threats. The seeds for this badly 
needed transformation should be sown by our military educational institutions. 
Maintaining a ready traditional military force in a democracy over protracted periods 
of peace is an extraordinarily difficult problem. Once it took the resources of a nation to 
wage war. Now it only takes the resources of a hacker. 
Our challenge is awesome, because success is the enemy of change and the 
performance of our military has not been merely a magnificent one, - it has been a 
legendary one. The door to America's Armed Forces hinges on the leading edge of its 
successors, and a markedly competitive advantage will favor those who are educated in 
and exploit technology. Our personnel should be encouraged to not steam midway 
between the buoys, but dare to be imaginative and explore new horizons. They must be 
given the freedom to be creative, the guidance to be productive, given the educational 
opportunities they need, and rewarded for their contributions. 
To change a culture, its rewards system must be changed. Sadly, today education 
often debases an officer's opportunities for promotion. A Navy Lieutenant has a 75% 
chance of making Lieutenant Commander, unless he is an aviator who attends the Naval 
Postgraduate School. Then his chances plummet to 60%. During this period of 
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diminishing defense dollars, we should be investing more, not less in the intellectual 
capital of our military personnel. Regrettably, the opposite is occurring. Again, we are 
guilty of mortgaging the future for the present. The Navy's recently announced Permanent 
Military Professor program will permit it to benefit from the brilliance of those officers who 
are community drop-outs. 
Changes in operational concepts, organizations, educational curricula, and 
teaching methods must not be made to create the illusion of progress, but to guarantee 
that we will be able to meet the threats and win the next inevitable conflict. These future 
conflicts will be manifested in an ever increasing variety, and will be as challenging to our 
imaginations as to our resources. We prepare to fight the next conflict at great peril if our 
preparation is based on how the last war was won. And yet, it is folly to rehearse a play 
differently from what the script and scenario will be for show time. Furthermore, no plan 
ever survives the initial encounter with the enemy, so our personnel must be educated in 
such a manner that they will posses the intellectual ability to cope, prosper and prevail in a 
Proteus battlespace. 
As we have observed, information systems make middle managers an endangered 
species. We will witness dramatic organizational changes, as the demographics of the 
society from which our armed forces will be recruited change greatly. Within two decades, 
80 percent of the jobs in the United States will be cerebral, as opposed to manual. My 
generation experienced two to three career shifts per lifetime. Today's graduating 
students will undergo 13 to 14 such career transitions. 
Higher education is now the United States' fifth largest export, at $7 billion a year. 
Nearly 460,000 foreigners, mostly Asians, are enrolled in U.S. colleges, focusing on 
business, math, science, engineering and computer studies. By comparison, there are 
only 90,000 U.S. students studying abroad. But this situation is a treat, not a threat. 
Education will serve as the glue to cement the world into a more holistic one. 
If all enrolled college students were to change their majors to computer science, 
information management, information systems or information technology, there still 
wouldn't be enough educated personnel to satisfy job-related requirements. This current 
paucity of personnel skilled in information technologies has enormous implications, both 
inside and outside the lifelines of DoD. Ever increasingly, industry will find it difficult to 
deliver these high technology information systems the military needs. 
Information technology makes possible virtual classrooms and new military 
organizations that will permit different functions to be performed by different organizations 
at different locations, resulting in a revolutionary change in force composition. 
The world has been depolarized without open conflict for the first time in the history 
of mankind. There will be a propensity for us to cling to the romantic past with out-dated 
educational methods at the very time we should change in order to better exploit the 
fascinating technologies that have enabled us to enter the Information Age. If we always 
do what we have always done, we will get what we have always gotten. We can't direct 
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the wind, but we can adjust our sails. The building of the 21st Century is the task at hand 
- not clinging to the 20th. 
It was not ships, aircraft, tanks or reusable containers that brought down the wall, 
but information. Information is the fulcrum on which the lever of victory turns. And, as 
Archimedes proved, given the right position and a long enough lever, literally worlds can 
bf .1oved. 
We have moved into an age where the equities of the byte age can be combined 
with the abilities of the divinely given brain to ameliorate ignorance and biases -- and 
permit a more holistic, safer and peaceful world. This exciting capability will enable us to 
combat disease, enhance the quality of life, promote commerce and conduct and win wars 
in a more benevolent manner than ever before. Information should be used as an 
instrument to preserve the peace and, failing that, as a weapon of war. The public 
tolerance for casualties, usually unrealistically low, is vanishing, ushered in on the wings 
of a Global Information System. Our armed forces must be educated on how to leverage 
this capability. 
Forty years ago, when school curriculum was based on the study of classical 
knowledge, children learned about six simple machines -- the inclined plane, the level, the 
pulley, the wheel and axle, the wedge, and the screw. These simple machines are basic 
devices that modify energy, converting limited input forces and motions into the much 
larger, focused ones required to perform specific work. Today, simple machines continue 
to play an important technological role in society and in the military, just as they have for 
thousands of years. 
The computer is the seventh simple machine, and the first new machine in several 
millennia. It is the attribute of the simple machine that makes the computer the harbinger 
of the Information Age and makes the Information Age so revolutionary. Information 
Technology is not just a new invention, like the car or electric dynamo. It is a new tool set. 
This simple machine can leverage every activity of human life. The seventh simple 
machine makes it possible for an artist, engineer, accountant, writer, child - and warrior -
to integrate dispersed ideas and islands of information and bring to one screen the 
creativity of their minds. 
Collaborative planning, cooperative problem solving, self-directed discovery-based 
learning, and collective learning are all made possible by information systems, giving a 
new meaning to the word "synergism." There will be vast repositories of knowledge, 
containing every imaginable type of information that will be shared with a huge and widely 
dispersed audience and be immediately accessible from anywhere in the world. We will 
gather data under conditions of uncertainty and process it into meaningful information; 
obtain information from widely dispersed domains; analyze, evaluate, and endow it with 
the knowledge based on experience to create wisdom. 
We will amass information from many highly developed minds, critically analyze it 
in real-time, and impart this knowledge into the minds of the masses. On-line and 
8A-4 
interactive long-distance training and embedded knowledge bases and expertise will 
greatly facilitate problem solving, even in the most complex multi-disciplinary systems. 
Learning has never been easier. Information has never been more plentiful. Knowledge 
has never been as accessible. 
Modeling and simulation will serve as an usher for, and revolutionize, how we 
educate our people - as profoundly as the assembly line did the Industrial Age, pushing 
forward the boundaries of human knowledge to Olympic heights. Modeling and simulation 
cannot do everything that we want them to do, but they can do anything that we want 
them to do. They will provide us knowledge not otherwise available or achievable, 
spanning the spectra from the composition of our universe; deep outer space and beyond 
to the molecular composition of our bodies. The same process now used for the detection 
and identification of enemy targets can be applied to digitizing mammograms to fight 
breast cancer. Modeling and simulation can be applied to any oneiric concept that one 
can envision. 
Ever increasingly, more information will be made public. There will exist digital 
repositories - a gateway to a vast information universe, a virtual Global Village - for 
anyone to access. The amount of public information available for anyone with a VISA 
card, that is not overdrawn like mine, will be staggering. The competitive advantage will 
return to those with knowledge, because everyone will have access to an unfathomable 
amount of information. -- When there are no boundaries to the flow of information, 
knowledge is limitless. 
There will be over thirty countries with Earth Observation/Remote Sensor satellites 
within the next four years, many with one-meter resolution. Within a decade, they will be 
able to tell when you need a haircut from space. The expression "nation-state privacy" will 
have become irrelevant. Military strategic planning will have to be greatly altered. 
Decision cycle times will plummet. It will be our ability to manage tomes of unstructured 
information and present it via multi-media in an understandable format that can be rapidly 
assimilated that will be the enabler. 
We will experience the maturity of fuzzy logic not restricted to binary choices, but 
which can deal with ambiguities. We will have expert systems that can make deductions 
and actually produce new information. Data mining, through which we will be able to find 
and extract previously unknown information from existing databases, will open up vast 
new vistas. Genetic algorithms using Darwinian principles of random mutation will be able 
to create programs superior to any man can craft alone. Neural networks that emulate our 
brains' parallel processing structure to derive inductive conclusions, and object-oriented 
programming are just some of the technologies which will contribute enormously to our 
ability to better educate our personnel. 
Am I Quixote? Hardly! I'm just an incurable optimist. Years of public humiliation 
have steeled me and thickened my skin, along with my waistline, my arteries and, 
according to my company, my head. Hopefully, I have been able to intoxicate you with the 
fantastic opportunities and exciting challenges that await us, and present you an 
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intellectually sound and persuasive argument for education - education that will provide 
the competitive advantage to our warriors for the next millennium. We, indeed, are 
surrounded by fantastic opportunities - brilliantly disguised as unsolvable problems. Not 
since Galileo peered through his telescope has the world witnessed as great a sea of 
opportunities. 
You have honored me by your kind attention. May the most that you wish for be 




VICE ADMIRAL JERRY 0. TUTTLE, USN (Ret.) 
President, ManTech Systems Engineering Corporation 
Senior Vice President, ManTech International Corporation 
Admiral Tuttle joined ManTech International Corporation's executive management team 
October 18, 1996, as Senior Vice President of ManTech International Corporation and 
President of ManTech's largest subsidiary, ManTech Systems Engineering Corporation. 
He is responsible for strategic planning at the international level and total operating 
responsibility at the subsidiary level of this 3,700 person management and technology 
firm. Previously, Jerry was with Oracle Government for 33 months, as Vice President, 
Business Development and Chief Staff Officer. During this period, Oracle Government 
quadrupled in size and in revenue. 
Admiral Tuttle retired from the United States Navy, following a blissful 39-year career. 
From seaman recruit to Vice Admiral his career included assignments to numerous attack 
and fighter squadrons. He served as Aide and Flag Lieutenant to the Commander in 
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Dr. Arch Barrett 
Professor Browder: I am a substitute for Representative John Chapla, who is staff 
director for the House National Security Division Personnel Subcommittee. 
Unfortunately, because of an unexpected trip to Bosnia, he could not be here today. 
He asked that I extend his apology to you. I will speak, not faculty member at NPS 
or even as a former congressman, but will facilitate the discussion of this panel, 
which I believe will be a highlight of the conference. I would ask the panel members 
to make their comments as members of Congress, who have heard some pretty 
interesting questions raised in the last day and a half. For example, what is the role 
of congress in PME. We have the experience of the Skelton Panel, which through 
thorough investigation and analysis, developed a theory and a scheme for PME and 
then made some very good recommendations to the military. They were very 
restrained in their use of the legislative power. Another model, is for congress to 
come in, make a lot of recommendations, and have a very aggressive policy of 
enforcement. The question before us today is what is the congressional role in 
PME. Congress is obviously interested in the purposes, definition and the structure 
of PME. How does it approach those issues. Congress, obviously, will have to take 
an interest in officer career development, or somebody will. As has been made 
clear today, the career paths of officers are very limited. And how do you mix all of 
these concerns into a career. The question of jointness; the reserve component; 
those are very important things that have to be looked at. I'd like to ask the 
members of this panel to discuss the issue of support for PME. Finally, I would ask 
the panelists to comment on where the congressional and military establishments 
should go from here with PME. I will now turn the program over to Congressman 
Sam Farr, who will make some remarks and then introduce other panel members. 
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Rep. Farr: Thank you very much, Glen (Browder). It's a delight to have a former 
member of Congress on the NPS faculty. I'd like to welcome my colleagues in 
Congress to Monterey. As I indicated in the opening session, this is where 
California government began. 
We've attracted a lot of institutions to this area, not only military institutions 
like the Naval Postgraduate School and the Defense Language Institute, but also 
civilian schools. It's interesting to note that the Navy, through this session, has 
been able to organize Congress like no one else. You've got the largest 
concentration I've seen here of former members of Congress, some of who are 
sitting in the audience today: Beverly Byron, the former Congresswoman from 
Maryland and Peter Smith, president of the new university at Fort Ord. His school 
has 1,500 active students and projects growth to about 10,000 students, on the site 
· of the largest military base closing in the United States. Glen Browder is here, and 
Leon Panetta joined us the other night. So the former members are heavily 
present. 
The conference has also attracted the president of the Monterey Institute of 
International Studies, General Bob Gard. For those of you that might be interested, 
a lot of federal money that Congress appropriated has been put into MllS's Center 
for Non-Proliferation. The lead story in today's paper describes vvhat that center is 
doing, and a copy of it is on your seats. 
I think that this panel has two roles - one is to discuss the academic issues 
of military education. Having the "journeymen" here, the people who are on the 
dias in Congress making the decisions, the other is to discuss how the military 
better lobby Congress to get this done? I think we can share some of our 
experiences with you on how the PME community might be able to do that. The 
value in this is really that it's a panel discussion. All of us sit on the dias in 
Washington. We listen to testimony and are given one or two minutes to ask a 
question, and that's it. There are 50 members on the panel, and you don't get to 
come back. So, rarely do you have a chance to have a dialogue among members 
and people who may want to ask questions. I think we can do that today. 
· The unique thing about these panelists is that they are highly educated 
members of Congress. You've got Jack Reed - a West Point graduate vvho went 
on to get a Master's degree in Public Policy from Harvard's John F. Kennedy School 
of Government and then a law degree from the Harvard Law School. From there, 
he went into private practice, served in the Rhode Island State Legislature, served 
in the House of Representatives, and now serves as a United States Senator from 
Rhode Island. He has had a really distinguished career in human resources. He's 
on those committees and this is his specialty. He's done a lot in crime prevention, 
a lot in dealing in legislation, dealing with development of the human potential. He 
is certainly as well-educated and also well-traveled as any member of Congress. 
I think he has visiting many of the very issues that we're talking about in the new 
global world. He has been to Haiti, Somalia and Yugoslavia on peace-keeping 
missions. 
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As a former Peace Corps Volunteer, I've always felt that there needs to be 
some discussion about soldiers that are somewhere between warriors and Peace 
Corps volunteers, soldiers we are increasingly calling on to provide a peace-
keeping infrastructure. 
Also on our panel is Bob Underwood, a delegate from Guam, who has all the 
roles in Congress that the rest of us do. Born and raised in Guam, his mother was 
a teacher and his father worked for the U. S. Post Office. He got a master's degree 
and went on to become a school teacher, a school administrator, and a curriculum 
writer. Bob is involved as an instructor in the Bilingual-Bicultural Training Program. 
He was a Dean and Academic Vice President at the College of Education. He's 
been very active in Congress in those roles that require his expertise. And he's one 
of the leaders in talking about government structures. 
Guam is in a struggle for its self-determination, and Bob has led the 
discussion on creating Guam as a commonwealth. It's also interesting to note that 
Guam was probably harder hit than any other piece of real estate America is 
interested in by the recent typhoon in the South Pacific. The island, as you know, 
is almost totally devastated. The recovery from that disaster will be much like the 
recovery from a military conflict. And so I think that he has a great deal to add to 
this discussion, both as an educator and as a politician. 
Also on our panel is someone who is very dear to me because, when I first 
walked onto the floor of the U.S. House of Representatives, one of the first persons 
I met was Ike Skelton. Ike became my 'father.' I parachuted in when Leon Panetta 
went to the White House. They had a special election. I was like the kid who 
shows up in class in the middle of the year and nobody knoVJS who they are. They 
really haven't developed any friends. Ike is one of my favorite members because 
he reached out and took me under his wing. I was on the Armed Services 
Committee - I got on his subcommittee on personnel -- and I learned more in six 
months under the wing of Ike Skelton than I have under any other member of 
Congress. 
Ike Skelton is like many of us, but he has a district that's much bigger. All 
of our districts are based on population. His represents 23 counties. That's 23 
crises every single day that he has to resolve. He's a graduate of the Wentworth 
Military Academy and the University of Missouri at Columbia, where he got his law 
degree, was a Phi Beta Kappa, and was on the Law Review. He's a senior member 
of the National Security Committee. He's been Chair of the Subcommittee on 
Military Personnel and the ranking member on Military Procurement. Ike Skelton 
has military installations in his district, as the rest of us do - Fort Leonard Wood 
and Whiteman Air Force Base. His district is a lot like this area, with a lot of small 
towns and farming communities. He was an Eagle Scout, and he is the father of 
three sons. 
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So, I think what you see on this panel is people who have been in the 
positions of responsibility that a lot of this conference is about. And I think that the 
challenge we have is to decide how we can best use our role in the United States 
Congress, which must not only set policy but then put money behind that policy, to 
advance PME. 
And, lastly, before I sit down, I'll throw in my two-cents worth, which is 
essentially what I think Ike Skelton said this morning - that leadership is absolutely 
necessary to get things done on the Hill. We like the saying in politics, "The 
squeaky wheel gets the grease." If, indeed, military education is going to receive 
the attention it should receive, it's got to squeak a lot louder. 
The example this year that hit this school is that two Senate staff members 
reduced the education appropriation. That affected this S~hool. When the Navy 
was asked to respond, they didn't respond. And I have to say, if that's where the 
status of education is on the Hill - that staff members are deciding what's important 
and what's not impo~:mt - then we need to speak a lot louder, and we have to 
become much more politically involved. 
I'm also very interested in the dialogue on collaboration. In this area, we 
have the Monterey Institute of International Studies and its Center for Non-
proliferation - a civilian school which the Federal Government is putting a lot of 
military dollars into. The reason for that is that it has such expertise as a language 
school - it teaches about every language that's spoken on the globe that's 
essential to know. Smart students there, by just reading unclassified civilian 
material, have been able to track the flow of dangerous supplies and equipment, 
and deduce who has the capability of building weapons of mass destruction. That's 
not CIA \l\tOrk; that's not military \l\tOrk; that is a civilian school that's doing \l\tOrk that 
people are very interested in. And the capability there is, frankly, incredible. It's 
a civilian community with a lot of students who've lived overseas and have come 
home to get an education here in Monterey. 
So collaboration between the NPS and MllS is absolutely essential. We have 
more meteorologists here in the civilian community than any place except 
Washington, D.C. Collaboration with the Fleet Numerical weather station is also 
absolutely essential. 
So, what I'm very interested in - as a politician who sees a downsizing of all 
budgets, not just the military budget, is how to we get more out of our resources? 
I think the answer to that is we have to do a better job of collaborating when 
possible -when there's excess capacity in military (like NPS and DLI) and civilian 
schools (like MllS), and there's a willingness of the school superintendent to allow 
a civilian to sit in that classroom because it \l\tOn't hurt the mission. We ought to 
allow them to do that. 
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But with the current military process, there has to be a cost-reimbursable 
basis, and nobody can afford to pay $22,000 a year to send people to the Defense 
Language Institute. If there were an exchange between the University of California 
and the California State University system, you'd just exchange credits -- you'd 
send a student over here this year who gets six, seven, twelve units of credit, and 
you'd send one there next year or the year thereafter. We ought to be banking that. 
We need to find better toots to meet the mission that we've outlined here through 
better collaborations. So I'd like to have that part of the discussion as well. 
I'd like to call on my colleagues - each has a point to make - in this order, 
and then, hopefully, Glen-Browder will be able to engage in some dialogue. First 
of all, I'd like to call on Senator Reed. He's got more seniority than any of us, 
because he's in the Senate. When I got to the House, someone said, "Sam, you've 
got to realize that the Republicans are the opposition, but the Senate's the enemy." 
So, we in the House always appreciate it when a former House member gets 
elected to the Senate, because we think he'll be more appreciative of the House. 
Then I'll call on Bob Underwood to make a statement; and lastly, as cleanup batter, 
Ike Skelton. So, take it away, Senator Reed. 
Senator Reed: Thank you very much, Sam. As a junior senator from Rhode 
Island, it's wonderful to be here in Monterey - the Newport of the West. I listened 
very closely to Sam's introduction and was very flattered when he said I was highly 
educated. But then I was alarmed, in this crowd, when it was disclosed that I 
graduated from West Point. ·We tend to undercut that, but I hope I'll demonstrate 
or prove his point. 
We all understand that we're in the midst of a tremendous revolution in 
technology - information technology in particular. This is an intellectual idea that 
we can all grasp. But when you go out and visit some of the more exciting places 
around here, particularly Hewlett-Packard Laboratories, and all the companies I 
have been going to in the last few days, you realize how profound this is - the 
behavior of these companies, these institutions. You realize what they're doing is 
investing dramatically in the education of their work force. In fact, their whole 
approach to the future is investing in the human capital of their employees. It's 
transcended any other resource that they command as business leaders. 
In the same sense, the military has to do that. The military has to recognize 
that the future, even though it will be shaped profoundly by technology, will be 
managed ~nd mastered by individuals. And to do that, they have to be extremely 
well-educated. 
Now, as we look around, the core value that we must continue to emphasize 
in the military is the capacity to be a warfighter. There's no assuming otherwise. 
Warfighting will continue to be the essential mission of a military officer. But I 
believe we also have to recognize that, at the core of that challenge and mission, 
is an ethical and moral commitment as much as an intellectual one - that the 
dedication to country, service and sacrifice that is at the heart of being a warfighter. 
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This is something that we have to maintain, recognize, and promote as much as any 
intellectual skill we may teach. 
If we do that, I think we will have a sound basis to build, and continue to 
build, a strong military force. But we have to recognize today, perhaps more than 
years or decades ago, that we have to compliment that core value - that warfighter 
knowledge -- with much more sophisticated knowledge, and a whole range of 
intellectual activities. We have to develop officers and leaders who understand 
technology, who understand information systems, who understand the history and 
culture of the country they may operate in, and who understand and are able to deal 
with ambiguity and uncertainty. 
If we do these things, I think we will produce a leadership corps within the 
military, because I believe we recognize that leadership extends not just through the 
officer ranks, but also into our noncommissioned officer ranks as well. If we do 
these things, I think we will be well-prepared to meet the challenges of the next 
several years, and of the next several decades. 
I returned from Bosnia just about a week ago. While there, I had the chance 
to go out and visit some some of our soldiers. They are living proof of the value 
and the success of the military, but are also a good example of the typical 
challenges that the military forces face today. 
I went up to Outpost Demi, which is in our sector near Tuzla, and met with 
troops from the Second Squad and Second Army Calvary. There was a young 
lieutenant colonel there - and I've reached the point in life where lieutenant 
colonels are young - operating in a multi-dimensional mission. Not only is he 
primarily responsible for force protection - doing the traditional military tasks of 
outposting associated with conducting patrols, and insuring the protection of his 
forces - but he acts in some respects as a surrogate mayor for the towns around 
him. He is coordinating and collaborating with multi-national political officials. He 
is integrating, at the very lowest level, the intelligence that's coming in from all 
different sources. He's also operating in a situation where media and public 
perceptions are very, very important. All of these are skills that are not taught, or 
were not taught, when I was going through Fort Benning and other places, and that 
have to be taught to soldiers today. 
The other thing that stood out as an example of the situation there was that 
the level of responsibility and authority has been pushed down dramatically. When 
you send out a patrol led by an E-5, that individual has to be a little bit sensitive -
I would say a lot sensitive -to culture, to history, to technology, and to his or her 
role in dealing with a very complicated situation. So, in effect, one of the other 
challenges we have in military education is to educate a generation of educators 
- not just trainers, but educators - who can take their broad, interdisciplinary skills 
and translate them down to the very lowest ranks of those he or she commands. 
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Another aspect I think is important -- and I don't know if it fits in very neatly 
- is that we have to ensure that those professional military officers who are pledged 
and sworn to protect our country actually understand our country. I think for many 
years we took that for granted, because we had a huge influx each year, through 
the draft and through ROTC, of individuals who did not plan to spend 20 or 30 years 
in the military. Their orientation was military, but it was also one of going back 
home - of being part of the great American culture. 
That has changed significantly as we've moved dramatically to an 
all-volunteer force. I think that we have to recognize that one of the challenges we 
have is to ensure that our leaders understand how our system works, understand 
the values we fight about in Washington all the time, understand these elements in 
a much more pronounced way, and keep a strong connection to the American 
culture as they develop these other technical skills. 
As we go forward, we are going to have to prepare soldiers for a vast array 
of different tasks. We are going to have to ensure that they are technically capable 
and, as I've tried to suggest, but are also committed to that fundamental element of 
military service. 
Another important aspect we all have to recognize is the proliferation of joint 
service - of joint experiences. One of the things we have to do very consciously 
-- and it is a question of where we do it in the military education structure - is to 
harmonize the different cultures within the Department of Defense. We have to 
recognize that, just because everyone wears a uniform, everyone might not have 
the same sense of prospective or proportion on a different issue. 
For instance, I was startled to read, in the wake of the Kelly Flynn episode, 
that the services have different standards for what is and what is not permissible in 
terms of contacts between the genders. That struck me as odd. You would think 
that fundamental-level policies like that should be uniform. In fact, it strikes people 
outside the military, civilians, as being sort of odd also - perhaps undercutting of 
the legitimacy of the rules that you have, if you can't agree on a baseline for 
something that's very important. That's just one anecdotal example of the type of 
standardization that I think we have to do to proceed forward, and a lot of that has 
to be done in the context of military education. 
The bottom line is what everyone has talked about today - the world we face 
will be dominated by those who are the best educated. It applies in business, it 
applies in military, and it applies across the board. We have to develop, sustain 
and expand a system of professional development that will carry all of our leaders 
from their indoctrination into the service all the way to the end of their careers. 
They must participate in a constant cycle of learning, and a constant cycle of 
teaching to those who follow, to their subordinates. If we do that, I think we'll be 
able to integrate and to master all the new technologies. If we don't do that, we'll 
be the servants of these new technologies, and I don't think we'd be serving the 
best interests of the country. Thank you. 
9-7 
Representative Farr: Thank you, Senator Reed. Representative Underwood. 
Delegate Underwood: Thank you, Sam. Happy day to all of you. At an event of 
this nature, I always wonder what the role of Congressional panels are. I think that, 
sometimes, they are to demonstrate the ignorance of members of Congress, so all 
the people in attendance can feel good about themselves and what they know. I 
don't think the others in this panel will do that, but perhaps I will. 
As a former academic - and I think of myself primarily as an educator - I 
come to this issue by looking at it and making comparisons to governments and the 
operations of institutions of higher education. I find it interesting that so many of the 
buzz words and discussion points are quite similar to those used in civilian 
education. 
I have no military experience. And so I'm trying to figure out, as a member 
of the National Security Committee, how I can be useful to the kinds of prescriptions 
you've given in the course of this conference, and to the kind of ideas and 
theoretical perspectives that have been shared. 
The theoretical issue I find interesting is the role of technology in education 
- whether it is inherE?.ntly transforming, or whether it is simply another element that 
we must take into c 1sideration; and how that affects - how that impacts the basic 
training of military personnel? 
Many people are typecast as curmudgeons, who hold technology off at the 
edges of their existence. They are seen as impediments to the reformulation of the 
essence of the professional military officer in today's world - people who appeal to 
tradition and history as the basis for PME. I tend to share the perspectives of those 
who see historical examples as having particular life and usefulness today. I don't 
see myself as being an advocate of technology, if people see technology as 
inherently reformulating the enterprise of anything that we do. 
I think of technology as very useful, very important and very critical. I just 
don't see it as inherently transforming. And if we do see it that way, then I think we 
have let the tool influence the enterprise of what we do in life in a way that is 
unacceptable. 
Let me refer to some of the examples given by Jack (Reed), of military 
officers now being required to function as surrogate mayors - the idea of military 
officers being required to do a whole range of activities that were not done in the 
past. The capacity of these military officers to learn new technologies and gain new 
expertise in very short periods of time indicates to me only that there is a need to 
make sure that our officers are educated in a way that produces flexibility and 
knowledge - knowledge about vvhat brought their profession to this point in human 
history, and flexibility to deal with the challenges they must confront. So flexibility 
and leadership in the professional military field, I think, are critical, as they are in 
almost all professions in life. 
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Yet there's something a little bit disconcerting -- or perhaps, I would say, 
something I don't quite understand yet -- compared to what companies do, to what 
professionals who work in the private sector and the professionals who work in 
universities do. In University Life. one of the stories that's often repeated to 
dramatize the separateness of being a member of a university faculty is that, when 
General Eisenhower was President of Columbia University - and I assume General 
Eisenhower came out of the industrial organizational model - during one meeting 
he addressed the faculty of Columbia as employees of Columbia University. 
As soon as he was done, one of the faculty members stood up and said, 
"General Eisenhower, we are not employees of the University. We are the 
University." And that's a very different sense of what it means to be an academic. 
In a sense, academics are involved in a world in which they do the kinds of 
things referred to in last night's presentation, where they articulate their mission 
sometimes "out of nothing." Academics are good at that. So, sometimes they can 
look· at the world and chart their course, and the whole notion of participatory 
involvement in the shaping of missions, goals and objectives quite fits the university 
model. 
To some extent, even though companies are certainly admonished to watch 
their bottom line and to make a profit, some are able to shape their image in the 
community by saying, "Well, while we make money, we want to be known as a 
helpful company, or we want to be known as an environmentally sensitive 
enterprise." 
It seems to me that, while those elements are useful, I don't know that the 
military is quite that free. In the Constitution there's the basic mission of the 
military, and there's civilian control,. So what we're trying to do, it seems to me, is · 
to adapt the processes utilized by organizations that are freer, in the sense of being 
able to develop their essence, into an organizational structure which is not that free. 
At times that might seem very inviting. At other times, it might lead to a lot 
of frustration down the line, and might not lead to the kinds of things we hope to 
accomplish as a result. I could see the sense of frustration in some of the 
presentations, and in some of the discussions that I've heard. 
As an organization engaged in the defense of the country, I think the high 
sense of purpose the military has in relation to the life of this nation is very different 
in scope and mission than certainly anything that a university is, or does, and 
certainly anything that private enterprise does. 
I throw that out as an item to consider; because, unless we are quick to 
acquire processes from other organizations, if you acquire processes without 
clearly understanding the end point, the process defines your end point, rather than 
your doing so. Sometimes, that's a very big danger, and I see that all the time. 
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Glen Browder was telling me before we went on, that the blessing of this 
particular presentation - we have no slides, so we're technologically challenged --
is that the 21st Century Warrior will not hear the three words he fears the most, and 
those are "Next slide, please." I credit that to Glen. 
It seems to me there's an inherent contradiction in how we manage the 
organization in order to develop and understand the competencies necessary to be 
a fully-functioning officer in the 21st Century. I find I'm in sympathy with much of 
what I've heard in terms of the importance of having a historical base for providing 
that education, because education is a process that allows you to frame new 
events. Education is not a process that leads to you certain conclusions as you 
confront new events - that's training. Training is getting you to behave in an 
automatic way to a new situation. Only education can allow you to frame and make 
autonomous decisions, and you can only do that with awareness. If you don't have 
awareness of the frame of your profession, and the unique nature of it as an 
organization, then I think we are all the worse for it. 
In terms of clarifying and making an impact on Congress - certainly almost 
every member here will agree - unless people in the Pentagon themselves make 
a big fuss about the need for education, it's not really very productive to tell us in 
this setting. It has to come from the organization itself. 
One of the ironies that's very clear to me is that, with the intensity and feeling 
that's given to discussing and describing the information revolution, it's just barely 
a "pop" when it comes to giving resources in order to be able to train people and 
educate people to deal with this revolution. I mean, if indeed these changes are 
revolutionary and transformaf.ional in scope, where are the concomitant resources 
to deal with that? 
So it does no good for a bunch of people in uniform with many, many stars 
to constantly talk about the information revolution and the need to transform the 
military organization, but not have the concomitant resources to develop the 
professional coterie you need in order to manage that information. 
Thank you very much. 
Representative Farr: Dear friend, Ike Skelton. 
Representative Skelton: Thanks, Sam. After the learned discussions by my 
friends Sam and Jack and Bob, I feel like saying, "Me, too" and going on to the 
questions. I appreciate your comments very, very much. 
It was a pleasure a number of years ago to head up the Panel on Military 
Education. We've discussed it a little bit today. It's the only time Congress has 
ever tackled the institution of military education. We had a lot of excellent members 
of Congress working on it. Archie Barrett, whom I spoke of earlier today, had his 
heart and soul in it. He made us all look good. 
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Another reason for this success was the fact that there was a group I call the 
"Dawn Patrol," based on the four members of the cast in that 1935 movie, which 
maybe some of you have seen. That "Dawn Patrol" consisted of an Air Force 
lieutenant colonel, who was promoted during our tenure; an Army colonel; a Navy 
commander, who was also promoted during our tenure; and a retired Air Force 
colonel. We have 50 percent of that "Dawn Patrol" with us here today. So much 
of the work and effort was due to them - Colonel Mark Smith, Retired, and Major 
General Don Cook. They allowed us to have the 28 hearings, hear from many 
witnesses, and interviewwell over a hundred people. They allowed us to pass the 
information back to their respective services, so they knew what was going on. 
That turned out to be a major success for Congress and for the military, and I feel 
that I should praise them, as well as our friend Arch Barrett, for their phenomenal 
work. 
The question is, 'Where do we go from here?" In looking at this, I am 
convinced that, regarding military education, it is really an individual thing. 
On a personal level, I've had two hobbies since I was a boy. One was 
reading all that I could on how to try lawsuits - reading about the great trial lawyers, 
how they cross-examine. Getting old books - Daniel Webster's closing argument 
in a murder case - as well as the new ones. My second hobby was reading military 
history. And, as a result of all of these, I was able to ask the right questions on 
various hearings in the Congress of the United States. General Al Gray, a few 
years ago before he retired, put out a reading list for every rank of officers in the 
United States Marine Corps. They were quite good - the books in each of the. 
categories. And, if officers took this seriously, they would be all the more educated. 
That's why I think it is an individual thing, to begin with. Using my readings 
on how to try lawsuits, I got the very first conviction in our county on manslaughter 
by automobile - tremendous closing argument. In my second case as a young 
prosecuting attorney, my closing argument was an excellent variation of Daniel 
Webster's in a murder case. You team these things individually. And military 
people, by reading and studying individually, need to do the same thing. 
But it's more than that. If there's a basis within the individual - a love of 
history, a love of understanding of how battles are won, how battles are lost, how 
battles are avoided - then the Professional Military Education System comes into 
play. All the better. That's what this is all about. 
The question was raised as to the support for military education. I mentioned 
earlier, in response to a question, that the service chiefs and the secretaries are 
going to have to make this a priority. Remember this last year, Bob (Underwood), 
in our committee -- and, I don't know, Jack (Reed), over in the Senate - the Air 
Force was doing everything but falling on its S'NOrd for the F-22. If you put that type 
of priority on military education, our country would be far better off. But we're going 
to have to urge them to do this. It won't be easy because of the higher priority of 
weapon systems and other things. 
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If you're going to win battles, or you're going to avoid conflicts, those who 
wear the uniform of the United States have to have instinctive knowledge. This 
leads to another support of military education matter, but it goes deeper than that. 
It goes, Sam (Farr), to the support of the military in general. Jack (Reed) hit upon 
it when he said that, "People in uniform must understand our country." I'm 
convinced there's a growing gap between those of you in uniform and the 
Americans you are sworn to protect under our Constitution. 
There are two aspects to this. The first aspect is reflected quite accurately 
in Tom Rick's book, Making the Corps. Maybe some of you have read it. I 
recommend it to you. It speaks about young Marines going through boot camp, 
which is tough at best, returning home and seeing the peers they left - couch 
potatoes with long hair and the like. They realize that there's a great gap between 
the values they've acquired through their recent experience and those held by their 
buddies back home. If they stay in the Marine Corps - and this is true with the 
other services as well -there will be a gap between those who defend and those 
who are to be defended. 
There's another aspect to this, and this gets to the support element. The gap 
of which I speak is the gap that is reflected by the lack of numbers of young men 
and women coming from American homes into the military. Growing up as a boy 
in World War II, I saw so many older brothers and young men I admired who left 
high school and went into the military. Most families were touched, one way or the 
other, when their son, daughter, nephew, or grandson went into the military. 
The end of the draft and the continued shrinking of the military resulted in 
fewer and fewer homes from which young people join the services. Even further 
than that, you will find very, very few sons or grandsons or granddaughters or 
daughters from those families in the boardrooms of large corporations across the 
country. So there is a sociological gap as well. 
During the days of the draft and during the war, a beer truck driver could be 
in a foxhole with the son of a Wall Street banker. I don't think you'll find too much 
of that today. So there is a growing gap and because fewer people are in uniform, 
fewer families are affected. 
What's the result of this? The result of this is that we in Congress, on the 
House and the Senate side, get fewer and fewer letters urging us to take care of the 
sons and daughters who are at Parris Island, or aboard the USS THEODORE 
ROOSEVELT, or elsewhere. As a result, it's almost a "out of sight, out of mind" 
attitude. This is the growing gap. How can it be fixed? 
I think it's primarily up to the military, but it's also a challenge for our 
veterans' organizations - to cause the American public to appreciate those in· 
uniform a bit more. 
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It can't be applied everywhere, because you don't have posts, or bases 
uniformly across America. But young men and women in command positions, 
whether they be company, battalion or post commanders, should have a block on 
their performance or fitness reports on how well they do in relating to, and working 
with, the community or communities around. Some do well, and some don't. 
There has to be an increased awareness among the American people if you 
want them, in their talks with us and letters to us, to support the military more 
strongly. I see this as a major challenge. And I hope that both the veterans' 
organizations and the military can take heed of them. If that happens, the support 
for the military will increase, and part of that support, of course, would be for 
Professional Military Education. 
Representative Farr: I opened with some remarks about collaboration. Senator 
Reed talked about broad skill development. Representative Underwood stressed 
that questioning authority is essential to creative leadership thinking - to not 
accepting the outmoded. And Representative Skelton has outlined, I think very 
clearly, that there has to be individual drive for education, and support in general 
for the military - not only support from the civilian community for the military, but 
military understanding and support of the civilian community as well. 
Does anyone on the panel want to ask questions of other panelists? If not, 
we'll go into questions and answers with the audience. Does anyone have any 
questions for the four members of Congress who are here? Remember - squeaky 
wheels get the grease. You'd better squeak. 
RADM Marflak, National War College: Good afternoon, sir. It's an honor to be 
here with you. I must say, Representative Underwood, your prediction did not come 
true. We were all very impressed with your comments. We have all been very 
intensely immersed in this issue for a couple of days now. This has been very 
interesting and revealing for me because, as I noted this morning, for the last 
couple of years I've been more or less operationally involved. I haven't had a 
chance to become deeply involved in the issues Representative Skelton raised 
today - the history of PME. 
One thing that I have not experienced in any other recent conference is the 
issue Senator Reed brought up and that Representative Skelton just spoke to; that 
is the increasing alienation, or separation, between the military and the people of 
the United States. It may be that, in Tom Ricks' book, having the right "esprit de 
combat" and so on - is highlighted as an issue for some young people. 
But, I must say, I have not honestly seen (evidence of the civilian-military 
gap) at the higher levels of command, and I wonder if we could, in the remaining 
minutes available to us, perhaps have a conversation about that, and how the 
people here in the audience feel about it. Because I think it goes to the core of the 
all-volunteer force. The kind of professional military operation we have here in the 
United States is very, very good. 
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We have the "911" force in the Gulf. The American people expect that it will 
be able to show up quickly and be competent - that it will arrive and that everything 
will be highly organized and function accordingly. We in the military are very good 
at conveying those expectations, but if we lose contact with the people from whence 
we spring who are ultimately our customers, then we didn't do it right. So, I'd 
appreciate it if we could dialogue on that today. 
Representative Farr: I think you hit on a key point. I grew up in this community, 
and we've had a large presence of military here, with Fort Ord as a Army training 
base; with the Defense Language Institute, which is a multi-service trainer for 
languages; and with the Naval Postgraduate School. I served in local government, 
in the state legislature, and now in Congress. 
Yet, until I got elected to Congress, I didn't really know what the mission of 
these schools were. Frankly, they have gates around them and you have to work 
go through them. I have to say, I think the public's understanding of the military is, 
essentially, little more than the recruiting messages they see during Super Bowl or 
NFL games - the ones that say, "Be all you can be," and like that. 
I think there needs to be more breaking down of the barriers between military 
installations and the communities around them. The military retired community is 
very supportive, of course. It gets access to the commissaries and things like that. 
You can see there's a vested interest in it, but there's got to be a better 
understanding of the role by the general public. 
There are a couple things I've observed along these lines that have been 
really interesting. We host the Special Olympics here. The Defense Language 
Institute brings down platoons of students there. It's the first time that the public 
can see the incredible diversity in the military, learning all these exotic language3 
you don't expect. They do a kind of cultural cross-over. They're down helping with 
the Special Olympics or the coastal clean up. I think that the men and women in 
uniform who are told they have to do this do a tremendous job. When we need a 
lot of hands, they're there. But the rest of the time, there's still a lot of mystery. 
· That's why I think the educational process needs a collaboration, 'Where we 
can, on space-available basis, bring civilian students in to military courses. Let's 
have some dialogue in the classroom; and, in exchange, put the person in unifor'"ll 
into the civilian school, 'Where it's appropriate. We don't need to duplicate, J 
have two standalone stovepipe systems of education, 'When 'What is being taugtn is 
mutually beneficial to one an~ther. 
COL Harry Summers, USA (Ret), L.A. Times: Professor of Philosophy, Gene 
Urstein, in the last issue of The New Republic, commented on the loss of authority 
in the United States. He 'NaS commenting on the civilian population, going back to 
de Tocqueville and his comments in 1831 about the relationship between authority 
and liberty. He said that the serious decline of social authority in this country 
threatens the existence of liberty, on the civilian side. I commented that our military 
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is older than the republic. The great irony now is that the military is being criticized 
primarily for being too virtuous. That is, the media was astonished that the military 
would actually take the Seventh Commandment seriously. I mean, my God, that 
was unheard of. 
As we came out of Vietnam in disarray, one of the things the Army came up 
with was the slogan ''The Army wants to join you." It was an absolute disaster. We 
joined the civilian 60s and 70s generations, and it damn near destroyed the 
institution. Finally, we moved back to basics, back to fundamentals, back to a 
realization that authority in the military is an absolute. You can't have a military 
without it. 
One of the great reviews of Tom Rick's book was by Amy Waldman, who's 
a reporter for The New York Times. She concludes her observations with -- and 
there's certainly a wake up call involved, but to some degree it's a wake up call for 
civilian society as well -- that the schools and the classes have to begin again 
paying attention to such things as discipline, correct behavior, and all the rest -- if 
we're going to have a society worth a damn. 
I think it is not so much that the military has diverged from American society, 
but that American society has diverged from the military. Certainly the attributes 
that Ricks talks about in the Marine Corps for an entry level officer are essential in 
the battlefield. We saw what happened when we lost that kind of authority in the 
closing days of the Vietnam War. And I don't think any of us want to go through 
that again. I just would say that there's another dimension of this civil-military 
business that needs to be addressed as well. Thank you. 
LtGen Redden, Air University,;. If you haven't had the opportunity to do so, I would 
commend that all the members sitting here go to a hard-core, inter-city school and 
visit a Junior ROTC detachment - one of the program~ under our purview at Air 
University. It's supported by all the services, and reaches out to thousands of 
young people who like discipline and structure in their lives. It is a leadership 
program, working with strong support from retired military volunteers. It is not 
aimed at recruiting young men and women for the armed forces of the United States 
and it is tremendously successful. 
I have visited with school administrators, many of whom are anti-military and/ 
or have expressed to me sentiments that were predominately anti-military --from 
Hawaii, and across the breadth of the United States of America, mainly the United 
States. Yet they find JROTC to be a tremendous addition and greatly appreciate 
the study focus, discipline and pride it brings to their young people. I have had a 
number of principals in very tough schools tell me that the day that the young men 
and women in Junior ROTC wear their uniforms to class are the days that they have 
the fewest problem in those schools. 
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So I disagree that we are disconnected with society in many ways. I think 
we reflect society. And I think the bulk of society reflects a lot of the values that are 
represented by all of the individuals in this room. We have an undercurrent though, 
that we are seeing in our junior officers, and I would reference the Flynn case. 
There is a certain belief that our very leadership neither reflects nor respects 
society's values. When all the dust settled out of the Flynn case, it wasn't about 
gender -- that was about officership and integrity, and about someone who 
essentially violated the trust in the chain of command. 
I was very pleased to see a number of journalists, who had been on the 
opposite side of that fence, revise their views as all the facts came out over time. 
It's an issue that we need to be aware of. We become a little bit bewildered when 
we find ourselves set upon by the very civilian authority that we serve, and 
appearing to get a mixed signal from that authority. 
I think we all very strongly believe that those values that represent the 
integrity of the military are essential to us, and we don't want to sacrifice them. I 
think you would find, if you visited some of those JROTC programs, that we've got 
a heck of a lot of people out there making great civilian contact at a great 
grass-roots level and contributing a lot to the citizenship development of young 
people in this nation. 
Senator Reed: I think it's an interesting point. The Flynn case is a good prism 
through which to analyze how the military reacted, versus the civilian community at 
large. To the civilian community, this was a sexual harassment case. Just like IBM, 
just like General Foods, they thought some executive was doing something wrong. 
And, frankly, as I suggested in my remarks, they got more puzzled when they 
realized it was a penalty in one service and not a penalty in another service. 
Those who have been in the military understand, I think intuitively as you do, 
that the case was a question of leadership - of a military officer exploiting a 
subordinate. It reflected a \/ · .. '.ation of that basic core value of leadership and 
service and self-sacrifice to the institution. But civilians looking at this, and military 
looking at this, saw it in different ways. That might illustrate the point I think 
Congressman Skelton made, and I also tried to make, that there are different 
perspectives out there. The military must understand how the civilian world reacts 
to this, and why there was such a hullabaloo, if you will, both in the Congress and 
around the country. 
I think, in a way, we all have to get the message out to the civilian world that 
this was not just an issue, like in General Motors or some big company - of sexual 
harassment. This was an issue of leadership, and of something that an officer has 
to do that was not done, apparently. This whole dialogue is a very important one. 
One other point I'd like to make is that the military is very different, as we 
recognize, in other aspects of American life. The military is structured hierarchically, 
and authoritarian; and it should be. 
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We have to understand where the differences are; and we have to 
understand where the common values are. I sense, in an institutional way, that this 
is more of a challenging subject today because, as an institution, the military 
doesn't get the huge push-through of people coming in that it used to. It's a smaller 
institution. There's no draft. There's no requirement to bring in a large category of 
second lieutenants or ensigns each year, who go through and bring with them a lot 
of civilian attitudes and ideas that keep refreshing, in all sense, the entire military. 
We have to understand that. Thank you. 
Delegate Underwood: If I could just add to that. I'm being educated as I hear 
people discuss this issue, because I understood the issue of the gap between the 
civilian and the military as really just a function of demographics. You don't have 
as many people in the military anymore, so you don't have very many intermediaries 
explaining the conditions that exist inside the military as an institution. 
As a consequence, that places special responsibility on the military to explain 
itself- not to join society, or to engage in some new marketing plan to beef up its 
image. It didn't seem to me that it was a question of a critique of anything 
necessarily going on in the military. It just seems that the demographics of the 
situation are such that you don't have as many intermediaries explaining the military 
as you once had. That places special responsibility on the military to explain its 
unique circumstances as an institution. Indeed, even Junior ROTC programs are 
fine ways to do that. But I think the bottom line is that that's insufficient. 
The broader question of what to do about the issue of authority again comes 
up as people talk about the growth of knowledge and net.Norking. I was joking with 
someone outside. I said, "Well, what do you do if you have increasingly flat 
structures of information? What do you do with the chain of command? Do you 
have a chain of netoorks? What does that do in terms of the hierarchical structure 
that once existed?" 
In any situation, civilian society included, if you increase the autonomy of 
individuals, individuals are going to have it naturally in their grasp. That means that 
they have to list~n less to each other, and such things as authority, and a 
pronounced sense of authority goes out with it. If you add into that mix an 
increasingly changing population undergoing various cultural trends, and good old 
American individualism, you have a very difficult mix to deal with. 
The issue of the growing gap between the civilians' and the military's 
understanding of the military is simply a function of demographics. I don't think it's 
necessarily a function of a critique of what's going on in the military. 
Professor Browder: If I could, as moderator, I'd like to exercise one of my 
prerogatives to lead us into our last few minutes by saying that we have, on this 
stage, what I consider to be a very good representation of what we have in the 
United States Congress. We have people who have a varied background. 
Congressman Farr represents this institution and other military institutions, and has 
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proven himself champion of our issues. Let's take, for example, one of the ones he 
was just talking about - the education issue. He was just the lead on one of those 
issues in Congress, this past year, and his efforts resulted in progress. 
We have Congressman Underwood, who is an educator but who sat with me 
on the Armed Services Committee and has demonstrated his leadership on that 
issue. 
We have Senator Reed, who has not only the career background, but the 
Constitutional responsibilites, to address this issue. 
And right here we have the Statesman of PME - I was going to say the 
Founding Father, but I won't go that far - Ike Skelton. 
Yesterday we had a representative from the new generation of leadership -
Congressmen Buyer. The military education community has got to work with these 
people and to communicate to them our concerns, especially as we see the shifting, 
the devolution, of these responsibilities among younger leaders in Congress. 
Let me remind you that following this panel, after a break, we'll have a 
recapitulation of what has been going on here, followed by a discussion of where 
we go from here. But in these last few remaining minutes, let me offer you, and 
again remind you, that we have an opportunity for you to ask the questions, 
knowing the other panelists. 
We've have a lot of questions, and I could look around and see by the faces 
that there were some other questions that people wanted to ask but did not get to 
ask. Let me tell you, you've got an audience up here today that will provide an 
excellent opportunity for you to ask those questions. So in the few, last minutes we 
have, if you have any questions about Professional Military Education, come to one 
of the mikes and get it off your chest. I see Arch Barrett going to the mike. 
Dr. Barrett: When Goldwater-Nichols was passed, it was because the Congress 
had challenged the Pentagon to no avail, and Congress had a Constitutional 
responsibility to reprioritize things in the Pentagon to increase joint influence. 
Goldwater-Nichols had some provisions that told the Pentagon, the Secretary of 
Defense, and the Chairman of Joint Chiefs to adjust military education so that the 
education of officers would now reflect a new joint interest. 
Nothing was done for two years. That became the genesis of the Skelton 
Panel. My point is that there are things in the Pentagon, and things in the services, 
that don't receive the priorities that perhaps the civilians who control the military 
should insist upon. I'm not asking for legislation - I was an Army official for the last 
three years and I went to see Mr. Skelton and, very sincerely, told him that I didn't 
think Congress should interfere in this particular issue. I looked him straight in the 
eye as I said that, and he broke out laughing. After all, he said, "You drafted the 
most micro-managing legislation that's ever been passed on the Pentagon." 
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I'm not asking for legislation, but I am suggesting that, in this area of 
education, that Congress really needs to show interest in what's going on. 
As a senior Army official, I sat on the Army's Resource Support Board, the 
next highest board to the secretary, and made recommendations to the secretary. 
And in three years, I don't recall one Professional Military Education resource 
allocation issue reaching that level. 
So, I would just urge Congress to pay attention, because one of the finest 
things in our civil-military relation is that the civil part is able to readjust the priorities 
of the military part - most of the time in the right direction, in my view. That's my 
point number one. 
I'd like to speak for a moment now on a point number two. This conference 
has looked at traditional military education - Professional Military Education - and 
that, to me, has a value that has been amply defended. Strategy and the study of 
military history are aspects the war colleges teach about. Another aspect that we 
haven't talked very much about is the whole civil-military relationship -- how the 
military fits together in the Pentagon, how resource allocation is done in a 
democracy, etc. 
A third thing that's studied at these schools is how to apply the forces that 
officers and the services have at the present time, or that the officers may 
encounter in the future - theater warfare, operational art, etc. It's difficult, I think, 
to say that none of these things are valuable, or shouldn't be a component of an 
officer's education. 
On the other hand, we've heard eloquent statements about how we need to 
face other aspects of the evolving situation. Technology has received the most 
attention, but there have been myriad things that PME should do, if you believe this 
conference, that, it seems to me, are almost impossible. It's -impossible because 
we've also accepted one assumption. We've accepted the assumption that we're 
in the ·box of 20 to 22 years to qualify to be competitive for Flag or general officer. 
There's just not enough time to do all of these things. 
It is really counterproductive for the technologist and the traditional PME 
people to be arguing. It's unfortunate, but they see it as a zero-sum game. It 
doesn't have to be that way, in my view. Also, because we've been focusing on 
education, we haven't really thought about what officers are required to do. 
Education is important. But, as the Skelton Panel pointed out, in order to be 
an adequate joint officer, you have to first be a service officer. And that means not 
just having a service education, but, in the Army, serving as a platoon commander, 
a company commander, a battalion XO, a battalion commander, or a brigade 
commander; and in the Navy as a ship or squadron department head, XO, or CO 
and perhaps group commander. Those things take time, and if you put them all 
together, there's just not enough time to do them all. 
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I would ask you to look at increasing the time. The reason we only have 20 
to 23 years is because of a lesson we learned in World War II, where we had to fire 
a whole generation of superannuated officers, not only Guard but active, in order 
to get the vigorous Eisenhowers, and Bradleys, and people like that who won the 
war. The lesson learned from that was, we are always going to have a young, 
vigorous force, and that means 20 years to Flag and then almost 35 years to 
retirement. I don't think that assumption holds anymore. Just look around at the 
leaders today. A fifty-five-year-old general officer is every bit as vigoro_us as a 
45-year-old was 30 years ago. So, if we changed the box and think about what we 
need, as a government, out of our military officers, I think we would expand that box 
to a longer career. I've already said that I think the downside of that is almost zero. 
The upside is tremendous. 
First of all, we would get the experience we need in young officers as they 
come up. They could serve longer in positions. There would be time for joint duty, 
which Congress has demanded. There would be time in the Army to have young 
Army officers serve with the Guard and the reserves, and overcome that schism -
and I don't know any other way to overcome that cultural schism. 
We would get our money's worth. The government, after all, invests a 
tremendous amount of money in these officers, who we say, most of them, will serve 
20 or 22 years. The most discouraging statement I heard in this whole conference 
was a young officer who got up this morning and said, "After one or two years in the 
Navy, the young Navy officer starts to consider what he's going to do after the 
Navy." Can you imagine the distortion in careers that comes from thinking about 
what you're going to have to do in your second career? Whereas we talk about the 
military as a profession. I think it should be studied and practiced and developed 
throughout a lifetime, if you're going to be successful. I'm not suggesting doing 
away with "up or out." I am suggesting, though, lengthening the time. 
Representative Farr: Arch (Barrett), can I have one question of you? You've been 
in a unique position. You've been a staff member to Congress on the Armed 
Services Committee, and then you served in the Pentagon. In the squeaky-wheel 
issue, is it that the Congress is not responding to the issue of more financial 
resources, or is the problem that the Pentagon isn't asking? 
Dr. Barrett: Sir, I think it's a combination of both, on military education. As 
someone pointed out, the dollars are so small that they really don't get above the 
noise level to the leadership. 
There is a structural problem, also, with respect to joint education. The Army 
calls Fort McNair an Army installation - it passed up joint education at the National 
War College. The Army thinks it's bankrupt already, and yet it has to fund the Army 
War College. You can imagine how joint education stacks up in that way. The 
Armed Forces Staff College is on a Navy installation with the same sorts of 
problems, so these are things that can be changed. 
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You can fund those schools through joint staff, although there are structural 
problems to overcome. I'm not suggesting legislation. I'm just suggesting that you 
need to pay attention to this very important area. 
L TG Chilcoat, National Defense University: I want to say something about 
civil-military relations. Your comment about the connection, or lack of connection, 
between the military and our society is way up on the screen of our senior service 
college students. They are wrestling with this. That's the good news in all of this. 
We all know that there are a lot . of issues there. Dick Kohn and I had a 
conversation about it. I don't al'Nays agree with what he has to say on the subject, 
but he keeps the civil-military relations issue up on the radar screen for all of us. 
For example, last year, the Army War College made that a special theme. 
In just the last week, Gerry Galloway (Dean of Students at ICAF) and 
General Walt Ulmer, USA (Ret) were talking about an enterprise which would look 
at this issue in the context of today's and tomorrows military culture. So the good 
news is, while it's an issue, it's going to be looked at carefully, studied, worked, and, 
at least at the war-college level, wrestled with. 
Arch's comments are always thoughtful and cause me to reflect. And, with 
reference to the young commander's comments this morning, I had a great 
conversation with him. 
When I went to the Military Academy at West Point in 1960, I went for one 
reason: I wanted a great education. I 'NBS going to leave the service and go do my 
second career. I stuck around for about eight to ten years, and then I said, "I'm 
going to the business school at Harvard, get me an MBA, and then I'm going to get 
out and make me a bunch of money." So it's not just his generation, or Generation 
X, which has hedged its bets. 
But what happens is, there's some magic in this profession. It's in all of the 
military services, and it's because we are a val~es-based organization. What 
happens is, we do learn about selfless service. It takes over, and so I don't worry 
a lot about today's generation having a little bit of self-interest because I know, as 
they grow and mature and assimilate the values of the profession in which they 
serve, all of that will tend to mellow. 
A couple quick comments on the role of Congress - I agree with Arch. But 
dialogue with us. You have been great about that. Your attendance and your 
willingness to take the time to come out here and do this is more than just noted. 
And continue to support us. 
Where do we go from here? I had the privilege of speaking to the group last 
night. I'm not interested in reforming the current system. As I argued last night, it 
has served us well. What I'm interested in is evolving the system now into a new 
future. We've had lots of ideas about how to do that. I say, we need to take the 
time, and I think we in the PME community have to help shape it. But we need to 
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formulate a new vision for JPME. We have to ensure that that vision is codified into 
the larger vision of the Armed Forces of the United States, and we need to resource 
it. And we need to keep it robust. I am very much heartened by your attendance, 
especially with the Director of the Joint Staff here. 
·Some comments about leadership. I've worked very closely with two Army 
Chiefs of Staff over the last three years, and I know of General Shalikashvilli's and 
of General Shelton's commitment to PME. While they deal with the Bosnias, lraqs 
and lrans and a whole host of operational questions, they deeply value Professional 
Military Education. So I think we in the community just need to make sure that we 
help keep it on their radar screens, as well. 
Professor Browder: Let's give a round of applause to these panelists. This 
session is concluded. 
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THE HONORABLE SAM FARR 
17th Congressional District, California 
Sam Farr, a Democrat, represents the 17th Congressional District of California, which includes 
all of Monterey County, San Benito County and a large portion of Santa Cruz County. 
Agriculture, tourism, education, and commercial fishing form the economic underpinnings of the 
District. 
Congressman Farr serves on two key House committees: Agriculture and Resources. Since 
taking office, he has made economic revival and the creation of new jobs in the 17th District his 
top priority. So far, Sam Farr has provided an economic stimulus by obtaining $44 million in 
defense conversion funds to start a new California State University at Fort Ord and a federal 
commitment to hire hundreds of employees for a new Defense Department finance center to be 
located at the base's closed hospital. Congressman Farr also saved 300 jobs by stopping the 
closure of the Social Security Administration's Salinas Data Operations Center. Sam Farr has 
been recognized as an "Environmental Hero" by the League of Conservation Voters, garnering a 
perfect voting record in its 1996 ratings, and has been given perfect voting scores by the Center 
for Marine Conservation and Children's Defense Fund. He was named 1996 Legislator of the 
Year by the American Planning Association. 
Before coming to the House of Representatives, Sam Farr served 12 and one-half years in the 
California State Assembly, being re-elected six times with overwhelming majorities. As a 
member of the Assembly, Sam Farr chaired the Assembly Local Government Committee as well 
as the Committee on Economic Development and New Technologies and was a member of the 
standing committees on Education, Natural Resources and Finance and Insurance. He is 
recognized as a leader in legislative efforts for educational excellence, environmental protectiOn, 
economic development, and new technologies. His accomplishments include passage of laws to 
expand and develop the State Park system, to stop offshore oil drilling and hold polluters fully 
financially responsible for oil spill damages, to give businesses incentives ·to develop new 
technologies for environmental cleanup, to place computers in public school classrooms and to 
study the impacts of defense conversion on the state's economy. Sam Farr has been named 
Legislator of the Year nine timei;;. 
Sam Farr began his career in public service in 1964 with a two-year commitment in the Peace 
Corps in Colombia, South America. Sam Farr graduated from Willamette University in Salelll; 
Oregon with a Bachelor of Science degree in Biology in 1963 and attended the Monterey 
Institute of International Studies and the University of Santa Clara. He is fluent in Spanish. 
A :fifth-generation Californian, Sam Farr was born on the 4th of July, 1941. He is a long-time 




Naval Postgraduate School 
Glen Browder has bridged the gap between classroom political science and real-world 
government. As Professor of Political Science at Jacksonville State University (Alabama) 
for 16 years, Dr. Browder taught thousands of college students the important principles of 
American democracy. Then, as an Alabama State Legislator, Secretary of State, and U.S. 
Congressman, he played a key role in the governmental process. Now, as Distinguished 
Visiting Professor of National Security Affairs at the Naval Postgraduate School in 
Monterey, California, Glen Browder is putting his academic and practical experience to 
work for our country's national security. 
Browder's extensive experience and expertise have been directed over the years toward 
political reform and America's adjustment to a changing world. He has won recognition 
as a positive and effective public servant throughout his career. 
Browder was horn in Sumter, South Carolina, and attended Presbyterian College (B.A. in 
History) and Emory University (M.A. and Ph.D. in Political Science). His occupational 
background includes work as an investigator with the U.S. Civil Service Commission, 
sportswriter of the Atlanta Journal, and public relations assistant for Presbyterian 
College. He came to Jacksonville State University directly from graduate school and has 
been a member of that institution since 1971 (he is currently on leave of absence without 
pay from JSU). 
Browder, a Democrat, served one term in the Alabama House of Representatives (1982-
86) before being elected statewide as Alabama's Secretary of State (1986). He won a 
special election to the U.S. House of Representatives in 1989 and served in Congress 
(1989-96) as a member of the House National Security and Budget Committee. After an 
unsuccessful run for the U.S. Senate in 1996, he was appointed Distinguished Visiting 
Professor of National Security Affairs at NPS. 
Browser, 54, and his wife, Becky, have been married for 30 years, and they are the proud 
parents of Jenny Rebecca. 
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THE HONORABLE IKE SKELTON 
Fourth Congressional District, Missouri 
U.S. Rep. Ike Skelton (D-MO) has represented Missouri's Fourth Congressional District in the 
U.S. House of Representatives since 1977. His district includes 23 counties stretching from Blue 
Springs, to Missouri's state capital, Jefferson City, to the Ozark region of the state. 
Skelton, a native of Lexington, is a graduate of Wentworth Military Academy and the University 
of Missouri at Columbia where he received AB. and L.L.B. degrees. He was named as a 
member of Phi Beta Kappa and the Law Review. Prior to his election to Congress, Skelton 
served as Lafayette County Prosecuting Attorney and as a Missouri State Senator. 
A leader in the House on defense issues, Skelton is a senior member of the National Security 
Committee, currently serving as ranking minority member of the Subcommittee on Military 
Procurement. He is also a member of the Subcommittee on Military Personnel. Skelton also 
serves on the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. Skelton' s district is home to 
two military installations -- Fort Leonard Wood and Whiteman Air Force Base. Skelton was 
instrumental in bringing the Army Engineer School to Fort Leonard Wood and the B-2 Stealth 
bomber to Whiteman. 
As most of the Fourth Congressional District is comprised of small towns and farming 
communities, Skelton looks after the needs of rural America. He is a former chairman of the 
Small Business Subcommittee on Procurement, Tourism and Rural Development and the 
Congressional Rural Caucus. 
Skelton is an Eagle Scout, a member of Sigma Chi social fraternity, a Lions Club member, and 
vice chairman of the Board of Trustees of the Harry S. Truman Scholarship Foundation. Skelton 
is an elder of the First Christian Church in Lexington. He and his wife Susie have three sons. 
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THE HONORABLE JACK REED 
Senator, Rhode Island 
Senator Reed was born in Providence, Rhode Island in 1949. After graduating from 
LaSalle Academy in Providence, he received a Bachelor of Science from the United 
States Military Academy at West Point in 1971. Reed received a Masters of Public Policy 
from Harvard's John F. Kennedy School of Government in 1973. From 1973 to 1977, 
Reed served as Infantry Platoon leader, Company Commander, and Battalion Staff 
Officer in the 82nd Airborne Division at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. He then returned to 
West Point as an Associate Professor in the Department of Social Sciences. 
Reed left the Army in 1979 to attend Harvard Law School. He graduated in 1982 and 
spent one year with the Washington D.C. law firm of Sutherland, Asbill, and Brennan 
before returning to Rhode Island. There he joined Edwards and Angell, a law firm in 
Providence. In 1984, Reed was elected to the Rhode Island State Senate and served three 
terms where he gained statewide recognition for his leadership on childcare and housing 
issues. Reed represented Rhode Island's 2nd Congressional District in the U.S. House of 
Representatives from 1991 to 1997. In January 1997, he was sworn in as Rhode Island's 
47th U.S. Senator. 
Senator Reed has made education one of his top priorities and has actively worked for 
passage of the GOALS 2000 Act and reauthorization of the Higher Education Act as a 
member of the House Education and Labor Committee. He supports efforts to improve 
access to health care coverage for all Americans, particularly the uninsured children of 
working families. Upon his arrival in the Senate, Reed was appointed to the Senate· 
Committee on Labor and Human Resources to continue his role as a Congressional leader 
on education and health care issues. 
As a leader in the effort to fight crime, Reed worked in the House Judiciary Committee to 
make streets safer and protect our nation's police officers. Reed advocated passage of the 
1994 Crime Bill and the Brady Bill, and he fought efforts to repeal the assault weapons 
ban. In addition, Reed has worked to ban "cop-killer" bullets and introduced legislation 
in the House to ban Saturday Night Specials, or "junk guns". He joined a bipartisan group 
of Senators to reintroduce the bill to ban junk guns this year. 
Reed has also developed expertise on international affairs and defense issues. A graduate 
of West Point and a former Army Ranger, Reed served on the House Select Intelligence 
Committee and has traveled to Haiti, Somalia, and the former Yugoslavia to evaluate 
U.S. peacekeeping missions. 
In addition to the Labor and Human Resources Committee, Reed serves on the Senate 
Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, and the Special Committee on 
Aging. Democratic Leader Tom Daschle also appointed Reed to serve as Eastern 
Regional Chair of the Democratic Policy Committee. 
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ROBERT ANACLETUS UNDERWOOD 
Guam's Delegate to the United States Congress 
Congressman Robert A. Underwood was born in 1948 in Tamuning, Guam He earned a 
Bachelor of Arts degree in History and a Master's degree from California State 
University at Los Angeles. In 1972, he joined the faculty of George Washington High 
School, Guam's oldest public secondary school. After working as a teacher, school 
administrator and curriculum writer, Mr. Underwood left the Department of Education 
and joined the faculty of the University of Guam as an instructor in the Bilingual-
Bicultural Training Program in 1976. In 1988, after receiving a Doctorate of Education 
from the University of Seq.them California, Mr. Underwood was named dean of UOG's 
College of Education. In 1990, he became the university's academic vice president. 
Mr. Underwood was elected to the Territorial Board of Education in 1978 and was 
appointed to the National Advisory Council on Bilingual Education by the U.S. Secretary 
of Health, Education and Welfare in 1979. He was appointed to the Chamorro Language 
Commission in 1977 and served as its Chairman for more than 12 years, until 1991. He 
was also a member of the Guam Historic Preservation Review Board from 1977 until 
1990. Robert was a founding member of PARA'-PADA, a coalition of language rights 
and political rights activists opposed to a proposed Guam Constitution in 1975. In 1981, 
he was named to the Guam Commission on Self-Determination's Task Force on Free 
Association/Independence, to research and present to the public its findings on the 
advantages and the disadvantages of those two political status options. 
Robert also was a founding member of OPI-R, the Organization of People for Indigenous 
Rights, which advocated the formal recognition and eventual exercise of the Chamorro 
people's right to political self-determination. OPI-R remained actively involved 
throughout the political status plebiscite of 1982 and the subsequent drafting of the Guam 
Commonwealth Act, which was accepted by the people of Guam and introduced in 
Congress for the first time in 1987. One of Robert's first acts as Guam's delegate to 
Washington in 1993 was to re-introduce the Guam Commonwealth Act in the 103rd 
Congress. 
Robert retired as UOG's academic vice president in 1992, to make a bid for the 
Washington Delegate's seat, which was authorized by Congress in 1972. He won the 
1992 election and became Guam's third delegate to Washington. He serves on the 
Committee on National Security and the Committee on Resources. 
Congressman Robert A. Underwood and his wife, the former Lorraine Aguilar, are the 
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Remarks by 
RADM Paul G. Gaffney, II, USN 
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I'll try to keep it light and pretty fast. And I'm not going to bother to recapitulate 
what the members of Congress just said. Their convictions were quite clear, and their 
words quite recent. We've intensely covered a great deal of territory over a 
considerable number of working hours during the past two days. The true leaders on 
this subject convened here and stayed engaged throughout. Both the Office of Naval 
Research and the Naval Postgraduate School congratulate you for that. 
Some things that happened over the past t'NO days: We wired up the National 
Defense University and shared its vision over dinner and dessert last night. We 
qualified Wayne Meyer as a polite attendant. We had a football lesson from Professor 
Kohn, and a wake-up call from him on the American civil-military relationship. We had 
a Remington Ranger in wing tips teach us how to make the perfect backstroke and 
then pointedly articulate the over-constrained nature of Professional Military Education 
when it bumps up against a military career. 
We had a Mark Twain-speaking, hundred-dollar-tie-wearing speaker with a 
rapier wit and a folksy delivery who punctuated - or who punctured - his way into our 
self-satisfaction with PME - General Kelly. A terrorist wanted poster was reissued. 
At lunch today we learned about space-based haircuts. Some feathers flew up here 
on this stage and some henhouse cleaning ensued. We had thoughtful, well-prepared 
people deliver persuasive arguments that would make a debate or drama coach at any 
first-class university in America envious. And we learned the difference between 
vision and hallucination. 
Some common themes came out, some differing opinions came out. Mostly 
they weren't divisive, but some were. Some interesting outsider issues were 
presented, and some topics were not addressed - not fully, in any case. 
I'll organize this summary according to those categories. I won't scratch every 
itch. My remarks will probably be one sigma from the center. They won't get every 
outrider. And they will not only reflect my opinion, but try to be a fair opinion among 
a number of people who took notes over the last two days. My notes here are a living 
document; the ink on some of these pages is still quite wet. 
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Here are the common themes, in no priority order, but this first one is probably 
a priority. We need thinkers whom the system does not suppress. We cannot afford 
to disincentivize risky but responsible thinkers. And if you think about the way that 
Congressman Skelton pronounced the word "thinker" every time he gave his speech 
this morning, you know it was almost with reverence. That, I am sure, is the kind of 
emphasis that he intended. 
Next, resources for this critical investment are obviously insufficient. And they 
are directly related to the commitment of our leaders. The cost of ignorance greatly 
outweighs the cost of education. And we, perhaps, lag industry in our investment. 
PME insertion into the career of an officer is already, and probably always has 
been, an over-constrained problem. Organizational slack - as we heard this morning 
- is literally gone. And innovation, if we're not careful, will be a victim. PME needs 
to be continual, not episodic. 
Quality was an issue - degrees of quality - but all agree it could and should 
be improved. 
Technology, which became more of our focus in the last part of the 
conference, is obviously a challenge to teach. The speed of technological change 
is undeniable. We've left the Industrial Age. We've entered the Information Age. 
We're not yet settled on how much one teaches in the technological area. We are 
all certain, I believe, that is a necessity; although it may not be sufficient, on its own. 
And we also, I think, all believe that there will continuously be a tug-of-war. 
Throughout the conference, information technology and the word technology 
were used interchangeably and, in my opinion, that's an error. Information 
technology is, has become, a foundation discipline on its own, and is an 
underpinning for every other discipliine; but there are many others that brought us 
Stealth, and lasers from space, and many other of the technologies that we live with 
and \Jill live with tomorrow. 
Trust, we found throughout the two days, is important to gain, is important 
not to lose, and, if we do lose it, we must recapture it quickly because it is key to 
our military culture. It is key to team survivability and absolutely necessary for 
innovation. 
We probably suffer from inflexibility of our personnel system. Maybe it's an 
outdated system as well. It has hamstrung us in detailing students to PME 
assignments, and has not helped the quality of our military professors. It has not 
allowed us to realize the full potential of our civilian faculty. 
Goldwater-Nichols and its derivative, the Skelton Panel, were good, were 
right, and spurred us on to get to where we are today in PME. But some 
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unintended consequences and new opportunities are seen ten years later. As a 
matter of fact, we know that technology has changed enormously since the first 
meetings of those two groups. 
Technological tools for education offer certain hope for solving continuum, 
time, geographic, outreach, nonresidency, and JPME-2 gap challenges. But when 
to buy in, and how often to buy in to keep that technology current, is an issue that 
was brought up several times. We do not have a lock on that problem. It is a 
problem that the entire armed forces deals with every day - when to buy in for new 
information technology. 
There was a surge here at the end, perhaps designed by the people that 
paid for this conference, on the technological aspects of PME, punctuated by 
Admiral Tuttle's lyrical remarks at lunch today. The possibilities for, and potentials 
of, technology impact us in every way, and will impact the changing face of war. 
That's been emphasized. 
Several presentations inherently argued for technological skill and for it to 
be continually updated. We started off talking about a comfort factor, and then 
confidence, and then competence. And I think since the beginning of the 
conference, while comfort with technology was probably at the high end of the 
teeter-totter, by the end of today it swung back the other way-- that we're a little bit 
more concerned about competence, and not just comfort. Sometimes it may even 
be good to be uncomfortable with technology so you use it with respect. 
We decided we can't measure the output of education within the wavelength 
of the typical decision-maker's fitness report reporting period. One has to believe 
in education as an investment. It's a pay-me-now, or pay-me-later - or even pay-
me-more-later issue. 
The Reserve in the Guard need to be reached with PME, especially as its 
stock rises as a full-fledged partner with each of our services. 
An extension of PME to our civilian partners was also mentioned several 
times, in a positive way. We ought to know why we exist, and where we are going 
as a military, and ensure that the PME system we design matches up with that. 
Faculty quality was discussed many times, and several options were 
presented for correcting and guaranteeing quality. But in every case, faculty quality 
was judged as critical. 
It will be helpful, I think we all agree from dinner last night, to have a shared 
vision so that we can stand together to make progress. Because we can be 
divided. We've demonstrated that in vignettes over the last two days. Divided we 
will not succeed. 
And, finally, on common thoughts. I think we can all agree that we still do not 
know what the speed of dark is. We don't know what was better before sliced 
bread. And we don't know when to tune a bagpipe. There were some divided 
themes. How good are we absolutely, and how good are we relative to one 
another? 
All agree that improvements could be made, but some thought we are doing 
absolutely the best we could with the resources we have, and we continue to make 
improvements. Others were less charitable, for sure. Who should attend PME was 
an issue, as well. Some said all; some said only the best. Some said only the 
warriors; some said the support folks as well. 
Do we do PME as a group, and socialize, harmonize and develop peers? 
Or do we do it separately? Is using IT alone good enough? Should PME and 
JPME create interchangeable officers - homeogenity? Or should we use PME, and 
maybe some of the tools available to us now, to ensure diversity of skill and match 
those up in the right way? And what about diversity in the more popular sense, that 
relates to the heritage, race, linguistic, and national capabilities of our work force 
in America? 
JPME-2 was a hot button early on. The Armed Forces Staff College's utility 
was questioned by some. Some proposed that the maturation of the PME process 
in the service schools was good enough now to carry the whole burden. Others 
argued about the gap between PME-1 and PME-2, and the effect that has on the 
CINCs. There was no real consensus there. 
Congressmen Buyer argued that there should be a crucible that generates 
our entry force of officers. He argued for the academies and the military colleges 
and felt that ROTC should be down-sized. Others asked for a much a wider 
expansion of the ROTC program. 
Are we the envy of American business and industry, or are we diverging from 
the American civilian culture, our client? These are different questions, really, but 
they beg whether we as an officer corps and as members of the military force are 
admired, or increasingly rejected. PME might be central to the resolution of that 
issue. 
We're split on the correct balance between technological and social skills. 
Everyone agrees, however, that it is inevitably a tug-of-war. Mr. Skelton threw a 
very tight spiral to the Navy to think about a paradigm shift in its PME. This also 
has geographic implications. Nobody brought that up when the Senator from 
Rhode Island and the Congressman from Monterey were in the same room. 
Several things were not really addressed. Are we teaching the right things 
once we sort of get a balance? Do we have the priority straight so that we can -
those who are professionals at designing curricula - design the correct PME 
curriculum? Right now we lack a priority list of which things to fix first, assuming 
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that we're not going to get more resources, or even assuming we do get more 
resources, although such a prioritization may come in the proceedings. 
There's some evidence we talked right by the character of Generation X. 
There was a glancing blow by a bright young student this morning. They are the 
targets of future PME. They are also the targets of today's PME, at some levels. 
Are we doing what they desire? Are we doing what they will accept? 
Some have said that some Generation Xers out there have already 
surpassed the grand plan for the National Defense University. We haven't --
people of my age - but maybe there are some lieutenant commanders and captains 
out there that already have. You have to keep that in mind. Their acceptance, I 
think, will have a direct relation to retention and motivation and innovation in our 
military force. 
And, much like t~e relationship between PME and careers, the schedule for 
this conference was over constrained - there was not enough time for the audience 
to get into the mode of asking questions and to give the people on the stand a 
chance to answer them or to defend their position. That is a function not of the skill 
of the people in the room, but purely of time, and I don't think we could have 
stretched or squeezed any more into the time that we did here. 
The whole concept of formal graduate education, technical or social, PME 
or not, at this Naval Postgraduate School or in civilian institutions, wasn't addressed 
until the very last moments when two fellows from Missouri and one from Texas 
brought it up - Congressman Skelton, Admiral Meyer, and Admiral Tuttle. The NPS 
existence within the demise of the armed forces - and of the Air Force Institute of 
Technology - were not mentioned at all, except by those three people near the 
end. 
There are some outriders. These are not themes that either congealed or 
dispersed the community here, but interesting thoughts vvorthy of mention -- vvorthy 
of being recorded. 
· The first one was interesting and it initially came from a Naval officer and a 
woman who talked about physical capabilities and which echoed many times after 
that. Strength, agility, endurance, good health. 
Recruiting quality as a national problem was brought up. And it's part of the 
calculus of addressing quality and time in PME. There was even talk of requiring 
entry level master's degrees of unrestricted line officers in the Navy. 
PME for the NCO was brought up several times. A study that the Naval 
Research Advisory Committee did this past year on logistics support for the small, 
dispersed Marine Corps unit was quite interesting. Their assessment was that the 
young Marine was vastly underrated in his ability to absorb training and education, 
especially in information technology. So we may be underestimating the 
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capabilities of our enlisted people all the way around, and PME ought to be 
considered for them. 
The notion that an unsophisticated enemy is capable of affording today's 
technologies, to create cheap kills that will be seen on the six o'clock news, was 
brought up. This is something to be kept in mind when you're deciding how much 
of the program should be technological in nature. 
The whole notion of getting really serious about PME was brought up by 
several people. Concepts like applying for the program, taking qualifying exams, 
mid-career competency exams, assignments based on performance, and standards 
for professors were all brought up. They bring shivers to many people on the 
faculty and in the student body. Nonetheless, these were serious proposals and 
should become more serious. 
Professional Military Education for our coalition partners in the context of 
continual cuts to the IMET budget was also brought up. Somebody mentioned that 
we were 10 to 15 years ahead of our international military counterparts in this field. 
Well, that's great if your international counterpart is an enemy. It's bad news if your 
international counterpart is fighting a coalition war with you. It may even be worse 
if your coalition partner is coming to get PME so that he can go back and better 
serve the clients, civilian leadership, and civilian peers back in his country. 
A very interesting thought based on some pretty rigorous research was, 
should we even touch the enduring character of the officer? Should we at all 
address skills like risk-taking, multiple-task juggling and intellectual vigor? Or do 
we just recruit those people, like the NBA does, and focus most of our energy on 
occupational and domain knowledge? I think that's a pretty serious question. 
That's my report. It's a compilation of the notes I took over the last couple 
days. I leave it now to the Postgraduate School to record this in a more thoughtful, 
better organized, and better prioritized way - hopefully for the record. 
We'll ask Lieutenant General Holder to write the exam for all of you. And I 
leave it next to Admiral Blair to set our course as our capstone speaker. For the 
Postgraduate School and ONR, let me say that we are terribly worried about what 
might be a shamefully small investment in research and education for our future. 
And we are buoyed to know that you share that concern with us, this powerful 
organization. 
For Mr. Skelton, we thank you for inspiring this conference; Mr. Browder, for 
designing it; and the Naval Postgraduate School for pulling it off. Thank you for this 
inspiring and unusually candid event concerning a topic that affects all of us and 
all our tomorrows. 
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REAR ADMIRAL PAUL G. GAFFNEY, II, USN 
Chief of Naval Research 
Rear Admiral Paul G. Gaffney, II, became the 19th Chief of Naval Research, 
commanding the Office of Naval Research (ONR), on July 12, 1996. 
As the Chief of Naval Research, RADM Gaffney manages the science and technology 
programs of the Navy and Marine Corps from basic research through manufacturing 
technologies. ONR's annual budget of approximately $1.3 billion is allocated for 
research and development programs conducted by universities, Navy laboratories, and 
industry. 
His distinguished military career has spanned nearly three decades and includes duty at 
sea, overseas, and ashore in executive and command positions. His duties have included 
tours as: Operations officer in USS WHIPPOORWILL, a minesweeper homeported in 
Sasebo, Japan; Advisor to the Vietnamese Navy Combat Hydrographic Survey Team; 
Executive Assistant to the Oceanographer of the Navy, Washington, DC; Commanding 
Officer of the Naval Oceanography Command Facility, Jacksonville, Florida; Assistant 
Chief of Naval Research in Washington, DC. Commanding Officer, Naval Research 
Laboratory, Washington, D.C.; and Commander, Naval Meteorology and Oceanography 
Command. 
He is a 1968 graduate of the U.S. Naval Academy, was selected for immediate graduate 
education and received a master's degree in Ocean Engineering from Catholic University 
of America in Washington, DC. He completed a year as a student and advanced research 
fellow at the Naval War College graduating with highest distinction. He completed an 
MBA at Jacksonville University. 
He and his wife, Linda, call the Mississippi Gulf Coast their home. They have one 
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Ladies and gentlemen, today what I'd like to do with my time is to think out a 
little bit into the future on this subject of Professional Military Education. I'm 
thinking first about the joint education of future officers, which is my current 
concern. What changes in officer education will strengthen the planning and 
execution of joint operations as we know them today? And how should that 
education anticipate and adapt to make our joint officers even more effective in the 
future than they are in the present? 
Most of what I say is going to be pretty "meat and potatoes". My current job 
is trying to take visions and tum them into programs that we can execute to get 
things done and make things better. Most of what I have to say I've heard touched 
on today and referred to yesterday, so little of it will be new. But let me try to put it 
together in a way that sketches out a way forward. 
I think our point of departure here must be the war-fighting effectiveness of 
the joint force. How do we educate - not train but educate - the commanders and 
their staffs for the maximum combat effectiveness of the force? 
In order to answer that, you have to know what the primary ingredient of a 
successful joint task force is. What makes the great ones, and what makes the 
not-so-great ones? Above all, in my observation, it is the attitude set by the 
commander, and even more, the attitudes set by his component commanders. If 
those commanders are actively looking for common solutions, offering support and 
assistance across component lines, showing impatience with "that's not my 
responsibility" thinking, and reading joint doctrine pubs to adapt them to find new 
ways to cooperate, then the effectiveness of that joint task force will be greater than 
the sum of its parts. 
If the reverse is true, that is if the joint task force commander and especially 
his component commanders are reading joint doctrine in order to find out what they 
don't have to do, or are using it to assert their authority against other component 
commanders, or if they are just keeping score to see which component is ahead, 
then the combat effectiveness of that joint task force will be less than the sum of its 
parts and certainly less than we owe the American people. 
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Now, Joint Professional Military Education on its own cannot instill this joint 
attitude, this pride in the joint team and officers who attend it. It's more a matter of 
leadership and example. But I believe that joint education should contribute 
directly to joint attitudes, which are at the heart of joint combat effectiveness. 
As I review the Officer Professional Military Education Policy, the OPMEP -
the instruction that governs our joint education - I find objectives which express 
this idea, which I believe lies at the heart of successful joint operations, both now 
and in the future. 
For the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, we find the following 
learning objective: Internalize a thoroughly joint and interagency prospective as an 
element of personal and professional development. And, for the course at the 
Armed Forces Staff College, the following: Demonstrate a thoroughly joint 
perspective and comprehension of the increased power available to commanders 
through joint effort and teamwork. 
Now, these two objectives, I believe, get at what is the essence of jointness: 
teamwork. Taking as much pride in the accomplishments of the joint team as in 
one's individual service. 
So what concrete steps can education take to build this teamwork? I believe 
that the personal contact among officers of the different services is a large part of 
it. Joint tours, in my experience, do build joint understanding and joint 
appreciation. It's impossible to walk away from a joint tour without recognizing the 
quality, education, dedication, and contribution of the officers of the different armed 
forces. It's hard to keep single-service prejudices. 
Currently, we mix our students up in JPME Phase 2 at the Armed Forces 
Staff College, at NDU and ICAF, of course, and at Capstone. And at our service 
schools, there are small proportions of officers from the other services. 
We should continue mixing up these student bodies at least to the current 
level and perhaps increase it. Why not make half the students at the Air War 
College Air Force, a quarter Navy, and a quarter Army? Would the service 
emphasis suffer? Would the Army and Navy students move from token 
representatives to contributing participants in a joint learning experience? I think 
we can do more here. 
There are additional objectives which I believe we could undertake in Joint 
Professional Military Education to foster this sense of joint teamwork, which will 
characterize the great, as opposed to the average, joint task force of the future. 
I don't believe that in our current system anywhere we really teach the 
unique essence of each service to the other. For example, the essence of the 
Navy is teams of people making big machines perform - from firing guns, to 
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launching missiles, to replenishment at sea. 
The Navy gets its job done through operating big, complicated pieces of 
machinery in the very unforgiving environment of saltwater, on steel ships that are 
rolling, pitching and flexing. Because a battlegroup contains relatively small 
numbers of these big machines, the Navy does not develop, nor need, rigid 
detailed doctrine. Commanders can, and do, adapt during operations and still 
carry out their intent. Navy logistics involves getting shiploads of equipment and 
supplies to other ships, and they don't change that much from peace to war. They 
just get larger in scale. 
Now, the essence of the Army, on the other hand, is quite different. The 
essence of the Army is controlling formations of large numbers of people and small 
machines. Because of these large numbers and because formations who may 
have not trained together may be thrown together in the course of campaigns, Army 
officers must develop, learn, and apply doctrine. 
In the Army, the movement of logistics is an incredibly diverse, complicated 
business - quite different in war from what it is in peace, and a dominating factor in 
their operations. 
I have found, in my experience, that the proclivity of officers to look down 
their noses at other services is pretty much in direct proportion to their ignorance of 
what drives the other services. 
A major part of our joint education should be to break down this ignorance --
and I'm not talking here about junior officer orientation visits to other services, to 
take a look at and spend a few days with another service. I am talking about taking 
mature, experienced officers in their own professions who know what their service 
can do, and teaching them what makes other services tick so that they can operate 
more effectively together by taking advantages of the strengths and minimizing the 
weaknesses of the other service in forming the the joint team. 
I think we go too quickly to the higher level of integrated operations, that we 
don't teach the essence of the other services in order to get the team working 
together. For instance, how would I design a course that would teach Naval 
officers or Air Force officers about the Army? I would start with a few key books 
like We Were Soldiers Once And Young, which gripped me and which my Army 
friends tell me gives the truest picture of what a small unit infantry battle is like. 
I would play for these officers the taped reconstruction of the 73 East Wing 
Battle in the Gulf War, with its interactive presentation of what the battlefield looked 
like from an individual tank, and with the sound of the radio circuit on which that 
battalion commander controlled the engagement. I would include Steve Ambrose's 
book, Citizen Soldiers. giving the soldier's viewpoint in the European Theater in 
World War II, which still has large effect and a large legacy in the Army today. And 
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I would assign these Naval officers, these Air Force officers, a detailed research 
project on a detailed tactical aspect of the Vietnam War, or the war in the desert, 
and have them present it to an Army officer for his critique. 
The objective of such a course would be for officers to understand how their 
colleagues in other services really think, what they worry about, what they aim to 
accomplish, what the characteristics of their environment are, and what mission 
drives them to do things one way and not another way. 
I believe that, at the same time, officers would learn more about the unique 
essence of their own service, just as one learns more about one's own language 
when one learns a foreign language. And, to me, this kind of understanding and 
educattion would make far more effective joint officers than, perhaps, that extra test 
on joint doctrine or survey of national security classics. 
So, in summary, I would offer two changes to joint education to enhance joint 
teamwork, which I think is the key criteria: 1 ) increased mixing of officers of the 
different services, and 2) courses in which mature officers really learn the essence 
of their sister services. 
Now, let me turn to the 'how' of joint education and make a couple of 
recommendations. I endorse completely General Chilcoat's call for electrically 
linking the resources of all service and joint educational institutions, and I see a 
double advantage in doing this. Certainly, it will give the student officers access to 
a huge range of learning resources, literally at their finger tips. 
But, in addition - and we've referred to this several times in this conference 
- these officers will learn how to use distant databases, how to interact 
electronically with other colleagues spread across the country and the world, and 
this will help them become masters of this information technology, which will make 
the difference in warfare in the future. 
They will learn its purposes; they will learn to bend it to their purposes; they 
will learn its strengths and it's limitations. And, with this full electronic connectivity 
among our service schools, and then to you, we can increase the interaction 
through distant joint war games for all students as an integral part of their 
education, rather than taking a few and doing a single war game at the end of the 
course. 
Second, I believe that we should put greater emphasis on the case study 
and war gaming of our recent operations, specifically those since the end of the 
Cold War. It's been my observation that officers who have served in these joint 
operations - Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, and a host of smaller ones that we've 
undertaken -- come back enthusiastic about what joint operations can be, anxious 
to apply what they learned, to learn more, and to make improvements. These are 
the inspired joint officers that we want to encourage. These are the ones who can 
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develop ideas for future joint operations. And for those officers who don't happen 
to have served in these operations, who've been at a distance from them, I think 
the study of them in case histories is the best way to build this enthusiasm and the 
knowledge that we will need in the future. 
In truth, from where I sit, since the Berlin Wall came down, we are really 
learning on the run now, as we define these new roles for military forces in this new 
era. So let's acknowledge it, capitalize on it, and learn that way. 
Now, let me turn to educating. Everything I've talked about will make greater 
joint officers in the present. Let me try to think out a bit into the future, and see 
what will be different. And what can we do in Joint Professional Military Education 
to make those joint task forces even better in the future than they are today? 
I think we must emphasize two areas which are evolving in our thinking 
about military force. And in the interest of even treatment, one will be a bull subject 
and the other will be a liar's subject, for those of you who went to the Navy 
Academy. And this is not training; we have not sorted out these areas well enough 
to teach 'plug-and-chug' solutions. This is education - teaching principles, asking 
questions, encouraging new thinking. 
The first area has to do with the contingencies the joint task forces perform 
below the level of major theater wars. We have to maintain our core competency in 
joint and combined butt kicking. We will continue to do so, and we are far ahead of 
the rest of the world. What we have not really worked out is what military force 
can do, and should do, when it's committed, for example, to restore order in failed 
states or disrupted, disintegrating societies. 
We know very well how to overcome, overhaul, neutralize or destroy other 
military or paramilitary forces. What I find that we really haven't figured out yet is 
how we in the armed forces, the joint task forces, can, or should, support police 
forces, support unbiased local print and broadcast media, support economic 
recovery, work with fledgling civilian governments, and so on. 
· Right now, I will tell you that the military role in these essential tasks is 
decided at very high levels in this government by very senior officers. And they 
base their recommendation to the National Command Authority, and they make 
decisions based on seasoned judgment and their ovvn experience. 
When my boss, General Shelton, decides what to recommend to the 
Secretary of Defense and the President concerning Bosnia, he harkens back to his 
Haiti experience as the most vivid example on top of many years of military 
experience and common sense. 
For General Shalikashvili, it was the same, particularly in operation Provide 
Comfort, which he was involved in. But those of us on his staff doing the work for 
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him, we in the armed forces who support those operations, do not have a body of 
thought, doctrine, or refined experience to draw on to provide the staff work for the 
chairman. 
At the other end of the scale, we've heard description of the battalion 
commander out in Bosnia who's doing the same thing, making it up as he goes. 
Facing his situation with good tools, smart people, common sense, and a lot of 
diverse training, he makes the decisions as he goes. 
I think that in our Joint Professional Military Education and our Professional 
Military Education, we need to work on this problem, to develop the ways of 
thinking about it. What works? What doesn't work? What can be done at various 
levels? What are the risks? What is the same about some of these contingencies 
we've been involved in, and what's different? How can we apply them in new 
situations in the future? 
And, again, I do not see this area of nontraditional military tasks as 
weakening our core ability for combined arms coalition warfare. I see it as part of 
the versatility of joint task forces, which will enable them to satisfy and do a range 
of jobs across the future. 
The second area, and perhaps more important, is education and information 
technology. I agree with those who believe that taking advantage of - exploiting -
information technology is the single key to transforming warfare, both for the 
services and certainly for joint warfare and joint operations. Doing so will make a 
joint task force commander more effective across the board if his component 
commanders are looking at the same real-time operational picture and are able to 
communicate freely at all levels in the chain of command when questions arise and 
issues come up. 
When I was a Naval component commander a couple of years ago in 
Exercise Tandem Thrust in the Pacific, in the early going we had a real tussle with 
the joint special operations task force commander as we tried deconflict the use of 
water space. The JSOTF commander was running special forces in boats and 
submarines in and out of the objective area amd, as the Naval component 
commander, I was running submarines and surface ships in the same area. 
We were not looking at the same operational picture. We couldn't, because 
we didn't have the gear, we didn't have the connectivity, and we weren't 
communicating very well. There was danger, there was confusion, and there was 
a loss of combat effectiveness. The more we can pass this real-time operational 
information around the joint task force, the more effective we'll be. 
But communications and displays are really just the starting point. These 
future joint task force commanders and their staffs have to develop a feeling for 
what information technology can do for them, in the same way that those of us 
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who've grown up for the past 30 years in the armed forces had a feeling for what 
VHF radars and UHF radars and grease pencils can do. 
We need to harness this information technology to develop the C4 systems 
that will enable the intricate, high-tempo joint operations which will be the 
breakthrough warfare of the future. 
But there's another dimension of information technology that I believe 
requires education - thought questions and doctrinal development. How will this 
information technology transform in a very fundamental way the conduct of warfare 
and military operations? 
If we can know in near real time what's going on on the enemy's side of the 
battleline - which we may or may not be able to do -- and if we can know what's 
going on our side of the battleline, including the location and status of all of our 
forces - which we certainly can do but which we don't do now, then we can fight 
wars in ways which we have not been able to do before. Commanders could then 
confidently commit forces to attacks that today would be considered foolhardy. With 
this kind of information, the average commander of tomorrow can look like the 
Napoleon of today. And the exceptional commander of tomorrow can go off into 
the stratosphere. 
I think this is the key. But from where I sit, if we are to realize its potential, 
we have to control this information technology and not allow it to control us. 
Already it is badly fraying the traditional three-level thinking which we all grew up 
with - tactical, operational and strategic. 
After all, this hierarchy was partly built on communications limitations. It was 
physically impossible to know the tactical situation in time, at a distance. So 
higher-echelon commanders were content with issuing guidance and waiting for 
summary reports. 
Now, higher-level authorities can watch CNN or look at your relayed tactical 
picture. If you are a lucky subordinate, all you will be asked for are quicker 
explanations for your actions. If you're an unlucky subordinate, you will be given 
detailed orders by the boss looking over your shoulder at the same tactical picture 
that you're looking at. 
Perhaps, in serious combined-arms warfare, the level of activity will be so 
great that higher-echelon commanders will be overwhelmed and fall back to 
higher-level direction in reporting and leave lower-echelon commanders to operate 
within their areas of responsibility. But right now, I think we all agree, we are 
learning a lot of very bad lessons with three or more levels of the chain o~ 
command all worrying about the same tactical decisions. 
This is leading to the imposition of higher-level rhythms on lower-level 
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commanders -- simple things like commanders in Asia having to wait until 
Washington awakens and focuses. But more troubling is the more insidious trend 
that higher levels know better, and the mother-may-I attitude that builds on the part 
of lower commanders. Or, conversely, when you've had enough "Mother, may I?" 
the trend toward a "Screw 'em, I'm just going to do it!" attitude, which is probably 
equally bad. 
While the communications have improved, I don't believe that the human 
span of control has increased. Higher-level leaders can only channel surf around 
their subordinates, to a certain point, effectively. The question is: how do we 
master this information technology so that it preserves the things that we know are 
important in conducting joint operations, and doesn't hamstring us by clogging the 
decision sequence and decreasing our combat effectiveness? 
How do we de1 ·~!op higher-level leaders who will exercise self-restraint, and 
lower-level leaders wnv will push the vital information up so that all levels can take 
advantage of the capabilities future information technology will offer, without 
tripping over each other? 
'm convinced that the solution to mastering information technology lies in the 
education of our officers and, particularly, our joint officers. We have to teach 
principles, not road solutions, because we haven't figured out the road solutions 
yet. And this is the essence of education. 
And then we have to put these solutions into practice by officers who are 
knowledgeable about the basics, clear on the mission, and can put both together to 
get the job done. This must be done for us to maintain our combat edge, which the 
armed forces of the United States currently have and which we are going to have to 
work hard to maintain in the future. 
So, let me sum up my recommendations for taking Professional Military 
Education, and especially Joint Professional Military Education, into the future. 
First, we must specifically direct education to build a sense of joint teamwork 
in officers by intensifying their personal interaction within our schools during that 
part of their careers. And we must explicitly teach the essence of each of the 
services to the officers of other services. 
Secondly, we need to link our military educational institutions together so 
that students at any one of them can draw on the resources of all. We need to do 
that to make these resources available and to teach them to learn to use 
information technology to get the job done. 
Third, we need to study the question of the military's role in operations to 
restore failed states and disrupted societies, and these other complicated jobs that 
we are being called on to do. What can military force do? What shouldn't military 
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force do? 
Fourth, we need to study and educate more people on information 
technology, which will be that single, greatest technology in transforming warfare in 
the future. 
I certainly look forward to the aftermath of this conference, which I think has 
identified a tremendous number of issues which we need to work out, those of us in 
the Professional Military Education community. I don't think there's any more 
important job we have in the future than getting this thing right, and I certainly look 
forward to working with all of you as we do so. 
Thank you very much. 
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addition, the direction that each has taken over the past decade has been based to a large extent on the Clements 
Commission Report of Senior Service College Curriculum Study published in 1975. Against this background the 
differences between the schools can be seen primarily as ones of emphasis, focus, or structure rather than ones of 
significant content or directional divergence. This study presents analyses of those areas within the senior service 
colleges that the authors believed would best demonstrate both the similarities and differences between these five 
unif onnly excellent institutions. Individual reports on each college have been included for the benefit of those readers 
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who may have an interest in a more detailed description of the program at a particular school. If a conclusion is to be 
drawn from this study, it is that all five colleges are successfully meeting their objectives by providing the leadership 
cadre of the military services and many government agencies with a graduate level course of instruction with a major in 
national security, strategy and policy, and a minor in the preparation and execution of military activities in support of 
that policy. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: AD-A159935 
Bolinger, M., G.H. Bristol, K.M. Kelly and R.L. Kilroy. "Improving Officer Career and 
Intermediate Level Education." Washington, DC: Marine Corps, 1April1991. 40p. 
Abstract: Although career and intermediate level schools are adequately educating officers for future command and 
staff billets within a MAGTF, they are not modem professional educational institutions. The schools, as a whole, 
exhibit significant weaknesses in the areas of faculty and pedagogy - - cornerstones of a quality professional military 
education system. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: AD-A239883 
Boggs, Kevin G. et al. "The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 
1986: An Analysis of Air Force Implementation of Title N and its Impact on The Air Force 
Officer Corps." Maxwell AFB, AL: Air Command and Staff College, May 1995. 68p. 
Abstract: In 1986, Congress enacted the Department of Defense Reorganization Act directing how Services manage 
joint officers, in an effort to improve the quality of joint officers and operations. This research paper analyzes AF 
legislation compliance in: promotions, assignments, education and joint specialty officer (JSO) designations for field 
grade officers. The research analyzes the initial law and subsequent amendments to establish a compliance baseline 
and examines AF, Joint Staff and Secretary of Defense records to assess conformity. After the compliance review, the 
research examines programs, policies and laws affecting compliance, followed by a study of the integration of Title IV 
concepts in the OPD Program. There were two non-compliance areas- promotions and JSO guidelines. First despite a 
multitude of initiatives involving promotion board processes and assignments, AF failed 41 or 46 promotion categories, 
although significant improvement was noted. Second, there were no established JSO career guidelines and there were 
negative perceptions regarding joint duty in OPD. To improve compliance, this paper recommends better integration of 
joint concepts in OPD; the establishment of JSO guidelines; and an aggressive media effort to enhance perceptions of 
joint. Further, it advocates the inclusion of OPD counseling during mandatory perceptions of joint. Further, it advocates 
the inclusion of OPD counseling during mandatory performance feedback, and the implementation of existing 
legislation affecting JP:MlS outplacement Last, it recommends revitalizing cross-flow' assignments between Air and 
Joint Staffs, and establishing a comprehensive data-base to enable more extensive analysis of joint management 
initiatives. Modifications or enhancements,' AF should be in full compliance. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: AD-A328040 
Brooks, Vincent K. "Knowledge is the Key: Educating, Training and Developing Operational 
Artists for the 21st Century." Monograph AY 1991-1992. Fort Leavenworth, KS: Army Command 
and General Staff College, School of Advanced Military Studies, 12 May 1992. 76p. 
Abstract: Warfare in the era will be joint. However, the Armed Forces have been slow to make requisite changes. 
The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 forced change by legislating reforms and 
ending the internecine quarrels which had impeded progress for decades. Joint warfare is the desired effect of the 
Goldwater-Nichols Act and the Armed Forces are making progress in the ability to conduct joint warfare. More 
progress is needed, however, before joint warfare becomes routine. Practicing joint warfare requires a new way of 
educating officers. The House of Representatives Committee on the Armed Services Panel on Military Education 
(known as the Skelton Panel after its chairman, Representative Ike Skelton) explored the professional military 
education system and recommended ways of providing the type of education necessary to meet the spirit of the 
Goldwater-Nichols Act. The panel was particularly concerned with ensuring the education system provided the link 
between producing competent Service officers and competent joint officers. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: AD-A254124 
9 
Bruns, James W. and Lawrence A. Eichhorn. "Comparison of Non-Performance Characteristics 
with United States Air Force Officer Promotions." Master's thesis. Wright-Patterson AFB, OH: Air 
Force Institute of Technology, School of Logistics and Acquisition Management, September 1993. 
42p. 
Abstract: The question of which non-performance factors influence the promotion of officers to major, lieutenant 
colonel, and colonel within the Air Force for Promotion Boards held in 1992 is the focus of this thesis. The thesis 
statistically examines the impact of the variables commissioning source, prior enlistment, age, aeronautical rating, 
graduate education level obtained and source of education, Professional Military Education courses taken :: · " method 
of completion, distinguished graduate status from commissioning source and Professional Military Educan courses 
for in-the-zone promotions. Multivariate logistics regression techniques are used to analyze and identify those variables 
significant to promotion. Odds-ratios are used to determine the sensitivity of each variable. Each of the variables is 
found to be significant in some of the promotion models. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: AD-A273967 
Bunn, Leslie and Ricahrd J. Steppic. "A Study of the Methods by Which the United States Air 
Force Can Provide Professionai i.iilitary Education for Senior Foreign Officers." Master's thesis. 
Wright Patterson AFB: OH: Air Force Institute of Technology, School of Systems and Logistics, 
January1974.207p 
Abstract: The study identifies methods that can be used by the United States Air Force to provide professional 
military education for senior officers from allied, friendly and nonaligned nations. Extensive interviews conducted with 
senior officials currently involved in professional military education provide the primary source of data. The study 
concludes that five methods are available to provide an increased program, and that the most feasible method is to 
establish a separate college for senior foreign officers co-located with other USAF professional colleges and schools at 
Maxwell AFB, Alabama. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: AD-776784 
Callard, James R. "Changing Nature of American Democracy Consequences for the Military." 
Final report. Newport, RI: Naval War College, 14 June 1996. 161p. 
Abstract: This paper provides a philosophical and ethical framework to evaluate changes in democracy that affect the 
relationship between the public and the military profession. Changes in communication technology have allowed the 
media and public to play a more influential role in the information of national security strategy. Use of propaganda to 
market war in the past has been problematic and contrary to American democratic principles. Applying a strong 
professional military ethic grounded in institutional and constitutional values will insure that senior military leadership 
understand the ramifications of applying knowledge strategies in the future. Adding ethics and civil-military affairs 
courses to joint professional military education is major reconllllendation. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: AD-A311167 
Clark, Edward S. "Comparative Analysis of Intermediate Service College (ISC). Phase 1. Joint 
Professional Military Education (JPME)." Master's thesis. Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate 
School, March 1990. 120p. 
Abstract: This thesis compares the four Intermediate Service Colleges (ISC) and the Defense Intelligence College 
(DIC) Phase I Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) curricula and student and faculty mixes. It asks the 
question, 'Is it feasible to offer a Phase I JPME curriculum at the Naval Postgraduate School.' The results clearly show 
that a Phase I JPME program is feasible if es~blished within the National Security Affairs/Intelligence (NSAII) and the 
Joint Command, Control and Communications (C3) curricula. In these curricula, the student and faculty mixes can be 
easily attained and the curriculum can be established with minimum disruption to the graduate education mission of the 
Naval Postgraduate School. Additionally, with six core courses established as Phase I JPME, students from other 
curricula may be tracked into Phase I by detailers on a case-by-case basis. Ultimately, this would increase the number 
of Navy Phase I JPME graduates by 69 percent. These graduates would then be available for Phase II and further on 
Joint Duty Assignments (JDAs). · 
ACCESSION NUMBER: AD-A220077 
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"Combined Arms Sufficiency Study (CASS) Update." Fort Leavenworth, KS; Army Combined 
Arms Center, April 1983. 175p. 
Abstract: The intent of the Combined Anns Sufficiency Study as originally conducted, was to obtain a snapshot of 
the status of Combined Anns instruction at the time and provide commandants comparative data with which they could 
make an educated estimate of the effectiveness of their combined arms instruction. The original intent is still 
applicable. The purpo,se of the current update is to build on the original study, refme the Combined Arms Sufficiency 
data, and through a systematic process, identify courses of action to continue to enhance Combined Arms instruction in 
company level professional development courses. This update is intended to develop Combined Anns Sufficiency data 
to a credible confidence level so that decisions can be made on tradeoffs and accommodations, with a clear 
understanding of what the costs are in terms of specialty and Combined Arms understanding. The objectives of the 
present Combined Anns Sufficiency update are to: identify all Combined Arms subjects and develop an updated list; 
identify Combined Arms subjects which should be taught in Officer Basic and Advanced Courses, and to what level of 
sufficiency; enhance Combined Arms instruction by better defining personnel and other resource requirements; and 
facilitate the infusion of Combined Arms subjects into the OITA process. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: AD-A133316 
Defense Manpower Commission Staff Studies and Supporting Papers. Volume IV. "Developing 
and Utilizing the Total Force and Shaping the Future Military Career Force." Washington, DC: 
Defense Manpower Commission, May 1976. 1060p. 
See also Volume 5, AD-A029 953. 
Abstract: Contents: The Defense Officer Personnel Management System (DOPMS); Reserve Component Officer 
Career Force Grade Authorization; Pre-Commissioning Programs; The Uniformed services University of the Health 
Sciences and Alternative methods of Procuring and Retaining Military Physicians; Professional Military Education; 
Professional Military Education for the Reserve Components; Officer Graduate Education; Funding of Education 
Programs; Flight Training; Overseas Rotation and Tour Lengths; Minority Participation in the Department of Defense; 
Women in the Defense Establishment; The Development and Utilization of women in the Department of Defense; The 
role of the DOD Civilian in the Total Force Structure; Limitations on Managers Brought about by Restrictions of the 
Civil Service System; The Air Force Institute of Technology and the Naval Postgraduate School; The G.I. Bill today; 
and The Career Force of the Future. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: AD-A029952 
DeGraff, Dennis J. et al. "Senior Service School Timing for Air Force Officers: A Cultural 
Change." Maxwell AFB, AL: Air Command and Staff College, April 1996. 64p. 
Abstract: Initial study of the relationship of in-residence Air War College (A WC) completion to promotion success 
was accomplished in 1975, and subsequently updated in 1984. The focus of this study is to revalidate the promotion 
trend cited in the 1984 study and to examine the importance of attendance timing for Air forces officers to Senior 
Service School (SSS). Sources used in preparation of this study includes officer cohort and promotion files for 1984-
1995, as well as a review of officer utilization policy from the Air force Personnel Center (AFPC), Headquarters 
USAF, the Office for Colonel Matters, and A WC. Personnel interviews and surveys were used to glean current issues, 
concerns, and recommendations from senior leaders and major command (MAJCOM) personnel officers throughout 
the Air Force. Analysis of promotion statistics concludes that while the promotion rates among the Senior Service 
schools are not at parity, they have leveled somewhat from the analysis done in the l984 study. Additionally, this study 
discusses the current trend of sending more junior lieutenant colonels to SSS shortly after ISS completion and before 
they have had the opportunity to gain valuable leadership experience. These officers, their classmates, and the air force 
would be better served by modifying the SSS selection process to facilitate in-residence attendance later in an officer's 
career without negatively affecting promotion opportunities. The study recommends changes to the selection process 
and strives to foster a cultural change within the Air Force to ensure SSS is viewed as a tool for developing future 
leaders and not as a square to be filled for promotion to colonel. The study has a direct impact on the management of 
senior officer development and utilization in the Air Force for the remainder of the century. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: AD-A331576 
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Faller, Craig S. ''The Navy and Jointness: No Longer Reluctant Partners?" Master's thesis. 
Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, December 1991. 189p. 
Abstract: This thesis examines the intention and effectiveness of the changes initiated by the Goldwater-Nichols 
Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 (GNA) with emphasis on the United States Navy. This assessment 
considers the implications for future national security of present trends in the balance of power between the joint and 
service institutions within the Department of Defense (DOD). Interviews conducted by the author with key individuals 
involved in the writing and implementation of GNA legislation, coupled with a review of the literature, provide the 
basis for understanding the intent behind the GNA and its provisions. In assessing the effectiveness of GNA this thesis 
focuses on three areas: operations, plans, and people and how the key change mechanisms implemented by GNA are 
impacting these areas. The author forwards policy recommendations, for both DOD and the Navy aimed at making 
jointness more relevant and meaningful. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: AD-A246441 
Flaningam, M.R. and J.N. Joyner. ''Feasibility of Individualized Instruction for USMC Professional 
Military Education Programs. Phase I. Implementation at Instructional Management School." 
Interim report. February-June 81. Alexandria, VA: Human Resources Research Organization, 
March 1983. 23p. 
Abstract: This report descnbes the implementation of individualized instruction at a USMC Instructional 
Management School (IMS), which trains instructors of professional military education courses. The IMS instructor 
course was converted from fixed-entry, lock~step and lecture-base to variable-entry, self-paced, application-base. 
Course materials were modularized so that training could be tailored to individual needs. 
NPRDC-SR-83-19 
ACCESSION NUMBER: AD-A126455 
Fox, Daniel B. "Conceptual Design for a Model to Meet the War-Gaming Needs of the Major 
Commands of the United States Air Force." Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University, Airpower Research 
Institute, July 1985. 77p. 
Abstract: The 1975 Clements Blue Ribbon Panel Report on Excellence in Professional Military Education (PME) 
and the August 1976 Air Force chief of staff constant readiness tasking called for the development of intensive courses 
and innovative methods to instruct students in war fighting. In response, the United States Air Force has embarked 
upon a multiphase project to establish a comprehensive, computerized, war-gaming capability. This project, known as 
the Command Readiness Exercise System (CRES), is located at Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama. The CRES 
development is under the operational control of Air University's Center for Aerospace Doctrine, Research, and 
Education (CADRE) and will be housed in the newly created Air Force Wargaming Center (AFWC). The purpose of 
this research is to explore the positive and negative features of war games and to examine how these features relate to 
potential applications of phase three of the CRES. 
AU-ARI-848 
ACCESSION NUMBER: AD-A215909 
Gorrie,Robert G. "Joint Battle Staff Training." Newport, RI: Naval War College, Department of 
Operations, II February 1991. 28p. 
Abstract: History shows that the success of modern military operations is directly dependent on the effectiveness of 
the commander and battle staff team. Crises in the new world environment requiring the use of military force will see 
the employment of multi-service Joint Task Forces (JTF). Trained command and joint battle staff teams will be needed 
to lead them. Impromptu staffs for JTFs are not cohesive teams. They are not as adept as trained and drilled staffs at 
time-sensitive planning and execution. Current training and exercises for joint battle staffs is deficient. A training 
program, based on the Army's Battle Command Training Program, is needed to fill the void. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: AD-A236279 
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Gottlieb, Aryea. "The Role ofSOF Across the Range of Military Operations." Washington, DC: 
Department of the Air Force, 16 October 1996. 5 p. 
Abstract: Since the creation of the United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), Special Operations 
Forces (SOF) personnel have been working hard to tear down the walls of secrecy which have led to years of 
misunderstanding between conventional and special operations forces. Both USSOCOM and the Services are actively 
integrating SOF curriculum into the Service's professional military education schools to educate future military leaders 
on the role ofSOF across the range of military operations (war and military operations other than war). The end of the 
Cold War has dramatically changed the international security environment. The US now faces a world marked by 
numerous regional and transnational uncertainties. The opportunity to employ SOF to meet these challenges is as great 
today as it has ever been. With its unique capabilities and specialized equipment, SOF can support a wide range of 
operations from humanitarian assistance in a benign environment, to combat operations during war. The puxpose of this 
article is to explain how SOF can be integrated into joint operations across the range of military operations. Just as 
each Service team brings certain capabilities to the theater of operations, SOF similarly offer unique capabilities to the 
Joint Force Commander (JFC). In addition to their primary special operations missions, (direct action, special 
reconnaissance, unconventional warfare, foreign internal defense, counterterrorist operations, psychological operations, 
and support to counterproliferation operations), SOF are also suited to conduct certain collateral activities. Some of 
their more common collateral activities include humanitarian assistance, counterdrug operations, combat serach and 
rescue (CSAR), and coalition warfare. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: AD-A32474 
Grissett, J.M. "China's Military Professionalism." Student report. Maxwell AFB, AL: Air 
Command and Staff College, April 1985. 59p. 
Abstract: The People's Liberation Army (PLA) in the People's Republic of China (PRC) modernized its forces from 
1949-1984 and developed its military professionalism. Since 1978 tremendous progress has been made in this 
professionalization. The PLA supports and maintains an extensive professional military education program to train its 
officer corps. The current leadership of the PRC supports the professionalism of the PLA officer corps will continue 
into the 1990's. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: AD-Al56120 
Handy, Gurnie H., Jr. and Ronald L. McCool. "An Educational Methodology for Enhancing 
Familiarity with United States Air Force Combat Logistics." Master's thesis. Wright-Patterson 
AFB, OH: Air Force Institute of Technology, School of Systems and Logistics, September 1983. 
303p 
Abstract: Certain developments since the end of the Vietnam War have given Air Force leaders cause for concern 
over a potential weakening of the war-fighting ability of the service. The authors offer evidence of that problem, then 
focus specifically on logistics war-fighting issues. After substantiating dual needs to continually relate logistics to war-
fighting and also to avoid functional specialization, the authors suggest creating a combat logistics body of knowledge 
to address those needS. The primary research objectives include establishing a system for determining relevant combat 
logistics topics and proposing a Professional Continuing Education course syllabus on the subject. HQ USAF and 
AFLC provided over 80 suggested topics which the authors analyze with a matrix system. The matrix results show that 
qualifying topics are distributed fairly evenly among five major logistics functions, except for acquisition. 
Consequently, the authors recommend :further research on that area, and in transportation. The authors conclude by 
reviewing problems with peacetime analytical thinking and by recommending the combat logistics course as a positive 
step toward building a war-fighting and readiness orientation. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: AD-A134 402 
Hardesty, Michael J. "Training for Peace: The U.S. Army's Post-Cold War Strategy." Research 
paper. Carlisle Barracks, PA: Army War College, 4 April 1996. 74p. 
Abstract: With the collapse of the Soviet Union, the U.S. national military strategy had to go through dramatic 
change. This paper traces the policy and doctrinal evolution of this change and the corresponding adjustments to the 
Army's training strategy. A case is made that because operations other than war are significantly different from war 
itself, an expanded training approach is necessary. How the U.S. Army has responded to this need is examined in detail 
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by evaluating the innovations occurring within the professional military education system as well as pre-deployment 
unit training. Considerable attention is devoted to documenting training enhancements made over the past several · 
years. Where shortfalls exist, recommendations for improvement are made. The paper concludes with a problematic 
question resulting from an increasing operational tempo and a decline in real defense expenditures. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: AD-A311157 
Harrold, James A. ''Historical Analysis of Basic Air Force Doctrine Education within the United 
States Air Force Air Command and Staff College, 1947-1987." Master's thesis. Wright-Patterson 
AFB, OH: Air Force Institute of Technology, School of Systems and Logistics, September 1987. 
161p. 
Abstract: The purpose of this study was to examine the historical treatment of Air Force basic doctrine within the Air 
Force Professional Military Education System The curricula of one specific component of this system, namely the Air 
Command and Staff College, was located and analyzed. The reason this research was undertaken was to answer the 
criticisms of several authors who have contended that the Air Force has historically not conducted education in its basic 
doctrine. This failure has led, maintain the critics, to poor perfo:rmance in war. The study had three objectives. The first 
was to determine if the Air Force had conducted doctrinal education. The second was to examine the context in which 
this education had taken place. The third objective was to determine the existence of historical trends in the area of 
doctrinal. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: AD-A187184 
Hester, Paul V. "Does CGSC Prepare the Air Force Officer for His Follow on Assignment?" 
Master's thesis. Fort Leavenworth, KS: Army Command and General Staff College, June 1980. 
59p. 
Abstract: This study attempts to determine ifCGSC prepares the Air Force officer for the responsibilities and tasks he 
will encounter in bis next assignment. The investigation focuses on an analysis of the curriculums of CGSC and ACSC; 
impressions of the 1979-80 Air Force students; and a survey of the experiences of the two previous classes of the Air 
Force students. The investigation revealed that the answer is not a clear cut yes or no. But instead one that is dependent 
upon a variety of factors. The officers surveyed offered numerous suggestions for curriculum changes to improve the 
Air Force officer's education at CGSC. These were consolidated and presented as recommendations. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: AD-A093086 
Hollingsworth, Stephen L. "The War Colleges: The Joint Alternative." Maxwell AFB, AL: Air War 
College, April 1990. 62p. 
Abstract: This paper examines the recommendations of the Skelton Panel as they apply to joint education at the 
senior service colleges. It reviews the historical basis and development of the senior service colleges to determine the 
impact previous studies and proposed changes have had on the education of senior American military leaders. It also 
reviews the recent reaction of senior military leaders and civilian writers to the Skelton Panel findings. The paper 
concludes that the Skelton Panel's recommendations are a step in the right direction. It contends that the Panel did not 
go far enough in correcting the historical impediment to a functional joint education system - individual service 
prerogatives. The paper recommends the formation of a strengthened National Defense University system under the 
control of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. All senior service college students would initially attend either an air, land or sea 
senior service college composed of a balanced faculty and student body (e.g. equal service representation). The 
curriculum would be developed and overseen by the Joint Chiefs of Staff rather than the individual services. Selected 
students would attend a second year at the National Defense University to address issues of national military strategy. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: AD-A241056 
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Johnson, William C. "Analysis of Current Attitudes of Company Grade and Field Grade Air Force 
Officers Regarding Air Force Officer Professional Development Initiatives." Master's thesis. 
Wright-Patterson AFB, OH: Air Force Institute of Technology, School of Systems and Logistics, 
September 1989. 132p. 
Abstract: The OPD survey was designed to obtain responses from participating officers regarding several OPD 
initiatives and policy changes including: Professional Military Education (PME), the AF Form 90, commander 
involvement in the assignment process, the Officer Evaluation System (OES), Join Spouse progress, ASTRA, Regular 
Appointment, below-the-zone promotions (BPZ), captains' service commitment, and senior officer involvement in 'by 
name' assignment requests. Analysis of the survey found that officers generally agree with the various issues and· 
initiatives. However, some disagreement was noted in officer attitudes regarding PME, the Join Spouse program, and 
the OES evaluation and promotion system. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: AD-A215833 
Joyner, John N. et al. "Instruction Systems for USMC Professional Military Education: Exploratory 
Development." Final report. March 1980-August 1984. Alexandria, VA: Human Resources 
Research Organization, September 1984. 60p. 
Abstract: Phases I and Il of this effort to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of Marine Corps professional 
military education (PME) addressed resident PME; and Phase m, nonresident PME. An individualized instruction and 
evaluation system: implemented in Phase I at the Instructional and Management school trained students faster and more 
effectively than the previous lock-step course. Evaluation of an individualized portion of a subcourse at the Command 
Staff College in Phase II suggests that the quality of the instructional segment may affect students more than the 
presentation mode. Phase m compared several delivery media for nonresident PME and tested one medium, 
teleconferencing. The official participants reacted favorably to teleconferencing, considered it to be a good instructional 
technique, liked its ability to bring diverse groups together without having to travel to a central location, but preferred 
the interactions possible in a face-to-face group discussion. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: AD-Al 74897 
Joyner, John N., R. Vineberg and M.R. Flaningam. "Handbook for Individualized Instruction." 
Interim report no. 2. Alexandria, VA: Human Resources Research Organization, July 1983. 18lp. 
See also Report no. NPRDC-SR-83-19, AD-A126 455. 
Abstract: A handbook and associated study guide and test forms were developed to assist instructors in 
individualizing courses. The handbook is designed primarily for use at formal school settings and for professional 
military education courses, but may have potential applications to other training settings. 
NPRDC-SR-83-45 
ACCESSION NUMBER: AD-A139146 . 
Jubeck, Cornelius Neil. ''Test and Evaluation and Graduate Education Needs." Master's thesis. 
Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, June 1981. 75p. 
Abstract: The hypothesis is advanced that testing and evaluation (T and E) of complex weapons systems requires 
unique skills, that testing and evaluation of weapons systems has evolved into a recognizable engineering discipline, 
and that professional technical personnel in the Department of Defense Test and Evaluation community should be 
considered as unique assets and supported by the establishment of a postgraduate curriculum in T and E engineering. 
The evolution of DOD T and Eis traced and analyzed with particular attention to capability requirements of personnel. 
The general conclusion is reached that the hypothesis can not now be universally supported. Reasons for this position 
are given and recommendations made for improving capabilities ofT and E personnel. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: AD-A105879 
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Karschnia, P. T. "Education, The War Colleges and Professional Military Development." 
Washington, DC: National War College, Strategic Research Group, May 1975. 16p. 
Abstract: Professional military education resides in difficult circumstances. While external challenges from the 
Congress and the administration appear to constitute the most serious problems, the gravest concerns emanate from 
within the military establishment. Military education tends to vocationalize and specialize professional development 
rather than convey broad understanding. The political environment faced by the military generalist is not adequately 
confronted in the educational system nor is the indeterminacy of future strategic design. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: AD-A008 945 
Kelley, Jay W. "SPACECAST 2020, Volume l ."Final report. Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University, 
June 1992. 486p. 
Abstract: SPACECAST 2020 was a ChiefofStaff ofthe Air Force (CSAF)-directed space study, challenged to 
identify and conceptually develop high-leverage space technologies and systems that will best support the warfighter in 
the twenty-first century. The study produced a series of white papers which have been assembled into clusters of 
concern for future space capabilities. Volume I consists of 11 unclassified white papers: Leveraging the Inf osphere: 
Surveillance and Reconnaissance in 2020; Space Traffic Control: The Culmination of Improved Spave Operations; 21st 
Century Weather Support Architecture; Space-Based Solar Monitoring a11d Alert Satellite System; Space Weather 
Support for Communications; Spacelift: Suborbital, Earth to Orbit, and On Orbit; Unconventional Spacelift; Rapid 
Space Force Reconstitution (RASEOR); Space Modular Systems; Professional Military Education (PME) in 2020; and · 
Preparing for Planetary Defense: Detection and Interception of Asteroids on Collision Course with Earth. The Volume 
also contains an Operational Analysis and listings of Project Contributors and Project Participants. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: AD-A295142 
Kelly, James P. "Theater Strategy Training for Senior Leaders." Maxwell AFB, AL" Air War 
College. April 1987. 47p. · 
Abstract: Remarks on the declining combat experience of the active military force introduce a discussion on the 
importance of capturing the lessons of previous wars in training and education programs for future senior Air Force 
leaders. A discussion follows comparing Air Force and Army terminology concerning the operational level of war and 
· operational art to set the basis for a look at current training and education programs. The author presents his views on 
the need for emphasis in training and educating future senior combat leaders for the operational level of war, that area 
where national strategy is focused into theater and campaign strategy and linked to battlefield tactics. This need for 
training and education goes beyond the study of history and procedural knowledge into the area of enhancing intuition, 
instinct and judgement in the face of uncertain knowledge of the enemy. The senior service schools are offered as the 
forum for developing a foundation for these mental skills. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: AD-A186663 
Koran, John G., III. "Manpower Management for Joint Specialty Officers: A Comparative 
Analysis." Master's thesis. Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, December 1990. 148p. 
Abstract: This thesis investigates_ the development of Title IV of the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense 
Reorganization Act of 1986 and the Jo(-nt Specialty Officer (JSO) management policies mandated by the law. 
Individual service manpower management procedures for the nomination/selection for Joint Professional Military 
Education (JPME) and Joint Specialty Officer designation are presented and analyzed. The size and composition of the 
Joint Duty Assignment List (JDAL) is also presented and analyzed. The results indicate significant progress has been 
made towards fulfilling the Title IV requirements regarding JPME, JSO designation, and improving the quality and 
stability of officers assigned to Joint Duty Assignments. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: AD-A246209 
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Lacki, Michael J. "Soviet Officer: A Credible Adversary." Research report. Maxwell AFB, AL: Air 
War College, April 1986. 47p. 
Abstract: The intent of this report is to present a review of the training and indoctrination of Soviet officers. The 
report traces the elements of the communist system which influence the officers' beliefs. Aspects of civilian and 
professional military education are reviewed. Some elements of the officer's life-style serve to provide another 
perspective of his life. A summary of the strengths and weaknesses of the Soviet officer corps concludes the remarks. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: AD-Al 77736 
Leidich, R.G. "The Marine Corps Professional Military Education Selection System." Student 
essay. Carlisle Barracks, PA: Army War College, April 1982. 31 p. 
Abstract: The essay descnoes the Marine Corps method of selecting officers to attend Professional Military 
Education courses of instruction prior to 1977. It then researches the new selection technique that developed into a 
'system' and describes the reasons for change and gives the details of the revised system. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: AD-A116230 
Lopez, Kevin W. "Impact of AFSC Regulation 36-5 on the 27:.XX Career Field." Master's thesis. 
Wright-Patterson AFB, OH: Air Force Institute of Technology, School of Systems and Logistics, 
September 1987. 99p. 
Abstract: The objective of this research study was to assess the potential implications of AFSC Regulation 36-5 on 
the 27XX career field. This analysis was accomplished by comparing the attitudes of Junior (AFSC 2724) and senior 
(AFSC 2716) officers in relation to the requirements outlined in the regulation. Using this approach, this study 
established that both test samples.of officers proposed a positive relationship between career development and the 
following variables: I) specialty training, 2) professional military education, 3) academic background, 4) operational 
experience, and 5) different acquisition-related experiences. In addition to these findings, this study detemrined that the 
attitudes of both Junior and senior officers relative to career development are very similar. With the exception of those 
individual training, and professional military education programs oriented towards either Junior or senior officers, the 
general attitudes of these test samples of officers were comparable. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: AD-A186913 
Mansfield, M. "Air Force Lieutenants: An Analysis of Perceptions Surveyed During the 
Lieutenants Professional Development Program." Final report. Maxwell AFB, AL: Leadership and 
Management Development Center, January 1984. 66p. 
Abstract: It is essential that Air Force lieutenants develop proper leadership and management skills early on in their 
careers so that they may meet the greater challenge inherent in their progression in rank and responsibility, This paper 
attempts to paint a picture of today's Air Force lieutenants using information and data derived from two sources: the 
Leadership and Management Development Center's Lieutenants' Professional Development Program and 
Organizational Assessment Package survey. The information and data show primarily that, among other things, 
lieutenants are perceived to be lacking good supervisory and managerial skills. Subordinates of lieutenants are 
experiencing many of the same problems as lieutenants themselves. Herein lies the valuable potential of the LPDP. 
This problem is designed to help lieutenants, especially managerial skills and supervisory role. Since professional 
military education is generally offered at about the three year point, and then only to a small percentage, a program 
such as the LPDP is needed for this large segment of Air Force leadership. The data clearly indicate the need for 
additional training. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: AD-A138786 
Mansfield, M. "Air Force Lieutenants: An Analysis of Perceptions Surveyed During the 
Lieutenants Professional Development Program." Final report. Maxwell AFB, AL: Leadership and 
Management Development Center, January 1984. 66p. Supersedes AD-A138 786. 
Abstract: It is essential that Air Force lieutenants develop proper leadership and management skills early on in their 
careers so that they may meet the greater challenge inherent in their progression in rank and responsibility. This paper 
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attempts to paint a picture of today's Air Force lieutenants using information and data derived from two sources: the 
Leadership and Management Development Center's Lieutenants' Professional Development Program and 
Organizational Assessment Package survey. The information and data show primarily that, among other things, 
lieutenants are perceived to be lacking good supervisory and managerial skills. Subordinates of lieutenants are 
experiencing many of the same problems as lieutenants themselves. Herein lies the valuable potential of the LPDP. 
This program is designed to help lieutenants, especially those who are supervisors, gain pragmatic insight into how to 
develop and fulfill their managerial skills and supervisory role. Since professional military education is generally 
offered at about the three year point, and then only to a small percentage, a program such as the LPDP is needed for 
this large segment of Air Force leadership. The data clearly indicate the need for additional training. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: AD-Al42529 
Mansfield, M. "Impact of Various Levels of Professional Military Education and Formal Education 
on Selected Supervisory Dimensions." Final report. Maxwell AFB, AL: Leadership and 
Management Development Center, August 1983. 64p. 
Abstract: Officers need training and education in order to perform assigned duties. Problem: How much of what type 
of education and/or training does an Air Force officer need. This paper analyzes how an officer's level of professional 
military and academic education influence subordinate perceptions of managerial/supervisory issues. An analysis of 
covariance (ANCOVA) is performed using 2x4 factorial design (level of college degree x level of PME). The data 
show that officer professional military and graduate education positively influence the perceptions of subordinates on 
key supervisory measures. To determine ho\\ the Air Force compares to industry, information was collected from four 
defense related corporations. These industrie:s place as much or more emphasis on the professional education of 
employees than the Air Force. In the area of advanced education, what may appear costly in the present should reap 
enormous benefits in the future. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: AD-A133076 
McConnell, Reed J. "Impact of Air Force Systems Command Regulation 36-5 on the 27XX Career 
Field." Master's thesis. Wright-Patterson AFB, OH: Air Force Institute of Technology, September 
1988. 98p. 
Abstract: The purpose of this research was to determine if the attitudes of acquisition managers have changed over 
the past year, with respect to the Acquisition Manager Career Development Program, set forth.by Air Force Systems 
Command Regulation (AFSCR) 36-5. A survey approach was used to compare the attitudes of Juneior (Air Force 
Specialty Code 2724) and senior (Air Force Specialty Code 2716) officers in relation to the criteria specified in the 
regulation. The results were then compared to the results of a previous survey to measure changes over time. Both 
surveys found generally a positive relationship between the attitudes of acquisition management personnel and career 
development in all areas investigated. These areas include: 1) specialty training, 2) academic background, 3) 
professional military education, 4) operational experience, and 5) different types of acquisition management 
experience. Not only were the responses from the previous survey to the current survey similar, the attitudes of Juneior 
and senior personnel were also comparable. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: AD-A201516 
Miller, Roger M. "Air National Guard Full-Time Support." Student report. Maxwell AFB, AL: Air 
Command and Staff College, 1988. 31 p. 
Abstract: Full-time support for the Air National Guard is federally funded and subject to federal law and rules for its 
administration. Retirement benefits are a positive motivator for a career force, but also require clear rules for members 
to belie\'(; they can reach retirement. The purpose of this report is to establish the need to revise Air National Guard 
(ANG) regulations controlling Active Guard Reserve (AGR) members and to provide a history of full-time support in 
the National Guard. ANGR 35-03 Military Personnel Management needs to be revised to conform to federal laws 
concerning reservists on active duty. Promotion, professional military education, and active mission support should be 
centrally managed to use military duty members. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: AD-A192520 
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Miller, Stephen J. "Joint Education: Where It Really Should Begin." Study project report. Carlisle 
Barracks, PA: Army War College, 5 April 1993. 38p. 
Abstract: The 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act mandated sweeping reforms to 
the professional military education system In particular, the law called for the creation of joint specialty officers, and 
gave the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, authority to formulate policy in the military education system in order to 
produce officers competent in joint matters. Thus far, the focus of the changes have been at the intermediate and senior 
service schools. The Chairman has issued clear objectives for joint education curricula, and each of the programs must 
be periodically accredited. However, very little guidance has been given to the precommissioning schools, and their 
joint programs are not formally reviewed by the JCS. As a result, the variety and depth of joint curricula varies 
considerably between the service academies and ROTC units. In the author's opinion, officers are graduating with 
differing perspectives and levels of understanding about joint matters. However, the military is changing and young 
officers are being exposed to the joint environment earlier in their careers through consolidation ofDoD organizations, 
training exercises and real world contingencies. This paper presents several arguments why joint education should be 
improved for officer candidates, and recommends that precommissioning schools become full fledged partners in the 
joint education process by implementing common learning objectives and submitting their curricula to periodic JCS 
review. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: AD-A264041 
Morsh, Joseph E. "Survey of Air Force Officer Management Activities and Evaluation of 
Professional Military Education Requirements." Lackland AFB, TX: Air Force Human Resources 
. Laboratory, Personnel Research Division, December 1969. 93p. 
Abstract: The main purpose of the officer management survey was to identify :functions which all officers perform as 
distinct from work specific to a particular specialty and to determine the relationships of managerial responsibility to 
grade, career area, or other variables. A further aim was to obtain an evaluation of topics of professional military 
education requirements in terms of job performance or as contnbutory to an effective Air Force career. 
AFHRL-TR-69-38 
. ACCESSION NUMBER: AD-705574 
Moskos, Charles C. "Sociology of the Army Reserves: A Comparative Assessment." Interim 
report. December 1987-November 1988. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University, Dept. of 
Sociology, July 1990. 32p. 
Abstract: This report highlights the core characteristics of the American Reserve System with a comparative analysis 
ofreserve forces in the Federal Republic of Germany, the United Kingdom, and Israel. The analysis adopts a case-
based approach and uses qualitative binary methodology. The following are the core elements of the social organization 
of American reserve components: (1) No other reserve system requires as much training time for its members; (2) no 
other reserve system relies on reservists for basic full-time support; (3) no other reserve system has a well developed 
career path (with a corresponding professional military education system) leading to senior command and staff 
positions; and (4) in no other reserve system do reservists have such limited real vacation time. The effect of these 
conditions is that the American reserves, in comparison with those in other Western countries, are characterized by 
greater conflict between reserve duties and family obligations and, most especially, between reserve duties and civilian 
employment responsibilities. Long-term policy changes to improve reserve force must take this into account. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: AD-A226717 
''Noncommissioned Officer Education and Professional Development Study." Fort Monroe, VA: 
Continental Anny Command, 1971. 62p. 
Abstract: The following are among this study's recommendations: Retain the present Noncommissioned Officer 
Education System (NCOES) as the Army's program for noncommissioned officer education and professional 
development and implement it fully as rapidly as possible; Examine the NCOES and make modification to insure that 
every soldier in every military occupational specialty has a career path through NCO ES to noncommissioned officer 
rank; Develop, insofar as possible, programs of instruction within NCOES which will include all MOS, consolidating 
instruction to insure flexibility in accommodating all MOS within programmed classes at each service school 
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regardless of variations in ACMF and MOS training; Continue to analyze service school courses to eliminate 
duplication between NCOES and specialized and functional courses; Terminate the Skill Development Base Program 
as rapidly as possible, by 30 June 1972, or earlier, in favor of earlier expansion ofNCOES; Retain the present 
organization of noncommissioned officer academies for the foreseeable future; and Develop on NCOES student 
procurement system to replace current solicitation procedures for procurement of best-qualified students, by 
establishment of mandatory quota requirements, which must be met, based on distribution of personnel within major 
organizations by MOS and rank. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: AD-A089270 
Orlansky, Jesse. et al. "Joint Warfare Analysis Program." Final report. October 1994-June 19~· 'i. 
Alexandria, VA: Institute for Defense Analyses, June 1996. 54p. 
Abstract: This paper examines the need for a program of Joint Warfare Analysis as an option in Joint Professional· 
Military Education, Phase I, for intermediate level officers. The findings are based on structured interviews with 50 
senior flag officers on whose staffs graduates would serve. Graduates of such a program are considered important on 
Joint and Service Command staffs, and half the respondents consider them essential and would trade off a current billet 
for such a graduate. The curriculum should include studies campaign analysis, simulation and joint exercise evaluation. 
It is estimated that 30 to 40 graduates would be needed each year to fill 90 to 130 billets on Joint and major Service 
command staffs. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: AD-A311927 
Palmer, George E. "A Discriminative Study of the Senior Service College Selection System as it 
Relates to the Anny War College." Research paper. Carlisle Barracks, PA: Anny War College, 
January 1972. 40p. 
Abstract: The major thrust of this study is to analyze the Anny Senior Service College Selection System with a view 
of determining the merits of the system and its relationship to the US Army War College (A WC). The basic question is 
whether or not the student body of the Army War College has been and remains a reputable product of the selection 
system. In addition, have any noticeable trends been established in using this selection system over an extended period 
and is the formulation of a War College student profile feasible. Data was gathered using a literature research of 
appropriate civilian publications and statistical information compiled at the A WC and Department of the Army. A 
twenty-two year survey of the student body attending the A WC was conducted. The analysis of the student body at the 
A WC indicates that the Senior Service College Selection System is accomplishing its goal of selecting the best 
qualified for attendance to the Senior Service Colleges. The students nominated appear to meet the selection criteria as 
related to rank, professional skills, educational standards, and time in service. Minor variations in each class 
composition are noted. These variations may be prevalent in each of the Senior Service Schools due to the random 
selection of students and the suspected desire to more closely integrate the educational process of the senior officers 
from all services. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: AD-A026935 
Park, S.H. "Evaluation of Graduate Education of the Military Professionals and Assessment of 
Their Need." Master's thesis. Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, December 1983. lOlp. 
Abstract: The military services have been aware of the importance of advanced, formal education since the Korean 
War ( 1950-1953 ). Dum;g; the past three decades, however, with the philosophy of the fortification of self - defense 
power; the modernizaticn .:•fthe military equipment, and the development of defense - industry, there has been a great 
increase in the need for :>ificers with education at the baccalaureate level and graduate level to prepare them for a 
extreme variety of roles beyond the traditional professional officer's combat mold. In this regard, this thesis is 
concerned with whether or not the needs for graduate education were inflated; whether officers so educated were used 
adequately in positions identified as requiring graduate education; and how we measure the value of graduate education 
in military officers. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: AD-A140626 
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Payne, Rodney M. "Common Sense Approach to Strategy." Research report. Maxwell AFB, AL: 
/ · Air War College, May 1987. 4lp. 
Abstract: Professional military education at all levels emphasizes the necessity for military commanders to study, 
understand and, in turn, properly apply the classic strategies and principles of war. Using the Civil War career of 
Lieutenant General Nathan Bedford Forrest as a case study, this paper points out that even though he was uneducated 
and had no prior military experience, Forrest was a genius in the strategies and principles of war. An analytical 
discussion of several of Forrest's campaigns is used to support this thesis. Given the fact that Forrest could not have 
read or been taught the classic strategies and principles, he undoubtedly adhered to some form of strategy formulation 
framework which intuitively led him to make the correct military decisions. The author postulates that framework as a 
basis for the analysis of Forrest's achievements and suggests that the same framework could prove beneficial at all 
levels of command ad a quick reference back-up for contemporary battlefield strategy decisions. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: AD-A187008 
Peacock, W.R., Jr. "Soviets - How Much Do We Know." Research report. Maxwell AFB, AL: Air 
War College, April 1985. 55p. 
Abstract: Initial discussion of both the historical and current reasons for knowing the United States' primarily 
adversary, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), leads to further examination of the specific categories of 
knowledge the professional military officer should have regarding his enemy. History, society, economy, political 
system and geography are discussed along with the implications each has in contributing to the senior professional's 
required knowledge. Next, the results of a questionnaire on the Soviet system administered to the Air War College 
USAF students in the cla5s of 1985 lead to the conclusion that lieutenant colonels and colonels in the Air Force have 
only superficial knowledge of the USSR in the five categories of knowledge previously mentioned. General 
observations on the American educational system, media, and professional military education programs at Squadron 
Officer School, Air Command and Staff College, and Air War College point to a need to start the Soviet education 
process earlier in the individual's career, increase the exposure at all USAF professional military education schools and 
establish some type of additional mandatory training. Suggestions as to the specifics of implementing such a program 
are offered with the hope of providing a starting point for fixing the problem. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: AD-A159277 
Peterson, James R. "Tactical Deception--Vital Then, Vital Now." Student report. Maxwell AFB, 
AL: Air Command and Staff College, April 1987. 30p. 
Abstract: Tactical Deception is the force multiplier that can be the difference between victory and defeat. Sinc;e 
Biblical times, Deception has played a vital role in warfare. The advances in technology, change in our society, and 
expanded military role have not reduced Deception's value. In addition, Soviet's reliance on Deception throughout its 
military dictates increased United States military emphasis in the study and use of Deceptive measures. The study 
examines the types of Deception, key factors for success, and examples throughout history on how Deception, has been 
vital. By increasing the emphasis of Deception in routine exercises, evaluations, and Professional Military Education, 
the United States military can fully utilize this vital tool. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: AD-A200583 
Powers, James F., Jr. ''National Assistance and Civil-Military Operations: The Gap in Professional 
Military Education." Research report. Carlisle Barracks, PA: Anny War College, March 1996. 35p. 
Abstract: The Department of Defense (DoD) is not properly preparing the U.S. Armed Forces to execute Civil-
Military Operations (CMO) as a supporting, mission activity ofNation Assistance. Furthermore, the DoD appears to be 
unaware of this shortcoming and thus incapable of solving the problem due to a general lack of education and 
awareness regarding Nation Assistance and its component activities. This argumentative paper evaluates the national 
security policy area of Nation Assistance and one of the stated component activities, CMO. It traces the genesis of 
CMO from the President's National Security Strategy through the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) and Chairman, Joint 
Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) National Military Strategy to a break in the linkage at Service level. Civil-Military Operations • 
are defmed as the complex of activities in support of military operations embracing the interaction between the military 
force and civilian authorities fostering the development of favorable emotions, attitudes, and behavior in neutral, 
friendly, or hostile groups. The methodology used in this evaluation is the U.S. Army War College (USA WC) Ends,· 
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Ways, and Means model for developing National Strategy; i.e., Ends being the objectives, Ways the concepts, and 
Means the resources available. The term CMO comprises five mission activities: populace and resources control, 
foreign nation support, humanitarian assistance, military civic action, and civil defense. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: AD-A309111 
Powers, Marcella V. "Survey of Studies Addressing Graduate Education in the United States Air 
Force." Research report. Maxwell AFB, AL: Air War College, April 1987. 63p. 
Abstract: The purpose of this report is to establish the basic structure for the education of Army (including Army Air 
Forces) officers. The charter of the board covered commissioned officers only. The military leadership emerging from 
World War IT recognized that the United States would play a major role in world affairs. The military officers of the 
United States needed to be educated to assume military leadership under more complex situations and using more 
sophisticated technology than had been the case before that time. The bulk of this study, chaired by Lieutenant General 
Leonard T. Gerow, deals with professional military education. Annex IO (which addresses Army Air Forces) includes 
the requirement for the Air Institute of Technology. At this early stage of the development of modem-day military 
education, no specific reference is made to graduate education. The board established the mission of the Air Institute of 
Technology as assuring scientific technological development of Army Air Forces equipment and efficient operation of 
procurement, supply, maintenance, and service responsibilities assigned to the Army Air Forces. (p. 75) It would be 
heavily science-and-research oriented Instruction would be provided in those subjects to prepare officers to serve in 
the Air Technical Service Command and tactical operating units. Provisions called for Reserve and National Guard 
officers to attend an associate, condensed course and for the Air Institute of Technology to provide a correspondence 
course for officers on inactive status. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: AD-A186843 
"Professional Military Education - Officer AFPT 90-XXX-522." Special report. Randolph AFB, 
TX: Air Force Occupational Measurement Center, October 1984. 56p. 
Abstract: This report presents the results of an Air Force occupational survey of the leadership, management, and 
communicative tasks performed by Air Force officers. This survey was requested by HQ Air University to help validate 
and revise the curricula of officer precommissioning and postcommissioning professional military education (PME) 
courses. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: AD-A147387 
Redmond, Kimberly, Joe Sheppard, Marlene Humphrey and Lee Stacy. "CD-ROM Applications in 
Professional Military Education (PME)." Final report. September 1991-May 1992. Arlington, VA: 
Eagle Technology, Inc., October 1992. 99p. 
Abstract: This effort was conducted to identify the :nost cost-effective and efficient utilization of Compact Disk-read 
Only Memory (CD-ROM) within the Marine Corps Professional Military Education (PME) schools at the Marine 
Corps University (MCU). CD-ROM, Professional Military Education (PME). 
ACCESSION NUMBER: AD-A256662 
Reed, D.D. ''Future Technologies Needs Analysis." An Air University Staff Report. 1986. 75p. 
Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Mid-South Educational Research Association (15th, 
Memphis, TN, November 19-21, 1986). 
Abstract: This report summarizes the findings of a survey of all permanently assigned personnel at the Air 
University at Maxwell Air Force Base (Alabama) to determine what future workplace technologies will be needed to 
support the university's two major programs, Professional Military Education (PME) and Professional Continuing 
Education (PCE). The objectives of the study were to determine exactly what personnel perceived their needs to be for 
a local area network; for future technologies for presenting PME and PCE curricula; and for achieving the necessary 
staff work of support organizations. There were 1,211 respondents who provided information on: (I) their willingness 
to accept technology advances; (2) potential workload savings by automation; and (3) specific equipment and software 
requirements. The survey data were also designed to permit future mapping of external and internal data flow at the Air 
University. The text is supplemented by seven figures and six tables, and four appendices include a copy of the survey 
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questionnaire and analyses of the data for individual questions. A descriptive analysis of future tecbnologicat needs in a 
military university based on this study is attached. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: ED290443 
Reed, Ronald D. "Perspective on Commissioning and Education-- Total Quality, Total Force." 
Final report. Maxwell AFB, AL: Air War College, April 1993. 60p. 
Abstract: Internal and external pressures drive leaders, planners, and senior decision makers to evaluate educational 
programs for efficiency, effectiveness and long-term benefits. This paper focuses on such issues with respect to 
Department of Defense (DOD) commissioning programs. Meshed with older educational concerns for development and 
reform, a growing emphasis on Total Quality Management (TQM) offers opportunities and challenges in meeting such 
pressures and in supporting evaluation. TQM areas of particular importance in tailoring TQM to commissioning 
programs are customer and product identification, quality definition and measurement, leadership and teamwork in 
organizational culture, and benchmarking. Data is needed to support decision making and program improvement at all 
levels. Several metrics of comparative quality are available, with one being surveys of supervisors for newly 
commissioned officers. A case is made that better coordination of evaluative data and commissioning programs is 
needed. Ultimately, this coordination should extend within each service, across the joint services, and through career-
long professional military education. 
ACCESSION ~ER: AD-A283215 
Reely, Robert Harold, Jr. "An Analysis of the Relationships between Job 
Satisfaction/Enrichment Factors and Demographic Variables for United States Air Force 
Professional Military Education Faculty." Doctoral thesis. Wright Patterson AFB, OH: Air Force 
Institute of Technology, August 1976. 131p. 
Abstract: This study has focused upon an application of job motivation/satisfaction theory to the faculty of the United 
States Air Force Air University. The study was limited to the three major college faculties within Air University. Two 
hundred and twenty subjects were measured with the Air University Faculty Motivation Survey. The instrument 
presented and defined 15 job factors. Scales were included to measure both an individual's satisfaction with and 
perceived importance of each factor. Six job enrichment factors and selected demographic variables were also 
measured. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: AD-A031821 
"A Review of Education and Training for Officers (RETO)." Volume 2. Career Progression. 
Washington, DC: Office of the Chief ofStaff(Army), June 1978. 638p. 
Abstract: Partial Contents: (C). Precommissioning. The Precommissioning Screening System. The ROTC Program. 
The ROTC Scholarship Program. (D). Officer Education, Training and Military Qualification Standards, 
Precommissioning through 10 Years AFCS. Military Qualification Standards. Notional Model ofMQS I. Notional 
Model ofMQS II, Specialty 11. Notional Model ofMQS II, Specialty 35. Notional Model ofMQS II, Specialty 81. 
Notional Model ofMQS III, Specialty 11. Notional Model ofMQS ill, Specialty 35. Notional Model ofMQS ill, 
Specialty 81. Professional Military Education Components at MQS I, II and ID. The Advanced Course Analysis. 
Transition to War. (E). Training and Education for Field Grade Officer Development Preparing Field Grade Officers. 
Skills and Knowledge Common to All Majors and Lieutenant Colonels. Combined Arms and Services Staff School 
(CAS3). U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. Expansion for War: USACGSC and CAS3. 
Specialty/Assignment--Relevant Training and Education. (F). Senior Officer Education and Training. Senior Service 
Colleges. Battalion and Brigade Precommand Courses. Continuing Education and Training for General Officers. 
Transition to War. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: AD-A080159 
"A Review of Education and Training for Officers (RETO)." Volume 4. Rank-Independent Issue. 
Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Staff (Army), June 1978. 367p. 
Abstracts: Partial Contents: (M) Commitment, (N) Officership-The Army Environment and Its Impact on 
Officership, (0) Assessment Concept in Support of Officer Education and Training System-Assessment Concept for 
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Mid-Career Developmt:_ • .6xecutive Development Laboratory for Newly Selected Brigadier Generals; (P) Professional 
Military Education for Army Officers-Future Requirements in Professional Military Education, Graduate Level 
Education of Army Officers, Foreign Languages and U.S. Army Officers, Professional Ethics, Military History, (Q) 
Reserve Components--Reserve Components Officer Professional Development, (R) Management of Officers--
Promotion by Specialty Floors, Commander Management, OPMS Specialties - DA Proponency and Specialty Primacy, 
Specialists and Generalists: A Look at the Army Officer Corps; (S) Aviation Program. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: AD-A080161 
Richardson, F.G. "Law of War and the Operational Commander." Final report. Newport, RI: Naval 
War College, Dept. of Operations, 8 Februaiy 1994. 36p. 
Abstract: Every member of the military is bound by oath to discharge his or her duties in accordance with the law of 
war. This paper examines the influence of the law of war on the operational commander and includes legal planning 
considerations for campaigns. It does not list all laws of armed conflict or the provisions of applicable conventions 
concerning warfare. Operational law, based on the principles of military necessity, unnecessary suffering, and 
proportionality enables the operational commander to plan and execute legal, successful operations. Command criminal 
responsibility assumes an operational commander does not issue illegal orders or in some way personally directs or 
supervises a prohibited activity. Selected cases in military history clearly indicate that operational commanders who 
have adhered to the law of war emerged victorious in their respective campaigns. Analysis of these cases and current 
law supports the premise that the operational commander must obey the law of war, and has no authority to violate or 
selectively enforce the law. To ensure operations are conducted within the spirit and intent of the law of war, training 
programs need to be instituted at all levels of professional military education. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: AD-A279705 
Rose, M. Richard and Andrew J Dougherty. "Educating the American Military Officer. The System 
and Its Challenges: An Overview." Washington, DC: National War College, Strategic Research 
Group, November 1975. 32p. 
Abstract: Over the years there has developed within the Department of Defense perhaps the most elaborate and 
successful system dedicated to the intellectual and professional development of officers of the Armed Forces to be 
found in any institution m the world. An examination of this process, its components and its genesis, reveals a 
composite of separate programs developed and adapted over the years to satisfy specific needs. That the programs so 
developed have been successful in the aggregate cannot be denied. We need only to look at the officer corps of the 
Armed Forces, as they now exist, to be persuaded of the effectiveness of these programs as instruments for the 
development of professionalism and expertise. The nation and the Armed Forces have just completed the longest, most 
divisive and difficult war in our national history. In the course of that war, the overall performance of the Armed 
Forces, as it reflects officership, was superb. The dedication and professionalism exemplified by the American 
prisoners-of-war, as representative products of the system, during their long incarceration and their subsequent return to 
our nation with their honor intact, attests to this quality and substance of these programs. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: AD-A024215 
Roth, Brenda F. "Student Outcomes Assessment of Air Command and Staff College: An 
Evaluative Study." Doctoral thesis. Wright-Patterson AFB, OH: Air Force Institute of Technology, 
April 97. 244p. 
Abstract: In the mid-1980s, the assessment movement began to spread throughout academia as colleges and 
universities created programs to address the issues of accountability and program improvement. A multitude of 
comprehensive institution-wide assessment programs emerged from the movement which brought about change on 
many campuses .. The purpose of this study was to develop a comprehensive assessment program at an Air Force 
professional military education institution, Air Command and Staff College (ACSC), based on the perceptions ofrecent 
Air Force officer graduates of the program. Graduates (n=395) were asked to rate the quality of program elements 
(teaching methods and program activities) and to disclose their perceived competence on outcome variables. Based OI} 
the data from a 90-item questionnaire titled, 'Student Perceptions of Program Effectiveness Questionnaire,' the 
researcher analyzed student perceptions on three types of variables-inputs (demographics and student expectations), 
environment (teaching methods and program activities), and outcomes (program goals). Information from returned 
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questionnaires was collected and analyzed using descriptive (means, standard deviations, and percentages), 
correlational (cross-tabulations and Pearson 'r's), predictive (multiple regression) statistics, and qualitative analysis. The 
results of the correlational and predictive analyses show that ACSC graduates generally perceived their competencies 
on outcome variables and the quality of environmental variables as high. The most important results emerged from the 
predictive analysis. After controlling for the effects of inputs, which accounted from three percent of the variance in 
Command and Leadership to nine percent in Critical Thinking outcome Leadership to fifteen percent in Joint Campaign 
outcome variables. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: AD-A323627 
Rupinski, Timothy E. "Selection Criteria for Professional Military Education." Final report. 
Alexandria, VA: Center for Naval Analyses, Marine Corps Operations Analysis Group, 
10 August 1987. 61p. 
Abstract: The Marine Corps provides Professional Military Education (PME) for its noncommissioned officers. Each 
level of training is designed to provide the leadership skills necessary for advancement in rank. This research 
memorandum shows that prior performance, time in grade, length to end of active service, and operational 
commitments affect the selection of eligible Marines into some of the resident courses. 
CRM-87-148 
ACCESSION NUMBER: AD-A187693 
Shaw, Chris. ''Professional Military Education: An Alternative Approach." Research report. August 
1991-April 1992. Washington, DC: Industrial College of the Armed Forces, April 1992. 32p. 
Abstract: The national imperatives of our economy reflect directly on military budget austerity and manpower 
drawdowns, yet the education of officers must not and should not suffer. The history and evolution of PME and a 
different approach can provide the answers to the where and how the PME system should proceed. What results from 
this prescribed alternative approach is an educated officer versed in the various levels of war, capable of participating 
directly in the formulation of national security policy. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: AD-A262081 
Siegel, Adam B. "A Brave New Curriculum for a Brave New World?" Alexandria, VA: Center for 
Naval Analyses, March 1991. 28p. 
Abstract: The Naval War College, like all other defense institutions, is reeling from the rapid changes in the security 
outlook. From the crumbling of the Soviet empire to the crumbling domestic support for military outlays, the U.S. 
defense establishment faces challenges to many of the basic defense planning assumptions of the past decade. As Capt. 
John H. Heidt of the Naval War College commented, the threat is no longer the Russians. The threat is uncertainty. 
Adjusting to the rapidly changing environment is a challenge that has to be met if the safe future for the nation is to be 
secured - adapting the education and training of the nation's future military leaders to the changing environment is one 
means to ensure appropriate defense policies in the future. One is forced to wonder whether the nation's war colleges 
require brave new curricula for the brave new world of the coming decades. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: AD-A234351 
Smariga, Linda K. "Reactions and Attitudes Displayed by Air Force Officers to the Combat 
Support Doctrine." Master's thesis. Wright-Patterson AFB, OH: Air Force Institute of Technology, 
School of Systems and Logistics, September 1987. 112p. 
Abstract: The purpose of this study was to determine a group of officers, reactions and attitudes towards AFM 2-15, 
the Combat Support Doctrine. Specifically, the study attempted to fmd if(l) The Combat Support Doctrine was 
understandable and meaningful to these officers; and to determine (2) If the doctrine was not understandable and 
meaningful to these same officers, was the problem the actual doctrine itself, or was the problem related more to the 
institution; the Air Force. That is, was the problem related more to the fact that the Air Force does not emphasize the 
study of doctrine. The data was collected by a survey developed for this study. The research found that the Combat 
Support Doctrine was understandable to these officers, but that it was not equally as meaningful to these same officers. 
There was no conclusive evidence that the doctrine itself was at fault, but the research did show that the Air Force does 
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not emphasize the study of doctrine on a regular basis. Doctrine is only presented, usually in a brief format, at 
commissioning sources, and more in depth at professional military education schools, in residence. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: AD-A186539 
Smith, B.G. ''USAF Security Police Officer Leadership: Effectiveness, Agreement, and the Effects 
of Education and Experience." Master's thesis. Wright-Patterson AFB, OH: Air Force Institute of 
Technology, 1984. 97p. 
Abstract: The effects of education and experience on leadership are disputed. In the USAF both are viewed as 
methods of creating effective leaders. Professional military education teaches leadership theory while experience is 
believed to increase an officer's ability to lead. This study asked four questions concerning: (1) the leadership 
effectiveness of security police officers; (2) the level of agreement between the officers, their subordinates and/or 
superiors, on the officer's behavior in given leadership situations; (3) the relationship between professional military 
education and leadership effectiveness; and (4) the relationship between experience and leadership effectiveness. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: AD-Al45371 
Smith, Linda L. "Skelton: A Strategy for Air War College." Research report. Maxwell AFB, AL: 
Air War College, April 1990. 57p. 
Abstract: No abstract available. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: AD-A229941 
Talbert, Gene E., John P. Hourigan, and James L. Hoyt. "An Analysis of the System for 
Determining and Validating Air Force Professional Education Requirements. Final report. 13 Jul 
70-13 Feb 71. Santa Monica, CA: Systems Development Corporation, April 1971. l 16p. 
Abstract: The study of the Air Force professional education system descnbes and examines the procedures used for 
determining, validating, and meeting requirements for the development of career officers via the formal programs and 
courses of Air University. A descriptive model is developed which displays the current processing procedures, 
information flows, and interrelationships among the agencies, programs, and structures which together comprise the 
educational system and its embedding environment. The findings from an analysis of the current system and from an 
examination of alternative procedures are presented together with suggested prQcedural modifications. Ii is concluded 
that the system in its present form does function as a system; that benefits from 'ready solutions' to particular problems 
may be more apparent than real when considered from the overall system's point of view; and that the principal values 
of the current study may lie in its descriptive rather than its prescriptive aspects. It is suggested that sustained and 
concentrated efforts on a number of fronts are needed to develop a comprehensive and valid set of prescriptive 
measures. Principal issues to be resolved and approaches to be considered are discussed. 
AFHRL-TR-71-3 
ACCESSION NUMBER: AD-738300 
Taylor, Robert L. and Deonn M. Wall. "Air Force Professional Military Education and Executive 
Leadership and Management Development - A Summary and Annotated Bibliography." Final 
report. Colorado Springs, CO: Air Force Academy, January 1980. 84p. 
Abstract: Professional Military Education (PME) has, historically, been the process employed by a nation's armed 
services to train and develop officers for future responsibility and the conduct of war. Over the years, substance and 
pedagogy have changed, but objectives remain the same. The importance of P.ME cannot be understated as it is the 
framework for professional development in an officer corps. 
USAFA-TR-80-1 
ACCESSION NUMBER: AD-A080552 
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Toner, S.C. "George Washington, America's First Strategic Leader." Research report. Carlisle 
Barracks, PA: Army War College, April 1996. 26p. 
Abstract: American military officers are educated via a formal professional military development program, for more 
than twenty years in pursuit of mastery of the strategic art Much of that developmental program emphasizes the 
concepts of war and military genius advocated by Carl Von Clausewitz in his nineteenth century classic, On War. This 
study examines the strategic thought and actions of General George Washington in the American Revolution, which 
preceded Clausewitz's work by more than thirty years. It shows that, despite the lack of any formal military 
professional education, Washington made skillful use of the ways and means available to him to construct a strategy 
capable of achieving the desired ends. The author concludes that, whether judged against Clausewitz's concepts or 
modem definitions of the strategic art, Washington deserves to be recognized as a master of the strategic art and 
America's first strategic leader. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: AD-A309270 
Trotter, Jesse J., Jr. "International Military Education and Training Program: Building Bridges 
Toward a New World Order." Study project. Carlisle Barracks, PA: Army War College, 29 May 
1992. 25p. 
Abstract: The publication of the August, 1991 version of the National-Security Strategy of the United States marked 
a watershed in the evolution of American defense planning by migrating from a forty year policy of containment to one 
emphasizing regional interests and threats. As DOD considers competing programs to support this regionally-based 
strategy, the International Military Education and Training Program (IME1P), which provides professional military 
education and technical training to foreign military personnel, is offered as a possible solution if the program is 
strengthened and expanded. This study places the IME1P into proper context with the other, larger components of the 
U.S. security assistance program, examines the dynamics that are currently affecting the program and proposes possible 
solutions to allow it to make a greater contnbution. The study is based on primarily source materials as well as 
interviews with current and retired security assistance officials and key Congressional staff personnel. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: AD-A252931 
United States General Accounting Office. "Air Force: Status of Recommendations on Officers' 
Professional Military Education." Washington, DC: National Security and International Affairs 
Division, March 1991. 45p. Briefing Report to the Chairman, Panel on Military Education, 
Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives. 
Abstract: We focused on recommendations concerning Phase I professional military education and selected the 
recommendations for which the schools are either directly responsible or play a significant supporting role in their 
implementation. We interviewed appropriate officials at both schools and asked them to characterize the status of each 
recommendation, and examined pertinent supporting documents. In each case where we were told that the schools had 
implemented or partially implemented a recommendation, we reviewed and analyzed the supporting documentation 
used in determining their characterization. In addition, we examined their methodology used to produce supporting 
data. Where additional action was still required, we met with school officials to discuss future plans. We obtained 
written documents to support those plans whenever possible. In those cases where school officials told us that they had 
not taken any action in response to a Panel recommendation, we interviewed appropriate officials to obtain their 
reasons for non-implementation. 
GAO/NSIAD-91-122BR 
ACCESSION NUMBER: AD-A253626 
U.S. General Accounting Office. "Army: Status of Recommendations on Officers' Professional 
Military Education." Washington, DC: National Security and International Affairs Division, 21 
March 1991. 48p. Briefing Report to the Chairman, Panel on Military Education, Committee on 
Armed Services, House of Representatives. 
Abstract: A primarily objective of the Goldwater-Nichols Reorganization Act of 1986 is to strengthen combined and 
joint operations of the various military services. To fulfill this objective, the House Armed Services Committee 
established the Panel on Military Education in November 1987 to report its findings and recommendations regarding 
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the ability of DOD to develop joint specialty officers through its professional military education systems. The 
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, established policies, programs, guidelines, and procedures for coordinating, among 
other things, the joint professional military education of members of the U.S. armed forces. 1bis guidance is c.ontained 
in the Military Education Policy Document that was issued in May 1990. Military departments are required to 
incorporate this guidance into their own professional military education systems. 
GAO/NSIAD-91-121BR 
ACCESSION NUMBER: AD-A253956 
U.S. General Accounting Office. Department of Defense: Professional Military Education at the 
Four Intermediate Service Schools. Washington, DC: National Security and International Affairs 
Division June 1991. 35p. 
Abstract: A primarily objective of the Goldwater-Nichols Reorganization Act of 1986 was to strengthen combined 
and joint operations of the various military services. To fulfill this objective, the House Armed Services Committee 
established the Panel on Military Education in November 1987 to report its findings and recommendations regarding 
DOD's ability to develop joint specialty officers through its PME systems. The Panel's April 1989 report envisioned 
that joint education would be an integral part of PME and would be implemented in two phases. Phase I would be 
taught at the intermediate level service schools attended by officers primarily at the rank of major/lieutenant 
commander or at the senior schools attended by officers at the rank of lieutenant colonel/commander and 
colonel/captain ranks. Phase II, taught at the Armed Forces Staff College (AFSC) in Norfolk, Virginia, would 
complement Phase I and officers would usually attend it after completing Phase I. 
GAO/NSIAD-91-182 
ACCESSION NUMBER: AD-A253959 
United States General Accounting Office. "Department of Defense: Professional Military 
Education at the Three Senior Service Schools." Washington, DC: National Security and 
International Affairs Division, June 1991. 22p. Report to the Chairman, Panel on Military 
Education, Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives. 
. Abstract: This report compares, analyzes, and discusses the actions of the three senior service schools. The Panel on 
Military Education report envisioned that joint education would be an integral part of PME. Phase I would be taught at 
the intermediate level schools attended by officers primarily at the rank of major/lieutenant commander or at the senior 
level service schools attended by officers at the rank of lieutenant colonel/commander and colonel/captain ranks. Phase 
II, taught at the Armed Forces Staff College in Norfolk, Virginia, would compliment Phase I. The senior service 
schools reported that they have taken some positive action on at least 90 percent of the applicable Panel 
recommendations, but some key and other Panel recommendations concerning faculty and students have not been fully 
adopted. 
GAO/NSIAD-91-202 
ACCESSION NUMBER: AD-A253629 
United States. General Accounting Office. Marine Corp~: Status of Recommendations on Officers' 
Professional Military Education." Washington, DC: The Office, 1991. 34p. Fact sheet for the 
Chairman, Panel on Military Education, Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives. 
Abstract: No abstract available. 
GAO/NSAID-91-88FS 
United States General Accounting Office. "Military Education: Curriculum Changes at the Armed 
Forces Staff College:" Washington, DC: National Security and International Affairs Division, 
September 1991. 27p. Report to the Chairman, Panel on Military Education, Committee on Armed 
Services, House of Representatives. 
Abstract: No abstract available. 
GAO/NSIAD-91-288 
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ACCESSION NUMBER: AD-A253726 
U.S. General Accounting Office. "Military Education: Implementation of Recommendations at the 
Armed Forces Staff College." Washington, DC: National Security and International Affairs 
Division, October 1991. 32p. 
Abstract: The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 seeks to strengthen combined 
and joint operations of the various military services. In fulfilling this objective, the House Armed Services Committee 
established the Panel on Military Education in 1987 to report its findings and recommendations about DOD's ability to 
develop joint specialty officers through its professional military education programs. This report discusses Phase II 
professional military education programs taught at the Joint and Combined Staff Officer School in Norfolk, Virginia. It 
continues the series of GAO reports on actions taken by DOD to improve its officer education at the service and joint 
schools. 
GAO/NSAID-92-30 
U.S. General Accounting Office. "Military Education: Implementation of Recommendations at the 
Industrial College of the Armed Forces." Washington, DC: National Security and International 
Affairs Division, July 1992. 49p. 
Abstract: In response to a request, the General Accounting Office has examined various issues relating to the 
professional military education activities at the joint schools of the National Defense University located at Fort McNair 
in Washington, D.C. This report addresses the Industrial College of the Armed Forces' implementation of 41 
recommendations contained in the April 1989 report of the Panel on Military Education. These recommendations were 
developed to assist the Department of Defense (DOD) in improving its professional military education programs for 
officers. This report is the last in a series addressing the nature and extent of actions DOD has taken to improve its 
officer education at the service and joint schools. (See Related GAO Products at the end of this report.) A primarily 
objective of the Goldwater-Nichols Reorganization Act of 1986 was to strengthen combined and joint operations of the 
various military services. To fu1fi11 this objective, the House Armed Services Committee established the Panel on 
Military Education in November 1987 to report its findings and recommendations regarding DOD's ability to develop 
joint specialty officers through its professional military education systems. The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
established policies, programs, guidelines, and procedures concerning joint professional military education. In May 
1990, he issued guidance in the Chairman's Memorandum 344-90, Military Education Policy Document. While Panel 
recommendations are advisory, military education institutions are required to incorporate the Chairman's guidance into 
their own education systems. The professional military education system of DOD is composed of eight service schools 
and three joint schools. 
GAO/NSIAD-92-221 
ACCESSION NUMBER: AD-A298395 
U.S. General Accounting Office. ''Military Education: Implementation of Recommendations at the 
National War College." Washington, DC: National Security and International Affairs Division, 
June 1992. 41 p. 
Abstract: A main goal of the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 was to 
strengthen joint and combined operations of the military services, in part by training joint specialty officers at 
professional military schools. Of 41 recommendations made at the National War College in Washington, D.C. 32 have 
been successfully implemented, including two key recommendations on establishing a professional military education 
framework and hiring quality faculty. Nine recommendations have been partially implemented, four of which involve 
letter grades while the others cover areas not fully within the college's control, including (1) student-to-faculty ratios; 
(2) the completion of a service intermediate school before attendance at a joint school; and (3) officers in professional 
categories, like doctors and lawyers, who are assigned to joint duty positions after graduation. 
GAO/NSAID-92-202 
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U.S. General Accounting Office. "Military Education: Information on Service Academies and 
Schools." (Briefing Report). Washington, DC: National Security and International Affairs 
Division, September 1993. 18p. 
Abstract: A variety of constraints - physical, financial, and environmental - make it unlikely that military academies, 
with the exception of the Air Force Academy, will be able to absorb additional professional military education 
institutions. All three academies are at or over capacity for classroom and dormitory facilities, and both the Army and 
Navy Academies have very little land on which to build additional facilities. Because the services differ in how they 
interpret the definition of professional military education as defined in the Military Education policy document, the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff's guidance for training military service personnel, the Army has ended up with more professional 
military education schools that could be candidates for consolidation than has the air Force. GAO identified 32 
different schools that conduct 60 different courses; during academic year 1992-1993, more than 36,000 students were 
enrolled at these schools. The cost for providing professional military education in fiscal year 1993 was pegged at 
about $123 million. This figure includes salaries for instructors and support staff but does not factor in such expenses as 
student salaries. 
GAO/NSAID-93-264BR 
United States General Accounting Office. ''Navy: Status of Recommendations on Officers' 
Professional Military Education." Washington, DC: National Security and International Affairs 
Division, March 1991. 40p. Briefing Report to the Chairman, Panel on Military Education, 
Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives. 
Abstract: We focused on recommendations concerning Phase I professional military education and selected the 
recommendations for which the Naval War College is either directly responsible or plays a significant supporting role 
in their implementation. We interviewed appropriate officials at the College, asked them to characterize the status of 
each recommendation, and examined pertinent supporting documents. In each case where we were told that officials 
had implemented or partially implemented a recommendation, we reviewed and analyzed the supporting documentation 
used in making their characterization. In addition, we examined their methodology used to produce supporting data. 
Where additional action was still required, we met with College officials to discuss future plans. We obtained 
documents supporting those plans whenever possible. In the case where officials told us that they had not taken any 
action in response to a Panel recommendation, we interviewed appropriate officials to obtain their reasons for non-
implementation. 
GAO/NSIAD-91-124BR 
ACCESSION NUMBER: AD-A253627 
United States General Accounting Office. Testimony. Professional Military Education by Paul L. 
Jones, Director of Defense Force Management Issues before the Panel on Military Education, 
House committee on Armed Services. Washington, DC: National Security and International 
Affairs Division, 5 February 1991. 13p. 
Abstract: GAO testified on its review of Phase I joint professional military education at the four intermediate and 
three senior service schools. Overall, GAO indicated that the seven service schools have responded very favorably to 
the recommendations of the Panel on Military Education (part of the House Armed Services Committee), with each 
school taking positive action on at least 90 percent of the recommendations. Although the schools have taken many 
positive steps to improve the quality of joint professional military education, concerns exist in curriculum., faculty, and 
student evaluation areas that warrant the Panel's continuing attention. These areas include in-residence Phase I 
education, the distinction between the intermediate school and the senior service school curricula (at the Naval War 
College), prescnbed levels of non-host faculty and student mixes and student/faculty ratios, and letter grades (at the 
Army senior school and the Air Force schools). 
GAO/T-NSIAD-91-4 
ACCESSION NUMBER: AD-A253939 
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Walsh, Daniel J. "Joint Professional Military Education and Its Effect on the Unrestricted Line 
Naval Officer Career." Master's thesis. Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, March 1997. 
162p. 
Abstract: The results of this thesis show Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) has four primary impacts on 
the Unrestricted Line (URL) Naval officer career. First, JPME is an effective retention tool. Second, almost all URL 
officers completing WME do so between the 10 and 22 year points in their career. Third, a URL officer completing 
any form of JPME prior to the 0-5 promotion board does not have a significantly better chance of promoting to 0-5; 
whereas a URL officer completing resident JPME prior to the 0-6 promotion board has a significantly better chance of 
promoting to 0-6 except in the case of nonresident WME, intermediate level Phase 1/11, and the equivalents (Federal 
Executive Fellowships or Foreign Service Colleges). For these three forms of JPME, the effect on promotion is 
insignificant at all levels. Fourth, unlike JPME, a URL officer completing any form of graduate education prior to the 
0-5 promotion board has a significantly better chance of promoting to 0-5. In contracts, a URL officer completing 
graduate education after the 0-5 promotion board does not have a significantly better chance of promoting to 0-6. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: AD-A331606 
Watson, Donald W. "Are We Teaching Senior Noncommissioned Officers What They Really Need 
to Know." Student report. Maxwell AFB, AL: Air Command and Staff College, April 1988. 24p. 
Abstract: The aim of this project is to determine if the SNCO Academy is meeting its pilrpose. This determination 
will be made by an analysis of data supplied by the Air University and the Senior NCO Academy. Senior 
Noncommissioned Officers have been part of the USAF for about 30 years. These Senior NCOs were and are an 
·extension of the NCO corps and they took a portion of officer positions and responsibilities. Are we educating these 
individuals to adequately cany out their duties. This report concludes there are two major areas where senior NCO 
Professional Military Education is falling short; Communicative Skills and Leadership and Management. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: AD-A194197 
Weiss, Michael R. ''Education and Development of Strategic Planners in the Navy." Master's 
thesis. Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, December 1990. 188p. 
Abstract: This thesis examines the graduate level education and professional military education programs available 
to U.S. Navy officers who are designated as, or seek to become, Strategic Planners. The programs are reviewed and 
suggestions are given for interweaving education with billets to provide the career path necessary to expose naval 
officers to the environment in which the modem strategist must operate. The utilization of officers is also investigated 
through the results of a survey sent to 449 naval officers with both educational and experience-based Strategic Planning 
subspecialty codes. Their opinions on the preparation they received, plus their recommendations for improvement are 
provided. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: AD-A247021 
Wendt, Richard J. "Space, Wargames and Displays." Student report. Maxwell AFB, AL: Air 
Command and Staff College, April 1987. l 12p. 
Abstract: There is a need to enhance the introduction of space systems into the professional military education 
(PME) system of the Air Force. This study recommends what to incorporate; how to incorporate it; and in particular, 
how to display it. Displays can help students understand the three dimensional aspects of space activities. Wargames 
acquaint the students with both the capabilities and limitations of space systems; and wargames can illustrate how 
much we depend on space systems for the conduct of war on earth. War in space may be on the horizon, and new 
simulation tools are needed to study the doctrines and strategies required to meet the challenge. This study analyzes the 
needs of three different audiences in the PME environment; and recommends an approach for the development of 
wargames and simulation tools for each with an emphasis on displays. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: AD-Al82124 
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White, Gregory B. "Artificial Intelligence Concepts and the War Gaming Environment: A Case 
Study Using the TEMPO War Game." Master's thesis. Wright-Patterson AFB, OH: Air Force 
Institute of Technology, School of Engineering, March 1986. 157p. 
Abstract: With the introduction of computers, war games became increasingly sophisticated yet most current war 
games are either too slow, not realistic, or use the computer as a referee only and not as a player. An approach is 
discussed in the context of TEMPO, a force planning war game currently used by the Air Force at its Squadron Officers 
. School. This thesis involved the development of a version of TEMPO in which a computer expert system takes the 
place of one of the players, and an intelligent computer instruction system that takes the place of the section leader. Tue 
system is implemented on a microcomputer allowing its use in professional military education seminar courses. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: AD-Al 72782 
Wilson, James R. ''Postgraduate Education and Professional Military Development: Are They· 
Compatible?" Master's thesis. Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, December 1991. 61p. 
Abstract: This thesis examines the utilization of graduate education for graduates of the Naval Postgraduate School, 
Manpower, Personnel, and Training analysis (MPTA) curriculum, from December 1986 through June 1991. Tue study 
focuses on four areas: (1) developing a list and rank structure of billets requiring the xx33P code granted upon 
completion of the education, (2) tracking the careers of the officers following their graduation from the curriculum, (3) 
examining the career progression paths to find places where timely utilization could be undertaken, and ( 4) examining 
the designator composition of the population. Tue study determined that utilization for the period December 1986 
through June 1991was22.2%. Assuming that all officers still in the two-tour Department of Defense utilization 
window were assigned to utilization billets as their next assignment, the utilization rate would rise to 52.5%. This w: 
deemed unacceptable, and the recommendation was to require an eighteen month utilization tour immediately 
following completion of the curriculum. This would cause the utilization rate for MPTA graduates to rise to 97%. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: AD-A245988 
Woodruff, Steven E. "Analysis of Air Force Acquisition Engineering Officer's Perceptions of the 
Adequacy of Their Preparation for Management." Master's thesis. Wright-Patterson AFB, OH: AJ.r 
Force Institute of Technology, School of Systems and Logistics, March 1994. l 14p. 
Abstract: Tue purpose of this study was to determine how much time Air Force acquisition engineers spend in 
performing management functions, how those engineers spend in performing management functions, how those 
engineers perceive their management training, and which types of training contnbute the most to managerial 
competency. Tue results from surveys of215 acquisition engineers assigned to ASC/EN, Wright-Patterson AFB, OH 
and their supervisors revealed that engineers do indeed spend substantial amounts of time performing management 
functions. Slightly more than half the engineers reported spending at least 50% of an average workday performing 
management functions. Over 53% of engineers responding to the survey felt their management training had been either 
'excellent' or 'good'. Management skills were rated either 'excellent' or 'good' by 72% of the respondents. In the key area 
of communication skills, 87% agreed they had the necessary communication skills to be successful in their jobs. Tue 
most effective contributors to managerial competency were experience, an aptitude for management, and having a 
mentor. Items rated least effective in improving management abilities included Professional Military Education courses 
and the System 100 and System 200 system acquisition classes. 
ACCESSION NUMBER: AD-A277972 
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Web Sites 
Vision Statements and Doctrine sites 
Joint 
Joint Vision 2010-- http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jv2010/ 
Joint Publications -- http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/iointpub.htm 
Air Force 
Army 
Global Engagement -- http://www.xp.hq.af mil/xpx/2 l/nuvis.htm 
Doctrine Documents -- http://www.afinc.wpafb.af.mil/pdl/af/dd.htm 
Army Vision 2010--http://www.army.mil/2010/ 
Doctrine Manuals -- http://www-cgsc.army.mil/cdd/doc-lib.htm 
Marine Corps 
Navy 
Operational Maneuver From The Sea --
http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jv2010/usmc/usmcvpub.htm 
Doctrine Manuals -- http://ismo-wwwl.mqg.usmc.mil/docdiv/manuals.htm 
Forward From The Sea - http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jv2010/navy/nayYypub.htm 
Doctrine Publications --
http://ndcdb.nayy.mil/ows-bin/owa/ptss _ code.dis_p prod?ndp_ cat=7 
Professional Reading Sites 
Air Force 
Army 
Chief of Staff -- http://www.af.mil/lib/csafbook/index.html 
Information Warfare Division -- http://www.cdsar.afmil/cad.re/iwac.html 
· Acql,lisitions Corps-- http://www.decm.sarda.army.mil/publications/proread/ 
Engineer School-- http://www.wood.army.mil/DTLE/prlistl.htm 
Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff 
http://www.dtic.mil/mil-ed/read _list.html 
J-7 Military Education Division Home Page 
http://www2.dtic.mil/mil-ed/index.html 
Armed Forces Officer Pamphlet-- http://www2.dtic.mil/mil-ed/pamphlet/ 
Vision for Professional Military Education -- http://www2.dtic.mil/mil-ed/opening.html 
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Preliminary Summary Analysis 
of the 
Conference on Professional Military Education for the 21st Century Warrior 
sponsored by the 
Naval Postgraduate School and Office of Naval Research 
Introduction 
On January 15, 1998 the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) and the Office of Naval 
Research hosted a historic two-day conference on professional military education 
(PME). Representatives of virtually the entire PME community met for the first time to 
examine the most fundamental issues confronting military education as the defense 
establishment moves into the 21st Century. In addition to senior officers from the PME 
schools, attendees included several members of Congress and congressional staffs; 
personnel representing the Secretary of Defense, each military department and service, 
and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; and a number of defense intellectuals 
from academe and defense-oriented institutions. 
Analysis of this Conference Proceedings reveals a number of insights on the major 
issues of concern to the conferees. Although the following observations, findings and 
conclusions are based upon a preliminary analysis of the text of the Proceedings, not a 
poll of the participants, the presentation of each issue attempts to stay within the 
bounds of the views of the conferees. 
Principal Observations, Findings, and Conclusions 
A. Professional military education is important - crucial - if the United States is to 
continue to develop the world-class professional officer corps required to 
maintain the nation's preeminent standing among the world's militaries. 
Analysis of the Proceedings leaves little doubt about the importance the conferees 
placed on maintaining a healthy, vigorous regimen of professional military education 
for the officer corps. 
Officer individual development. Professional military education is a key 
element in the development of individual officers who possess the characteristics 
needed at the outset of the 21st Century. The Proceedings yield a valuable 
catalog of the attributes required of the 21st Century officer, a spectrum that 
includes: 
• First and foremost, fundamental competence as a soldier, sailor, airman, 
or marine; 
• Personal qualities that range from dedication to duty to adaptability to 
changing situations; 
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• Leadership ability; 
• Education in subjects as disparate as military history and the place of the 
military in a democratic society; and, 
• In an era of revolutionary change, an increasingly sophisticated mastery of 
technology that qualifies officers, among other things, to make decisions 
about the best technologies to fill operational needs and to use technology 
in conducting operations. 
Officer corps development. Professional military education is critical to 
developing and maintaining an officer corps throughout the armed forces with 
collective attributes that make it capable of responding successfully to the 
challenges of the present and future national security environment. Based on the 
Proceedings, those attributes can be summarized as follows: 
The officer corps should be composed of leaders prepared to meet the 
challenges of the future. It should contain the requisite number of strategists. It 
should be prepared to cope with the interactive nature of warfare as a 
consequence of its knowledge of military history and military art. It should be 
capable of maintaining the U.S. armed forces' operational and technical 
superiority over other nations' militaries. It should understand and support the 
subordinate position of the military with respect to civil authority in a democratic 
society. It should be linked internally through a network of inter-service personal 
contacts that foster trust and facilitate coordinated multi-service operations. In 
sum, it should be an officer corps whose education, training, and experience are 
force-multipliers in and of themselves. 
Learning from "old warriors" is especially important in a period when combat 
experience of the officer corps in increasingly limited. PME is the principal 
means of imparting the knowledge and experience of "old warriors" to "young 
warriors". PME serves as the surrogate to pass on and inculcate crucial combat 
values, skills, and tactics. It teaches what has worked. And it emphasizes what 
has failed, including past failures to respond to emerging conditions that led to 
military disasters: failures to adapt to technology, to recognize the necessity to 
understand foreign cultures, and to take account of geopolitical, economic, and 
other factors. 
Professional military education can also be a means of fostering innovative 
thinking about the future based on the experiences of the past. Particularly 
important today, it has the potential to foster thinking about how new 
technologies affect military operations - how to match doctrine, organizational 
structure, and weapons development and acquisition. 
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Professional military education facilitates the adaptation of large organizations 
such as the services and the Department of Defense as a whole to the 
challenges of the future. Organizations of this size cannot be changed through 
top-down direction; educating their future leaders about the challenges of the 
future and the implications of evolving changes in their organization's external 
environment is the key to making these organizations responsive to change. 
Professional military education provides conditions conducive to the 
development of inter-service contacts among officers and the resulting trust 
that facilitates joint action of the armed forces as a unified team of land, sea, air, 
and marine forces. 
B. The PME community is not in agreement on what Professional Military 
Education is. 
Structural issues. Is PME, as it has been traditionally regarded, confined to the 
curriculums of the intermediate and senior military schools? Or is it "cradle to 
grave", extending from ROTC and the academies through the panoply of service 
training and education courses, including post-graduate studies, undertaken by 
each officer? Or is it the career-long individual study of military affairs? Should it 
be focused on a select few officers or should it be made available to as many 
officers as possible? 
Until questions such as these are answered it will be impossible to develop a 
coherent framework for professional military educational development. 
Questions concerning the substance of PME. Is the subject matter of PME 
properly confined to the study of the history of warfare, strategy, tactics, 
operations, the international environment, and the U.S. defense establishment or 
should it include technology, peacetime contingencies, and the cultures of allies 
and potential adversaries? 
Conferees disagreed on these questions, particularly with respect to the study of 
technology. A few believed that the traditional history-strategy-operations 
approach remains preferable. At the other end of the spectrum, some conferees 
believed that technical studies should be considered to be PME and that those 
studies must be completely independent of the traditional courses. General 
Sheehan, former ACOM commander, opined that the legacy characteristics of 
the PME system might be an impediment to providing the education officers need 
today. Those favoring more emphasis on technology faulted the current 
approach for its inability to cope with the requirement that all officers today 
should be technically "literate" and for failing to fulfill the expanding needs for 
technically skilled officers. Most conferees endorsed the validity of the traditional 
approach but in varying degrees acknowledged that PME should devote more 
attention to equipping officers to handle the technological challenges of the 
revolution in military affairs. 
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Admiral Blair, the Director of the Joint Staff, suggested that the traditional 
approach be modified to focus on recent military history (which has been 
heavily influenced by technological change). Representative Skelton 
acknowledged the need to devote more attention to technology but disagreed 
that the treatment of the lessons of military history should be shortened to cover 
only a few decades of the 20th Century. 
Representative Skelton proposed that the Naval Postgraduate School serve 
as a test bed for developing an intermediate course that combines the 
traditional approach and a focus on technology into an integrated PME 
program. 
C. The current officer career development systems are seriously flawed. The 
current service systems fail to provide sufficient time for officers to complete the 
requirements for operational and command experience, joint duty, post-graduate 
and professional military education, and service staff assignments expected of them. 
The Proceedings suggest that a large portion of the conferees believed that the 
service personnel systems, shaped in and immediately after WWII, need to be 
changed not only to allow sufficient time for PME but also to make room for 
other, fundamentally important career experiences. Some participants indicated 
that the personnel systems hurry officers through assignments too quickly and 
they fail to obtain the needed command, staff, and operational experience. 
Admiral Oliver, Chief of Navy Personnel, stated that we don't have the right 
educational paradigm; for example, officers are forced to obtain their graduate 
degrees in the narrow career window between six and eleven years of service 
when they face crucially important career operational demands. Other 
participants noted that the Goldwater-Nichols Act added requirements for joint 
PME and a joint duty assignment to already over-crowded careers. At least one 
conferee suggested that the current officer career systems are developing the 
wrong kind of human capital for the future. 
The conferees suggested a number of approaches to improving the career 
development system. 
With respect to military education, one participant suggested reducing the 
proportion of officers attending PME schools. Other participants who favored 
making PME available to as many officers as possible suggested consideration 
of a "bookend" approach with relatively short in-residence periods at the 
beginning and end of PME programs. One conferee suggested "frontloading" 
PME as much as possible to ROTC and academy pre-commissioning programs. 
With respect to the career development systems in general, Admiral Oliver 
suggested that consideration be given to lengthening careers or allowing a 
"time-out" (i.e., sabbatical) for post-graduate education. He also suggested 
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that more advanced education might be required as a condition of accession. 
Mr. Harry Thie of the RAND Corporation also emphasized the need to lengthen 
officer careers. Other suggestions included adopting multiple paths to career 
development and overpopulating the officer corps to allow time for education and 
other non-operational career requirements. 
D. The Department of Defense has not established a joint career development 
program. including provision for PME. for the Reserve Components as 
envisioned in the Goldwater-Nichols Act. 
E. In a period of severe cutbacks in the Defense budget, PME is seriously 
under-funded and over-stretched. 
F. Senior leadership, military and civilian, service and joint, should become more 
involved in PME in order to correct its deficiencies. A vision of what the defense 
community wants the output of military education to be and a corresponding plan to 
achieve that vision is needed. Senior leadership should ensure that PME is 
emphasized appropriately and adequately funded. The unified and specified 
commanders should become more involved in PME, especially in the schools' 
exercises and war games. 
G. Additional problems voiced by one or more participants: 
Intermediate and senior PME programs should be more rigorous. All vestiges 
of the cultural problem of viewing the PME programs as so-called "gentlemen's 
schools" with loose academic requirements and ample time to lower the golf 
handicap should be eliminated. Representative Buyer 
PME faculties need to be improved. Talented officers who have the potential to 
be future service leaders should be assigned to the faculties. Today, assignment to 
a PME faculty can jeopardize a career. One participant suggested board-selecting 
officers for faculty positions or extending Goldwater-Nichols promotion incentives to 
PME faculty positions. Another conferee suggested establishing an exchange 
program for civilian faculties in order to make them more "joint." More investment in 
faculty education was also recommended. 
Performance in PME programs is not linked to career success. General Holder 
emphasized that if PME is to be valued the reward system must be altered. He 
suggested tying future assignments and promotions to PME performance. Corollary 
measures include requiring PME as a prerequisite for promotion to flag/general 
officer rank and establishing entry requirements for PME schools. 
The Armed Forces Staff College Phase II joint PME course does not provide 
sufficient "value added" to the service Phase I joint courses. This 
shortcoming is amplified by the scheduling problem that requires many 
officers to leave their joint assignments for twelve weeks to attend AFSC. 
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Attrition of academy graduates is far too high. Representative Buyer 
There is an overage in the number of ROTC programs that should be 
corrected. Representative Buyer 
One participant suggested that there is a growing schism between societal ideals 
and those of the military. The PME schools, he indicated, should play a key role in 
eliminating any differences that might undermine the preeminence of civil authorities 
with respect to the military. The PME schools must stay in touch with the American 
people. In this context, a conferee also suggested that officers attend civilian 
universities for graduate education. 
Summary 
The Conference on Professional Military Education for the 21st Century Warrior was a 
remarkable event in that it convened representatives of the entire PME community for 
the first time and facilitated the identification of the issues of major concern to that 
community. Its Proceedings provide a valuable discussion of the attributes that will be 
needed in the 21st Century officer corps. The C~nference also elucidated the crucial 
role professional military education must play in developing that officer corps. Finally, 
the Conference highlighted a number of problems that currently detract from 
professional military education, not least of which is the absence of an agreed 
understanding of what constitutes PME. 
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